Events in Crete moved fast in the autumn of 1943. Written while still on the island, Leigh Fermor’s sixth report was principally an account of his continued dealings with local Italian officers — especially Lieutenant Franco Tavana, an energetic and stridently anti-Fascist counter-espionage officer — after the sudden announcement on 8 September of Italy’s surrender. It describes the local negotiations between the Italians and Germans and his own efforts to persuade Italian units to retain some cohesion and give their weapons to the Cretans, even as strong German forces went about disarming and dispersing them, and closes with his arrangements for the escape from the island of General Angelo Carta. It was while assisting with the final stages of Carta’s flight that Leigh Fermor found himself stranded aboard the Royal Navy vessel sent to pick Carta up, and was shipped to Egypt, too.
* * *
21 September 1943
THE ITALIAN ARMISTICE AND AFTER
. . . [T]wo days before the armistice my operator (S/Sgt. BROOKE) was off the air owing to heavy and continual rain. The only hideout I had been able to find close to TUSCANY, and at the same time to SODOM for the parachutists and the MORNE MTS for boating parties, was a bleak, shelterless hillside on the western slopes of the TUSCAN Mts above CASTLES [Kastelli Pediados]. We sat there and got soaked to the skin for thirty-eight hours on end, making frequent, slippery and vain efforts to get on the air and keep the rain out of the set at the same time. I finally received your message, warning me that the armistice was pending, and the other telling me of its fulfilment, on the morning of the eighth. A few minutes later a shepherd arrived from the plain, foaming with excitement, with the same news, and also told us that the Huns had visited the Iti post at MOUCHTAROU at dawn and stripped the Itis of all their arms. I assumed the same thing (or Italian armed resistance) had probably started in LASITHI, and, in view of your wish to get the Iti arms handed over to the Cretans, had to move fast . . .
The problem of the arms handover was a difficult one . . . I had [previously] gone to certain lengths to stiffen the Itis’ inclination to resist Hun disarmament, to remain united, and to hit back, on express orders from you. On the same orders I had also held out some hopes of allied support in the event of an armed clash. Thus my new mission insisting they should tamely give their arms to the Greeks — a course which would obviously lead to heavy penalties on Itis and Greeks alike . . . — was no enviable one . . .
MINOAN MIKE arrived at my mountain that night with an Italian soldier, and a cargo of assorted arms sent by TAVANA. He had fixed up an Iti motor car to wait for me in the Tuscan plain. We went down next day and rattled along the VILLENEUVE [Neapolis] Road. Half way there we were met by TAVANA in the General’s car on his way out to see if anything had gone wrong. He was dressed in a most dashing Alpine uniform with spurs and plumes and a phenomenal number of medal ribbons. I changed over to his car and we rolled into VILLENEUVE in state, and arrived in his house in time for an excellent dinner, washed down by chianti.
TAVANA was in tremendous spirits and expecting the [Allied] invasion at every moment, and discussing what dispositions the Itis should take up. This was the result of my former line of talk, and I felt like several different kinds of swine for having led them up the garden path. He had already tipped off all his officer friends to make a resolute resistance to any Hun attempts to disarm them. He has an attractive and eager personality and great popularity and respect among all ranks in TUSCANY. I informed him that plans had changed, that since the invasion of Italy Crete operations were no longer immediate. He naturally said it was out of the question to hand over all their arms to the Cretans, but that he would do what he could on the quiet.
I insisted on seeing the General [Carta], and after dark he went round to his house and smuggled him along unobserved by the newly arrived Gestapo men. He is plump, rosy, urbane and very agreeable. He said that MÜLLER had visited him the day before, and demanded that all arms should be handed over. CARTA refused and eight hours of talk followed without any result . . .
[W]hen the General had tiptoed home to bed, TAVANA and I sat up till daybreak discussing what we could do on the side in the way of arms. We decided to get whatever surplus arms we could smuggled to outlying points by car, and taken over by responsible local leaders and distributed at once. It was very tricky, however, as Huns were continually arriving and nearly all dumps were under their supervision. During the following days, however, we managed to hand over about 200 rifles, quantities of grenades and ammunition, a couple of mortars, and several LMGs and MGs. This was mostly done by TAVANA himself, driving a lorry out after dark, dismissing the sentry, loading the stuff on board with his soldier-servant, and driving it to the approved tryst. He is certainly a spirited young man. His first action when the news of the armistice came through was to burn every bit of paper in his archives. When the Huns took over, they would have found not a shred of guidance to help and would have to begin from the start — no easy matter at this late hour . . .
The Huns continued stripping Italian troops of all but their personal arms, summoning them to Neapolis, and sending them westwards to the various destinies that awaited them . . .
I was now anxious to save what I could from this steady erosion and, rightly or wrongly, decided to save the General, who had not behaved too badly, to send to you for information purposes (also Capt. LUDOVICI his ADC) and above all Capt. GROSSI from the 3rd Bureau (ops) for the same reason, and obtain, if possible, the plans of the heavy defences of LASITHI in detail, as I felt sure the Huns would not change them . . .
Meanwhile VILLENEUVE was filling up with Huns . . . and a swarm of plain clothes spies. I was living in TAVANA’s house and almost every hour receiving panicky letters from our leaders in the town, to escape before it was too late. The Huns paid one visit to the house, while I was there alone, in search of TAVANA. I spent an uncomfortable half hour under a bed, clutching my revolver, and swallowing pounds of fluff and cobwebs. I finally left in a civvy car . . . and stayed at the OUTRIVER [unidentified location] (on the road between VILLENEUVE and the TUSCAN plain) . . . TOM was by this time near at hand with the [wireless] set, between which and me COPPER MANOLI had been speeding with streams of messages . . . I started organising the General’s flight, and urging TAVANA by letter to get his hands on to the defence maps.
He arrived next morning in the General’s car, stopped outside the village and sent in MINOAN MIKE to fetch me. I found him beaming under a plane tree with a whole satchelful of documents. They were the full defence organisation of LASITHI, a map of the points considered most valuable to different kinds of attack, and much besides. I took it back to the village feeling it might go off bang on the way. I can’t help feeling that this result justifies all the fuss and anxiety and frustration of the preceding few days. I also managed to secure an up-to-date Italian map (4/9/43) indicating the location of guerrilla bands in Greece and a fascinating translation of a secret Hun document dealing with the battle and Hun occupation of CRETE up till the end of ANDRAE’s administration. It is a long confession of guilt and ends up with some absorbing paragraphs on British activity in Crete . . .
The flight of CARTA and his officers was laid on with the help of an excellent GK [Greek] Captain . . . They left in the General’s car and a lorry (filled with arms; TAVANA was game to the last!) . . . [then] walked across the TUSCAN plain, the General’s car, with pennant flying, leaving at once for SETEIA, where it was to be abandoned on the road as a false scent. COPPER, GRIGORI and I met the party in the village near TUSCANY, and took them by long and arduous stages across the mountains and the plain to the MORNE MOUNTAINS, where I am writing this report in conditions of acute discomfort . . .
When we halted, CARTA and I would drink some of the excellent Triple Sec in his water bottle, and he would regale me with lively anecdotes of high life in Rome and Paris or his reminiscences as an MFH in Trieste. He is most informative and entertaining on the subject of BRÄUER and MÜLLER and German officers in general. He went with a great swing everywhere. He has always been a popular figure in LASITHI.
On the second day of our journey Hun recce. planes (FIESELER STORCHS) flew low all over the mountains we were crossing, dropping leaflets (enclosed). They fell right at our feet. They were offers, in German, Italian and Greek of thirty million drachmas reward for General CARTA, dead or alive, and a full pardon for any evildoer or outlaw who would hand him over. CARTA was very amused.
The abduction of CARTA made the Huns boil with anger. Search parties were sent out everywhere, and all garrisons told to try and apprehend him before he left the island. The nuisance value is considerable and I advise you to exploit this, announcing his escape on the wireless, even letting him talk against the Huns on it. It will make the Huns more awestruck than ever at the long arm of the Secret Service, which already has great bogey value . . .
I realise by your telegrams that you consider him something of a white elephant. I hope he will not prove so, and that you will manage to get a lot of useful stuff out of them all told. Treat them as well as is allowed. If only for his good administration of TUSCANY in sharp contrast to that of the Huns he is worth some consideration . . .