1412—Yudin, Fedotko, Slyusarenko, Apanasyevich arrived. Compartment six bulkhead temperature over 70 degrees [Celsius], entry impossible.
1415—IP-6s recharged; Yudin, Apanasyevich, Slyusarenko left for five to deliver LOKh into compartment six.
1418—UHF communication established with airplane.
1420—LOKh delivered to compartment six from five. Captain 3rd Rank Yudin, Seaman Apanasyevich arrived, Warrant Officer Slyusarenko didn’t go.
Warrant Officer V. F. Slyusarenko (interrogation tape recording):
Then the executive officer ordered Yudin to deliver LOKh from compartment five into compartment six. And he ordered me to go as a safety. They couldn’t find anyone else, because practically the entire crew was topside. Warrant Officer Valyavin, who knows compartment five well, went below. Valyavin couldn’t go because he had breathed in a lot of CO. He was forbidden to go. While they were searching for another man, Yudin had already gone down to compartment five and returned. I don’t know whether or not Yudin delivered LOKh into compartment six from compartment five.
From this statement it is clear that the manning of the damge control parties was not appropriate. Let’s turn attention to the temperature of the fore bulkhead of compartment six, and the time. At 1412 the bulkhead temperature was over 70 degrees Celsius. It had to be estimated subjectively because the damage control party did not have any measuring instruments. It was said earlier that the fire was no longer burning in compartment six; hence, delivery of LOKh into it made no practical sense.
Here we must talk about the version that was produced by the working group of the State Commission. The point of discussion was the possibility of the ventilation valves of the MBTs No. 8, 9, and 10 to open spontaneously during the fire in compartment six. This is what is said about it in the joint act sections entitled, “The Damage Control Operation” and “Shipbuilding”: “Examinations of the drawing of the hydraulic system and the piping to the ventilation control valves (No. 577-32-1424) drawing reveals, in principle, the possibility of opening ventilation valves during the heating and boiling of hydraulic fluid in the cavity of the hydraulic machine and control piping. In view of the complexity of the process, occurring when the hydraulic fluid boils, only a full-scale experiment can answer this question.” The working group of the government did not provide an answer to this question.
When could the ventilation valves of the MBT open spontaneously? The most favorable condition for this is created during the period between the time of the highest pressure in compartment six, that is when there was a high-volume mean temperature, and the time of attaining the lowest pressure in compartment six, when enough volume of the high mean temperature was at the lowest pressure in the system’s portside main hydraulics. These favorable conditions began at 1158, when the air entering into accident compartment was released, and continued until 1356, when the emergency party was organized to enter compartment six. What kind of after-effects would there be when the ventilation valves opened spontaneously and water began to fill the MBTs 8, 9, and 10? The submarine would be down by the stern with a trim near 1.5 degrees and would have a list to the port side. However, the actions of the crew at 1357 to straighten the list of the submarine to the port side and photographs taken by a plane at 1440 synonymously verify that the spontaneous opening of the ventilation valves had not occurred up to the time of 1440. The conditions for this were not right at this later time.
From the ship’s log:
1426—On the bridge: Move away from “Ivolga” for radio transmission.
1427—RDO No. 13 transmitted third time. Six RSP-30 mm1 handed up to bridge: two red, two green, two white.
1432—AV. stop. UKV “Komar” set at “beacon.”
1440—Airplane sighted visually. Smoking, coming in from port, marking its location, four-engined.
1441—“Komar” “beacon” switched on. IL-38—classified.
The airplane arrived in the area, established communication with the submarine, and the first photographs were taken. The airplane communicated that surface ships would reach the submarine by 1800. At this time a query was relayed to the submarine from Northern Fleet headquarters via the airplane regarding entry of water into the pressure hull and regarding the fire. The attention of the submarine command was simultaneously turned to the need to: utilize all possibilities of the LOKh system to deliver freon into compartments six and seven; to seal off the aft compartments; to prevent gas contamination of the other compartments of the submarine; to monitor continuously the gas composition in the compartments; and to make economical use of individual protective equipment. Having no information about the accident’s development and the course of damage-control measures, the Northern Fleet’s command post was forced to transmit a set of typical recommendations known even to young seamen.
In the meantime, the submarine began listing to starboard as the starboard MBT No. 10 filled. All of the effort to correct the list to port turned out to be not only useless but also harmful. The buoyancy reserve was lost purposelessly. Water began entering compartment seven through the cooling Kingston valve of the stern-tube gland. A small patch of bubbling water on the starboard side in the vicinity of the indicated Kingston valve could be seen distinctly on a photograph taken from the craft at 1440—this was air “gurgling up” from compartment seven. There are no precise references to the time when the list began shifting to starboard and when filling of the starboard MBT No. 10 was finished. The testimony of the crew members is contradictory.
Warrant Officer V. S. Kadantsev (explanatory report):
In order to measure the temperature of the bulkhead between compartments five and six, after compartments four and five were vented, I left for compartment five and set a thermometer, capable of reading to 100 degrees Celsius, on the aft bulkhead of compartment five. The thermometer read a temperature above 100 degrees Celsius—approximately 115 to 119 degrees Celsius. At this time the trim was 1.5 degrees by the stern. The list began changing to starboard.
According to the ship’s log the time the temperature was measured was 1539.
Lieutenant A. V. Zaytsev (explanatory report):
On orders from the BCh-5 commander Warrant Officer Kadantsev bled air out of the starboard MBT No. 7. After this the list became 0 degrees, and then shifted over to the starboard, becoming 4 to 5 degrees to starboard. . . . At around 1400 the starboard MBT No. 7 was blown with air remaining in high-pressure air cofferdam No. 3. The list became equal to 0 degrees.
It may be surmised from Lieutenant Zaytsev’s explanatory report that listing had shifted to starboard before 1400. But this could not have been, because the starboard MBT No. 7 was not flooded until 1357, and it could not have been blown at 1400. Analysis of photographs taken from the airplane permits the assertion that the starboard tank No. 10 was flooded at around 1500, and then water rushed into compartment seven through the cable conduits.
On the submarine Komsomolets, as on many other submarines of the Navy, the MBTs are not equipped with Kingston valves [rather they are equipped with open floodports that depend on the air pressure in the tanks to avoid flooding of the tank]. This gave the leaders of the Navy grounds to maintain that one of the main reasons the submarine sank was the absence of Kingstons on the MBTs, in particular on the MBT No. 10. To consider this charge, we can examine scenario variations of the submarine’s accident if it had a Kingston on MBT No.10. As was said earlier, the submarine surfaced without blowing MBT No. 10 on the port side and with a partial blowing of MBT No. 10 on the starboard side. To blow the tanks the Kingston valve must be open. For this scenario we will allow that, after surfacing, the crew would have been able to close the Kingston valve of this tank. When the increased pressure in compartment seven was greater than 3 kg/cm2, the hot gas would begin to be blown through the damaged pipe and enter into MBT No. 10 on the starboard side, thereby raising the pressure in it. When the excess pressure neared 0.5 kg/c2, the Kingston valve would be displaced and water would begin to be forced out of the tank. After blowing water out of the tank ended, the hot gas would continue to exit through the Kingston and would destroy the effectiveness of the rubber seal. Thus, the seal of MBT No. 10 of the starboard side would be lost and the further development of the accident would be factually analogous to the actual events. The inevitable destruction of the effectiveness of the rubber seal of the Kingstons is confirmed by the exfoliation of the rubber [hull] covering the region of MBT No. 10 on the starboard side. That exfoliation indicates the coating was heated to 200 to 300 degrees Celsius—that is, to a temperature significantly exceeding the integrity of the rubber on a Kingston valve. Consequently, in such a scenario, the presence of the Kingstons in the MBT No. 10 would not have altered the development of the accident in the submarine Komsomolets. If the Kingston valve didn’t fail there is one other scenario variation. An increased pressure in MBT No. 10 on the starboard side, which would prove inevitable if the valve didn’t fail, would give rise to a higher pressure in the accident compartment—that is, a pressure above that actually achieved during the accident. It is possible that this increase in pressure would be enough to cause destruction of the solid bulkheads between compartments five and six with even more adverse consequences.
From the ship’s log:
1442—Yudin, [A. M.] Ispenkov connected up to IP-6. Going to compartment five to stop reversible, check temperature of compartment six fore bulkhead.
1445—Reversible of five stopped. Airplane dropped a buoy.
1449—CO at bulkhead at aft end of compartment three to 5 gm/m3. IP recharging station deployed. Spent PDUs, IPs tossed overboard [oxygen regenerating cartridges].
The diesel generator had now been carrying a load for over an hour. Two reversible converters were working, which was redundant to a certain degree. With the automatic controls of the electric power system working, the reversible converter could have been stopped from the control console, but when the “Sinus” system was deenergized, it could be stopped only from the local control post in compartment five. Sending a special damage-control party to compartment five for this purpose is unconvincing, because there was no urgent need to stop it; moreover, under these circumstances this would reduce the electric power system’s reliability. Apparently, the main goal of the patrol was to get power to distribution panel RShchN No. 6 so that the electric exhaust fan of the aft ring of the general ship ventilation system could be started. But there is no one to check this with, because the entire BCh-5 electrical engineering division perished.
The damage-control party took no instruments, as it set off to check the temperature of the fore bulkhead of compartment six.
From the ship’s log:
1457—Venting of compartment four with compartment four’s exhaust fan started.
1502—RDO No. 14 transmitted.
1512—Exhaust clack valves of compartment four closed. Venting of compartment five through hatch of compartments three and four using exhaust fan of aft unit started.
The readiness of compartment four for venting was verified from 1218 to 1233, but because of the absence of power to distribution panel RShchN No. 6, this venting was not started until over two hours later.
RBZh-PL-82, Article 98:
To maintain permissible concentrations of gases [toxic substances] in the atmosphere of compartments adjacent to distressed compartments, after the submarine rises to the surface these compartments must be vented into the atmosphere to the extent possible.
This procedure was not utilized for more than two hours.
From the ship’s log: “1518—Transmitted to airplane: No water entering [no flooding]. Fire being put out by sealing off compartments. Air only in one VVD group.”
The message received by the Northern Fleet’s command post at 1535 reads: “Fire still burning in compartments six, seven. Seaman Kulapin, Senior Seaman Bukhnikashvili died, need a tow. VVD remaining only in commander’s group. Can no longer use the LOKh system. Monitoring pressure and temperature.”
It is hard to say what there is more of in these messages—half-truths or deliberate disinformation. The submarine’s leadership had no basis for asserting that the fire was still burning in the distressed compartments. Over 30 percent of the ship’s reserves of high-pressure air had been delivered into them. During the accident, gases flowed unhindered from the distressed compartments into compartments five, three, and two. How can there be any talk of putting out the fire by sealing off the compartments? The temperature of the bulkhead between compartments five and six had not yet been measured.
High-pressure air did, for a time, in fact remain only in one commander’s tank group, but this was over three hours previously. Since that time there was no air in the submarine’s mains, and the air-foam, fire-extinguishing system was not working. By this time, four persons had already died aboard the ship, but the deaths of only two were reported. The submarine needed a tow as of 1123, when according to the entry in the control log for the main propulsion unit, the emergency safety rods and shim rods of the reactor were rested against their lower limit switches. The assertion of the submarine command that water was not entering the pressure hull was also groundless. At the moment the message was transmitted, the ship’s situation was catastrophic, which is confirmed by the photographs taken from the airplane. Listing of the submarine had shifted to starboard. Trim rose from 1.5 to 2 degrees by the stern. It was time to shout “Help, we’re sinking!” Processes, which were not controlled and not thought through by the leadership, were occurring aboard the submarine: surfacing with a list, growth of pressure in the distressed compartments, dropping of this pressure, shifting of the list to the other side, and increasing trim by the stern. How can there be any talk of monitoring pressure and temperature when even simple recording of the events was not performed? On the whole, these messages did not reflect the actual state of the distressed submarine, and they disoriented the Northern Fleet’s command post.
The State Commission Working Group believed that entry of water into the submarine’s pressure hull began after 1400; and by 1500 the quantity of water that had entered compartment seven was twenty tons, as is reflected in the joint act of sections four and seven of this working group.