From the ship’s log: “1230—Seaman Filippov connected up to IDA-59. Check out compartment three.”
Warrant Officer V. F. Slyusarenko (explanatory report):
Then I saw Seaman Filippov, who ran over carrying an IDA-59. He was connected up to a PDU1 and he tried to switch over to the IDA-59, but his hands were shaking, and he didn’t know what to do to put it on. I helped him switch over from the PDU to the IDA-59. After this he hurried over to prepare the diesel generator for starting in the hold of compartment three.
Such was Seaman R. K. Filippov’s effort in putting on the IDA-59. Who was supposed to be responsible for such crew training?
From the ship’ s log: “1233—Two men transferred from compartment four: Makhota, Valyavin. Went topside.”
Warrant Officer V. S. Kadantsev (explanatory report):
After the fire in compartment four, the personnel of this compartment took shelter in the instrument enclosure. A damage control party consisting of damage control division commander Captain 3rd Rank Yudin, me, and Lieutenant Tretyakov was created for their evacuation. We put on our IP-6s and left for compartment four. The compartment was extremely smoky. The damage control division commander opened the air lock to the instrument enclosure and went in, closing the door behind him. At this time I checked the compartment’s readiness for venting into the atmosphere. Rapping could be heard from compartment five. Opening the bulkhead door leading to compartment five, I entered the compartment five airlock, but I couldn’t open the airlock door. I couldn’t do it together with the damage control division commander either.
Lieutenant A. V. Makhota (interrogation tape recording):
The first party of scouts couldn’t open us up. The second party did, obviously because the evacuating compressors were working [they were relieving pressure]. We donned our PDUs and left compartment three, and we were led up to the superstructure.
Due to the aggressive actions taken by Captain 3rd Rank Yudin, it was possible to lead the personnel of compartment four out of the radio room. At this time the readiness of the fourth compartment for venting into the atmosphere was checked. But another two hours and twenty-four minutes passed before venting of the compartment was started. There is no justification for the delay.
From the ship’s log:
1235—Smoky in VTsK. Filippov. Report gas composition of two. Take SPS2 documents up to VSK (commander’s order). Entry of smoke into compartment three stopped. 3 gm/m3 in compartment two (initially through the ShDA). Compartment three inspected. High smoke content in TsVK, no open flames.
By this time the fire in compartments six and seven had apparently gone out. The pressure in them continued to fall, and by 1235 it decreased to 3 kg/cm2. The safety valves of the trim system’s air line stopped bleeding air and combustion products from compartment seven into compartment three. Entry of smoke into compartment three diminished abruptly, which is noted in the ship’s log. Still, air continued to enter compartment three through other unclosed pipelines, albeit in small quantities. Poisoned air was entering from the air console of the high-pressure air fitting control system, located in the TsVK compartment.
Warrant Officer V. S. Kadantsev (interrogation tape recording):
The smoke level in the aft section was very high, and a large amount of air was being bled from the main air console (from the far left manipulator). The entire interior of the air console, where all of the pipes connect to 45 kg/cm2, and all of the pipes were sprayed with dirty soot.
Considering the way the pneumatic fittings of the high air pressure system were configured, why would smoky gas go through the system in compartment three, and what could have been done to stop its introduction? A control valve was located on the air control panel. It is subject to the average air pressure. These valves are connected to pneumatic piping with high-pressure fittings. When the valves controlling the piping are closed, the control valve is vented to the atmosphere in compartment three. When the control valve is open, its piping is disconnected from the atmosphere of the compartment and medium pressure air is directed into the openings of the corresponding fittings of high pressured air. When the control valves are closed simultaneously, stopping the supply of medium air pressure, the pneumatic piping control valve is connected to the atmosphere of compartment three, the pressure from the piping is compromised, and the high air pressure fitting closes. At the time of the accident, the air console controlling the high air pressure fitting was located in the initial position; that is, the control valves were closed, but the pneumatic piping was connected to the atmosphere of compartment three. During the fire, the pneumatic piping fittings for blowing the stern group of the MBTs became frozen (“blind effect” due to condensation of moisture in the air) and smoky gas from compartment seven began to enter compartment three unimpeded, as Warrant Officer Kadantsev discovered during his visit to the location of the TsVK. And again, his inaction is incomprehensible. The warrant officer saw the location from where the smoking gas was leaking and did nothing to stop it. In order to stop the introduction of the smoky gas, the supply of the medium air pressure had to be released at the air console and the fitting control valve for blowing the stern group of the MBTs had to be opened. By doing this, the pneumatic piping going to compartment seven would be separated from compartment three and the introduction of the smoky gas into compartment three would have been stopped. But apparently, a poor understanding of the ship’s systems and the unsatisfactory execution of the damage control tasks, due in part to the absence of the RBITS, did not afford the warrant officer the ability to stop the introduction of gas through this piping.
Lieutenant A. V. Tretyakov (explanatory report): “In compartment three, the executive officer gave orders to inspect the hold, and to find seamen [A. V.] Mikhalev and Filippov. We checked the hold, and reported through Lieutenant Fedotko that neither was there.”
At this moment Seaman Filippov, who had donned his IDA-59, returned to the hold of compartment three and was helping to start the diesel generator.
The attack center’s supposition that fires were burning in compartment three was not confirmed. Venting of compartments two and three had not yet been started because of the absence of power at distribution panel RShchN No. 7, which is why the amount of smoke in the compartments remained high. The carbon monoxide concentration in the air of compartment two exceeded the maximum permissible concentration by over 600 times. However, the concentration of carbon monoxide in compartment three could not be measured because of the absence of measuring equipment.
Warrant Officer V. F. Slyusarenko (explanatory report):
The submarine commander gave orders to measure the CO concentration in the compartment. I took the measurements with a PGA-VPM3 for low concentrations, because I couldn’t find any indicator tubes for high concentrations; the limit for low concentrations was 50 mg/m3, and the tube showed much more. I reported this.
What was the estimate of the accident situation during this period by the submarine’s leadership?
Captain 1st Rank B. G. Kolyada (interrogation tape recording):
According to the BCh-5 commander’s calculations, in the worst case scenario—flooding of the aft compartments—the submarine would lose stability by 1500. The command “Prepare for evacuation to approaching vessels” was given.
Nothing was known about how things stood with the evacuation of people, but at this time the submarine commander gave orders to evacuate secret business documents, which was documented in the ship’s log.
Warrant Officer E. D. Kononov (explanatory report): “In response to the command from the control room I went to the control room, and then took the documents up into the rescue chamber on the commander’s orders.”
Later on Captain 1st Rank Kolyada talked long and often about the submarine’s loss being a surprise to the crew, which is why the personnel were unable to make full use of rescue resources. The ship’s loss was, in fact, a surprise to most of the crew. On the other hand, the leadership was well aware of the impending danger, and it was only its indecision that led to numerous sacrifices.