Plutarch, Lives that Made Greek History

Plutarch’s portrait of Nicias (c. 470–413 BCE), the pious, cautious leader who came to prominence in Athens after the death of Pericles, is taken largely from Thucydides. Both writers admired Nicias as a sober, steady, thoughtful man but found fault with his poor decisions as leader of Athens’ expedition to Sicily in 415–413, his greatest and most consequential undertaking. Nicias was unquestionably ill-suited for this job, especially after the defection of Alcibiades, with whom he was initially teamed, left him in nearly sole command. The story of Nicias thus reads, in both Plutarch and Thucydides, as the tragedy of a good man appointed to the wrong post, and as a critique of the democratic processes that brought about that appointment.

[2] Nicias … had made a certain name for himself even during Pericles’ lifetime; he had served as his co-commander,¹ and had often held sole command. And when Pericles died, Nicias was at once brought forward to hold first place, especially by the wealthy and notable, who made him a political force to counteract the coarseness and daring of Cleon,² though Nicias also enjoyed the common people’s good will and sympathy. For Cleon had won great influence by “humoring the old folks and offering regular paid employment,” but the majority of the very people whose favor he courted observed his greed and bold effrontery and tended to side with Nicias. For Nicias’ dignity was not too harsh or oppressive, but was blended with a certain caution, and made him popular, since he was thought to fear the people.³ Though he was naturally melancholy and unhopeful, good luck had masked his faint-heartedness on the military campaigns, since as a general he enjoyed consistent success; and in political life his timidity, and the ease with which he could be confused by accusers, endeared him to the people, who are inclined to fear those who despise them and to exalt those who fear them. For the highest honor the common people can receive from their betters is not to be treated with contempt.

[3] Now it was by his genuine prowess and eloquence that Pericles led the city; he needed no pretense or persuasive power to move the multitude. But as Nicias was inferior in these qualities, though superior in wealth, he made use of his money to win favor with the people. And since he lacked the confidence to compete successfully with the agile buffoonery by which Cleon pandered to the Athenians,⁴ Nicias tried to win their favor by sponsoring public choruses, gymnastic competitions, and other such expensive public spectacles,⁵ which in their extravagance and elegance surpassed those of all his predecessors and contemporaries.

[4] One may rest assured that Nicias’ tendency to indulge and gratify the people stemmed from his piety. For he was one of those persons who are awestruck by divine manifestations, and “heavily influenced by superstition,” as Thucydides says.⁶ In one of Pasiphon’s dialogues it says that day after day Nicias used to offer sacrifices to the gods; and as he kept a seer in his household, he pretended to be constantly consulting him about public matters, though he mainly sought advice about his private affairs, especially about his silver mines. For Nicias had acquired many in Laurion, and they produced vast revenues, though the operations were hazardous. He maintained a multitude of slaves there, and most of his wealth was in silver.

[5] Wary as he was of common informers, he neither dined with any of his fellow citizens nor attended discussions or social occasions. In fact he had no leisure for such pastimes: as a commander he remained until dark at the generals’ meeting place, and when attending the boulē⁷ he was the last to depart, the first to arrive. If he had no public business to transact, he was unsociable and unapproachable, remaining at home behind locked doors. Encountering persons who had come to visit him, his friends would beg them to pardon Nicias, since he was even then engaged in public business and not at leisure.

[6] Nicias sought to avoid difficult and prolonged military campaigns. But whenever he did hold command he advocated caution and brought most of his ventures to a successful issue, as was to be expected. And he attributed his successes not to any wisdom, power, or prowess of his own, but credited them to luck and took refuge in the divine, preferring to yield part of his glory rather than incur the gods’ envy.

Events justified his prudence; for though the city, at that period, met with many reverses, none of them involved Nicias. When the Athenians were defeated by the Chalcidians,⁸ Calliades and Xenophon were in command; the misfortune in Aetolia took place under Demosthenes’ leadership⁹ … and Pericles incurred the utmost blame for the plague, since during the war he had confined the throng from the country in the city, changing both their place of residence and their normal way of life.¹⁰ But Nicias remained free of blame for all of these misfortunes. And meanwhile, as general he captured Cythera,¹¹ an island lying just off Laconia and settled by Spartan colonists; he seized many of the Thracian towns that had revolted, and brought them over to his side; and after forcing the Megarians to take refuge in their city, took immediate possession of the island of Minoa.¹² And soon, using the island as a base, he got control of Nisaea, descended into Corinthian territory, and prevailed in battle, slaughtering many Corinthians including Lycophron, their general.

But then it happened that the corpses of two of his men had been left behind, overlooked when the dead were gathered up. When he realized this, he immediately halted his force and sent a herald to the enemy to request their return. But according to custom and convention, the side that obtained a retrieval of corpses under a truce was thought to have renounced the victory and could not lawfully erect a trophy; for those who held the field were regarded as the victors, whereas their petitioners did not hold the field, since they were unable to get what they wanted. Despite this, Nicias was willing to yield victory and glory rather than leave two of his fellow citizens behind unburied.

[7] When Demosthenes had fortified Pylos,¹³ the Peloponnesians advanced against him with infantry and ships. And when a battle took place, and nearly four hundred Spartans were confined on the island of Sphacteria, the Athenians thought their capture would be a great achievement, as indeed it was. But the siege proved difficult and troublesome, as the region lacked water. And since the transporting of supplies, which in summer was time-consuming and expensive, was unsafe and utterly impracticable in the winter, the Athenians were distressed, and regretted having rejected the embassy of Spartans that had come to negotiate a truce and peace treaty. They had rejected the embassy because Cleon, mainly on Nicias’ account, was opposed to it. For Cleon was hostile to Nicias, and when he saw the man eagerly cooperating with the Spartans he persuaded the people to reject the treaty. Then, when the siege was prolonged and the Athenians learned that terrible hardships were afflicting the army, they grew angry with Cleon.

When this man, placing the blame on Nicias, charged that through cowardice and softness he had let the men escape, and claimed that had he been in command they would not have held out for so long, it occurred to the Athenians to say, “No time like the present! Why not sail against these men yourself?” Nicias then stood up, relinquished his command at Pylos in favor of Cleon, and urged him to take with him as large a force as he liked, and not to parade his boldness in talk that brought no danger, but to furnish the city with an exploit worthy of serious consideration. At first Cleon hesitated, since he was thrown into confusion by the proposal’s unexpectedness; but with the people urging him on as well, and Nicias railing at him, Cleon’s ambition was excited and inflamed and he not only accepted the command but asserted that within twenty days of sailing he would either slay the men on Sphacteria or bring them alive to Athens. This aroused great laughter among the Athenians, rather than belief; for by then they were used to Cleon’s levity and regarded his inspired frenzy in a humorous and not unpleasant light. (It is said that on one occasion when the assembly was in session and the people, seated on the Pnyx, had been waiting for him a long time, he finally appeared, crowned with a garland, and urged them to postpone the assembly until the next day. “For I am not at leisure today,” said he, “as I’m about to entertain guests and have just sacrificed to the gods.” Thereupon the Athenians burst out laughing, rose to their feet, and broke up the assembly.)

[8] But on the present occasion, Cleon had good luck, and with Demosthenes as his co-commander managed the campaign so well that within the stated time he took as prisoners of war, their weapons surrendered, all the Spartans who had not fallen in battle.¹⁴ And this reflected great discredit upon Nicias. For he was thought not to have thrown away his shield, but to have done something worse and more disgraceful in voluntarily relinquishing his command out of cowardice, and giving his enemy the opportunity to achieve such a success, since he had actually voted himself out of office.… And indeed, Nicias did the city no little harm by letting Cleon attain so much renown and influence, by means of which the man wallowed in oppressive arrogance and ungovernable rashness and inflicted other misfortunes on the city, of which he, as much as anyone, bore the brunt. Violating the propriety of the dais, Cleon was the first to raise his voice when addressing the people, the first to pull off his cloak and strike his thigh and dash about while speaking. And he thus implanted in those who managed the government an indifference to baseness and a contempt for what was proper that soon confounded the whole city.

[9] By now Alcibiades¹⁵ was becoming a force in Athens, and as a popular leader was not quite as intemperate as Cleon. But just as the land of Egypt, in its fertility, is said to bring forth

Medicinal herbs, many of them healing, and many harmful,¹⁶

so the nature of Alcibiades, inclining strongly in both directions, gave rise to serious upheavals. That was why Nicias, though rid of Cleon, had no opportunity to soothe and calm all the city’s troubles: once he had set its affairs on a path to safety, he lost his influence, and through the power and vehemence of Alcibiades’ ambition was again embroiled in war.

This came about in the following way. The men most at war with the peace of Greece were Cleon and Brasidas,¹⁷ since war concealed the baseness of the one, and adorned the prowess of the other. When these men both fell in the same battle at Amphipolis,¹⁸ Nicias immediately learned that the Spartans had long been yearning for peace, that the Athenians had lost heart for the war, and that both sides were unstrung, as it were, and willing to drop their arms. He therefore took steps to ally the two cities, free the other Greek states from their troubles, and give them a respite, thereby ensuring for all time his renown as a successful statesman. The affluent, the elderly, and most of the farmers were immediately in favor of peace; and by meeting with many of the other citizens and instructing them in private, Nicias blunted their keenness for the war. Then, offering hope to the Spartans, he invited and urged them to embrace peace. They were inclined to trust him both because of his reasonableness on other occasions, and because, having charge of the men who had been captured at Pylos and imprisoned, he was treating them humanely and lightening their misfortune.…

[10] Meanwhile Alcibiades, who was not naturally disposed to remain quiet, was vexed with the Spartans because they ignored and disdained him, while heeding and embracing Nicias. At first, though he did what he could to oppose and resist the peace, he accomplished nothing. But shortly thereafter, seeing that the Athenians were no longer so pleased with the Spartans (they supposed themselves wronged when the latter made an alliance with the Boeotians and failed to hand over Panactum with its fortifications restored, or Amphipolis at all),¹⁹ he harped on these grievances and sharpened the people’s indignation at every slight. Finally, sending for envoys from Argos, he tried to forge an alliance between the two cities.²⁰ When ambassadors had arrived from Sparta with full powers, and after their first meeting with the council seemed to have come with perfectly fair proposals, Alcibiades, fearing that the assembly might be swayed by the same arguments, circumvented the ambassadors by a trick.²¹ He promised under oath that he would cooperate with them in everything if they would not claim or admit that they had come with full powers. He declared that if they heeded him in this they would certainly obtain what they desired. When they had been persuaded, and had transferred their allegiance from Nicias to him, he introduced them in the assembly and immediately asked whether they had come with full powers to negotiate about all issues. When they said no, he reversed course, contrary to their expectations, and called upon the members of the council to bear witness to what the embassy had told them, and urged the people not to heed or trust men who were so obviously lying and saying now one thing, now its opposite. The ambassadors, naturally enough, were confused, and Nicias was unable to say anything, as he was overcome with dismay and astonishment. But though the people were eager to summon the Argives at once and make them allies, an earthquake came to Nicias’ aid and broke up the assembly. On the following day, when the people again assembled, Nicias, by assiduous activity and oratory succeeded, with difficulty, in persuading them to suspend their overtures to the Argives and to send him to the Spartans, promising them that all would be well.

On reaching Sparta, though in other respects he was honored as a good and diligent man, Nicias accomplished nothing. Instead, after being overruled by those who sided with the Boeotians, he returned home, not only discredited and maligned, but also fearful of the Athenians, who were grieved and vexed that they had been persuaded by him to restore so many distinguished prisoners of war. (For the captives brought from Pylos came from the foremost families of Sparta and had powerful friends and kinsmen.) Though the people did nothing harsher in their anger at Nicias, they chose Alcibiades as general, formed an alliance with the Mantineans and Elians (who had revolted from the Spartans) along with the Argives, sent marauders to Pylos to plunder Laconia, and thus again embroiled themselves in war.

[11] At the height of Alcibiades’ quarrel with Nicias an ostracism was held. By this procedure, which the people were accustomed to perform every few years,²² one of those persons who were viewed with suspicion because of their high renown or envied because of their wealth was forced to emigrate for ten years. Alcibiades and Nicias now found themselves beset and menaced by a great uproar, since it was assumed that one of the two would surely be subjected to the ostracism. For the people felt a loathing for Alcibiades’ way of life and feared his boldness, as has been brought to light in greater detail in my account of his career,²³ while Nicias had incurred ill will partly because of his wealth, but especially because his way of life, which was not genial or affable but unsociable and oligarchical, struck people as strange. And since by then he had often opposed the people’s desires and forced them, contrary to their judgment, to do what was in their interest, he was felt to be oppressive. But to put it simply, the ostracism represented a contest between the warmongering young and their peacemaking elders,²⁴ the former aiming the ostracism at Nicias, the latter at Alcibiades.

“In time of strife even villains win a portion of honor,” and likewise in this instance, the common people, by dividing into two factions, made room for the boldest and basest men, among whom was Hyperbolus, from the deme of Perithoedae, a man who ventured though he lacked power, but was gaining power merely by venturing, and by means of the renown he was acquiring in the city was giving the city a bad name. At the time, Hyperbolus considered himself beyond the reach of the ostracism, since he was a more appropriate candidate for the pillory. But as he expected that when one of his two rivals had been banished he would himself become a rival to the man who remained in the city, it was clear that he was delighted by their quarrel and was inciting the common people against both men. But Nicias and Alcibiades, on becoming aware of Hyperbolus’ rascality, consulted one another in secret and brought their factions together. Having united to form one party, they carried the day, and thus, instead of either of them, Hyperbolus was ostracized. In the immediate aftermath, this afforded the common people delight and amusement; but later they were vexed, thinking that the practice had been abused by being applied to an unworthy man. For there was actually a hierarchy of punishment, and they considered the ostracism a form of punishment more suited to a Thucydides or an Aristides and their like, whereas for Hyperbolus it was an honor and a pretext for boasting, since by his rascality he had suffered the same punishment as the best men.

[12] When the embassies from Segesta and Leontini arrived and persuaded the Athenians to wage war on Sicily,²⁵ Nicias stood up to oppose the idea but was defeated by the ambitious counsel of Alcibiades. For even before the assembly convened, Alcibiades had gained control of the majority, whose judgment had already been perverted by hopes and stories, so that the young men in their wrestling-schools and the old men in their workshops would sit in semicircles sketching maps of Sicily, charts of the sea around it, and plans of the harbors and positions on the island’s coast facing Libya. For they did not regard Sicily as a prize of the war but as a base of operations from which they would contend against the Carthaginians and gain control of Africa and the sea inside the Pillars of Heracles.

Their eagerness was such that Nicias, though he opposed them, had few influential allies. For the affluent citizens, afraid they might appear to be avoiding their civic obligations, which included the fitting out of triremes, kept quiet against their better judgment. But Nicias, never flagging, would not give up; even after the Athenians had voted for the war and elected him general first, and after him Alcibiades and Lamachus, he stood up at the second assembly and tried to dissuade the people and to argue against the expedition, and ended by slandering Alcibiades, asserting that for the sake of private gain and ambition he was driving the city into a difficult and dangerous action overseas. But he accomplished nothing more; on the contrary, since the Athenians regarded his experience as highly useful and thought they would enjoy security against the rashness of Alcibiades and the harshness of Lamachus if these were tempered by Nicias’ caution, he succeeded only in confirming their resolution.

[13] Yet it is said that the expedition met with considerable opposition, even from the priests. But Alcibiades, who consulted different seers, cited a number of ancient oracles declaring that the Athenians would win great renown in Sicily.… No signs, not even those that were clear and conspicuous, could deter the Athenians, as for example the mutilation of the Herms.²⁶

[14] Lamachus moved that they should sail at once against Syracuse and fight a battle right near the city, and Alcibiades that they should incite the cities allied to Syracuse to revolt and then go after the Syracusans themselves.²⁷ But Nicias espoused the opposite course. And by urging them to proceed quietly along the Sicilian coast, circumnavigate the island, display their weapons and triremes, and then sail back to Athens after detaching a small force to aid the Segestans, he soon dampened his men’s spirits and sapped their resolution.

Shortly thereafter, the Athenians sent orders for Alcibiades to return and stand trial.²⁸ Though a replacement commander was named, Nicias actually assumed sole command.

[15] Nicias was constantly delaying and exercising caution. First, by cruising around Sicily as far from the coast as possible, he heartened the enemy; and then, attacking the small town of Hybla and departing before capturing it, he elicited utter contempt. Finally, he left for Catana,²⁹ having achieved nothing beside the conquest of Hyccara, a barbarian fortress.

[16] The summer had passed when Nicias learned that the Syracusans, who had gained confidence, intended to make the first move and come out against them.… Nicias embarked, though reluctantly, on a campaign against Syracuse. Since he wanted to encamp the army safely and easily, he secretly sent a man from Catana who told the Syracusans that if they wished to seize the deserted camp and get possession of the Athenians’ weapons they should approach Catana on a given date with their entire army. Since the Athenians, he explained, spent most of their time in the city, the Syracusans’ friends had planned, as soon as they noticed them approaching, to seize the gates and set fire to the dockyard; he assured them that many conspirators were already awaiting their arrival.

This was Nicias’ finest stroke of generalship in Sicily. For after drawing the enemy and their entire army out of the city, and practically emptying it of men, he himself set sail from Catana, got possession of the enemy’s harbors, and seized a spot for his camp where he expected to incur the least harm from that branch of his enemy’s forces in which he was inferior, namely the cavalry, and wage war without hindrance, deploying the branches of his own army in which he had confidence. When the Syracusans, having turned back from Catana, drew themselves up in battle array before the city, Nicias quickly led the Athenians against them and won a victory.…

But he took no advantage of his famous victory. When a few days had elapsed Nicias withdrew again, to Naxos.³⁰ … And consequently the Syracusans, again taking heart, rode out to Catana, ravaged the countryside, and burned down the Athenians’ camp. Everyone held Nicias to blame for this, since by pondering, delaying, and exercising caution he missed the critical moment for taking action. For no one could find fault with the man in the course of an action, since once he had begun he was energetic and effective; but he procrastinated and hesitated to engage.

[17] When he moved the army back to Syracuse,³¹ he managed his command so cleverly and his approach so unerringly that he reached Thapsus with his ships and disembarked without being observed, getting possession of Epipolae³² before anyone could stop him.… But what especially astonished the Sicilians and struck the Greeks as incredible was how quickly he threw a wall around Syracuse,³³ a city no smaller than Athens, though the unevenness of the surrounding terrain and the proximity of the sea and marshes made it that much harder to construct such a wall. But he came within an ace of completing the task—a man who was not even enjoying good health while engaged in such demanding efforts, but was suffering from a kidney disease, to which one may fairly attribute his failure to complete the work. In what they did succeed in accomplishing I marvel at the diligence of the general and the fortitude of his soldiers.

[18] Though ailing, Nicias was present at most of their actions. But once, during a severe bout of illness, he was lying in bed within the walls, attended by a few servants, while Lamachus led the army in an attack on the Syracusans who were extending a wall from their city to the one the Athenians were building, to intercept and hinder its completion. When the Athenians, having prevailed in battle, were engaged in a disorderly pursuit, Lamachus, left alone, stood his ground against the Syracusan horsemen who charged at him. The first of these was Callicrates, a skillful and spirited warrior. When challenged, Lamachus engaged him in single combat; receiving the first blow, he gave one back, fell, and died.…

Nicias was now the sole surviving commander, and his hopes were high. For cities changed their allegiance, and vessels filled with grain came to the camp from all directions, since everyone sides with those who are prospering. And proposals for a truce were already reaching him from the Syracusans who despaired of defending their city. When Gylippus, sailing to their rescue from Sparta,³⁴ heard on his voyage of the wall surrounding them, and of their troubles, he pressed on in the belief that Sicily was already occupied, and that he could only save the Greek cities on the Italian mainland, if that were still possible. For the report was spreading far and wide that the Athenians were in complete control and possessed a commander whose good fortune and sagacity made him invincible.

Nicias himself was uncharacteristically heartened by his present strength and luck, and especially by the persons sent from Syracuse to consult with him in secret,³⁵ since he thought that the city was just about to surrender under treaty. He therefore attached no importance to the fact that Gylippus was sailing against him, nor did he even post a proper guard. And consequently Gylippus, finding himself utterly ignored and despised, sailed through the strait unnoticed, and having landed at a point far distant from Syracuse, mustered a large army. The Syracusans remained unaware and were not even expecting him. That was why they summoned an assembly to discuss the terms of a peace with Nicias. Some were already on their way to it, as they supposed that a peace settlement should be made before the city was completely walled in. For only a very small part of the work remained to be done, and along that interval all the materials for wall-building had been conveniently scattered.

[19] At that point—at the critical moment of their danger—Gongylus arrived from Corinth³⁶ with one trireme. And when all the Syracusans, as may be imagined, flocked to meet him, he said that Gylippus would soon be arriving and that other ships were sailing to their aid. Though they were not yet sure they should believe Gongylus, a messenger arrived from Gylippus urging them to come out and meet him. Taking courage, they armed themselves; and straight from his journey, Gylippus led them, arrayed for battle, against the Athenians. When Nicias had ranged his men opposite them, Gylippus halted his armed force in front of the Athenians and sent a herald to say that he was offering them safe conduct if they left Sicily. Nicias did not think fit to respond, and some of his soldiers laughingly asked whether by the arrival of one threadbare cloak and staff³⁷ the position of the Syracusans had suddenly become so formidable that they despised the Athenians.…

In the first battle, the Athenians prevailed and killed a few of the Syracusans along with Gongylus the Corinthian; but on the next day Gylippus showed why experience counts. For he used the same arms, the same horses, and the same battleground, but not in the same way; and having changed his tactics, defeated the Athenians. And as the latter were fleeing to their camp, he halted his Syracusans, and with the very stones and wood the Athenians had brought together for their own use, built a fortification that extended all the way to the besiegers’ wall, so that they derived no advantage from their success in the field.³⁸

The Syracusans now regained confidence and manned their ships. Riding about with their own cavalry and that of their allies, they took many prisoners. Gylippus, meanwhile, approached the cities in person and roused them all to unite, follow his orders, and give him their vigorous support. And consequently Nicias, again reverting to his original arguments and acknowledging their reverses, grew disheartened and wrote to the Athenians, urging them either to send out another army or to recall this one from Sicily, and requesting in any case that they relieve him of command because of his illness.³⁹

[20] Even before this the Athenians had been intending to send a second force to Sicily, but envy of Nicias’ early successes had occasioned many delays. Now, however, they were eager to hasten in aid. Demosthenes was planning to sail with a large force in early spring.… But at that point Nicias was suddenly attacked by both land and sea. Though defeated at first, he nevertheless managed, with his naval force, to drive out and disable many enemy ships. But he did not arrive in time to aid the infantry. Gylippus, attacking unexpectedly, captured Plemmyrium,⁴⁰ where he got possession of all the naval equipment and large deposits of money, slaughtered many men, and took many alive. But most important of all, he deprived Nicias of easy access to a market. For the conveying of supplies past Plemmyrium had been managed safely and quickly while the Athenians were in control; but once they had been expelled, provisioning became difficult and entailed fighting with the enemy forces lying in wait for them there.

[21] At that point Demosthenes, resplendent in military gear that utterly disconcerted the enemy, came into view outside the harbors, leading five thousand hoplites on twenty-three ships, and no fewer than three thousand javelin-men, archers, and slingers. By the good order of his weapons, the ensigns of his triremes, and the dense mass of signalmen and flute-players spectacularly arrayed, he astonished the enemy. And thus the Syracusans, as was to be expected, were again overcome with dread. Without hope of any ultimate release, they saw themselves toiling futilely and perishing in vain.…

Demosthenes took the infantry and attacked Epipolae⁴¹ at night. He caught some of the enemy by surprise and killed them; the rest, though they defended themselves, he put to flight. Though victorious he did not remain where he was, but marched ahead until he encountered the Boeotians,⁴² who had already drawn themselves up in close formation. Running en masse against the Athenians with their spears couched, the Boeotians sent up a shout and thrust the Athenians back, killing many of them there. Terror and confusion overwhelmed the entire army. The part that was prevailing was now mixed up with the part that was fleeing, and the part that was advancing to attack was driven back by panic-stricken men and fell foul of itself, the men thinking the fugitives were pursuers, and thus treating their friends as foes. The disorderly scramble, the combination of fear and ignorance, and the untrustworthiness of their vision plunged the Athenians into terrible perplexities and reversals. For the night was not pitch dark, but neither was the light steady. The moon, hanging low on the horizon, was obscured by masses of weapons and bodies in motion, and the inability to discern shapes distinctly, coupled with fear of the enemy, led friendly forces to suspect one another. Furthermore, it somehow happened that the Athenians had the moon at their backs, so that they cast shadows on one another and thus concealed the number and brightness of their weapons, whereas the reflection of the moonlight on the enemy’s shields made them appear brighter and much more numerous.

Finally, when the Athenians gave ground and the enemy attacked them from all sides, they fled, some of them perishing at the enemy’s hands, others at one another’s hands, and still others when they fell from the cliffs. The Athenians who dispersed and wandered away were overtaken by horsemen the next day and put to death. The corpses numbered two thousand; and of the survivors, few got away safe with their armor.

[22] Stricken though not surprised by the defeat, Nicias blamed Demosthenes for his headlong haste. Demosthenes defended his conduct and urged that they sail away as soon as possible.… Nicias was dismayed to hear talk of fleeing and sailing away, not because he did not fear the Syracusans, but because he had an even greater fear of the Athenians and their lawsuits and dishonest prosecutions. He maintained that nothing dreadful was to be expected, and even if the worst should happen he would choose death at the hands of the enemy rather than at the hands of his fellow citizens.… But when a fresh army came to aid the Syracusans, and more of the Athenians were being infected by disease, even Nicias finally considered it advisable to change their position, and sent word to the soldiers to prepare to sail away.

[23] When all their preparations had been made and none of the enemy was keeping close watch, since they expected no such move, there occurred an eclipse of the moon at night, which terrified Nicias.… Nicias persuaded the people to wait until another lunar cycle had been completed.

[24] Abandoning almost everything else, Nicias sat sacrificing and taking omens until the enemy attacked, besieged the Athenians’ walls and camp with their infantry, and surrounded their ships in the harbor. Not only the men of Syracuse in their triremes, but boys in fishing boats and skiffs sailed from all sides against the Athenians, called them out to fight, and showered them with reproaches. When one of these boys, Heracleides, the son of distinguished parents, drove his boat out ahead of the others, an Attic ship pursued and tried to capture him. Fearing for Heracleides, his uncle Pollichus sailed in pursuit with the ten triremes under his command, and then the others, fearing for Pollichus, likewise put out after them. In the fierce naval battle that took place, the Syracusans won a victory and slaughtered Eurymedon along with many others.

The Athenians, accordingly, could no longer bear to remain where they were but railed against their commanders and urged them to withdraw by land. For as soon as the Syracusans had prevailed at sea, they blocked up their harbor and barred its entrance. But Nicias and his officers would not comply, saying it would be terrible to abandon so many merchant ships and nearly two hundred triremes. Embarking the best of their infantry and the bravest of their javelin-men, they manned 110 triremes; the rest lacked oars.⁴³ Nicias stationed the remaining throng along the shore.

[25] The sea battle proved by far the greatest and most desperate. It dismayed and distressed those who witnessed it no less than the combatants, since the entire engagement, encompassing a great variety of unexpected reverses within a brief time, was unfolding in plain sight; and the Athenians found themselves disabled by their own equipment no less than by that of the enemy. For with their heavy ships⁴⁴ crowded together they were fighting against light vessels attacking from all directions. Assailed from all sides by stones, which generally hit their mark, the Athenians were firing back with javelins and arrows, whose aim was disturbed by the motion of the water. But the Syracusans had been trained to fight under these conditions by the Corinthian pilot Ariston. Though he fought throughout the battle itself, Ariston fell just as the Spartans were prevailing.

The rout and slaughter were tremendous, and the Athenians found their route of escape by sea cut off. Observing that their deliverance by land would be difficult, they made no effort to hinder the enemy soldiers who were still nearby, towing away their ships, nor did they request permission to retrieve their dead, whose lack of burial seemed less pitiable now that they had to face the abandonment of their sick and wounded.⁴⁵ And they considered themselves worse off than the corpses, since after suffering further misfortunes they would meet with the very same end.

[26] The Athenians were eager to set out that night. And Gylippus and his men, seeing the Syracusans occupied in sacrifices and carousals in honor of their victory and festival, had no thought of persuading or compelling them to rise up and attack the departing enemy. But Hermocrates,⁴⁶ acting on his own initiative, hatched a plot against Nicias and sent him certain friends who pretended they came from those who had often held secret talks with him. They advised him not to travel during the night, since the Syracusans had set ambushes for them and were in possession of the roads. Outwitted by this, Nicias stayed where he was, only to actually suffer at his enemy’s hands what he had mistakenly feared. For the Syracusans, going forth at daybreak, got possession of the rough patches of their roads, fortified the fords of the rivers, cut off the bridges, and stationed their horsemen in the smooth and level areas, leaving no spot where the Athenians could advance without fighting.

Remaining where they were both that day and another night, they marched forth weeping and lamenting (as if they were being forced to leave their native land rather than that of their enemy), both on account of their utter lack of necessities and because they were abandoning their disabled friends and intimates. And yet they imagined that their present ills were easier to bear than those they had to look forward to. But of the many dreadful sights in the army, none was more pitiable than that of Nicias himself, afflicted by illness and reduced undeservedly to a subsistence diet and the most meager share of the many provisions he needed because of his illness. Though weak, he persevered under conditions that many of the strong could barely tolerate, and it was clear to all that he bore these hardships not for his own sake or from any love of life; it was for his men’s sake that he would not give up hope. The others wept and lamented from fear and pain; but whenever Nicias was compelled to do so, it was plainly because he was comparing his expedition’s disgrace and ignominy with the stature and renown he had hoped to achieve.

And it was not only the sight of his person, but also the memory of the arguments and addresses with which he had tried to prevent the expedition, that sharpened their awareness of how undeserved his sufferings were. They also lost heart about their prospects for divine aid when they reflected that a highly favored man, who had distinguished himself by many important services to the gods, now met with a fortune no more seemly than the basest and meanest in his army.

[27] Yet Nicias strove, in his tone, his countenance, and his manner, to show himself superior to his dreadful plight. And throughout the entire eight-day march, though his men were being assailed and wounded by the enemy, he kept his force unconquered until Demosthenes and his force were captured. Left behind, they had joined battle when surrounded near the country house of Polyzelus. Demosthenes drew his sword and stabbed but did not kill himself, at which point the enemy surrounded and seized him.⁴⁷

When the Syracusans rode up to inform Nicias, he sent horsemen to make certain that Demosthenes’ force had been captured. He then sought to make a treaty with Gylippus, according to which the Athenians would be released from Sicily after giving hostages for all the money the Syracusans had spent on the war. But the enemy, paying no heed, assailed him with insolent threats and angry abuse, though he was now destitute of all necessities. Yet Nicias endured through the night, and on the next day advanced under fire to the river Asinarus. Meeting the Athenians there, the enemy thrust some of them into the stream, while others, driven by thirst, plunged in headlong. And it was there, in the river, that the heaviest and most savage slaughter took place, with men being slain as they drank, until Nicias fell at Gylippus’ feet and said, “Have pity in victory, Gylippus, not on me, who over the course of a varied and fortunate career won fame and glory, but on the Athenians, and remember that the fortunes of war are apportioned impartially, and that the Athenians, when they were prospering, treated you fairly and gently.”

As Nicias was speaking, Gylippus was moved both by his appearance and his words, since he knew that the Spartans had been treated well by Nicias when the peace was made.⁴⁸ Gylippus also felt that his own renown would be enhanced if he brought his enemies home alive. He therefore raised Nicias up and urged him to take heart, and gave orders that his men were to be taken prisoner. But as these orders traveled slowly across the battlefield, the slain far outnumbered those who were spared, though many were stolen away and concealed by the soldiers.

After gathering together those who had been captured openly, they hung their prisoners’ armor from the tallest and finest trees near the river, crowned themselves with garlands, adorned their horses splendidly, cut the hair of the enemy’s horses, and rode into the city, having contended in the most brilliant combat of Greeks against Greeks, and having won the most perfect of victories with the strongest force and the utmost display of zeal and valor.

[28] At an assembly of the entire citizen body of Syracuse and its allies, the popular leader Eurycles moved first that the day on which they had captured Nicias be a holiday, on which they would offer sacrifices and abstain from work, and that the festival be called the Asinaria, after the river Asinarus (the Asinaria fell on the twenty-sixth of the month of Carneius, which the Athenians call Metageitnion); and second, that the Athenians’ servants and their other allies be sold into slavery, and that the Athenians themselves and the Sicilian Greeks who had protected them be thrown into the quarries—all except for their generals, who should be put to death.

These resolutions were accepted by the Syracusans, whereupon Hermocrates, protesting that the noble use of victory was better than victory itself, was met with no small furor. And when Gylippus demanded the Athenian generals, so he might escort them to the Spartans, the Syracusans, now made insolent by their good fortune, rebuked him, especially since throughout the war they had found it hard to bear his harshness and the Laconic manner with which he wielded authority.… Timaeus denies that Demosthenes and Nicias were put to death at the Syracusans’ order, as Philistus and Thucydides have written; instead, he says that Hermocrates sent word to them while the assembly was still in session, and with the help of one of their guards they did away with themselves. Their bodies, however, were cast out by the entrance, and lay in plain sight for those who wished to set eyes on them. I hear that to this day, in a temple at Syracuse, they point out a shield that is said to have belonged to Nicias. Its gold and purple web is welded together with great skill.

1. Pericles’ office during most of his years as Athenian leader was stratēgos, one of the ten generals elected annually at Athens to lead military maneuvers. From this position it was easy to also gain political influence, since in the assembly, where anyone could speak, a stratēgos was assured of getting a respectful hearing. Plutarch is here noting that Nicias had often been among the board of ten stratēgoi in the same year that Pericles was.

2. Cleon, in contrast to Pericles and Nicias, was a politician who achieved influence only through his speaking style and force of personality, not by holding the office of stratēgos. His demagogy appealed particularly to the lower classes, prompting the wealthy to look to Nicias as a counterweight.

3. “The people” (dēmos in Greek) often means the Athenian assembly or the body of adult male citizens who were eligible to vote there.

4. According to Thucydides, Cleon’s speaking style was highly histrionic and accompanied by dramatic gestures, a judgment confirmed by Aristotle (Constitution of the Athenians 28.3). See chapter 8.

5. Wealthy Athenians voluntarily supplied the funds for the events Plutarch mentions; at this time Athens had few government subsidies for the arts.

7. The boulē was the Council of Five Hundred at Athens that served as an executive board setting business for the assembly.

9. In 426 BCE; see Thucydides 3.96–98. The Demosthenes mentioned here and elsewhere in this life, a general of the late fifth century, must be distinguished from the orator of the fourth century who is dealt with in Demosthenes later in this volume.

13. In 425 BCE. The episode of Pylos and Sphacteria, as it is often termed, forms one of the early turning points in the Peloponnesian War. Demosthenes decided on his own initiative to build a fort at Pylos, an abandoned harbor on the coast of the Peloponnese, as a base from which to mount raids on Spartan territory. The plan took on much bigger implications, however, when a Spartan force trying to take the fort became cut off on an island offshore, Sphacteria. Plutarch’s account of the action is closely based on Thucydides 4.4ff.

14. There were 292 surviving prisoners, of whom 120 were Spartan citizens. Brought back to Athens, they became a major bargaining chip that allowed Athens to conclude a peace treaty on favorable terms.

15. A handsome, wealthy, ambitious young man who had grown up as Pericles’ ward; see Alcibiades in this volume.

17. “The peace of Greece” refers to the attempts by Sparta and Athens to conclude a treaty, following the Athenian seizure of the Spartans on Sphacteria. Brasidas, an ambitious Spartan general, was unwilling to surrender the advantageous position he had achieved and the gains he had made in order to secure a treaty.

18. In 422 BCE. Peace efforts immediately went forward after the deaths of these two men, and a treaty was concluded that brought a temporary halt to the Peloponnesian War. Nicias was the principal Athenian negotiator, with the result that the treaty is generally known today as the Peace of Nicias.

19. The Peace of Nicias called on both Athens and Sparta not to alter the existing balance of power by making new alliances with states hostile to the other, and demanded restoration by both sides of certain territories taken during the war. Athens was also required to return the prisoners it had captured on Sphacteria.

20. Since Argos had thus far been neutral in the war, the attempted alliance did not violate the terms of the Peace of Nicias.

22. An exaggeration; though ostracisms had been called rather frequently in the first half of the fifth century BCE, the procedure had by this time become rare.

24. The idea of a generational split at Athens, pitting hawkish youth against more conservative, less aggressive elders, seems to be derived from Thucydides (e.g., 6.12–13).

25. These embassies occurred in the years before 415 BCE (see Thucydides 6.6). Segesta and Leontini were small Sicilian cities, allied with Athens, that felt themselves threatened by the regional superpower, Syracuse.

26. The episode is described more fully in Alcibiades 18. Just before the ships were to sail for Sicily, vandals defaced a number of religious monuments called Herms in the streets of Athens. Alcibiades was blamed for the sacrilege, perhaps unfairly.

27. These deliberations occurred after the fleet had already reached Sicily, in the summer of 415 BCE. Plutarch has skipped over the magnificent departure of the fleet, memorably recorded by Thucydides (6.30–31).

28. The recall of Alcibiades, and his defection to the Spartans, are described more fully in Alcibiades 18–24.

30. Thucydides explains at 6.71 that Nicias felt he needed to raise more forces, in particular the cavalry forces in which he was outclassed by the Syracusans, before making a further assault; and the onset of foul weather required, he felt, a more secure winter camp.

32. An area of high ground overlooking the city of Syracuse, and therefore a strategically vital position for an attacker.

33. Completion of this wall would have cut off Syracuse from supply and allowed Athens to starve the city into surrender.

34. Gylippus was a Spartan general, sent by the Spartans to supervise operations of the Syracusans against Athens. Plutarch explains the entry of the Spartans into the war for Sicily at Alcibiades 23. After deserting the Athenian-led army, Alcibiades had landed in Sparta and convinced the leadership there that Sparta had a vital interest in stopping the Athenian effort in Sicily.

35. The pro-Athenian party inside Syracuse had secret communications with Nicias during this period, hoping to betray the city to him and force it into an alliance with Athens.

36. The Corinthians, allies of the Spartans, had sent a fleet to aid the Syracusan resistance, and Gongylus was commander of the first ship to reach Sicily.

38. The Syracusan counterwall cut off the Athenian wall so that it could not be completed, and secured control of part of Epipolae for Syracuse. The Athenians’ position was very much undermined by this wall, which effectively made them the besieged instead of the besiegers.

39. Thucydides preserves a version of the letter (7.11–14). It was sent at the end of the 414 BCE campaigning season.

41. The focus of this battle was the point at which the Syracusan counterwall cut off the Athenian wall. If Athens could regain control of this position, it could safely complete its wall.

42. The Boeotians (Thebans and others), allies of Sparta, had sent troops to aid the Syracusan resistance.

43. A lot of Athenian naval gear had been lost when Gylippus and the Syracusans took Plemmyrium. Nicias had become caught in what today might be called a negative feedback loop, in which every setback led to a further setback.

44. As Thucydides makes clear, the Athenians, lacking a secure harbor, had been unable to properly dry out and re-tar their ships, which as a result had become waterlogged.

45. Those not fit to travel with the retreating forces had to be left behind to the mercy of the Syracusans, a scene Thucydides records in harrowing detail (7.75).

47. A rare case in this Life where Plutarch uses material not found in Thucydides. The account of Demosthenes’ surrender in Thucydides (7.81–82) makes no mention of Polyzelus nor of Demosthenes’ attempt at suicide.