THE Emperor Nicholas II was a weak man. As Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies he could not even fulfil the easiest task of an absolute monarch in war, that of arousing enthusiasm when he reviewed his troops. They had in them a deep store of enthusiasm, but he did not know how to tap it. Yet his loyalty as an ally was a quality which should stand to his credit when his melancholy reign and tragic end are reviewed. He had every intention of fulfilling his pledge to Joffre by setting on foot a big offensive in June 1916. Earlier than that his Chief of the General Staff, Alexiev, did not believe it possible to strike with good prospects of success. The reorganization after the disasters of 1915 went a long way during the winter and spring. The ranks were filled; the troops were well fed, well clothed, and generally in good heart; there were rifles and cartridges for all, even if of several types; machine-guns were more numerous; field artillery ammunition was adequate. The worst remaining shortages were in heavy artillery, though here too some improvement appeared, and in aircraft.
In February the north-south front established after the defeats and retreats of the previous year was held by three vast groups of armies: Kuropatkin—the defeated commander in the Japanese war—from the Gulf of Riga to Dunaburg; Evert thence to south of the Pripet marshes; Ivanov thence to the Rumanian frontier. Immediately after the opening of the German offensive Joffre appealed to the Emperor to launch a diversionary attack. It was a situation in which a commander like Haig, thinking of his own plans and determined not to sacrifice his troops by sending them forward unready, might have refused. The Emperor not only accepted but opened the offensive as early as 18 March.