From the ship’s log:
1241—Yudin, Kadantsev, Tretyakov came out. High smoke level in compartment four.
1245—Exhaust system clack valves opened between compartments two and three. Ventilation clack valves of intake system between compartments two and three opened.
Warrant Officer V. F. Slyusarenko (interrogation tape recording): “I handed the wrench to the executive officer to open the vent between compartments two and three. The executive officer opened them himself, and I was ordered to open the intake ventilation system. I opened it.”
Thirty minutes had passed from the moment the command to open the clack valves was given.
From the ship’s log:
1246—In one: hydrogen—0.4, oxygen—23 percent. Situation normal. Radio room inspected. No remarks. VVD-200 disconnect closed in one. No information from five.
1253—VVD-200 disconnected at stern and at bow.
1255—Makhota connected up to IP-6. Valyavin in IDA-59, going to four, five. Warrant Officer Gerashchenko feels poorly in VSK [rescue chamber]. Airlock window broken to equalize pressure with compartment five.
1300—Count all men. VVD-200 regulator charged. Diesel ready for starting.
Everything was in order in compartment one. The concentration of hydrogen and oxygen was within normal. Prior to loading, the 200 kg/cm2 air main was cut off at the stern to avoid bleeding of air into compartment seven, and at the same time it was cut off at the bow as well. A necessary measure, but a little too late.
Warrant Officer V. S. Kadantsev (explanatory report):
On order from the BCh-5 commander, I cut off the subgroup valves of cofferdam three and closed the disconnect valves for the VVD-200 system in compartment three and in compartment two. After this I charged the regulator for the VVD-200 system from cofferdam two, and supplied air to the VVD-200 system. The diesel generator started right away.
This is the explanation given by Warrant Officer Kadantsev, the chief of mechanics, for all of the manipulations with the 200 kg/cm2 air main. And we could have agreed with this, if this main were used to start the diesel generator. But actually the diesel is started by ship’s 400 kg/cm2 main pressure or the automation system. The automation system provides no less than three consecutive start-ups of the diesel on a cold engine and no less than six consecutive start-ups on a warm engine. And as we can see, all of the entries in the ship’s log regarding VVD-200 confirm in writing the submarine personnel’s poor knowledge of the submarine’s systems.
Lieutenant A. V. Makhota (explanatory report):
Then the two of us were summoned to the control room, and we were ordered to connect up to IP-6s, leave for compartment four and help the personnel in compartment five. On reaching compartment four we entered the airlock between compartments four and five. The airlock door would not open, it was stuck. Then we kicked it open and helped six men get out.
Warrant Officer V. S. Kadantsev (interrogation tape recording):
The BCh-5 commander sent two new scouts there and told them to break the glass in the airlock door to compartment five in any way possible. When they broke the glass, this didn’t do anything to make it easier to open the door, that is, there was no pressure in compartment five. The door was kicked in.
Because the power supply to the fan of the main ventilation ring was switched off, the navigation system instruments began failing due to overheating.
Warrant Officer A. M. Kopeyka (interrogation tape recording):
There was no smoke in the gyro-compass room. Everything was working normally. I checked all of the units and went to report to the team chief that we were not going to have any problems with the power supply. The second ventilation ring was working poorly. We requested power several times from compartment two, but the BCh-5 commander said that they couldn’t deal with this now, and to do everything we could. It was after I dragged the team chief up when he started feeling poorly that the command to measure CO in the compartments was transmitted.
The electrical navigation group tried to do everything possible to prolong the work of the navigation system with the ventilation system not working. In order to improve cooling the panels were removed from their pedestals, but it was all in vain. It would have been much easier to supply power to the electric fan of the cooling system, or to shut off the system right away.
Warrant Officer V. V. Gerashchenko (interrogation tape recording):
I disconnected the “magistral” system. I was feeling bad. I began to see brown spots before my eyes, my vision began to go dark, and I had an intense headache. Warrant Officer Kopeyka noted this, tore the ShDA mask off of me, and helped me topside. . . . I began to feel better after forty to fifty minutes, and I asked to be allowed to go back down. . . . I looked over the gyro-compass room and concluded that we had to shut everything down, because the instruments and the internal cabling could catch fire.
The navigation system was soon shut down.
After Warrant Officer Gerashchenko was poisoned, a command was given to personnel in compartment three to switch from the ShDA to other individual protective equipment.
It is hard to understand the entry in the ship’s log that there was no information from compartment five. The control room knew that people were in there, and that they could not open the airlock door. To get the door open, a command to break the glass in the airlock to equalize pressure in compartment five was given, despite the fact that there was “No information from compartment five.” Lieutenant Makhota and Warrant Officer Valyavin were sent to compartment five without spare individual protective equipment.
From the ship’s log:
1305—Diesel water drain working. Taken out of compartment five: Volkov—1, Tkachev—2, Kozlov—3, Dvorov—4, Zamogilniy—5, Shostak—6. Kulapin in five connected up to ShDA. He has no IDA. Alive.
1308—Connected up to ShDA in compartment five—Bondar on port side. Six men from five—topside. Forward of the sail.
1307—Dvorov, Makhota—to five after Kulapin and Bondar.
Connected up to IP-6’s. Valyavin arrived from five, carried Bondar and Kulapin to airlock. Moderate smoke level in compartment five. Valydvin went topside.
Six men were taken out of compartment five; the numbers after their names indicate the order in which the people were taken out of the compartment. It is not entirely clear why the entry in the ship’s log for 1308 was ahead of the entry for 1307.
Warrant Officer Bondar and Seaman Kulapin, who were connected up to ShDA equipment, remained in compartment five.
There is an inaccuracy in the ship’s log: Warrant Officer Valyavin only tried to carry Kulapin over, but he was unable to do this.
Lieutenant A. V. Tretyakov (explanatory report): “Warrant Officer Valyavin reported that he had tried to drag Seaman Kulapin out of the compartment, but he was so heavy and Valyavin was feeling so poorly that he was unable to do this alone.”
Captain Lieutenant S. A. Dvorov (explanatory report):
About 1.5 hours later the airlock door was opened from compartment four, and we were taken into compartment three. I put on a new IP-6 and once again left for compartment five with two IP-6s to evacuate Seaman Kulapin and Warrant Officer Bondar, who were connected to the ShDA. They were found unconscious in compartment five. Warrant Officer Valyavin and I carried them into compartment three.
The impression is created that in his position as compartment commander, during his presence in compartment five Captain Lieutenant Dvorov had not monitored the condition of people connected to ShDA apparatus. It is unclear from his explanations whether attempts were made to put IP-6 face masks on Warrant Officer Bondar and Seaman Kulapin. In addition, not only Captain Lieutenant Dvorov and Warrant Officer Valyavin but also Captain 3rd Rank Yudin, lieutenants Tretyakov, Makhota and Fedotko, Warrant Officer Slyusarenko and Senior Seaman Y. E. Vershilo helped to evacuate these people. It should be noted in this case that the submarine command, which knew that there were still two people connected up to ShDA apparatus in compartment five, was unable to organize a larger damage control party for simultaneous evacuation of the victims. The two persons sent to compartment five were unable to carry out two of the victims right away.
RBZh-PL-82 Article 11: “Damage control of the submarine is to be carried out by the entire crew, including the supernumerary, regardless of specialties.”
Electric power to the diesel generator’s cooling pump was sorted out over an hour after the order was given. Power was supplied to distribution panel RShchN No. 7 from the unconnectable load section of the main distribution panel No. 1, located in compartment two, and the electric cooling pump was started. Venting of compartment three with the exhaust fan of the forward ring of the general ship ventilation system was started simultaneously, although there are no entries to this effect in the ship’s log.
Lieutenant A. V. Zaytsev (interrogation tape recording): “Then we turned on the diesel engine and exhaust fans; air began flowing into the submarine.”
How long were the personnel of the main command post located in the ShDA apparatus?
Ensign Y. P. Podgornov (explanatory report): “In the third compartment, where I was located, there was a thick screen of white smoke, you could only see your hand 10 to 15 centimeters in front of you. When the party exited with the victims, I reported to the main command post. I was in the ShDA one hour and twenty minutes.”
Captain Lieutenant I.S. Orlov (interrogation tape recording):
Question: How long were you in the ShDA?
Answer: Periodically. When the fire began, I got a mask. My glasses misted up. The fire was extinguished in literally a minute. We discarded the hot pulley. At about 1300, the mechanic took the ShDA away. They had already ventilated the compartment and I took off my mask.
Agreeing with the ship’s log, the flare-up at the “Korund” post console occurred at 1122. Thus, personnel of the main command post were in the ShDA nearly one and a half hours. This is confirmed by the notes in the ship’s log at 0100. The entry in the log at that time noted that the diesel generators were ready to start and this means that the RShchN No. 7 switchboard was providing electrical feed. At that time they already could have started ventilating the forward ventilation rings with the ship’s ventilation system.
From the ship’s log:
1319—RDO1 No. 12 transmitted.
1325—Definite acknowledgement to RDO No. 12 received. No information on Kolotilin, Bukhnikashvili, tentatively in compartment six.
1327—Kulapin led out [sic—D. R.] of five. Communication session initiated. Personally addressed to us. No pulse felt on Kulapin, raised topside.
1333—Slyusarenko, Fedotko, Dvorov, Valyavin gone to stern. Load picked up by DG [diesel generator].
1339—Status of GEU: reactor stopped with all absorbers, AZ, KR, at lower limit switches. Loop one temperature 75 degrees Celsius, loop one pressure 105 kg/cm2, level in KO 3—19 percent, cooling proceeding through BBR system, two TsNPK working. GEU control totally absent. Kulapin has no pulse.
1340—Dvorov lost consciousness in compartment three. Bondar in compartment three in airlock.
1341—No people in compartment five. Compartment five inspected. Valyavin, Slyusarenko, Fedotko, Vershilo came out. In compartment one: Grigoryan, Anisimov, Kozhanov, Speranskiy. In compartment two: Markov, Gregulev, Bondar came up [sic—D. R.] (unconscious)
The diesel generator (DG) picked up the load two hours and sixteen minutes after the command was given. The reactor had been stopped with all absorbers (safety rods AZ and shim rods KR), which were resting on the lower limit switches, since 1123; however, an entry to this effect was not made in the ship’s log until 1339. According to the control log, control of the main propulsion unit (GEU) was lost at 1119, with the exception of control over mechanisms and units of the reactor compartment. The “Shtil” system, which supported the reactor’s emergency shielding, was working. The entry to this effect in the ship’s log is imprecise. Accelerated cooling of the submarine’s nuclear reactor by way of the batteryless cooling system (the BBR system) was proceeding with forced circulation of water in loop one by the loop one circulating pumps (TsNPK). The ship’s log entries regarding the loop one temperature and the water level in the volume compensator (KO), equal to 9 percent, indicate a high degree of reactor cooling.
The automatic system and equipment of the reactor compartment activated the emergency shielding, managed the reactor’s steady cooling, and monitored all of its parameters until the submarine went down. Evacuation of personnel from compartment five was completed. It took thirty-six minutes to evacuate the two persons from compartment five. Seaman Kulapin was raised topside in twenty minutes. It took a larger damage control party only eight minutes to evacuate Warrant Officer Bondar. There are full grounds for believing that the submarine command was unable to man large damage control parties. They were made up of only eleven men out of a crew of sixty-nine; in this case damage control division commander Captain 3rd Rank Yudin was forced to go to the aft compartments eight times as a member of damage control parties.
Despite all of the efforts by the senior lieutenant of medical service, L. A. Zayats, Seaman Kulapin and Warrant Officer Bondar could not be saved. The possibility is not excluded that the mistakes made by the commander of compartment five and the delay of evacuation led to the tragic outcome.