In retrospect, one is tempted to think that the Germans masterminded the get-together. However, the history of the encounter between the two chiefs of intelligence began as a pure coincidence, an unexpected meeting between Schellenberg and Meyer-Schwertenbach. In July 1942, Masson’s deputy, Colonel Werner Müller of the General Staff, was supposed to travel to Berlin to join delegates from other neutral countries for the annual meeting of the International Criminal Police Commission (in German: Internationale Kriminalpolizeiliche Kommission, or IKPK).9 Müller in his civilian career was head of the Security Police and Criminal Investigation Department in the city of Bern, and was the Federal Council’s representative at IKPK meetings.10 Müller was even a member of its administrative board.11 In that function, he had met Reinhard Heydrich before the war.12
At the annual meetings in Paris (in 1931), Rome (1932), Vienna (1934), Copenhagen (1935), Belgrade (1936), and London (1937), developments in Germany had not been foreseen. This explains why the 1934 decision to set up the IKPK headquarters in Vienna was not reversed. At the 1938 annual meeting in Bucharest, the atmosphere was tense. Shortly before that meeting, Hitler had forced Austria into the Reich, and the delegates intended to transfer the IKPK Secretariat to a neutral country. However, it was apparently already too late because, according to one scholar, “Heydrich had an arrogant and demanding attitude.”13 SS Oberführer Steinhäusel became the IKPK’s chief executive, and, when he died of tuberculosis in 1940, the head of the Reich Security Central Office named himself IKPK president and decided then and there to move the headquarters to Berlin. That meant that a criminal was in charge of the predecessor of Interpol, which was supposed to combat international crime.14 As of 1940, de facto, the IKPK was integrated into the Reich Criminal Police Headquarters and was no longer functional. In 1942, the Commission’s headquarters were located at Berlin-Wannsee, and Heydrich singlehandedly headed its “international” bureau.15
Under these circumstances, Colonel Müller refused to accept Germany’s invitation to the 1942 annual meeting, apparently fearing that the regime might use his presence for its own ends. Masson could not force Müller to attend the meeting,16 but he did not want to miss this opportunity to explore contacts for the intelligence service. As a way out of the dilemma, the two men turned to the head of the Special Service. Masson later explained: “[So] we asked our devoted Captain Meyer from our Security Service to take care of this mission because in the area of intelligence, nothing could be neglected in order to secure as many contacts as possible, no matter what kind of contacts they were. In this specific case, the subsequent events proved us to be right.”17
Masson informed Chief of the General Staff Huber about Meyer’s planned mission; Huber agreed to it and granted Captain Meyer a leave of absence from July 6 to 11, 1942.18 In a meeting with the Chief of Intelligence and the Head of the Security Service, Meyer-Schwertenbach was given four specific tasks for his mission to Berlin:19 first, to establish contact with key people on Himmler’s staff; second, to familiarize those officials with Switzerland’s situation and correct certain impressions that the SS had of the country; third, to use his influence to have Ernst Mörgeli, who had been held in custody for four months on suspicion of espionage on behalf of England, released from prison; and fourth, to address a number of police-related bilateral issues because for several months Heinrich Rothmund, the head of the Swiss Federal Police Section, had been waiting in vain to obtain a visa to travel to Germany.
At Schellenberg’s invitation, Captain Meyer traveled to Berlin as a private citizen.20 Schellenberg sent his intermediary Eggen to Dübendorf to pick up his guest.21 Were they trying to impress Meyer-Schwertenbach by showing him how powerful the SS was in the Reich? In any event, Meyer noticed22 that his trip went smoothly even though he did not yet have a visa for Germany. In Berlin, an SS car picked him up, and on July 8, 1942 Schellenberg received him at the SS guest house on Wannsee.23 Masson later reported:
During a private conversation, of course Schellenberg brought up the affair of La Charité24 (documents that the Wehrmacht had found, during its offensive in France, in Gamelin’s train, which was stopped at the small train station there. As you know, these documents contained evidence of a preliminary military agreement between France and Switzerland concerning the joint defense of the sector between Basel, Gempen, and Olten in the event of a German threat). Meyer told Schellenberg that it might be useful for him to meet [me] because our comrade [Meyer] knew how anxious I was to reduce the importance that the Germans attached to this affair.25
Meyer-Schwertenbach wrote detailed notes about his talks in Berlin26 that give quite a clear picture of the attitudes and intentions of the people who were involved. From the Swiss perspective, Masson could say that through Meyer he accomplished his goal of establishing contact with an SS authority that had some influence on the Secret State Police (Gestapo), which gave him access to people who held the reins of power. He had been unable to establish such contacts through the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Military Attachés, or the Wehrmacht’s Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Abwehr (Admiral Canaris). But didn’t Masson and Meyer venture too far out, and did that not unintentionally make them pieces on Germany’s chessboard?
Unlike Colonel-Brigadier Masson and Captain Meyer, Albert Müller, the head of the foreign news desk at the Neue Zürcher Zeitung27 who had found out about these contacts28 through Editor-in-Chief Willy Bretscher, considered direct relations between two armies that bypassed the countries’ political leadership as a dangerous example of the Third Reich’s successful extended strategy.29 In an extensive memorandum that he submitted to the Federal Council,30 Müller presented the technique “that Germany [was using] toward a state that it [wanted] to subjugate,”31 explaining:
Germany avoids using diplomatic channels, circumventing them. It closes down the normal channels that are used in bilateral relations and visibly despises the time-consuming and elaborate methods of official authorities and responsible bodies with which obstacles and delays have to be expected. Instead, Germany stresses the advantages of taking shortcuts via influential bodies as well as the advantages of “direct contacts.” Germany is willing to show its partner how efficient its preferred method is by paying the acting “influential bodies” or other instruments that are part of the “direct contacts” an advance premium in the form of favors or services that cannot be obtained from the competent authorities nor by following standard procedures.32
Furthermore, the NZZ editor pointed out that the extended strategy was clever because it could be adapted so as to take the circumstances of each country into account. “Under the current circumstances,” he added, “one has to assume that the German mediators will try even harder to… show their honest intentions and well-meaningness when they initiate a direct contact.”33 Moreover, Müller wrote that it had to be expected that with this method, Germany did not intend to achieve its objective straight away but only take a first major step in that direction. He warned, “With this method of direct contacts with individual bodies, at a suitable moment in time [Germany] might simply want to cause a crisis of confidence and a rift among the partner’s authorities, which would create favorable conditions for taking action. In any case, Germany would ‘swiftly strike’ to take advantage of the favorable conditions even if it had not planned to create them.”34
Meyer-Schwertenbach’s notes about his talks at the SS guest house on Wannsee read like an unintentional case study in support of Albert Müller’s theory of the extended strategy that Germany had honed to a specialty. Meyer wrote: “The meeting could be characterized as a private, friendly exchange of ideas. It was agreed that the meeting should be kept secret even though it was unofficial; its only purpose was to put Germany and Switzerland on friendlier terms. These meetings [were] expected to give both states the opportunity to present their requests, concerns… and to correct false information through the most direct, unofficial channel.”35 Meyer described the “contacts,” which deliberately avoided the existing diplomatic channels between the two countries, as
all the more important as [he] was able to find out that the German Legations in the few remaining neutral states were desert islands; their voice [was] not heard among the leading circles around H[immler] and H[itler]. From the outset, one [was] skeptical [about] everything that [arrived] in Germany through diplomatic channels because the leading figures at the German Legation (Köcher, Ilsemann) [were] considered people of a long-gone past.36
When the Germans pointed their finger at “several items in [Switzerland’s] catalogue of misdeeds”37 and mentioned, in spite of the censorship that was in place, the unmistakably critical attitude of the Swiss press toward the Third Reich, the owner of Wolfsberg Castle fearlessly replied that in Switzerland there was too much talk about Switzerland waiting to be integrated into the Reich as a province, adding, “To us, Germany [is] the bad guy!”38 He explained that if the Germans were interested at all in improving bilateral relations with Switzerland, they should recall Councilor von Bibra from Bern “because he was the most hated man in Switzerland and stood in the way of a better understanding between the two states.”39 Concerning the press, Meyer argued, “By curtailing the freedom of the press in Switzerland, you would knock down a pillar of democracy and put an end to our state system.”40 When the issue of Switzerland’s independence was addressed, Meyer was told:
Switzerland [is] currently not a burning issue for the Führer. He [does] not have time to deal with internal [sic] matters because he [is] fully absorbed in military issues. It should be possible to keep Switzerland independent; contacts such as the one we [are] having today, which [are] far from the diplomatic realm and [are] based exclusively on good faith and human trust, [can] accomplish this. In order to further cultivate these contacts, [we will] issue you a permanent visa.”41
As instructed, Meyer-Schwertenbach brought up the issue of Ernst Mörgeli’s release from prison. He noted, “I ask the gentlemen”—two unidentified SS officers took part in the meeting together with Schellenberg—“to render me this service out of friendship; after the [service concerning] the IPA,42 this will be the second pillar that we can build [our relations] on. They promise that they will do something about it and ask me to write a short report, which I put together the following morning.”43 However, Masson ended up having to personally intervene with Schellenberg to get Ernst Mörgeli out of prison.
The meeting at Wannsee convinced Meyer “that in the event of a German victory, it [would] be military authorities with a politically clean record, not civilian authorities such as the Legation or the Federal Palace, that [had] to contribute to making relations bearable.”44 It is therefore not surprising that Meyer wrote:
During the friendly meeting, we mutually made a commitment [to report on it] only to the direct superior; we will not tell the civilian authorities anything about it in order to avoid creating unnecessary difficulties and misunderstandings. [We will] also keep the granting of my visa secret in order for me not to be drawn into the battle between the forces. Everything that [has been] said [is] unofficial; this is a strictly personal conversation that should contribute to improving relations between Switzerland and Germany in view of keeping Switzerland autonomous.45 I promise [that I will keep everything secret] and pass this promise on as a commitment.46
The following day, on July 9, 1942, Meyer-Schwertenbach returned to Switzerland to report to his superior about what he considered a successful mission. In his opinion, Swiss Intelligence had managed to establish a personal, trusting contact with key German authorities. The head of the Special Service concluded, “I traveled to Germany without a passport, and after my meeting I received a permanent visa and a residence permit; meanwhile, [Heinrich Rothmund] the head of the Swiss Federal Police Section has been waiting in vain to obtain a visa, even though I am at least as patriotic as he is. This is striking evidence [of] who is in power in Germany.”47
Reasons for the Meeting
The Germans apparently also viewed Meyer’s visit to Berlin as a success and considered that the ties could be strengthened. As little as seven weeks later, on August 27, 1942, Schellenberg sent his intermediary, Eggen, to Zürich, supposedly only with instructions “to smooth the great tensions that existed between Germany and Switzerland in police-related matters.”48 For that purpose, the SS said that it would make it possible for Heinrich Rothmund, the head of the Swiss Federal Police Section, to travel to Berlin provided that Masson and Meyer guaranteed that the German Legation would not find out about it.49 However, now Schellenberg was primarily interested in establishing contact with Switzerland’s Chief of Intelligence. Fuhrer comments:
Schellenberg tried to create his own sources of information as far as possible because his ‘official’ connections with Switzerland did not live up to his expectations. The fact that he trusted himself more than anyone else might have played a role in that matter. These personal contacts with Switzerland could be called Schellenberg’s special channels. The Swiss Desk at the Reich Security Central Office was not let in on these connections.50
Like Masson, Schellenberg established his special connections as a complement or an independent corrective to the work done by the country desks.51
On August 27, 1942, when he met with Masson and Meyer at the Baur-au-Lac hotel in Zürich, Eggen prepared the ground for a face-to-face meeting between Schellenberg and Masson by remarking that Germany used to think that Masson was hand-in-glove with the British Intelligence Service, but that today he was considered a person who could be trusted. He said that Masson mostly had to thank Meyer for that change of opinion. Eggen urged Masson to meet Schellenberg very soon. Meyer noted: “[Eggen said that Masson] had to confirm to Schellenberg the things that [Eggen] and I had told Schellenberg.”52 Eggen explained that “if Masson spoke with Schellenberg, he would become their right-hand man with whom they would raise any issue or problem between Switzerland and Germany; [he said that] that was not possible through official channels because things were being stalled there.”53 The German intermediary added that Himmler kept being told “that the little organ [called] Switzerland was sick, so it had to be removed from the European belly. [He claimed] that Germany did not know anyone in Switzerland who it could solve general problems with in a friendly, trusting manner; Masson therefore had the chance to save Switzerland.”54
Meyer-Schwertenbach agreed with Eggen, who then addressed the military-political situation. A few days earlier, the German 6th Army had crossed the Don River, and Wehrmacht units had started advancing through the northern outskirts of Stalingrad. Eggen was confident, asserting that “currently Germany could no longer lose the war.55 [He said] that this winter they would be in a better position [than the previous one], that the meat and flour rations would be increased shortly, that in Ukraine they had a huge sunflower crop to produce oil, and that after the battle of the Caucasus, Europe would be economically [restructured].”56
By 3 a.m., when the two Swiss said goodbye to Eggen, Masson had been won over. He told Meyer that he felt compelled to agree to the meeting and asked him to make preparations for it.57 Meyer consulted with Captain Peter Burckhardt of the General Staff, choosing the German town of Laufenburg near the Swiss border as the venue for the meeting.58
Masson seemed to be perfectly aware of the fact that he was about to become involved in a delicate undertaking. He decided to take the risk mostly for the same reasons that had inspired him to meet Eggen.59 There is evidence for that argument both through Masson’s own explanations and a second-hand account by Barbey, who wrote an extended note on the matter in his diary. Masson went to see Barbey on September 3, 1942 “to tell [him] about the project that [took] up all his time and [fascinated] him.” Barbey wrote:
He offers to go to Germany shortly to meet a personality who has significant influence in Himmler’s and even Hitler’s entourage, a young, fine, very well educated general whose task he says makes him the Masson of the SS, so to speak. This man is supposedly open to receiving a real ‘Swiss message’ and is able to make that message heard, not among Ribbentrop’s entourage, which is very hostile toward our country, nor among the Wehrmacht, but among the entourage of the SS that is gradually gaining control.60
According to Barbey, Masson’s “Swiss message” consisted of two parts: first, he wanted to convince the Germans that Switzerland was determined to defend itself against any aggressor; and second, he intended to persuade them to stop their intensive intelligence activities against Switzerland.61 Barbey continued: “Masson elaborates on the issue. I gradually understand that in the absence of his direct superior, the Chief of the General Staff, who is on vacation, he wants to have the Commander-in-Chief’s approval. This is a delicate matter.”62 The Chief of General Guisan’s Personal Staff immediately understood how problematic Masson’s plan was, stating:
I tell Masson that at first glance, there are two aspects to this matter: the aspect of “intelligence,” i.e. we might be able to test the ground concerning the arrangements that the SS has made, which is undoubtedly valuable information; and the “negotiation” aspect, into which he risks being entangled. Instead of “entangled,” I feel like saying “outplayed.” I do not need to say it; Masson understands my hint. He sees himself as someone who uses the opportunity to advocate Switzerland’s cause and to have it advocated in key positions there.63
Barbey did not hide the fact that he felt uneasy when he heard Masson talk about his plan. He advised him to keep the meeting secret, adding, “Then I leave him, uncertain.”64 A short time later, he noticed that Masson approached the Commander-in-Chief “to briefly inform him about his plan. The General does not voice any objection.”65
It is difficult to determine whether in the fall of 1942 it was more important for Masson to tackle the long-term objective of correcting “the wrong impression that Germany had of [Switzerland]”66 or to resolve specific issues. In either case, the prospect of success seemed to be best if he entered into personal contact with Schellenberg. He explained:
I originally had Admiral Canaris in mind, the chief of the German Army’s Foreign and Counterintelligence Service; I knew that he was sympathetic toward Switzerland and that there was constant friction between him and the Nazi party.67 My most urgent request was to save my Swiss officer who was in prison in Stuttgart.68 Canaris was unlikely to be able to help me with that because my young staff member [Mörgeli] was being held in the clutches of the Gestapo, that is, Canaris’ political opponents. He would not have been useful to me concerning the other issues either because they lay outside his sphere of influence. It was therefore important to me to choose my means according to the objective that was to be achieved. In spite of the respect that I had for Canaris, I felt that it was more useful to approach Schellenberg.69
For the same reason Masson ruled out two other options, even though they would have involved fewer risks; he could have presented his requests to the German military attaché in Bern, General von Ilsemann, particularly because, as many as 20 years after the end of the war, Masson praised “his perfectly correct professional attitude”70; or he could have gone through the Swiss military attaché in Berlin, who had the advantage of being at the place where decisions were made. Masson actually gave these two options some thought but rejected them by arguing that both of them carried with them “the dualism and conflict between authority and competence.… By going through the military attachés, you actually reached the army, which was fighting at the front, not within the omnipotent party inside the country. Schellenberg, who had a status within Intelligence that was similar to mine but above all carried some weight in international political matters, had valuable contacts with the Gestapo.”71
Masson’s main reason for approaching Schellenberg was probably the strained relationship between Swiss Army Intelligence and Switzerland’s Department of Foreign Affairs. Shortly after Mörgeli had been arrested, Alfred Ernst, the head of the German Bureau, was outraged, informing Masson that the Intelligence Service could not expect any assistance or understanding from the Swiss Government. In that matter, he wrote:
Captain [Max] Maurer72 has just informed me that a German consular agent who was guilty of espionage and was supposed to be arrested in order to be exchanged with Dr. Mörgeli had to be returned to Germany.73 He said that the Department of Foreign Affairs had considered that it was better not to provoke the Germans, that we were weak and they were strong, so we should not do anything that could upset them.… I would like to ask you to vehemently protest against one of our most valuable officers being abandoned because of the Department of Foreign Affairs’ cowardice and inexplicable softness toward every German demand. Captain Maurer confirmed that it would have been easy to exchange our officer with the German agent.… I will under no circumstances abandon Dr. Mörgeli; I am going to move heaven and earth to help him if nothing is done for him.74
Ernst Mörgeli had been “extremely carefully selected”75 to replace James Ketterer, who had been expelled from Germany,76 at the Swiss Consulate in Stuttgart. The Head of the German Bureau was acquainted with the young second lieutenant, having served in the same unit with him during their initiation course in the army. Ernst explained: “I knew that he had an impeccable reputation both in the military and in his life as a civilian and was generally viewed as a skillful, reliable officer and jurist. As it turned out, our expectations were entirely fulfilled.”77