Plutarch, Lives that Made Greek History

Aristides (c. 530–c. 467 BCE) will be forever tagged with the epithet the Athenians gave him, “the Just.” He was celebrated in his own lifetime for fairness and upright conduct, and he demonstrated these traits quite memorably at the battle of Salamis, according to both Herodotus and Plutarch. But Aristides never really rose to a leadership position in Athens. In the end the Athenians preferred the cunning, conniving Themistocles to straight-arrow Aristides.

In much of this Life, Plutarch gives Aristides a far bigger role in events than Herodotus does, even while relying on Herodotus as his principal source. Frequently one can compare the two texts and see just how Plutarch has tried to foreground his main character, by attributing to him actions and speeches that Herodotus assigns to the Athenians generally. In most cases the license does not do violence to the historical record, but it should serve to remind readers that in the Lives Plutarch was composing character studies and moral paradigms, not history as we know it.

[2] Aristides became a friend of the Cleisthenes who organized the government after the expulsion of the tyrants.¹ He also emulated and admired Lycurgus the Spartan² beyond all other statesmen. He therefore embraced an aristocratic policy and had an entrenched opponent in Themistocles, son of Neocles, the people’s champion. Some say that even as boys and schoolmates they were always, from the outset, in deed and word, whether serious or playful, at odds with one another, and that their natures were revealed at once by that rivalry: the one being unscrupulous, reckless, crafty, and quickly and easily carried into every undertaking;³ the other grounded by a steady character, intent on justice, and admitting no falsehood, buffoonery, or deceit of any kind, even in jest.

[3] As Themistocles had embarked on a course of reckless agitation and was resisting and thwarting his every political initiative, Aristides himself was in some sense compelled, partly in self-defense, and partly in order to curb Themistocles’ power, which was increasing through the favor of the multitude, to oppose behind the scenes what Themistocles was trying to do, thinking it better that some advantages should escape the people than that Themistocles should become so powerful as to prevail in everything. Finally, on one occasion when he opposed and defeated Themistocles (though the latter was trying to do something useful), Aristides could not contain himself but said as he was leaving the assembly that there was no safety for Athenian affairs unless they threw both Themistocles and himself into the pit.⁴ … Through all the vicissitudes of public life, Aristides displayed an admirable steadiness. Honors did not elate him, and he remained calm and mild in adversity, believing that on all occasions alike he had a duty to serve his country freely and without any reward, either in money or even in prestige. And consequently, it appears that when the following verses, composed by Aeschylus about Amphiaraus,⁵ were recited in the theater,

For he wants not to seem, but to be just,
Reaping the harvest from a deep furrow in his mind,
From which wise counsels spring forth,

everyone gazed at Aristides, thinking that he possessed that integrity in the highest degree.

[5] When Darius⁶ dispatched Datis, ostensibly to punish the Athenians for burning Sardis,⁷ but actually to subjugate the Greeks, Datis landed at Marathon with his entire fleet and set about plundering the countryside. Of the ten generals the Athenians had appointed for the war, Miltiades held the highest rank; holding second place for renown and influence was Aristides. And on that occasion, since he embraced Miltiades’ views about the impending battle,⁸ Aristides did much to tip the scales in its favor. For command passed each day from one general to the next; but when it came around to Aristides, he surrendered it to Miltiades, explaining to his co-commanders that to obey and follow men of sense was not shameful, but honorable and beneficial. And by thus appeasing their rivalry and persuading them to embrace a single policy, namely the soundest, he strengthened Miltiades with an authority that no longer passed from one general to the next. For now each man, when it was his day to command, yielded his authority to Miltiades.⁹

In the battle,¹⁰ the Athenian center was pressed the hardest; it was there that the barbarians held out the longest against the tribes Leontis and Antiochis.¹¹ And there Themistocles and Aristides fought superbly, posted side by side, as one was a Leontid, the other an Antiochid. When the Athenians had routed the barbarians and driven them onto their ships and saw them sailing not for the islands, but carried by wind and sea toward Attica, they grew fearful that the barbarians might seize Athens, which was then bereft of defenders. Hastening there with nine tribes, they reached the city on the same day. Aristides, left behind at Marathon with his own tribe to guard the prisoners and spoils, did not prove false to his reputation. Though heaps of silver and gold lay at hand, and all sorts of garments and untold stores of other wealth in the tents and captured vessels, he had no wish to touch it, nor did he permit anyone else to do so, unless certain persons helped themselves without his knowledge.

[6] Of all his virtues, it was Aristides’ justice that made the strongest impression on the multitude, because he exercised it continually and with the public good in mind. And as a result, though poor and a man of the people, he acquired the most majestic and sacred name—“the Just.”

[7] Accordingly, it befell Aristides to be beloved at first because of his nickname, but envied later on, especially when Themistocles spread word among the people that Aristides had destroyed the law courts by trying and judging all cases privately,¹² and had managed, imperceptibly and without a bodyguard, to build himself a monarchy. For by then the common people, priding themselves on their victory and thinking they deserved the highest honors, were vexed at those who enjoyed a renown and reputation that surpassed their own. Assembling in the city from all directions, they ostracized Aristides,¹³ terming their envy of his renown “fear of tyranny.”

For ostracism was not a punishment for baseness, but was speciously said to be a humbling and curtailing of oppressive pride and power. It was actually a benign means of relieving the spirit of envious hostility, which thus vented itself not in the infliction of some incurable harm, but simply in a ten-year banishment. But when this penalty began to be imposed on people who were base or ill-born they discontinued the practice, Hyperbolus being the last to be ostracized.¹⁴ … The procedure—to give a sketch—was as follows. Each man took a potsherd, wrote upon it the name of the citizen he wished to see banished, and brought it to an area in the marketplace that was fenced by a railing. First, the magistrates would count the total number of potsherds. For if they numbered less than six thousand, the ostracism was canceled. Then, after sorting the potsherds by name, they would proclaim that the man whose name appeared on the greatest number was banished for ten years, though he continued to enjoy the income of his property.

At the time I am speaking of, when the voters were writing names on their potsherds, it is said that an illiterate rustic gave his potsherd to Aristides, taking him for a common citizen, and asked him to write down Aristides’ name. Aristides was taken aback, and when he asked whether Aristides had done him any harm, the man said, “None at all. I don’t even know the man. But I’m tired of everywhere hearing him called ‘the Just.’” Aristides, on hearing this, made no reply, but wrote his name on the potsherd and handed it back.

[8] But two years later, when Xerxes was marching through Thessaly and Boeotia against Attica,¹⁵ the Athenians repealed their law and voted to recall the citizens who had emigrated. They were especially afraid that Aristides, if he associated himself with the enemy, might corrupt many citizens and induce them to side with the barbarian. For they had no true conception of the man, who even before the public decree was constantly inciting and urging the Greeks to defend their freedom. And after the decree, when Themistocles was serving as commander in chief, Aristides supported his every action and counsel—exalting, for the sake of their common deliverance, the renown of his worst enemy. For when Eurybiades was planning to leave Salamis,¹⁶ but the barbarian triremes, putting out to sea at night, surrounded the strait and got possession of its islands, and no one knew of the encirclement, Aristides arrived, having recklessly sailed through the enemy’s line from Aegina. Coming by night to Themistocles’ tent, and calling him out alone, he said, “If we are sensible, Themistocles, we will now drop our vain and childish quarrel, and begin a beneficial and honorable rivalry, vying with one another to save Greece, with you as ruler and commander, I as helper and counselor. For even now I hear that you alone are embracing the best policy, since you are urging the Greeks to fight in the narrows as soon as possible. And though the allies are seeking to oppose you, the enemy appears to be lending you a hand. For around and behind us the sea is now filled with enemy ships, so that even the unwilling have no choice but to be brave men and to fight. For no route of escape is left.” To this Themistocles replied, “I would not have wished, Aristides, to have you outdo me here, but I will try to rival your sound beginning, and to surpass you in my actions.”

[10] Thereafter Xerxes, greatly alarmed, headed straight to the Hellespont,¹⁷ while Mardonius was left behind with the best part of the army, a force of nearly three hundred thousand men. A formidable commander, who expected great things of his infantry, Mardonius wrote the Greeks a threatening letter: “With your wooden ships you have conquered landsmen who are unskilled at plying the oar. Now, however, we have the broad land of Thessaly and the Boeotian plain¹⁸—a fine battlefield for brave horsemen and hoplites.” But on his own account he sent the Athenians letters and proposals from the King,¹⁹ promising to restore their city, give them vast sums of money, and make them supreme among the Greeks if they took no part in the war.

On learning of this, the Spartans grew fearful and sent envoys to Athens, beseeching the Athenians to send their children and wives to Sparta, and to accept provisions from them for their elderly.²⁰ For the people of Athens were in great want, having lost both their city and country. After listening to the envoys, the Athenians gave a marvelous reply, on Aristides’ motion. They said they could pardon their enemies for believing that anything could be bought with wealth and money, since these men had no conception of anything more important; but they were angry with the Spartans for seeing only the poverty and destitution now prevailing at Athens, and for being so oblivious of the Athenians’ courage and love of honor as to urge them to fight on behalf of Greece merely for the sake of food. On making this motion, Aristides brought the envoys into the assembly and urged them to tell the Spartans that there was no amount of gold, either above ground or below it, which the Athenians would accept in return for the freedom of the Greeks. And in replying to the messengers from Mardonius he pointed to the sun and said, “As long as Helios²¹ continues to wend his way, the Athenians will wage war with the Persians on behalf of their ravaged country and the temples that have been burned and desecrated.” He also wrote a decree stating that the priests were to call down curses on anyone who negotiated with the Medes or abandoned the Greek alliance.

When Mardonius invaded Attica for the second time,²² the Athenians again crossed over to Salamis. Dispatched to Sparta, Aristides accused the Spartans of tardiness and negligence, since they were again abandoning Athens to the barbarian, and demanded that they hasten to rescue what still remained of Greece. On hearing this, the ephors,²³ while it was day, made a show of festivity and enjoyment of a holiday, since their Hyacinthia²⁴ was in progress. But that night they selected five thousand Spartans, each of whom was attended by seven helots,²⁵ and sent them off without the Athenians’ knowledge. When Aristides again approached and accused the ephors, they laughed and said he was talking drowsy nonsense, since the army was already at Oresteum on its march against the foreigners (they referred to the Persians as foreigners).²⁶ Aristides replied that their pleasantry was ill-timed, as they were deceiving their friends instead of their enemies.²⁷

[11] Elected as general with full powers for the battle,²⁸ Aristides took eight thousand Athenian hoplites and marched to Plataea. Pausanias, as commander of the entire Greek force,²⁹ joined him there with his Spartans, and other Greek forces were streaming in. As for the barbarians, because of their vast numbers there was virtually no limit to their camp, which extended alongside the river Asopus; and they built a square wall, more than a mile long on each side, around their baggage train and main headquarters.

[12] Challenging the Athenians about their position in the line, the Tegeans demanded that whereas the Spartans, as always, held the right wing, they themselves should hold the left,³⁰ and cited, in support of their claim, many praiseworthy actions performed by their ancestors. The Athenians were indignant, and Aristides came forward³¹ and said, “This is surely not the proper moment for contending with the Tegeans about noble birth and valor. But we say to you, Spartans, and to the other Greeks, that one’s place in the line of battle neither gives a man courage nor robs him of it. Whatever post you assign to us we will try to maintain in a worthy manner, and thus guard against dishonoring our earlier contests. For we have come not to quarrel with our allies but to fight the enemy; not to praise our forefathers, but to show ourselves brave on behalf of Greece. And this contest will show how much any city or commander or ordinary citizen is worth to Greece.” On hearing this, the commissioners and leaders decided in favor of the Athenians, and gave them the other wing.

[14] Thereafter Mardonius, deploying what was thought to constitute his greatest asset, made trial of the Greeks, sending his cavalry in close order against them where they had encamped in rocky, defensible positions at the foot of Mount Cithaeron—all except the Megarians. These men, three thousand strong, were encamped on the plain, and that was why they suffered cruelly at the hands of the cavalry, which charged at them and attacked from all directions. They quickly sent a messenger to Pausanias, urging him to come to their aid, since on their own they were unable to hold out against the barbarians’ numbers. When Pausanias heard this, and saw the Megarians’ camp already obscured by the rain of flying javelins and arrows, and the Megarians themselves cowering together in a small space, he could not himself ward off the horsemen with his phalanx of heavy-armed Spartans; but to the other generals and Greek captains who surrounded him he proposed, as a chance to demonstrate their valor and ambition, that some of them volunteer to aid and defend the Megarians. When the others hesitated, Aristides, undertaking the exploit on behalf of the Athenians, dispatched his bravest captain, Olympiodorus, with the three hundred selected men and some archers under his command.³² These men arrayed themselves quickly and attacked on the run. And when the barbarian cavalry commander Masistius, a man remarkable for his valor, his stature, and the surpassing beauty of his physique, caught sight of them, he wheeled his horse about and charged toward them. A desperate struggle took place between those who resisted and those who attacked, since they regarded their combat as a trial run for the larger battle. But when his horse was shot with an arrow and Masistius was thrown, he found it hard to move, owing to the weight of his armor, and impossible to fight off the Athenians who were assaulting and striking him. For not only his chest and head, but his limbs as well were armored in gold, bronze, and iron. He was finally slain when someone struck him with the spike of a javelin through his helmet’s eyehole, at which point the other Persians abandoned his corpse and fled. The magnitude of their success was recognized by the Greeks not from the number of the corpses, as few men had fallen, but by the barbarians’ mourning. For they cut their hair—and that of their horses and mules—in honor of Masistius. Wailing and sobbing filled the plain, as they had lost the man who, after Mardonius, was by far their bravest and most powerful warrior.

[15] After the cavalry engagement, both sides refrained from battle for a long time, since from the sacrifices the seers were predicting, for Persians and Greeks alike, a victory for the side that fought defensively, and a defeat for the aggressors. [16] The Greeks then took counsel and decided to change their camp to a more distant position and to occupy an area that had a good supply of water, since the nearby streams had been sullied and defiled by the barbarian cavalry.

[17] When night came on and the commanders tried to lead their men to the appointed encampment, most of the soldiers were not at all eager to follow them or keep together. Instead, when they rose from their first defenses, most of them streamed into the city of Plataea, where an uproar arose as the men dispersed and encamped in no sort of order. It happened that the Spartans, against their will, were left alone behind the others. For Amompharetus, a courageous and danger-loving man, who had long been frantic for battle and resented the many delays and postponements, now denounced the change of position as an escape and flight and said he would not leave his post, but would stay there with his fellow soldiers and resist Mardonius. When Pausanias came to him and said that they were acting in accordance with the decision and vote of the Greeks in council, Amompharetus raised an enormous rock in both hands, threw it down before Pausanias’ feet, and said that that was his vote on the war.³³ He added that he had no use for the cowardly counsels and opinions of the others. At a loss what to do, Pausanias sent word to the Athenians, who had already departed, asking them to wait and march with him. He then led the rest of his forces to Plataea, hoping he would thus prompt Amompharetus to move.

At that point day overtook them, and Mardonius, who had been aware that the Greeks were leaving their camp, drew his forces up in battle array and attacked the Spartans, the barbarians raising a great shout and clamor, since they assumed that there would be no battle, but that they would pick off some of the Greeks as they fled. And this very nearly came to pass. For when Pausanias noticed what was happening, he halted the march and ordered each man to take his position for battle; but either because of his anger at Amompharetus or because he was distracted by the speed of the enemy, he forgot to give the signal to the Greek allies. And for that reason they did not come to his aid immediately or in a body, but in small, scattered bands when the battle was already in progress.

[18] When the order had been given to all the troops to range themselves against the enemy, the phalanx suddenly assumed the appearance of a single wild animal, bristling up to defend itself. The barbarians then recognized that their contest would be with men fighting to the death, which was why they held their wicker shields before them and shot their arrows into the ranks of the Spartans. But these kept their shields locked together as they advanced, attacked the enemy, and thrust away their wicker shields. Then, stabbing with their spears at faces and chests, they struck down many Persians, though the latter fought well and courageously before they fell. For they grasped the Greeks’ spears with their bare hands and shattered many of them. They then made effective use of their swords; wielding daggers and scimitars, they wrested the Spartans’ shields from them, engaged the enemy in close fight, and resisted for a long time.

The Athenians, meanwhile, stood still, waiting for the Spartans; but when they heard loud shouting, as of men engaged in combat, and a messenger, it is said, came from Pausanias to report what was happening, they hastened to the rescue as fast as they could. But as they were advancing across the plain toward the noise, they were attacked by the Greeks fighting for Persia.³⁴ As soon as Aristides caught sight of them, he came forward, far ahead of the others, and shouted out to them, in the name of the gods of Greece, to refrain from battle, and urged them not to oppose or hinder those who were going to aid the foremost defenders of Greece. But when he saw that they were paying him no heed, and were arrayed for battle, he turned aside from the rescue of the Spartans and engaged them, though they numbered nearly fifty thousand. Yet most of them gave way at once and retired, since the barbarians had also retreated. The battle is said to have been fought principally against the Thebans, whose most important and distinguished citizens were then eagerly siding with the Persians and leading the multitude, though the people went along not by choice, but at the bidding of the oligarchs.

[19] With the battle thus joined in two places, the Spartans were the first to repel the Persians; and a Spartan named Arimnestus killed Mardonius, striking his head with a rock.… The Spartans, meanwhile, drove the fleeing Persians inside their wooden fort.

Shortly afterward, the Athenians routed the Thebans, slaughtering three hundred of their finest and most distinguished citizens in the battle itself. When the rout had occurred, a messenger reached the Athenians with the news that the barbarian forces, trapped in their fort, were being besieged. And thus the Athenians, letting the other Greeks see to their own escape, hastened in aid to the fort. Joining the Spartans, who were wholly inexperienced and unskilled in siege warfare, they captured the camp by slaughtering enormous numbers of the enemy. For of the three hundred thousand, only forty thousand are said to have fled with Artabanus; of those who contended on behalf of Greece the fallen numbered 1,360 in all.

[21] Thereafter a general assembly of the Greeks was held, and Aristides wrote a decree stating that the deputies and ambassadors from Greece were to come together at Plataea every year, and that games—the Eleutheria—were to be held every fifth year; that a standing Greek force was to be enlisted, consisting of ten thousand infantry, one thousand cavalry, and one hundred ships, to make war on the barbarians; and that the Plataeans were to be exempted from military service and consecrated to the service of the gods, performing sacrifices on behalf of Greece.

[22] When the Athenians had returned to their city, Aristides saw that they were eager to restore the democracy. Believing that the common people, because of their bravery, were worthy of consideration, and realizing at the same time that they could not easily be forced out, since they were able warriors and prided themselves on their victories, Aristides wrote a decree stating that all might share in the government and that the archons be chosen from the entire body of Athenian citizens.³⁵

When Themistocles told the people that he had a plan that should not be revealed to the multitude, though it was beneficial to the city and its security, they ordered Aristides alone to hear and consider it with him. And when Themistocles told Aristides that he intended to burn the Greek allies’ naval station, since by that means the Athenians would be supremely powerful,³⁶ Aristides came before the people and said that nothing was more advantageous than Themistocles’ proposal—and nothing more unjust. On hearing this, the Athenians ordered Themistocles to desist. So devoted to justice were the people, and so trustworthy and true to them was Aristides.

[23] When sent out as general along with Cimon to prosecute the war,³⁷ Aristides saw Pausanias and the other Spartan commanders treating the allies with oppressive harshness; and by treating them gently and generously himself, and seeing to it that Cimon accommodated them and took part in their campaigns, he succeeded, without the Spartans’ realizing it, in stealing away the chief command—not by means of weapons, ships, or horses, but by sound sense and policy. For the Athenians had already endeared themselves to the Greeks by Aristides’ fairness and Cimon’s good sense; Pausanias’ rapacity and arrogance only made Athenian leadership more desirable. For Pausanias always dealt angrily and harshly with the allies’ commanders, and he punished many men with beatings, or by forcing them to stand all day long with an iron anchor on their shoulders. And it was impossible to get hold of straw for bedding or even fodder, or for anyone who went to a well to draw water ahead of the Spartans, since their servants, holding whips, would drive away those who approached. On one occasion, when Aristides had decided to confront and try to reason with him about this, Pausanias scowled, said he had no time, and would not listen.

After this, the Greek admirals and generals came forward—especially the Chians, Samians, and Lesbians—and tried to persuade Aristides to accept the chief command and seek the support of the allies, who had long wished to be rid of the Spartans and to transfer their allegiance to the Athenians. When he replied that he saw the urgency and justice of their proposals, but that as a guarantee of their fidelity some deed was needed, the performance of which would not allow the multitude to change sides again, Uliades of Samos and Antagoras of Chios conspired together and rammed the trireme of Pausanias near Byzantium, pinning it between their ships as it sailed out ahead of the rest. When he caught sight of them, Pausanias leaped up and angrily threatened to make it clear before long that they had rammed not merely his ship, but their own countries. In reply, they urged him to depart and be thankful for the luck that had attended him at Plataea. For it was only their respect for that, they said, that kept the Greeks from inflicting the punishment he deserved. In the end, they departed and rejoined the Athenians.

And then Sparta’s remarkable high-mindedness showed itself. For when the Spartans realized that their commanders were being corrupted by the greatness of their power, they voluntarily renounced the chief command and stopped sending generals to the war, choosing rather to have their citizens exercise self-control and remain true to their customs than to hold sway over all of Greece.

[24] The Greeks had been paying a certain tax for the war under the Spartans’ leadership, but as they wanted to be assessed proportionally, city by city, they asked the Athenians to send Aristides, and charged him with the task of inspecting their territory and revenues and determining the tax according to each city’s worth and ability to pay. But though he had become master of such power, and had in a sense been given sole authority over everything Greece possessed—poor as he was when he went forth, he returned poorer still, having performed the assessment not only honestly and justly, but in such a way as to make himself appreciated and beloved by all. For just as the ancients sang the praises of the age of Cronus,³⁸ so did the Athenians’ allies call the assessment in the era of Aristides a kind of windfall for Greece, especially since it was soon doubled and later tripled.

[25] Aristides made the Greeks swear an oath, and he himself took the oath on the Athenians’ behalf, casting a mass of red-hot metal into the sea.³⁹ But later on, it would seem, when their affairs had to be managed more aggressively,⁴⁰ he urged the Athenians to lay the blame on him for their perjury and to act with an eye to their own advantage. Theophrastus says that on the whole this man, who in private life was exceedingly just to his fellow citizens, often acted in public life with a view to his country’s policy, which required many unjust acts. He says, for example, that when the transfer of funds from Delos to Athens, contrary to the covenants, was being debated, and the measure was actually proposed by the Samians, Aristides said that it was unjust but advantageous.⁴¹

[26] Some say that Aristides died in Pontus,⁴² after sailing there on public business, while others claim that he died of old age in Athens, honored and admired by his fellow citizens.

1. In 508 BCE Cleisthenes reorganized the Athenian constitution along democratic lines, after the Pisistratids, the family who had ruled Athens for decades, were driven out.

3. As often in the Lives, Plutarch changes perspective depending on whose life he is examining. The portrait of Themistocles advanced here is less positive than that in Themistocles.

4. The barathron was a pit below the Acropolis into which criminals were hurled to their death.

6. Persian king of the late sixth and early fifth centuries BCE; Datis was one of his generals. The events referred to in this paragraph took place in 490, the date of the first Persian invasion of European Greece.

7. Athens contributed a small contingent to the Ionian Revolt, an uprising of Greek states in Asia that were subject to Persia. The rebels began by marching to Sardis, capital of Lydia, and torching it, in 499 BCE; Athens soon thereafter withdrew its forces.

8. Miltiades was in favor of giving battle immediately, rather than waiting, as the others preferred; his strategy was widely credited for the Athenian victory.

9. Herodotus (Histories 6.109–10) tells a similar story but without mentioning Aristides; instead it is a man named Callimachus who cedes authority to Miltiades.

11. “Tribes” here refers to the ten groups into which the Athenian population was divided. Originally based on kinship ties, the tribes by this time were purely political groupings.

12. An ingenious way to turn Aristides’ reputation for justice against him. Since the poor and unemployed of Athens most benefited from jury service, it would gall them to think that their main means of earning a living was being subverted.

14. See Alcibiades 13, Nicias 11. The ostracism of Hyperbolus took place about 415 BCE.

15. In the great Persian invasion of Greece, 480–479 BCE. Xerxes, son of Darius, used as his pretext that he was seeking to complete the punishment of Athens for participating in the Ionian Revolt (see note 7); hence he was marching, primarily, against Attica, but he really planned to conquer all of European Greece.

16. Plutarch has skipped over other battles against the Persians to reach the battle of Salamis. Eurybiades was the Spartan admiral in charge of the Greek fleet stationed at Salamis, and Themistocles, who headed the Athenian contingent, was vigorously opposing his strategy—which would have brought the fleet south to the Isthmus of Corinth to defend the Peloponnese. See Themistocles 11ff. (in this volume) and Herodotus 8.74ff.

17. That is, after losing the sea battle, which Plutarch here has omitted since Aristides played no part.

18. Since Thebes had gone over to the Persian side, Mardonius could consider Boeotia to be his ground.

19. As always in this volume, “King” when capitalized refers to the Great King of Persia.

20. Herodotus (8.142) reports that the Spartans offered to feed, not to take in, the civilian population of Athens. The Athenians were at this point in exile on Salamis and in Troezen, having fled from their own city (see Themistocles 10).

21. Another name for the sun. Again Plutarch’s version of events seems liberally adapted from Herodotus, who reports a speech (8.143) much like that given here, but attributes it to the Athenian people, not to Aristides.

25. Helots were the Messenian Greeks enslaved by Sparta and used as the labor force supporting its war machine. See Lycurgus 24, n. 35.

26. Other ancient writers confirm that the Spartans called the Persians xenoi, “foreigners,” while other Greeks called them barbaroi, “barbarians.”

27. This story by Plutarch again takes events narrated by Herodotus (9.6–11) and inserts Aristides as the leading figure.

29. A Spartan king had been placed in charge of the coalition Greek land forces, just as, at Salamis, a Spartan admiral (Eurybiades) had charge of the collective Greek navy.

30. It was a much-sought honor to hold one of the extreme positions (“wings”) in the line of battle, since that implied great prowess. The Spartans were always awarded the right wing, by far the more prestigious of the two assignments, whenever they joined with other cities to fight a battle.

31. Yet again, Plutarch has made Aristides the principal agent in an episode where Herodotus (9.27) speaks rather of the collective Athenian people.

32. Herodotus (9.20–23) confirms the role of the three hundred Athenians at Plataea and the other features of this chapter but does not mention Aristides.

33. The gesture is meant as an exaggerated version of the standard Greek method of voting, by dropping pebbles into an urn.

34. The Persians had compelled their Greek subjects, those living on the coast of Asia, to contribute troops to their invasion force and had also made allies of the Thebans and other Boeotians.

35. This statement is inaccurate if it means what it seems to. The Athenians, according to Aristotle (Constitution of the Athenians 26), only extended the archonship to the third of their four property classes in 457 BCE, well after the time referred to here; and the lowest class was never eligible. Plutarch seems to have trusted a source that was eager to promote Aristides as a friend of democracy.

36. By having the only dockyards, Athens would maintain its naval supremacy. The same story is told in Themistocles 20.

37. Though the battle of Plataea (479 BCE) ended the Persian invasion of Greece, the war for control of the Aegean Sea and the western coast of Asia continued thereafter.

38. The era in which Cronus, father of Zeus, was king of the gods, the earliest era of humankind, was supposedly a Golden Age.

39. The point of this gesture lay in the accompanying oath, which was that the alliance—known to historians as the Delian League, because its treasury was initially housed on the island of Delos—would endure until the metal floated to the surface. Why the lump of metal was heated before this ritual is unclear.

40. A euphemism for the pattern that soon set in, whereby Athens attacked those who sought to withdraw from the league.

41. Somewhat the reverse of his dictum on Themistocles’ proposal to burn the Greek dockyards; see chapter 22. Aristides was not so “just” as to ignore self-interest entirely.