Between 1981 and 1984, while Pollard was moving from one job to another, he was also disclosing, or attempting to disclose, classified information to people with no need to know. The way he went about it was clumsy, if not downright naive. Pollard pushed information on anyone who showed the least bit of interest—even on those with no interest at all. Did he do this in hopes of monetary reward, or simply to impress people with his knowledge and access? Probably both. He was mired in debt, and certainly, ever since childhood, his peers had ostracized him. Maybe Pollard was thinking he could help Israel and at the same time pick up some easy cash. No one would be hurt or the wiser.
In one of his earliest bumbling attempts, he approached an Australian officer who was working on a temporary basis in the NISC under a personnel-exchange liaison program run by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the U.S. Navy. Pollard began disclosing highly classified information to the officer that was coded NOFORN, for no foreign dissemination. As time went on Pollard grew bolder, revealing more and more documents. The RAN officer—who had no need to know—became so distressed over this that he called his supervisor back in Australia. Allegedly, the Australians began to wonder if this might be some sort of CIA ruse. Perhaps Pollard was trying to get them to take the bait. Being close allies, the Australians could not imagine the Americans setting such a trap. Nevertheless, they decided to bring their naval officer back before things got out of hand.
Not until Pollard was apprehended years later did the Australians realize he was a spy. As soon as they heard about the arrest, they contacted U.S. government authorities to explain the RAN officer’s encounter with him. Pollard subsequently admitted in an NIS debriefing report following his guilty plea that he had provided classified information to an officer of the Royal Australian Navy. But, he claimed, it was only a single secret message, a copy of the official U.S. position regarding disengagement from New Zealand, originated by the Department of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1 Later he would alter his story, saying that his supervisors ordered him to show the RAN officer classified information because the Australians were close allies. There are no known facts that suggest the Australian naval officer engaged in any improper or illegal activity. No further investigation was conducted, nor was Pollard charged with a violation in this case.
In another disturbing incident, Pollard disclosed classified information to nongovernment employees who had no need to know. In the introduction to the government’s memorandum in aid of sentencing it states, in part,
With respect to defendant’s claim that he was motivated by altruism rather than greed, a number of articulable facts demonstrate that this claim is superficial rather than substantial. Initially, it must be recognized that defendant’s espionage relationship with the Israelis is not the only instance where defendant has disclosed classified information in anticipation of financial gain. The government’s investigation has revealed that defendant provided to certain of his social acquaintances U.S. classified documents which defendant obtained through U.S. Navy sources. The classified documents which defendant disclosed to two such acquaintances, both of whom are professional investment advisers, contained classified economic and political analyses which defendant believed would help his acquaintances render investment advice to their clients. Defendant also gave classified information to a third social acquaintance who defendant also knew would utilize it to further the acquaintance’s career.
Defendant has acknowledged that, although he was not paid for his unauthorized disclosures of classified information to the above-mentioned acquaintances, he hoped to be rewarded ultimately through business opportunities that these individuals could arrange for defendant when he eventually left his position with the U.S. Navy. In fact, defendant was involved in an ongoing business venture with two of these acquaintances at the time he provided the classified information to them. . . .2
Pollard approached all sorts of people in his eager quest to impress others and share classified information, but he singled out one group for special consideration: the Israelis.
In tracing the history of his contacts with the Israelis it is difficult to sort fact from fiction. Some of the information we have comes from Pollard’s own mouth, in the form of confessions made after his guilty plea. This was probably one of the few times he felt compelled to tell at least a good portion of the truth, for he wanted to get his wife’s sentence reduced. But Pollard has changed his stories repeatedly, either consciously or because he is so tangled up in far-fetched tales that he himself can no longer distinguish between truth and fantasy.
Pollard, whose loyalty since his teens had been split between the United States and Israel—ethnic paranoia, he called it—toyed with the idea of immigrating to the Jewish homeland. But because his parents resisted, he decided to assist Israel in some other way.
Israeli flag —ELECTRONIC MEDIA
In 1981 the Mossad’s files showed that he had informally applied for a job with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in Washington, D.C. During his interview he told members of the committee “a very detailed story of AIPAC being watched by the Department of Justice, maintaining that its phones were bugged.” Pollard was turned down for the job.3 No one in the U.S. government will ever know for sure what Pollard told the AIPAC. There are no facts to show or suggest that AIPAC was involved in any way with Pollard. In fact, they wanted nothing to do with him.
The following year Pollard sat in on an exchange conference attended by the Israeli Defense Force and the U.S. military—or so he claimed in an NIS and FBI debriefing that took place in July 1986, following his guilty plea. According to navy officials, the idea that Pollard, a lowly analyst, ever attended a high-level official conference between Israel and the United States is ludicrous.4 At any rate, Pollard insisted that he had been present, and furthermore, that he had been horrified by certain anti-Semitic remarks coming from the mouths of American analysts. In his mind, U.S. disclosure documents didn’t reflect the tenor of the agreements for the exchange—in other words, the U.S. Navy was withholding information about terrorists that was vital to Israel’s defense. At one point, he maintained, he heard an American exclaim, “Let ’em lose a couple of pilots and they’ll figure it out!” The combination of anti-Semitic remarks and the U.S. Navy’s refusal to share information was too much to bear. In his own words, Pollard “snapped.” “I watched the threats to Israel’s existence grow,” he said, “and gradually came to the conclusion that I had to do something.”5
At the same conference, Pollard approached the Israeli military attaché and, addressing him in Hebrew, pitched an offer to spy. The attaché made no overtures to take him up on his offer. Pollard saw the same man at another conference in October 1983, but the two never spoke. Frustrated, Pollard thought perhaps he should approach the military attaché at the Israeli embassy in Washington. That would require an intermediary, and he didn’t have one. Once again Pollard entertained the idea of immigrating to Israel, but when he proposed this to Anne, she dug in her heels, adamant about not going. His next thought was to work in the United States for an Israeli defense company, but that didn’t happen either. Then, he “considered quitting the intelligence community and going to work in the private sector, taking with him a stockpile of classified documents to pass to Israel, but he decided this was unprofessional.”6
How could he provide secrets to the Israelis? Pollard was eager to forge ahead. He was an analyst with an almost photographic memory and a great fund of knowledge. He was a good liar and he had the gift of gab. He was an expert at manipulation. He had the access, he knew the security procedures. Most important of all, he had the courier card to transport TS/SCI anywhere in Washington, D.C., without being searched or questioned. His opportunity was just around the corner.
Dr. Morris Pollard was a good friend of Gustav Stern, a former owner of Hartz Mountain Food who had thrown parties to raise funds for Morris’s research programs in microbiology at Notre Dame.7 Gustav’s son, Steven, a wealthy stockbroker in New York, was about the same age as Jonathan and had attended several of the parties. Pollard renewed his association with Stern sometime in 1983.
Late in that year, Steven called Jonathan from New York to discuss prospectuses on an Israeli military company and a Belgium mutual fund. The two also discussed the effect on the oil market of a possible Persian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz closure.8 Through the spring of 1984 they stayed in touch, discussing business prospects and the plight of Israel. Steven was deeply impressed with Pollard’s analytical abilities and his knowledge of world affairs.
At one point Steven attended a Zionist conference at L’Enfant Plaza in Washington, D.C., and the two arranged a brief social meeting. Anne went along.9 Soon thereafter, around the time Pollard transferred to the ATAC, Steven called from New York to say that he had met an interesting colonel in the Israeli air force who had spoken at a lecture promoting bonds for his country. His name was Aviem Sella and he was pursuing a graduate degree in computer science at New York University. According to Steven, Colonel Sella was a bona fide Israeli war hero. Steven sought him out after the lecture and informed him of Pollard’s passionate loyalty to Israel.
Steven asked if Pollard would like to meet the air force colonel. “Pollard recounted that he immediately said to himself, ‘That’s my opportunity to begin providing information to the Israelis.’”10 A real war hero! The answer was yes, and they arranged for Steven to give the colonel Pollard’s phone number.
When the Pollard case broke in November 1985, Steven E. Stern told FBI officials that he never thought Pollard intended to spy for Israel and that the introduction arranged between Sella and Pollard was strictly because of Pollard’s love for Israel. The FBI follow-up investigation found no connection between Stern and Pollard’s spying for Israel. The investigation of Stern was not pursued and no charges were brought against him, nor was he considered a conspirator or possible accomplice in the Pollard spying activities.
It was early June 1984, and Pollard had just started working as a watch stander in the ATAC. No more than a couple of days after Steven had broached the subject with him, Pollard got a call in his apartment. Aviem Sella was on the other end of the line. Pollard could hardly contain himself. The colonel came across as mild-mannered and articulate on the phone. Would Pollard like to have lunch? Sella would be flying into Washington anyway to attend a conference at the Hilton Hotel, just a few blocks from Pollard’s apartment.
The answer was an enthusiastic yes.
Thinking it would be advantageous to have someone help him with the logistics of providing intelligence to Israel, Pollard decided to recruit a friend who had roomed with him for a semester at the Fletcher School. His plan was to present to Israeli intelligence a preexisting ring that could begin spy operations with minimal start-up time. His friend, a Jew sympathetic to Israel, worked at the Voice of America, was well traveled, and had access to highly placed individuals.
Although Pollard and Anne Henderson were not yet married, she was the girl of his dreams, and he shared everything with her. When he told her about his plan to pass secrets to Israel and to recruit the ex-roommate, they discussed the wisdom of the move. In Anne’s 60 Minutes interview with Mike Wallace on 1 March 1987, he asked if she and Pollard had discussed spying for Israel. Anne replied, “Oh yes, we did”; she further admitted she knew exactly what she was getting into.
After a lengthy discussion, they decided that Pollard should approach the fellow. That wasn’t all. Though she would initially deny it later, Anne herself planned to participate in Pollard’s spy ring and to join him in the recruitment attempt.
And so, one Saturday evening, Anne and Pollard showed up unexpectedly at his ex-roommate’s doorstep. No sooner had the visitors set foot inside than they began berating him for his pedestrian lifestyle and hinting that he could “live better.” Pollard told him there was money to be made if he would help him deliver certain classified documents. For whom? the friend inquired. “The brothers,” Pollard answered, referring to the Israelis. He went on to say that Anne was going into business for herself, and he wanted to help her. When the friend asked how much money he would make, Pollard replied, “Oh, this would be roughly two to three thousand dollars.” Apparently he meant monthly.11 Then he repeated, “Anne needs assistance.” Pollard explained that his friend would be responsible for delivering and disseminating documents.
Finally, Pollard cut to the chase. “Well, do you want to join us?” he said bluntly. Taken aback, the acquaintance gave a noncommittal answer.
As they were driving home, Anne turned to Pollard in distress. “This was a bad idea,” she said. “I think you should just forget that you had this conversation.”12 He might have been an ardent Zionist, but the ex-roommate hadn’t shown any enthusiasm for Pollard’s idea, nor had he displayed any expression of sympathy.
The next day the friend called and met with Pollard and told him that he wanted nothing to do with this scheme, adding that if the analyst was serious about it he was going to the authorities. “I was just telling stories, if anyone ever asks,” Pollard replied, as if nothing had happened.13
Anne initially denied any attempt to recruit Pollard’s former roommate in a memorandum in aid of sentencing presented by her attorney on 26 February 1987. In it attorney James F. Hibey picks apart the government’s accusations that Anne participated in a recruitment attempt. He argues it was just a conversation taken out of context by a friend who cannot be deemed reliable. The memorandum reads, in part,
. . . in order to imply that Mrs. Pollard was involved in the planning stages of Mr. Pollard’s scheme, the government describes in detail a visit by the Pollards to a friend’s apartment. . . . The government alleges that, in the course of this visit, Mrs. Pollard and her husband jointly attempted to recruit the friend to participate in Mr. Pollard’s activities, However, the government’s account of this visit, based on the account of the “friend,” is simply inaccurate and untrue. It represents the use of incredible information to make a serious allegation of criminal conduct without any safeguards of reliability. . . .
The Pollards went to visit their friend on a Saturday evening in the spring of 1984, hoping to persuade him to go out to dinner with them. . . .
It is true that Mr. Pollard attempted to solicit his friend’s participation in whatever might come of Mr. Pollard’s initiative to work for the Israeli government. . . . Mr. Pollard and his friend discussed a proposal to aid the Israelis. . . . Mrs. Pollard did not participate in this discussion, although she had accompanied her husband to the friend’s apartment and apparently overheard parts of it. . . .
Disjointed quotes about “Anne’s going into business for herself” and Mr. Pollard’s proposed plan being “for the Brothers” (meaning the Israelis) are strung together as if there were a relationship there. What that relationship could possibly be is a mystery that even the government does not attempt to explain. . . .
Furthermore, the friend’s story is contradicted by the Pollards’ account of the visit, and by their insistence, verified by separate polygraph examinations that Mrs. Pollard never attempted to “recruit” anyone. The friend has not submitted to a polygraph examination; he has not been cross-examined. The Court should discount the friend’s version of events, as used by the government, as inherently untrustworthy and incredible.14
In order to end this matter once and for all, the government filed with the court a “government’s reply memorandum in aid of sentencing” on 3 March 1987, just one day before her sentencing, stating, “Not only is her statement denying her activities in this regard patently false, but no such claim was ever certified by the government’s polygraph examiner.” The government decided to reveal her recollections of the reasons why Pollard thought he needed a backup to help him in his spying activities. The following excerpts are taken from the court record of the FBI polygraph examiner, Special Agent Barry Colvert:
Anne Henderson Pollard stated that the Washington friend had grown up in Detroit in a predominately black neighborhood and his “Jewishness” had been an impediment to him while growing up and in later life in seeking employment. . . . She described the Washington friend as being violently “anti-Arab” and espousing, at least in private, the same views with regard to the need for the security of the state of Israel as her husband Jonathan Jay Pollard.
Anne Pollard leaves U.S. District Court on 4 June 1986 after she pleads guilty to two charges brought against her by the government. —WASHINGTON TIMES
Anne Henderson Pollard stated that during the spring of 1984 a number of terrorist incidents had occurred throughout the world that were directed at Israeli citizens and American Jews. These escalating incidents greatly disturbed both Jonathan Jay Pollard and Anne Henderson Pollard. Jonathan Jay Pollard became upset with the fact that he was unable to provide any assistance to the state of Israel. . . .
Anne Henderson Pollard stated that Jonathan Jay Pollard had tried to assume the nature of this assistance and had anticipated that he might need a “backup” . . . and that in the event he was unable to make these trips he would need someone to go in his place. He felt that it was extremely important that this person be as committed to the state of Israel as he, Jonathan Jay Pollard, was. . . . Both Jonathan Jay Pollard and Anne Henderson Pollard considered the Washington friend to be reliable, intelligent, a “quick study,” and felt that he was as completely “pro-Zionist” as they were. . . .
Israeli Consulate on the corner of East 42nd Street and Yitzhak Rabin Way, New York City, NY—TODD CAMERON WESTPHAL
She stated that she had gone to the Washington friend’s apartment with Jonathan Jay Pollard knowing in advance that he would at some time during the evening ask the Washington friend for his assistance. . . . When Jonathan Jay Pollard ultimately asked the Washington friend for his assistance, he was unable to provide any exact details as to the nature of this assistance, only that he would need his help. The Washington friend’s response, according to Anne Henderson Pollard, was one in which he did not say “yes” [and] did not say “no.” Anne Henderson Pollard stated that she felt very negative “vibes” about this conversation as the Washington friend did not show any enthusiasm for the idea presented by Jonathan Jay Pollard. She noted no expression of sympathy and felt immediately that Jonathan Jay Pollard should never have brought this subject up with the Washington friend.15
Pollard’s disappointment did not last long. He was, after all, scheduled to meet Colonel Aviem Sella, a man who had flown combat missions during the Six-Day War, led the daring air raid on the Osirak nuclear reactor facility in Tuwaitha, Iraq, and masterminded an air assault in the 1982 war in Lebanon during which Israel shot down ninety Syrian MiGs. Before arriving in New York to pursue his degree, Sella had served three years as chief of Israeli air force operations.
Sella wanted to meet Pollard too. Quite aware that this was a delicate matter requiring discretion, he decided to contact Yosef “Yossi” Yagur at the Israeli consulate in New York City. Yagur reported to the scientific intelligence-gathering unit of the Israeli prime minister’s office, the Lishka Lekisherey Mada (LAKAM). LAKAM gleaned its scientific and technical information from governments and corporations around the world, its operatives attending events such as trade shows and business meetings and combing through news articles and other public sources. Some information was also collected in clandestine operations.
Yagur was concerned about Sella meeting Pollard. After all, they didn’t know anything about this American. Furthermore, Sella was a war hero, not a clandestine operative trained to run foreign agents in the field. But Sella was eager to meet with Pollard. Yagur, after getting permission from a higher-up, gave the air force pilot the go-ahead, with a warning to be careful. Sella’s decision to meet Pollard would prove to be fatal. It eventually ruined his career, made him a fugitive from justice, and caused a serious riff between the United States and Israel.
