RBZh-PL-82, Article 84:
When the main ballast tanks are damaged but water does not enter the pressure hull of a surfaced submarine, one can right the submarine in accordance with documents on keeping a damaged submarine afloat and the RBITS. Then one must monitor the submarine’s attitude more closely, blowing as necessary as the undamaged main ballast tanks, not equipped with Kingston valves, fill from wave action.
As was mentioned earlier, the “Manual on Combat Use of Technical Resources” (RBITS) had not been written for the submarine Komsomolets by Naval Institute Number One. The submarine’s attitude (fore and aft trim) was not monitored during the entire accident.
From the ship’s log: “1134—List to port increasing. Main ballast tank blown, list eight.”
Another mistake by the attack center. Pressure in compartment seven was growing due to entry of air into it from the medium-pressure air (VSD), outboard air (VZY), and 200 kg/cm2 high-pressure air (VVD-200) lines. Hot air, together with combustion products, entered the starboard main ballast tank No. 10 through the damaged emergency blow line and purged the tank. This caused the list to port to grow. The submarine command did not even try to determine the reason for the increasing list. No one checked the status of the ballast tanks. Instead of this, they repeatedly blew the end groups of the main ballast tanks. They uselessly expended the high-pressure air reserve and added fresh air to compartment seven, which intensified the fire. There are no grounds for asserting that, even after this repeated blowing, the valves of the emergency blow system of the aft group of main ballast tanks, located on air cofferdam No. 4 in compartment seven, opened spontaneously, because the watch officer at the bridge did not note spontaneous blowing of these tanks.
From the ship’s log:
1136—VPL delivered a second time to “Korund.”
1137—Transmit damage control signal. “Korund” fire put out.
Damage control signal transmitted. Open supply line’s clack valve.
The VPL system was recharged, and the fire in the “Korund” console was put out with it. The damage control signal was prepared for transmission nineteen minutes previously, but it was not until this time that it was first transmitted. The consequences of this delay have already been discussed. There was a great deal of smoke in the attack center and all of compartment three. It was impossible to start up the exhaust fan of the forward ring of the ship ventilation system because of the absence of power at distribution panel RShchN No. 7. Because of the lack of cooling, the diesel generator was operating at low rpm, and it was unable to remove smoke gases from compartment three. Under these conditions the submarine’s leadership apparently decided to start up the electric supply fan of the forward ring of the ship ventilation system, and gave the command to open the outer clack valve on the ventilation supply line.
Lieutenant A. V. Zaytsev (explanatory note): “It was impossible to start up the supply fans.”
The electric supply fans of the ship ventilation system received electric power from disconnectable load sections of the main distribution panels; they were deenergized after the reactor’s emergency shielding was activated. The command to open the clack valves was apparently not carried out.
From the ship’s log:
1141—List increasing.
1142—No communication with six. Command to open clack valve transmitted from three to four by tapping on wall.
1143—Clack valve opened on exhaust. . . . Four and five. List correcting itself.
The attack center is still unaware of the fire in compartment six. This is the only way that the entry regarding absence of communication with it can be interpreted. It is unclear in this case how Captain Lieutenant Dvorov could be so certain that he reported the fire in compartment six to the command.
At the same time the command to open the clack valve of the exhaust ventilation system between compartments four and five was transmitted to compartment four by tapping on the wall; opening the valve would reduce pressure from compartment five through the exhaust line of the forward ring of the ship ventilation system. But there was no one to carry out this command, because Lieutenant Makhota and Warrant Officer Valyavin were helpless in the instrument enclosure.
How do we interpret the two conflicting entries differing by two minutes: “List increasing” and “List correcting itself”? What was done by the personnel to correct the list? The ship’s log is silent about this. Lieutenant Zaytsev, the operator of the “Molybden” console, is also silent. And what do the other participants of the tragedy have to say? Here are two explanatory reports:
Captain Lieutenant I. S. Orlov:
There was a report “No. 1 TsNPK station is burning” from compartment four, after which there was no more communication. My subsequent actions were as follows: While monitoring the cooling process, in response to a command from BCh-5 commander Captain Lieutenant [S. A.] Nezhutin and I, the commander of the remote control division, opened and closed the vent valves of the starboard main ballast tank No. 5 to correct the list manually.
Warrant Officer V. S. Kadantsev: “When the submarine surfaced, it was listing to port, the starboard main ballast tank No. 5 and the starboard main ballast tank No. 7 were filled.”
Flooding of the starboard main ballast tank No. 7 will be discussed later on; now let’s analyze the matter of the starboard main ballast tank No. 5. The hydraulic drives of the vent valves of this tank (shut-offs one and two) are located practically beneath the chair of the operator of the main propulsion unit console; quite naturally, therefore, console operator Captain Lieutenant Orlov should have helped to open the tank vent valves. At the end of the tragedy Warrant Officer Kadantsev personally blew the starboard main ballast tank No. 5 on orders from the BCh-5 commander. In this connection there are no grounds for believing the testimony of Orlov and Kadantsev.
And so, in order to correct the list to port the decision to flood the starboard main ballast tank No. 5 was made in the attack center. What can be said about this decision? First of all, a list of even 8 degrees is not dangerous from the standpoint of maintaining the submarine’s transverse equilibrium, and sacrificing buoyancy reserve to reduce it is highly inappropriate. Second, before the submarine’s list was corrected, the reason for it should have been clarified, which was not done. Third, neither the instructions nor the training manual recommend correcting list by flooding the ballast tank in the middle group. In this case, if the decision had been made to correct the ship’s list, the ballast tank of the forward group should have been flooded. This would have made it possible not only to correct the list but also to trim the submarine. The main danger to a submarine is the loss not of transverse but of longitudinal equilibrium (stability). Hence, on the whole, the decision of the submarine command to flood the starboard main ballast tank No. 5 was incompetent.
Nonetheless, the starboard main ballast tank No. 5 was flooded, but the list was not corrected—on the contrary, it increased somewhat. This must be the interpretation of the entries in the ship’s log for the period from 1141 to 1143.
Why did this happen? Prior to the accident the submarine was at a depth of 386 meters. At this depth, main ballast tank No. 5 should have been connected for blowing by powder gas generators. During the emergency surfacing, and in all probability, “Molybden” console operator Lieutenant Zaytsev did not connect the tank to the high-pressure air blowing line, and the submarine surfaced with main ballast tank No. 5 unblown. When the vent valves were opened, water from the tanks on the starboard side drained off down to the water line, which resulted in a certain increase in list to port. This was apparently so much of a surprise to the attack center that it tempered its eagerness to fight listing for a long time. In addition, the carelessness in blowing the tank is, in all probability, the main reason why Lieutenant Zaytsev concealed the fact of flooding of starboard main ballast tank No. 5.