CHAPTER SEVEN

THE BATTLE OF TEMPE GORGE

CROSSING THE PINIOS

In the darkness before dawn on 18 April 1941, the assault units of the 6th Gebirgsjäger Division, the 1st and 3rd Battalions (143rd Regiment), moved into their assembly areas. The 1st Battalion had orders to conduct a feint attack on the Pinios River east of Parapotamos to divert Allied attention from the main attack, which would be launched later by the 3rd Battalion further downstream, west of Parapotamos.1 After sunrise, the darkness gave way to a bright clear day.

At 0530 h, the New Zealand 25-pounder field guns from the 26th Battery opened fire on Gonnos village and the 1st Battalion’s assembly area, disrupting German preparations. Half an hour later, forward observers from the 2/2nd Australian Battalion spotted German soldiers descending the high ground from Gonnos advancing towards the river. The Allied artillery bombardment intensified as D Troop targeted infantry and machine guns north of the river and E Troop shelled the Germans above Gonnos.² Captain Hendry, commander of D Company (2/2nd Battalion), observed mountain troops moving west from Gonnos along the goat tracks and, because no forward observer had been established near his location, he directed the artillery fire.³

The twelve 75-mm mountain guns from the 1st Battalion (118th Artillery Regiment) returned fire. An artillery duel erupted across the Pinios which lasted all morning and increased in ferocity as additional guns and mortars joined the action. German artillery concentrated on counter-battery fire before targeting the river bank, and their gunners established dominance along the front as more of their guns came forward and commenced firing. The 118th Artillery Regiment’s after-action report described the engagement:

The battle developed as an artillery duel, and it would have been desirable to have had more artillery in position. I/118 fired mainly on English MT convoys with marked success. It was hard to engage the enemy artillery, some of which was beyond our range. . . . The enemy artillery, which obviously had very good Ops, was very watchful, and particularly engaged our Ops, and 2 Bty’s positions, with very accurate fire, which caused casualties in 2 Bty. But the enemy did not fire for real effect.4

At 0800 h, the 1st Battalion (143rd Regiment) commenced its feint attack at the river bend east of Parapotamos between A and D Companies (2/2nd Battalion) which was thinly held by patrols. The mountain troops moved forward as heavy mortars and a machine gun platoon suppressed the Australian troops on the south bank. The battalion commander noted that ‘enemy shelling increased, and as our troops approached the river they came under heavy MG fire from the hills east of Parapotamos’.⁵

The Australian soldiers of the 2/2nd Battalion engaged the mountaineers approaching the north bank with machine guns and mortars while New Zealand artillery continued to shell the area. Lieutenant Colonel Chilton, commander of the 2/2nd Battalion, ordered the Bren gun carriers from the 2/5th and 2/11st Australian Battalions to race to the river bend to engage the enemy from across the river.⁶

One hour after the 1st Battalion commenced the feint attack, its soldiers were 500 metres (546 yards) from the river. As the German approached the river, Chilton reported: ‘Enemy attack increasing in intensity — supported by Mortars. Their infantry clearly visible approaching river bank in large numbers.’⁷ A Company (2/2nd Battalion) harassed the Germans and the 3-inch mortar platoon targeted the enemy troops, but Chilton remained unaware that this attack was a feint designed to distract his attention from the upcoming main assault.⁸

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Chilton, commander of the 2/2nd Australian Battalion.

(AWM)

Lieutenant Love, in command of six Bren gun carriers, led his force to the river and concealed his vehicles beside the track before sending a section forward on foot on a reconnaissance mission. The patrol observed German soldiers and enemy mortars on the north bank before returning to the carriers. Love ordered his carriers forward and the platoon engaged the enemy at the river bend.

Chilton asked Lieutenant Colonel Macky, commander of the 21st Battalion, for his Bren gun carriers in order to repulse the anticipated crossing at the river bend. Macky sent nine carriers commanded by Lieutenant Dee, who rushed to the sector and deployed to the right of the Australian carriers already in combat. The New Zealanders opened fire at 1000 metres (1093 yards), killing several German soldiers crossing the river. As Macky had no means of communicating with his Bren gun carriers, they remained under Australian command.

The Germans returned fire with mortars, killing Private Sullivan, mortally wounding Lieutenant Love and wounding four other soldiers. Sergeant Stovin and Private MacQueen silenced a mortar with Bren gun fire. After Corporal Lacey exposed himself to enemy fire to allow the others to rescue the wounded, the carriers withdrew to safety. At 1130 h, the 1st Battalion stopped its feint attack, which had successfully deceived the Australians as Chilton incorrectly believed he had repulsed a determined river crossing.9

Allied Bren gun carriers in Greece.

(© IWM)

Before dawn, the 3rd Battalion (143rd Regiment) left Gonnos and advanced towards the Pinios near Parapotamos village. As the mountain troops approached the river, German artillery suppressed the Australian soldiers defending the south bank as the 6th Gebirgsjäger War Diary noted:

The divisional commander ordered the artillery to be used as assault guns. So far it had been engaged in a hard artillery duel with the enemy from positions north and west of Gonos. The accuracy of its fire contributed materially to the decisiveness of our success.¹⁰

The 6th Mountain Division assault across the Pinios River, 18 April 1941.

At 0645 h, a platoon led by Sergeant Denk crossed the river in a captured boat and, as the battalion commander explained, the patrol was ‘engaged in Parapotamos by English troops who had come up from Makii Chori on trucks’.11 As the battalion continuously ferried reinforcements across the river, the Germans occupied Parapotamos.

D Company (2/2nd Battalion) had watched the Germans moving down from Gonnos but had not observed the patrols crossing the river. Although Captain Hendry sent Lieutenant Watson’s 2 Platoon to investigate Parapotamos and destroy the ferry, enemy fire mortally wounded Corporal Baker and wounded two other soldiers, halting their advance.

The Australian forward observers called in artillery fire on German troops moving south of Gonnos for the rest of the morning. Captain Porter (2/2nd Battalion) directed the artillery using a field telephone with effective results. Lieutenant Clark from D Troop left the artillery position and established an observation post in the high ground near Parapotamos with excellent visibility. He directed artillery fire onto enemy mortars, machine guns and infantry, inflicting heavy casualties on the 3rd Battalion.¹²

By 0930 h, the Australian defence near Parapotamos village had collapsed and the men retreated southwards to high ground. As the German commander noted, ‘The accuracy of our shellfire on Parapotamos and the sudden burst of fire from Patrol No 1 forced the English . . . to withdraw.’¹³

The 3rd Battalion advanced south and east, threatening C Company (2/3rd Battalion) and D Company (2/2nd Battalion) near Hill 156 east of Parapotamos with encirclement. One hour later, the Australian left flank was virtually surrounded on three sides. The 2/2nd Battalion’s Bren gun platoon raced to clear the river in front of D Company, engaging the German infantry at the river near Parapotamos, but the crews sustained casualties from mortar fire and could not halt the enemy advance. As the mountain troops consolidated their bridgehead near Parapotamos, they also planned another crossing, closer to Tempe village.

As the Germans fought the Australians at Parapotamos, Major General Ferdinand Schörner ordered the 1st Battalion (143rd Regiment) to launch a full-scale assault across the river south-west of Tempe, opposite Evangelismos. The battalion commander sent a patrol forward in search of a crossing point west of the village which found a suitable location at the sandbank west of Evangelismos: ‘I decided at once to cross at the spot recced, and to attack the enemy at Evangelismos and on the hills SE of it.’14 At 1400 h, the 1st Battalion commenced its river assault:

As soon as the enemy at and SE of Evangelismos recognized our attack he opened heavy shell, mortar and MG fire on our bank and the river itself. But before the fire could have any effect 1 Coy (which had been directed to establish a bridgehead) had reached the other bank, thanks to the speed of the advance, which took the enemy by surprise.¹⁵

As the German troops crossed the river, an Australian soldier, Charlie Green, observed the enemy:

They had our position pinpointed from our fire earlier in the day, and then began a rain of mortar and machine gun fire on our positions. From our position we could see thousands of German troops moving down from the mountains on the opposite side of the river.¹⁶

A Company (2/2nd Battalion) engaged the mountaineers with intense Bren gun fire as Sergeant Geoff Coyle’s two 3-inch mortars rained down bombs on the ‘enemy troops amassing to cross the river’ who ‘presented an irresistible target’.¹⁷ Corporal Evans’ mortar team lobbed 350 bombs at Germans crossing the river, but they kept moving forward as their dead floated downstream. Frank Delforce, another Australian soldier, recalled: ‘Our lads mowed the bastards down like sheep, but they kept coming, wave after wave.’¹⁸

Major General Ferdinand Schörner, commander of the 6th Gebirgsjäger Division, in Greece.

(Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-L29176)

Despite considerable artillery, mortar and machine gun fire, the mountain company crossed the river and formed a beachhead, allowing the rest of the battalion to cross while Australian infantry and mortar fire harassed their movement. After the battalion reorganized on the south bank, the men attacked Evangelismos at 1600 h, as the 6th Gebirgsjäger War Diary noted:

The enemy offered stubborn opposition and some of our heavy weapons were casualties, so the attack made very slow progress. Not until 1730 hrs did we break into the enemy positions after hand-to-hand fighting.¹⁹

The battalion suffered twelve killed, one missing and sixty-nine wounded.20 As the Germans approached Evangelismos, they could hear the noise of battle coming from Tempe Gorge as Kampfgruppe Balck assaulted the New Zealand defence.

ASSAULTING TEMPE GORGE

As the German mountain troops clashed with the Australians along the Pinios, Kampfgruppe Balck prepared to attack the 21st New Zealand Battalion inside Tempe Gorge. The Germans would attack through the gorge, along both banks of the river, under the tactical command of Lieutenant Colonel Karl von Decker. On the north bank, the battlegroup consisted of the 1st Company (1st Panzer Battalion) and the Cycle Squadron of the 112th Reconnaissance Unit. On the south bank, the German force included six panzers, the 7th Company of the 2nd Battalion (304th Infantry Regiment) and two elite special forces patrols from the 800th Brandenburg Regiment.²¹

At dawn, the cycle squadron, which had left their bicycles behind, advanced west along the northern bank of the gorge. As the soldiers emerged from the safety of the railway tunnel, they met light resistance and made significant progress, advancing 2 kilometres (1.2 miles) until New Zealand machine gun fire from the south bank stopped their advance opposite the valley between B and C Companies (21st Battalion). Major Barth noted this setback in his after-action report:

The squadron advanced under aimed rifle fire and reached the shrine on the railway embankment . . . where it was halted by heavy enfilade fire from MGs, mortars and artillery from the hills south of the river.²²

Although the Germans returned fire with mortars and machine guns, New Zealand small-arms fire and artillery prevented progress and, as Decker explained, ‘their further advance wasn’t possible until the occupation of the south side was pushed forward’.²³

The cycle squadron on the north bank posed little threat to the 21st Battalion and Macky was more worried about the prospect of German mountain troops attacking the rear of his battalion. In the morning, he told his subordinates in a conference ‘that if completely cut off and overwhelmed, those left would make out in small parties to Volos’.24 Macky had earlier ordered his company commanders to hold their positions for as long as possible before falling back to a second defensive line, but this new order now empowered his company commanders to decide when to withdraw.

As the cycle squadron attacked along the north bank, the infantry from the 7th Company and the Brandenburger patrols, having crossed the river on kapok floats, continued clearing the abandoned roadblock. The panzer crews which had crossed the river the previous day waited anxiously for the obstacle to be cleared before they could commence their attack along the south bank road. Decker believed that as soon as his six panzers rolled forward and attacked the New Zealand positions, the cycle squadron currently pinned down on the north bank would be able to resume its advance.

The Allied artillery had concentrated its fire on the mountain troops attacking from Gonnos and the cycle squadron on the north bank without realizing the presence of enemy armour and infantry inside the gorge on the south bank.²⁵ As 10 Platoon had retreated from the roadblock the previous evening, the New Zealanders could no longer observe the obstacle or the river crossing and no patrols had been sent forward to investigate. The 21st Battalion, therefore, had no advance warning of the impending assault and its forward observers could not direct artillery fire at the Germans preparing to attack. Macky later acknowledged his critical error: ‘The major mistake at Pinios was the siting of the road block in the gorge. The defending platoon became defiladed. The block was rendered unobserved when this platoon had to be withdrawn.’²⁶

At midday, after the roadblock had been cleared, the six panzers moved forward, supported by the men from the 7th Company and the Brandenburger troops. German fire from the cycle squadron on the north bank intensified as the panzers advanced west along the road towards B Company’s position on the New Zealand right flank.

As the soldiers of 12 Platoon — the forward element of B Company — continued engaging the cycle squadron across the river, six panzers suddenly approached their position along the south bank road. The New Zealanders opened fire on the tanks as mortar fire rained down on their own position. The panzers bypassed the men of 12 Platoon who could not stop the tanks with their inadequate weapons as they endured heavy suppressive fire. Major Le Lievre, after observing the panzers pass 10 Platoon, moved B Company further up the ridge towards D Company’s position near Ampelakia village in accordance with Macky’s order which authorized company commanders to independently withdraw. Once the soldiers of B Company reached the high ground, they had an excellent view of the Germans but were too far away to engage them.

The panzers halted to fire at the men of B Company while they climbed the ridge towards Ampelakia. As Allied artillery fire targeted the tanks, the infantry from the 7th Company and the Brandenburger troops advanced over the ridges while fire from the panzers and German artillery supported their movement. Decker noted that the ‘attack went forward. About 80 prisoners were taken that were pulled out of the mountains’.27 Balck observed that his infantry ‘climbed like goats and cleared out the enemy positions, under cover of the fire of the leading tanks’.²⁸

Decker, believing the incoming artillery fire was covering an Allied withdrawal, ordered the cycle squadron to resume its advance along the north bank. The squadron, as Balck noted, ‘advanced 4 km, under shellfire and flanking MG fire from the south bank all the way. The road forward was not easy even for old soldiers.’²⁹ Decker informed Balck that the assaults on both sides of the river were making slow progress because the panzers had difficulty advancing along the narrow road on the south bank. Balck, however, bluntly replied, ‘I don’t want to hear from you until you have taken Tempe. I can’t give you any more troops.’³⁰

The panzers slowly approached the ridge held by C Company and the anti-tank guns of L Troop. The New Zealand gunners, who had only expected panzers to appear on the north bank, were astonished to see enemy tanks on the south bank. Captain Nolan attempted to direct artillery fire on the tanks from his observation post, but the field guns could not properly target the south bank because the steep cliff walls protected the Germans from the flat trajectory of the shells.³¹ As the panzers approached the ridge held by 13 Platoon, they fired ineffectively uphill at the men in pits. Although 14 and 15 Platoons in the higher ground withdrew up the ridge, the soldiers of 13 Platoon in the lower ground 90 metres (98 yards) from the tanks were trapped in their pits.³²

As the New Zealand defence collapsed, Captain Robert McClymont, commander of A Company, reported to Battalion Headquarters. Macky ordered him to delay the enemy as long as possible, before retreating up the ridge and forming a rearguard to cover the withdrawal of the battalion towards Volos.

At 1300 h, the panzers cautiously resumed their advance towards Tempe village and, as German infantry advanced over the ridge, Lieutenant Mervyn O’Neill surrendered 13 Platoon, which had suffered one fatality and two wounded. Balck observed that the New Zealand prisoners ‘acted with dignity, refused to make any statements, and firmly believed in the victory of the Empire’.33 11 Platoon (B Company) watched the panzers advancing towards Tempe from the high ground further up the ridge, but they could not direct artillery fire against the tanks because they did not have a radio.³⁴ After Second-Lieutenant Yeoman received Major Le Lievre’s orders to withdraw, he pulled back his forward sections, which were engaging German infantry, and his men retreated to the hills above Ampelakia.

As the panzers approached the anti-tank guns, they reached the crater created by the Australian engineers in front of the spur near C Company as Decker explained: ‘the road was again destroyed by detonation. The second lead Panzer had to halt and the Pioneer-Zug of the Abteilung [battalion] pulled forward. After scouting, it turned out that this barrier was crossable.’³⁵

The crew of gun L4, camouflaged behind the spur under the command of Sergeant Cavanagh, had observed the panzers reach the crater. After the first panzer rounded the spur, he held his fire waiting for more tanks to come within range. The panzers halted and their crews climbed out to wait for the other tanks to arrive. After the third tank appeared, Cavanagh opened fire at 90 metres (98 yards).³⁶ Decker witnessed two panzers burst into flames:

As both lead Panzers (Leutnant Brunnenbusch and Feldwebel [Sergeant] Weber) drove forward to attack the village of Tempi, each was hit twice by anti-tank gun fire that knocked them out of action. Of all of the crew members, only Feldwebel Weber was unscathed. Three of the crew were killed and the fourth severely burned. Four including Leutnant Brunnenbusch were severely wounded and one lightly wounded.³⁷

Balck also observed the destruction: ‘In a moment both point tanks were burning. Some of the crews, including 2/Lt Brunnenbusch, escaped into the thick scrub seriously wounded’ and the medics ‘came up quickly and had plenty to do’.38 Sergeant Grzeschik, a panzer driver, battled the flames with a fire extinguisher until the ammunition exploded.

As the infantry from the 7th Company engaged the New Zealanders of C Company, the four remaining panzers on the south bank resumed their advance. Balck watched his tanks engage the defenders and ‘some of them got direct hits too. Finally one tank fought its way forward alone, defending itself with great difficulty against the direct fire of the artillery and A Tk guns.’³⁹ The Germans could not pinpoint gun L4’s location, but after the troops of C Company retreated, Cavanagh realized his gun position was isolated and decided to withdraw. The crew retreated to their truck 90 metres (98 yards) away and drove to the lines held by the 2/2nd Australian Battalion, only to later be captured by the Germans.⁴⁰

German infantry located gun L1, commanded by Sergeant Quinn, at the foot of the ridge and opened fire, as Decker reported: ‘An enemy anti-tank gun was positioned about 50 meters behind the barrier. Its crew was pinned down by machine gun fire from the northeast of Itis.’⁴¹ Soldiers from the 7th Company probably destroyed gun L3 as a lieutenant earned a Knight’s Cross in the action and his citation stated ‘he personally destroyed with hand grenades an A Tk position which fought to the last’.⁴² As the panzers approached Tempe village and the exit of the gorge, the Germans on the south bank had suffered three killed, six wounded and two tanks destroyed.⁴³

After the surviving panzers resumed their advance, artillery fire halted their further progress for two hours. The New Zealanders withdrew as the remaining 21st Battalion positions on the high ground became untenable. As each platoon retreated through the gullies and ravines of Mount Ossa, Macky lost contact with his men as his battalion fragmented and only A Company and a section of Bren gun carriers remained effectively under his command.⁴⁴

As Kampfgruppe Balck approached A Company and the exit of the gorge, the Bren gun carriers kept the infantry at bay but the panzers, supported by mortar fire, broke into their position. After German fire knocked out the Australian anti-tank gun, the New Zealand infantry could no longer offer effective resistance. Warrant Officer Lockett, in a desperate exploit, rammed his Bren gun carrier into the lead panzer, knocking it off the road in an act of valour which earned him the Military Medal.45 Lockett tragically died the following month in Crete, on 27 May 1941. After the Germans had knocked out four of the six carriers, the others withdrew under the cover of artillery fire. With the New Zealand defence routed, Decker could now turn his panzers south along the road to Evangelismos.

Kampfgruppe Balck’s assault through Tempe Gorge.

Macky had ineffectively attempted to command his companies from battalion headquarters and failed to maintain situational awareness or influence the battle.⁴⁶ He effectively delegated command to each of his company commanders who fought individual battles without being able to support each other. In contrast, Balck placed Decker firmly in charge of all German forces inside the gorge who co-ordinated the two groups on both sides of the river, which mutually supported each other’s operations.

CRISIS AT TEMPE

As the Australians fought the German mountain troops crossing the Pinios River, Macky informed Chilton by radio that Tempe village was under heavy mortar fire and his men were engaging enemy troops inside the gorge from across the river. Chilton did not realize the Germans had overrun the 21st Battalion: ‘During all our conversations he [Macky] never indicated that his position was at all serious or that he intended to withdraw.’47 After midday, contact over the radio abruptly ceased and Chilton remained ignorant of the collapse of the 21st Battalion’s defence.

One group of fleeing New Zealanders passed through Chilton’s headquarters and Major Paul Cullen remembered that efforts were made ‘to stop them and persuade them to stay with us, but we mostly failed’.⁴⁸ One New Zealand platoon commanded by Lieutenant Southworth rallied and Chilton placed the troops in ‘the centre of the position’ and they carried out their duty ‘in a very creditable manner during the remainder of the day’.⁴⁹

Balck’s panzers meanwhile advanced towards Tempe, followed by soldiers in trucks and marching infantry, and the Germans reached the village in the early afternoon. After advancing along the north bank, the cycle squadron also reached the village, as Major Barth noted, ‘Tempe was reached at 1530 hrs, and the enemy was thrown back out of the houses in Tempe along the railway embankment. At 1645 hrs the blown railway bridge was stormed.’⁵⁰ The squadron had suffered four killed and ten wounded, including its commander Lieutenant Count zu Eltz.⁵¹

After the New Zealand withdrawal, the men of the 2/2nd Battalion experienced a two-hour lull in the battle, although intermittent mortar and machine gun fire continued to harass their positions. By this time, the Australians had suffered around forty killed and wounded.⁵²

In the C Company (2/2nd Battalion) position south-west of Tempe village, Captain Buckley waited for the inevitable German attack: ‘Throughout the morning small arms fire was coming from NZ Bn on our right. Could not see what they were shooting at.’53 After a group of 21st Battalion soldiers passed through the company’s lines, Buckley learned that German tanks had passed the roadblock and that the New Zealand anti-tank gunners had been overwhelmed.

As the panzers moved south from Tempe village towards C Company, Chilton ordered Buckley to warn his anti-tank gunners to expect the enemy and defend the road from the village. Buckley, however, reported to Chilton that the New Zealand crew from gun L2 had fled, taking the breech-block with them.⁵⁴ The Australians of C Company engaged the advancing panzers from the slopes above the road, but without anti-tank support they could not stop the enemy.

After a tank drove through Lieutenant Lovett’s platoon, 365 metres (400 yards) in front of Buckley’s headquarters, most of the platoon fell back across the road to the southern slopes. Lovett had been wounded and was later captured by the Germans. Three panzers advanced south along the road and fired on the Australian anti-tank gun, preventing the crew from shooting back, making the infantry position untenable. Buckley informed Chilton that tanks had broken into his position and German infantry were firing on his troops from the high ground previously held by the New Zealanders. After Buckley lost contact with battalion headquarters, he independently ordered his men to withdraw, a decision Chilton later agreed with: ‘In the light of all facts now known to me Capt. Buckley’s decision was justified.’⁵⁵

In the late afternoon, as the men of C Company withdrew up the ridges, the Australian and New Zealand Bren gun carriers covered their withdrawal. The panzers halted and fired on the retreating Australians with canons and machine guns. As Kampfgruppe Balck overwhelmed the right flank of the Australian defence, the German mountain soldiers threatened to overrun Chilton’s left flank.

COLLAPSE OF THE AUSTRALIAN LEFT FLANK

As the Australian and New Zealand soldiers fought the Germans along the Pinios, Major General Bernard Freyberg ordered Brigadier Arthur Allen, in command of all Allied units around Tempe, to hold the road to Larissa until 0300 h the next day to allow the rest of W Force to pass through the crossroads. The 6th New Zealand Brigade was scheduled to pass through the town at 0100 h and Allen Force had to keep the Germans at bay until then. Allen accordingly planned a rearguard action and placed Lieutenant Colonel Lamb, commander of the 2/3rd Battalion, in command of the force. The rearguard was based around Lamb’s B and D Companies, which had been placed in reserve near Makrikhorion railway station. The New Zealand Divisional Cavalry Regiment despatched a squadron to Allen Force to reinforce his defence of the Tempe–Larissa Road.

The Allied troops fighting at the Pinios were to withdraw and rendezvous at the rearguard to strengthen its defence. As C Company (2/3rd Battalion) and D Company (2/2nd Battalion), under Chilton’s command, continued fighting the German mountain troops near Parapotamos on the Allied left flank, Lamb despatched orders to C Company to withdraw to the rearguard at dusk and to pass that order on to D Company.56

At 1400 h, thirty-five German aircraft circled Makrikhorion railway station near Allen’s headquarters for half an hour, dropping bombs, and one smashed the railway station.⁵⁷ After the air raid, General Freyberg arrived at Allen’s headquarters, hoping to find out what had happened to the 21st Battalion. As Macky could not be reached, Freyberg phoned Chilton who explained that contact with Macky had ceased. After Chilton described the situation and assured the general that he would collect any New Zealand stragglers, Freyberg told Allen, ‘You’ve a fine man up there, he’s as cool as a cucumber.’⁵⁸ After this conversation, Allen lost contact with Chilton.

As Allen and Lamb planned the rearguard, the soldiers of D Company (2/2nd Battalion) and C Company (2/3rd Battalion) continued to resist the mountain soldiers. Although D Company near Hill 156 held its ground, around 1500 h Captain Hendry reported to Chilton over the field telephone that the enemy was moving round his left flank and digging in south of Parapotamos. Chilton ordered Hendry to withdraw his patrol from the river bank and to counter-attack with Sergeant Stovin’s Bren gun carriers at the flats to the west.⁵⁹ After Hendry received this order, the phone line went dead.

Hendry withdrew his patrol from the river and prepared the counter-attack until Captain Murchison arrived with an order signed by Captain Walker, the 2/3rd Battalion’s adjutant. Walker’s order stated that C Company (2/3rd Battalion) was ‘now withdrawing’ and Murchison must co-ordinate the withdrawal of C and D Companies.60 Hendry questioned the misinterpreted order but ultimately obeyed it and in the afternoon, the men of C and D companies fell back towards Makrikhorion railway station, covered by Bren gun carriers, while German mortars and infantry harassed their movement. After the men reached Makrikhorion, Lamb ordered them to join the rearguard.⁶¹

Although the premature withdrawal of C and D Companies left a wide gap in the Australian defence, Chilton knew nothing about Lamb’s order or its misinterpretation. When German fire on the 2/2nd Battalion’s left flank ceased, he incorrectly assumed that both companies on the left flank had been overrun. Chilton’s A and B Companies remained the only Allied force left defending the Pinios near Evangelismos and the men now found themselves in an impossible position, threatened by Kampfgruppe Balck from the east and the mountain soldiers of the 6th Gebirgsjäger from the west.

THE FALL OF EVANGELISMOS

In the late afternoon, Balck reached Tempe village and ordered his men south towards Evangelismos on the road to Larissa with the 2nd Company (1st Panzer Battalion), commanded by Lieutenant von Nostitz-Wallwitz, and the 7th Company (304th Infantry Regiment) in the lead while the battle-scarred 1st Company (1st Panzer Battalion) followed behind the vanguard. ‘It was a marvellous feeling to advance with 2 Coy,’ Balck declared, ‘with a wide valley ahead and abandoned enemy guns by the roadside.’⁶² The 1st Battalion (143rd Regiment) also advanced south-east towards the village from its bridgehead on the Pinios.

The Allied artillery could not disrupt the German advance because the gunners had too many targets for their small number of field guns to cope with. After the panzers entered Tempe village, Lieutenant Hanna suggested moving the guns to positions better suited for an anti-tank role, but permission was refused. The artillery observers withdrew to their guns while a Stuka dive-bombing raid caused confusion and delay but no casualties.

A Company (2/2nd Battalion), which had been engaging the Germans crossing the river, also faced attack from Kampfgruppe Balck along the Tempe–Evangelismos road. The company — supported by eleven Bren gun carriers and an Australian anti-tank gun — was now the only Allied force between the Germans and Evangelismos. After learning that panzers had overrun C Company on the outskirts of Tempe, Captain Caldwell prepared to defend his position and German small-arms fire soon harassed 7 Platoon on the right rear of his position.63 At 1655 h, two panzers approached Caldwell’s right flank:

. . . the first enemy tank came in from the right flank and was knocked out, in flames, by a 2 lb anti-tank gun fwd of Coy HQ. A second tank was also hit but withdrew. These were approaching along the road. This line of advance was then abandoned and tanks came between the road and river.⁶⁴

After another ten German armoured vehicles with infantry support arrived, Decker pressed his attack with his 2nd Panzer Company, supported by the infantry of the 7th Company marching on foot. The tanks and riflemen soon broke into A Company’s position so Caldwell ordered a withdrawal up the ridge. From the high ground, he witnessed panzers and infantry advancing south, followed by more tanks and motorized infantry. As the panzers advanced, the Bren gun carriers covered the infantry’s withdrawal. Decker, cautious after the losses on the road, halted his panzers and the stationary armour fired on the carriers and forced them to withdraw.

After A Company retreated, Kampfgruppe Balck exited Tempe Gorge and moved west into the open ground on the road to Larissa. The panzers spread out across the western flats and, as they advanced, the two New Zealand 25-pounders commanded by Second-Lieutenant Brown opened fire. Sergeant Franklin’s gun from A Troop (5th Field Regiment), positioned east of the railway on the southern outskirts of Evangelismos, engaged the panzers, hitting the first two tanks which burst into flames. The third tank, however, returned fire and hit a truck loaded with petrol and explosives, creating a fireball which forced Sergeant Franklin to withdraw.⁶⁵ The gun crew headed south down the road and joined an Australian convoy.

Sergeant Gunn’s 25-pounder from F Troop (4th Field Regiment), positioned further south, knocked out two panzers, but another tank came forward and searched for the camouflaged gun. The crew manhandled their gun 90 metres (98 yards) and re-engaged the Germans from a slight hollow. After firing the last armour-piercing shell, Gunner Kelly attempted to collect more ammunition as Warrant Officer Tasker kept the German infantry at bay with a Bren gun. After a tank shell burst below the gun, wounding three crewmen, the others attempted to withdraw the gun, but their vehicle could not be backed into the hollow and the uninjured men could not pull the gun out on their own. The gunners had little choice but to withdraw in their vehicle back to the artillery line. Balck praised the courage of the field gunners who ‘scored hits which caused casualties both to the infantry and to us’.66

Hermann Balck in his command tank and a New Zealand prisoner of war.

(Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1994-009-17)

After Kampfgruppe Balck captured Evangelismos and continued south, the men linked up with the mountain soldiers from the 1st Battalion (143rd Regiment) advancing from the Pinios. By this time, the battalion had suffered twelve killed, sixty-nine wounded and one missing. Major General Schörner ordered the entire 6th Gebirgsjäger Division to cross the river and pursue the retreating enemy towards Larissa.67

The 1st and 2nd Battalions (143rd Regiment) advanced towards Makrikhorion railway station while the 3rd Battalion moved up the high ground south of Parapotamos towards Hill 591. The 141st Regiment advanced from Gonnos towards the Pinios and Captain Maile, commander of the 1st Battalion, noted:

When the battalion arrived there was considerable noise of fighting going on. The enemy was still offering opposition and trying to prevent us from crossing the Pinios in order to avoid being surrounded and to be able to carry out an orderly withdrawal.⁶⁸

The 1st Battalion crossed the river under artillery fire and advanced towards Makrikhorion village, west of the railway station.

Meanwhile, B Company (2/2nd Battalion), near battalion headquarters south of Evangelismos, defended the Tempe–Larissa road alone after A, C and D Companies had withdrawn. As Kampfgruppe Balck approached, the crew of the last Australian anti-tank gun, 70 metres (76.5 yards) from battalion headquarters, fled and Chilton explained: ‘No orders for its withdrawal were given and it had not been in action.’⁶⁹ Smoke from the burning panzers drifted south-west, creating a screen hiding the German tanks and infantry moving on the flat west of the road. As stray bullets began landing around battalion headquarters, Chilton talked to stragglers passing through his headquarters:

I halted some of troops on right flank and ascertained they were A Coy men. They informed me that enemy tanks had reached their forward area and that their O.C. (Capt. Caldwell) had given them instructions to scatter and take to the hills — every man for himself. They informed me that C Coy was withdrawing — no news of B Coy.⁷⁰

As German troops attacked from the north and north-west, Lieutenant Gibbins’ platoon from the 2/3rd Battalion and Lieutenant Southworth’s platoon from the 21st Battalion withdrew into the hills. The men of B Company resisted and Balck observed their valiant defence:

The Australians defended themselves desperately, but they had no tanks, and their antitank capabilities were limited since they had counted on the rough ‘No-Go’ terrain. The enemy was caught totally by surprise, wondering where we had come from. . . . We broke through line after enemy line. Their trucks went up in flames left and right, and we destroyed what few antitank guns they had.71

After panzers and infantry engaged the battalion headquarters staff at close range, Chilton ordered B Company to retreat. The wounded in the regimental aid post withdrew first, followed by battalion headquarters and B Company. Lieutenant Adrian Wilson, the battalion transport officer, formed a line of logistics troops and engaged several Panzer IV medium tanks with rifle and pistol fire.⁷² The signallers destroyed their radios and moved south down the road. A section, commanded by Corporal Kentwell, covered the withdrawal of Chilton’s headquarters by firing anti-tank rifles and Bren guns at the tanks, before withdrawing to another position further up the hill.⁷³

Meanwhile, a patrol led by Second-Lieutenant Mittinger from the 1st Battalion (141st Regiment) attacked Makrikhorion village, north-west of the railway station, held by Australian soldiers who had retreated from the Pinios:

We carried on through orchards, and were again fired on from Pt 326. L/Cpl Ricko definitely destroyed this post, using tracer ammunition. Enemy snipers and MH fire from Makrihori prevented us advancing directly on Makrihori. We moved to our left and wiped out the snipers with MG and machine-pistol fire. We broke into Makrihori with hand grenades and machine pistols and took possession of the SE exit of the village.⁷⁴

After the mountain soldiers had captured Makrikhorion village, the men observed panzers advancing south from their vantage point. As darkness fell, small parties of Australians climbed nearby hills east and west of the road to Larissa. As Kampfgruppe Balck and the mountain troops advanced south, Lamb’s rearguard near Makrikhorion railway station was the only force between the Germans and Larissa and the fate of W Force hung in the balance.