BY the end of 1916 the Egyptian Expeditionary Force had reached the Palestine frontier. On 9 January, 1917, it captured Rafa in an action brilliantly conducted by Major-General Sir Philip Chetwode with mounted troops, largely Australians and New Zealanders. It netted practically the whole garrison of two thousand. Simultaneously Murray lost one of his four infantry divisions, sent to France. He was, however, strong in cavalry and mounted infantry, with two divisions made up of Australian, New Zealand, and British Yeomanry brigades. He now decided to capture the ancient city of Gaza, the gateway to Palestine. It was held by only seven Turkish battalions and five batteries, two of them Austrian and one German. The plan of Murray’s subordinate, Lieut.-General Sir Charles Dobell, was pretty. The mounted troops would form a screen to hold off Turkish intervention from the east and south-east while the infantry took the place from the south. It had to be done quickly because communications were stretched and it was doubtful if nine thousand horses could be watered anywhere but in Gaza.
On 26 March the coup was nearly brought off. It might have succeeded but for fog, accidents, and misunderstandings. Intervention, under the vigorous leadership of Kress von Kressenstein, came promptly—for Turkish troops—but not in great strength. On the British side the cavalry was prematurely withdrawn to water just when it—not the infantry—had all but captured Gaza. The Turks were thus able to close in on the 27th and take the British infantry in enfilade with artillery. Dobell broke off the battle and withdrew to his original position. Murray cabled a misleading report which made Robertson suppose he had won a success, as a result of which he was informed, probably to his dismay, that his ‘immediate objective should be the defeat of the Turkish forces south of Jerusalem and the occupation of that town’. He tried again to take Gaza on 19 April. The situation was now changed because the Turks had dug themselves in along the Gaza–Beersheba road. The approach to their position was almost a glacis, and the British attack, gallantly as it was pressed, suffered a bloody repulse, with a loss of nearly 6,500 as against 2,000 on the Turkish side. This was too much for the War Cabinet and Robertson. Murray was recalled.
His successor, General Sir Edmund Allenby, who had commanded the Third Army at Arras, was a tall heavily built cavalryman, nicknamed ‘The Bull’ by reason of his formidable appearance and still more formidable temper. He took over a discouraged force and raised its spirits in a matter of weeks. One might have expected the independent and critical Australians to find him too authoritarian and brusque, but they rejoiced in his strength. Like most new men he demanded reinforcements, and got them. Two divisions were sent from Salonika; another was formed from British and Indian units in the theatre. Another had already been formed under Murray from Yeomanry not remounted since the Gallipoli campaign. Allenby moved General Headquarters from Cairo up to the front. Dobell had already been dismissed by Murray. Allenby formed two corps headquarters (Lieut.-Generals Sir E. S. Bulfin and Sir Philip Chetwode). He also formed a cavalry corps headquarters (The Desert Mounted Corps, commanded by the Australian Lieut.-General H. G. Chauvel) and, having been sent two Yeomanry brigades from Salonika, a new cavalry division, the Yeomanry Mounted Division. Seven infantry and three mounted divisions was a big army for a side-show, especially as the Turks were in evil case. Their tinsel dictator had sacrificed vast numbers of them to his megalomania; Yudenich had pounded them in Caucasia; their finest remaining troops had been packed off to serve against Russia and Rumania; they had now, as we shall see, been routed in Mesopotamia; and, typically of Turkish troops, their askers had deserted by scores of thousands. One last inflated scheme of Enver’s collapsed. A large Turkish army of fourteen divisions, reinforced by a German force of six thousand strong, had been formed to retake Baghdad under the command of General von Falkenhayn. It was found that, though narrow-gauge railways had been cut through the Taurus and Amanus, it was out of the question to maintain such a force in Mesopotamia. At the same time the growth of British strength in southern Palestine had been noted. Troops of the new Seventh Army (Mustapha Kemal) therefore began moving into Palestine, but only one division was present and Falkenhayn himself had not reached the scene when the British attacked.