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Conclusions of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee

The decision to introduce salmon into the Yemen

Conclusions and recommendations

  1. We conclude that it appears likely given the body of evidence that the decision to introduce salmon into the Yemen was not taken by any minister, but was the initiative of a private Yemeni citizen, the late Sheikh Muhammad ibn Zaidi bani Tihama.
  2. We conclude that the home secretary was, as he stated in the House of Commons, unaware of the alleged attempt at an assassination of the Sheikh Muhammad at his residence in Scotland by an alleged member of al-Qaeda. As this event was never proven to have occurred by a UK court, we cannot criticise the home secretary or the security services for failing to predict another such attempt, which is alleged to have taken place in the Wadi Aleyn shortly before the hydrological event which unfortunately terminated the life of the prime minister.
  3. In relation to the matter that was brought up during evidence of the death of Captain Robert Matthews, we conclude that the secretary of state for defence was genuinely unaware that Captain Matthews was on a mission in Iran, without the knowledge of ministers, and no blame can be attached to anyone for the unfortunate series of events which led to Captain Matthews being posted as Missing in Action.
  4. We conclude that the director of communications, Mr Peter Maxwell, was acting on his own initiative in advising the late Mr Jay Vent PM to take notice of the Yemen salmon project, and that Mr Peter Maxwell had concluded that some electoral advantage could be gained from Mr Vent’s presence at the launch of the Yemen salmon project, and that was his basis for recommending Mr Vent’s involvement with the project.
  5. We recommend that future directors of communications have their job descriptions phrased so as to make clear their role is to communicate, and not to take future prime ministers into harm’s way, regardless of electoral considerations. We recommend that Peter Maxwell should not be reinstated in his former role.
  6. We conclude that insufficient attention was given to risk assessment by the project engineers and managers, notwithstanding that such assessments are not required in Yemeni law as they would be under the UK Health & Safety at Work Act. Had such an assessment been carried out, the hydrological event which led to the death of the prime minister and others might have been predicted and appropriate precautions taken. Notwithstanding this conclusion, we are unable to say that any one individual was culpable in this matter.
  7. We conclude that the National Centre for Fisheries Excellence exceeded its mandate in agreeing to act as the primary technical resource for the Yemen salmon project, and we recommend that the centre be disbanded and merged with the Environment Agency.
  8. We conclude that, in policy terms, we cannot endorse the view of the prime minister’s office that an initiative involving the introduction of salmon into the Yemen would sit alongside its other policies in the region, which are mainly focused on military intervention in protection of regional oil resources and associated attempts at introducing the democratic process. We believe the government should choose between salmon and democracy in its regional initiatives. The combination of the two sends a confusing signal to regional players.
  9. Nevertheless we have detected a benign outcome from the tragic death of the late James Vent PM. The perception in the region that UK policy can also focus on non-military, non-oil-related subjects, such as fly-fishing, has not been entirely negative. On the contrary, we understand that a statue of the late prime minister and Sheikh Muhammad ibn Zaidi bani Tihama is being subscribed for, showing both of them in chest waders and carrying fishing rods, as they were when last seen alive. This will be erected in the centre of Sana’a, if planning permission can be obtained.