4. ‘UTHMĀN: THE CHALLENGE OF INNOVATION
1. H. M. T. Nagel, “The Authority of the Caliphate,” in Studies on the First Century of Islamic Society, 188–189.
2. ‘Uthmān was conspicuously absent from the famous campaigns of early Islam. When Badr happened, ‘Uthmān was absent in Medina, reportedly looking after his ailing wife, Ruqiyya, the daughter of the Prophet, who died soon after. At the Battle of Uḥud, ‘Uthmān was one of those who showed weakness and retreated in a fashion frowned upon by the Qur’ān, although tradition claims that he was later forgiven, along with the others who had behaved in the same way.
3. The famous ḥadīth, “mā ‘alā ‘Uthmān mā ‘amila ba‘da hādhā.” Aḥmad, Musnad, XXVII, 247. Ibn Sa‘d, VII, 78.
4. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 486, 494; Ansāb (Sā’ir), 135. Ibn ‘Asākir, XXXIX, 92–93.
5. Ḥadīth s that extol the merit of “ḥayā ’” as a sign of belief (imān) include mention of more ancient wisdom sayings (al- ḥimam texts), which warn that “some of the ḥayā’ is bliss and dignity and some of it weakness [inna minhu sakīnatan wa waqāran li-llāh wa minhu ḍa‘fun].” Although tradition denounces this spin on ḥayā ’ (Muslim, I [pt. 1], 6–7 [nos. 36–37]), it is unlikely to have been absent from the picture of valuation that narrators undertook for ‘Uthmān’s personality.
6. It should be noted from the outset that this conciliatory depiction of ‘Uthmān (whether crafted by narrators as a pious image or as a secular exemplum regarding caliphal weakness) does confront an opposing portrayal of the caliph as an authoritarian leader (most notably according to Ya‘qūbī’s version). In addition, there is probably an intermediate domain for reading ‘Uthmān’s reticence in taking the lead in making strong decisions as a deliberately duplicitous political approach.
7. W. Muir, The Caliphate, 207. “‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān,” EI (2000), X, 497. The entry by Levi della Vida has been updated by R. G. Khoury. H. Djait, La Grande Discorde: Religion et politique dans l’Islam des origines (Paris, 1989), 84.
8. There are two versions dating the conquest of Cyprus either before or after the Battle of Dhāt al-Ṣawārī, in A.H.28/A.D. 648 (Ṭabarī, I, 2820), or A.H.33/A.D. 654 (Ṭabarī, I, 2926).
9. Ṭabarī, I, 2829.
10. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 64: Ibn Sa‘d←Muḥammad b. ‘Umar←Muḥammad b. ‘Abdallāh al-Zuhrī. In a variant but clarifying version, ‘Uthmān’s reference to Abū Bakr and ‘Umar declares: “Abū Bakr and ‘Umar used to interpret things [i.e., religion] by being frugal on themselves and austere on their kinsmen, and I have opted to interpret matters in the way of building my filial bonds [innī ta ’wwaltu fīhi ṣilata raḥmī].” Both versions are included in Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 512.
11. Mention should be made here of the famous incident of the caliph’s signet ring, which contained the seal of the Prophet. This event, which happened toward the middle of ‘Uthmān’s reign, occupies a central place in the chronicles as a symbolic turning point in the career of this caliph. The chronicles describe how ‘Uthmān, sitting by the edge of a well one day, was reportedly fiddling with this ring when it accidentally slipped from his finger and fell into the well. He then reportedly invested great effort and funds into trying to retrieve it, but it seems to have gone beyond reach, thus causing him much grief. This event too was grounded in mythical biblical antecedents. It may well have been an adaptation of a similar story about Solomon, who also reportedly happened to be fiddling with his ring one day by the seashore when it fell in the sea and disappeared for a period of forty days, during which Solomon lost his throne to a demon and underwent an atoning phase of tribulation before he retrieved the ring by a turn of fortune from a fish he had caught. Solomon’s loss of his ring is explained in the Qur’ān commentaries and qiṣaṣ al-anbiyā’ as an act of divine punishment for religious transgressions that went on in secret at his court (specifically the continuing idolatry of one of Solomon’s concubines). In comparison, the religious innovations of ‘Uthmān’s reign were minor, but there is room to speculate that narrators of the similar episodes of the rings saw a parallel, albeit milder, context of religious disarray in ‘Uthmān’s reign that led to a similar divine punishment. The story of the ring and its coincidence with a turning point in ‘Uthmān’s reign was probably mainly valued by medieval readers for its symbolism and as an aside about the continuum between historical events and religious myth, prophetic sagas and caliphal history. It is worth noting in the content of these stories the resemblance in some of the phrasing between the story of how Solomon lost the ring and the story about ‘Uthmān. One account recounted on the authority of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib states: “Solomon happened to be by the sea coast one day, and was playing with his ring [wa huwa ya ‘bathu bi-khātamihi] when it slipped from his hand and fell in the sea.” Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmi ‘li-Aḥkām al-Q ur’ān (Beirut, 1993), VIII (pt. 15), 131. A followup statement declares that the inscription on Solomon’s ring was the proclamation, “There is no god but God and Muḥammad is His messenger.”
12. Ṭabarī, I, 2813: al-Sarī←Shu‘ayb←Sayf←Muḥammad and Ṭalḥa. It is here worth noting that ‘Uthmān’s other gubernatorial appointee to Basra, ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Āmir b. Kurayz, was an even more competent and popular leader. The sources concur in praising Ibn ‘Āmir for his generosity, bravery, and magnanimity, and seem to accord him a princely image that sometimes outshines the rank of Mu‘āwiya. Dhahabī refers to him as an Arabian prince (min kibār mulūk al-‘arab), while various ḥadīths describe the Prophet blessing him even though Ibn ‘Āmir’s father was a bitter enemy to Islam, as was ‘Uqba b. Abī Mu‘īṭ. Dhahabī, Siyar A‘lām al-Nubalā’, ed. S. al-Arna’ūṭ et al., 24 vols. (Beirut, 1994–1998), IV, 21. Ibn Sa‘d, V, 45. Ṭabarī, II, 67–68.
13. Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Kindī, Wulāt Miṣr, ed. Ḥusayn Naṣṣar (Beirut, n.d.), 33. Ibn Abī al-Sarḥ also received praise as governor of Egypt. Ibn Taghrībirdī states that the governor was virtuous in conduct and generous (“wa lammā wulliya miṣr aḥsana al-sīra fī al-ra ‘iyya wa kāna jawādan karīman”). Abū’l-Maḥāsin Yūsuf b. Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Miṣr wa’ l-Qāhira, 16 vols. (Cairo, 1963–1972), I, 79.
14. H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 73.
15. Ṭabarī adds more information about Sa‘īd’s family, “His uncles were men of long experience and early precedence, and had standing with the Messenger of God (dhawī balā ’ wa sābiqa wa qudma ma ‘rasūl allāh).” Ṭabarī, I, 2851. Humphreys, HT, XV, 57 (with some modification).
16. Ṭabarī, I, 2852. Humphreys, HT, XV, p. 58.
17. Ṭabarī, I, 2854–2855. Those who took advantage of the caliph’s offer of exchanging lands were Ṭalḥa b. ‘Ubaydallāh and Marwān b. al-Ḥakam, but others are also mentioned as having received an iqṭā ‘under this plan—although it is not clear that they exchanged it for assets in Ḥijāz. The individuals mentioned as having received such a benefit included ‘Abdallāh b. Mas‘ūd, Sa‘d b. Abī Waqqāṣ, al-Zubayr b. al-‘Awwām, Khabbāb b. al-Arat, and Usāma b. Zayd, Wā’il b. Ḥujr al-Ḥaḍramī, ‘Adiyy b. Ḥātim al-Ṭā’ī, Khālid b. ‘Urfuṭa, al-Ash‘ath b. Qays, and Jarīr b. ‘Abdallāh al-Bajalī. Balādhurī, Futūḥ, II, 335–336. Ibn Qutayba mentions that ‘Uthmān gave Fadak to Marwān b. al-Ḥakam as an iqṭā‘, although it was classified as the charitable inheritance (ṣadaqa) of the Prophet. This was, however, a statement of metaphor implying that ‘Uthmān was endorsing the handing over of the caliphate to the Marwanids in the future. Ibn Qutayba, Kitāb al-Ma‘ārif, ed. T. ‘Ukāsha (Cairo 1969), 195.
18. Ṭabarī, I, 2853. Humphreys, HT, XV, 59.
19. As early as ‘Umar’s reign, there are signs in Ṭabarī’s narrative that this caliphal seizure of land might happen if the Sawād territory remained vaguely labeled as the collective fay’ land of the conquerors. In A.H. 16/A.D. 636, ‘Umar had advised in generic terms, “Take possession of your fay’ lands [i.e., as private property]; if you don’t [the normal course of] affairs will grind to a halt because [too] much time has elapsed [in lam taf‘alū fa-taqādama al-amr yulḥaj].” Ṭabarī, I, 2469. Juynboll, HT, XIV, 49.
20. In a crucial passage, Ṭabarī describes how the settlers who lacked the merits of ṣābiqa and qudma resented those with such advantage and hence precedence in the assemblies of Sa‘īd, and reportedly used to characterize such distinctions as hostility (kanū yu ‘ībūna al-tafḍīl wa yaj ‘alūnahu jafwa). Ṭabarī, I, 2855–2856. ‘Uthmān’s policy of allocating land according to such social distinctions would have only enhanced the Kufan settlers’ feeling that they were becoming the object of prejudice.
21. Mu‘āwiya himself had reportedly asked for permission from ‘Uthmān to be able to dispense with the abandoned conquered territory according to the needs of his governorship (to establish ḥimā and/or iqṭā‘ that would sustain newly arrived troops). ‘Uthmān reportedly approved his request. Ibn ‘Asākir, II, 206. Ibn ‘Asākir gives some accounts about the abandoned conquered territory in Syria in terms that are parallel to the situation in Iraq and Iran. Whereas the elite who abandoned the land in Iraq are referred to as “asāwira,” in Syria they are labeled “baṭārika” (bishops or commanders).
22. Ibn ‘Asākir, XXXIX, 241–243.
23. Although Ibn Mas‘ūd’s muṣḥaf is said to have excluded the two sūrās known as “al-mu‘wwadhatayn” and the fātiḥa, the drama of this companion’s conflict with the caliph is not stressed for these issues. Rather, the episode of Ibn Mas‘ūd’s punishment is meant to show ‘Uthmān’s tyrannical behavior in general.
24. ‘Uthmān’s name was so strongly associated with the codification of the text that one account even states that he undertook the collection of the Qur’ān during ‘Umar’s reign. Ibn Sa‘d, II, 356. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 489.
25. In ‘Uthmān’s time the third commander of the campaign, alongside Salmān b. Rabī‘a and Ḥabīb b. Maslama, is said to have been Ḥudhayfa b. al-Yamān, who led the ahl al-Kufa. In ‘Umar’s time the name of the commander is Ḥudhayfa b. Usayd. It is more likely that the latter was the commander all along, but the name was readjusted to Ḥudhayfa b. al-Yamān for ‘Uthmān’s time.
26. Qurṭubī, al-Jāmi‘ (editor’s introduction), 38–41.
27. Ṭabarī, I, 2663. Ibn Kathīr, IV (pt. 7), 126.
28. Ṭabarī, I, 322.
29. M. Hinds, “Kufan Political Alignments and Their Background in the Mid-Seventh Century A.D.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 2 (1971): 351, 346–367.
30. Tha‘ālibī, Laṭā ’ if al-Ma‘ārif, ed. P. de Jong (Leiden, 1867), 104. Abū ‘Abdallāh Zakariyya b. Muḥammad al-Qazwīnī, Āthār al-Bilād wa Akhbār al-‘Ibād (Beirut, 1960), 251.
31. A range of statements are attributed to ‘Umar in which he describes ahl al-Kūfa as “ra’s al-‘Arab” or “ra’s al-Islām,” “rumḥ allāh” (the spear of God), and “kanz al-imān” (the treasury of religion) Ibn Sa‘d, VI, 5. Ṭabarī, I, 2515.
32. Kufa’s initial foundation, for example, is attributed to Abraham, and it is later the place where the sign for Noah’s flood first appeared, and from which Noah’s ark set out. Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam fī Ta’rīkh al-Mulūk wa’l-Umam, ed. M. A. ‘Aṭā (Beirut, 1992), IV, 219–220. Other sources add still other prophetic connections about Kufa: as the place that holds the staff of Moses and the ring of Solomon, andthat has the tree that shaded Jonah after his rescue. Ibn al-Faqīh al-Hamadānī, Kitāb al-Buldān, 174–175. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, Mu‘jam al-Buldān, IV, 492.
33. In the time of Mu‘āwiya one observer commented: “O People of Kufa! You were the best of people when you started out in the time of ‘Umar but then you changed, and four bad qualities spread among you: miserliness, deception, treachery and narrowness [in mind]. None of these qualities were in you, but when I looked into it I found it all coming from your mixing with others. Thus, deception came from gypsies [al-Nibṭ], stinginess came from Persia, treachery came from Khurāsān, and narrowmindedness came from al-Ahwāz.” Ṭabarī, I, 2631–2632. Miskawayh, Tajārib, I, 248. ‘Umar himself would change his tune on the Kufans and later say, “The Kufans are impossible people. No amīr pleases them, and no amīr is pleased by them.” al-Hindī, Kanz, XIV, 171 (no. 38269).
34. Ṭabarī, I, 2668.
35. The suspect authenticity of some political narratives associated with Kufa can be inferred from the contrast that narrators sometimes sought to establish between Basra and Kufa. The advantage of Basra’s image over Kufa’s seems to have been a broad-ranging topic of discussion in the early ‘Abbāsid period, and something that was common knowledge. A rare account narrated on this subject by al-Zubayr b. Bakkār describes a debate between two individuals recounting the merits of each town. Among the virtues listed on behalf of Basra is that it was a virtuous land that does not let evil settle on its soil, and that it was the garrison city that fielded the armies that conquered Khurāsān, Sijistān, al-Sind, al-Hind, Kirmān, Mikrān, Fars, al-Ahwāz, and al-‘Irāq. Notwithstanding the conflation of chronology in these conquests, what is significant here is the particular use of the events of the initial conquests in Persia. It will be recalled that the first wave of Arab conquests in Iran happened under the leadership of ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Āmir b. Kurayz, who was appointed by ‘Uthmān as governor of Basra in A.H. 29/A.D. 650 after the dismissal of Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī. By contrast, the expeditions that were reportedly dispatched from Kufa targeted Armenia and Azerbayjān, and these conquests eventually stalled. The debate is described in al-Akhbār al-Muwafaqiyyāt, 139–143.
36. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 67, 69. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 566. The very ḥadīth that specifies which crimes deserve the death penalty is ‘Uthmān’s declaration to his besiegers on “yawm al-dār.” Tirmidhī (kitāb al-fitān), IV, 400 (no. 2158).
37. One ḥadīth quotes the Prophet telling ‘Uthmān directly: “It may come that God may gird you with a shirt one day [la‘alla allāh yaqmuṣuka qamīṣan]. If this happens, and people try to make you renounce it, do not let them have their way.” Tirmidhī, V, 587 (no. 3705); 589 (no. 3710). Aḥmad, Musnad, XLI, 113. Ibn Sa‘d’s version attributes the saying to ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Umar as a conclusion to a statement of political advice on how to handle the opposition (“do not renounce a shirt that God has girded you with”). Ibn Sa‘d, III, 66. Ibn ‘Asākir, XXXIX, 43, 182.
38. Hence ‘Uthmān’s response to the opposition, “I will not renounce a shirt that God has girded me with, but I will make changes in the matters that you criticize” (wa lakin anza‘‘ammā takrahūn). Ibn Sa‘d, III, 66.
39. All the references to ‘Uthmān’s shirt and the shirt of the caliphate, however, are fictitious adaptations of a biblical motif—namely, the shirt of Joseph—that underwent a careful process of religious transition and was instrumental in the salvation of the patriarchs. In Islamic Qur’ānic commentaries, Abraham was first clothed during his ordeal with this shirt by the angel Gabriel, and the shirt later reappeared in a moment of divine consolation for Joseph when he was cast away by his brothers. Joseph’s shirt later stood at the center of the story of the fight with Potiphar’s wife and concluded the story of reconciliation of Joseph’s family when it was given to—or cast over—Jacob, thus enabling him to regain his sight. Qurṭubī, Jāmi‘, V (pt. 9), 95. While the shirt represented a symbol of familial succession and divine miracle in the biblical story, it was entirely adapted to the political context of the caliphate in Islam. The religious authority of the patriarchs was transformed into the divine right of ‘Uthmān to rule. The idea of divine investiture for Islamic caliphal authority was not an actual historical one in these cases (as in most literary attestations), but a polemical back-projection by Sunnī society in the ninth century onto the Rāshidūn caliphate. The construction of the concept of divine right to rule and of the caliphs as “God’s caliphs” is even more transparent and ‘Abbāsid-inspired in the case of ‘Umar.
40. Qur’ān 9:89 (Arberry, I, 250).
41. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 71. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 566. The account concludes by saying that ‘Uthmān then asked Ibn Sallām what to do, and that the latter urged him to hold back from fighting the crowd. “Holding back gives you more strength [al-kaffu fa-innahu ablaghu fī ’l-ḥujja].”
42. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 67: Ibn Sa‘d←‘Amr b. ‘Āṣim al-Kilābī←Ḥafṣ b. Abī Bakr←Hayyāj b. Sarī‘←Mujāhid.
43. This polemical line was used by ‘Uthmān in challenging the argument of the opposition that his rule was unrighteous and that his overthrow would be religiously legitimate. Ṭabarī, I, 3023–3024. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 68.
44. The story about a clique of Egyptian culprits leading the way in the attack on ‘Uthmān is probably a mythical extension within the reworked use of biblical stories. The choice of the number six hundred for the faction that came from Egypt is most likely inspired by the biblical account about the departure of six hundred thousand Israelites with Moses when he left Egypt. Exodus 12:37.
45. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 71. The Arabic of the latter portion of this statement is significant: “wa kāna aṣḥāb al-nabiyy… alladhīna khadhalūh karihū al-fitna wa ẓannū anna al-amra lā yablugha qatlahu, fa-nadimū ‘alā mā ṣana‘ū fī amrihi wa la-‘amrī law qāmū aw qāma ba‘ḍuhum fa-ḥathā fī wujūhihim al-turāb la-inṣarafū khāsirīn.” The account is narrated by Muḥammad b. ‘Umar←‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Abī al-zanād←Abū Ja‘far al-qāri’ (mawlā of Ibn ‘Abbās al-Makhzūmī). This is a crucial passage that represents a digest of what another author, Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, reported in a unique account that explains in more detail what Ibn Sa‘d says. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbi-hi’s account is based on a response that Sa‘īd b. al-Musayyib gave when al-Zuhrī reportedly asked him about the circumstances of ‘Uthmān’s death, what people’s attitudes to the event were, and why the companions neglected to come to his aid (“li-ma khadhalahua ṣḥābu Muḥammad”). Sa‘īd then set forward in a summary statement the assertions that ‘Uthmān was killed unjustly (maẓlūman), that his attackers were aggressors (ẓāliman), and that those who neglected aiding him were to be excused (wa man khadhalahu kāna ma‘dhūran). When al-Zuhrī asked what this meant, Sa‘īd explained how events had unfolded in different arenas of opposition to ‘Uthmān leading up to the conflict. Sa‘īd’s elaborate account does not shy away from blaming ‘Uthmān for errors, and has the important feature of setting the people’s anger against ‘Uthmān for dealing severely with Ibn Mas‘ūd, Abū Dharr, and ‘Ammār as a background to the additional matters that inflamed more opposition against the caliph (appointing family members to government positions, tapping into state funds, ignoring complaints about his governors, etc.). However, this account essentially describes the companions as working in a cooperative environment, albeit eventually unable to control (or unwitting to the existence of) a widespread climate of anger among some tribes and individuals who rushed to change the situation with violence. ‘Uthmān, according to this account, remained negligent to criticisms leveled against his government (he did not, for example, dismiss Ibn Abī al-Sarḥ from the governorship of Egypt except after repeated pressure from the companions—although it is never explained what the specific grievances against Ibn Abī al-Sarḥ were), and was either negligent or duplicitous in the story of the covert order to have the leaders of the opposition assassinated upon their return to Egypt (‘Uthmān’s response to the discovery of the letter commanding the assassination is a crucial line; after swearing by God, ‘Uthmān declared, “I did not write this letter, nor commanded this, nor sent the servant to Egypt [mā katabtu al-kitāb wa lā amartu bihi wa lā wajjahtu al-ghulāma ilā miṣr]”). What is perhaps most important about Sa‘īd b. al-Musayyib’s account is that it sets the role of Marwān b. al-Ḥakam as the spark for the assassination. After it became clear that Marwān was ‘Uthmān’s main advisor (or minister), and that he was responsible for the misrepresentation of the situation to the caliph, and for the botched conspiracy against the Egyptian opposition, the companions all agreed that ‘Uthmān should surrender Marwān to them for judgment. This ‘Uthmān refused, and his refusal now provoked a siege and an attack on his house. Ibn al-Musayyib’s account is nuanced in the way he clearly emphasizes (through the voice of ‘Alī) that the aim of the siege was to pressure ‘Uthmān to surrender Marwān, and was not intended to harm the caliph. This is where a division of interests then surfaces between the more politically conservative opposition of the older companions (led by ‘Alī), and a camp that included younger, more brash Qurashīs, such as Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr, and less respected opposition figures who were eager to overthrow the caliph for immediate material interests (such as robbery). When the attack happened, Ibn al-Musayyib’s account could reasonably argue, the leading companions were unaware that ‘Uthmān’s life was in jeopardy, which explains why they should be excused. In sum, therefore, this account blames ‘Uthmān for the political mistakes of his reign, shows the companions disapproving of his policies but trying to sort out matters through negotiation—and hopeful of extracting the caliph from the corrupt situation that Marwān b. al-Ḥakam had created for him—and finally shows that the assassination happened suddenly and without the knowledge of the companions. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al- ‘Iqd, IV, 287–292. Ya‘qūb b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān←Muḥammad b. ‘Īsā al-Dimashqī←Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Dhi’b←Muḥammad b. Shihāb al-Zuhrī←Sa‘īd b. al-Musayyib. Also, ‘Umar b. Shabba, Ta’rīkh al-Madīna, II, 213–216. The same account is given by Balādhurī but without the initial dialogue between al-Zuhrī and Sa‘īd b. al-Musayyib. Balādhurī’s initial reporter is Hishām b. ‘Ammār al-Dimashqī. Ansāb (Banū ‘A bd Shams), 556–560.
46. The focus on the early sources here does not allow discussion of this, but the later medieval period produced lengthy apologetics on behalf of ‘Uthmān. Writers such as al-Muḥibb al-Ṭabarī produced an exhaustive list of about nineteen points that they marked as alleged offenses of ‘Uthmān and set about rebutting them. See al-Muḥibb al-Ṭabarī, al-Riyāḍ al-Na ḍira, II, 181–201; Ibn al-‘Arabī, al- ‘Awāṣim min al-Qawāṣim fī Taḥqīq Mawāqif al- Ṣaḥāba, ed. Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb (Cairo, 1968), 61–111; al-‘Iṣāmī al-Makkī, Simṭ al-Nujūm, II, 400–403. It should also be mentioned that in spite of Ibn Sa‘d’s effort to distance some of the lesser-known attackers of ‘Uthmān from the companions, several of them are in fact said to have been former companions who gave a bay‘a at the gathering of al-Hudaybiyya. These include ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Adīs al-Balawī and Jahjāh b. Sa‘īd al-Ghifārī. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 486, 537. Another, Rifā‘a b. Rāfi‘al-Anṣārī, is reported to have participated in the Battle of Badr, while al-Ḥajjāj b. Ghaziyya is said to have been a companion. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 549. Others who were companions include Ḥurqūṣ b. Zuhayr and Farwa b. Nawfal-Ashja‘ī. Al-Jāḥiẓ, al- ‘Uthmāniyya, ed. A. M. Hārūn (Cairo, 1955), 174.
47. A key account in Ibn Sa‘d agrees with this where it states: “It was both the opinion of ‘Alī and the prominent companions of the Messenger of God that [‘Ubaydallāh] be killed. However, ‘Amr [b. al-‘As] spoke with ‘Uthmān regarding this and changed his mind.” Ibn Sa‘d, V, 17.
48. Ṭabarī, I, 2796. This reaction is indirectly reported by Ibn Sa‘d, citing al-Wāqidī. Ibn Sa‘d, V, 17. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Sā’ir), 490
49. Ṭabarī, I, 2801.
50. The gravity of such religious dilution falls within the scope of some religious discussions. See Bukhārī (bāb karāhiyyat al-shafā‘a fī’l-ḥadd idhā rufi ‘a ilā al-sulṭān), VIII, 512. Also on this principle, Ibn Sa‘d, IV, 69–70.
51. ‘Uthmān’s words were: “alā innī waliyyu dam al-Hurmuzān wa qad wahabtuhu li-allāh wa li- ‘Umar wa taraktuhu li-dami ‘Umar.” Ya‘qūbī, II, 164. In the immediately preceding account, Ya‘qūbī describes al-Miqdād’s great sorrow that the community had chosen ‘Uthmān over ‘Alī as caliph. This is included by Ṭabarī, I, 2786. Balādhurī includes a version by al-Madā’inī that quotes ‘Uthmān as saying: “O you people, We are not orators, and if I live you shall get the correct speech”—also in Ibn Sa‘d on the authority of al-Wāqidī (Ibn Sa‘d, III, 62)—“It was among the decrees of God that ‘Ubaydallāh attacked al-Hurmuzān, a man from among the Muslims who has no heir except the Muslims at large [wa lā wāritha lahu illā al-muslimūn ‘āmatan]. As your imām I have granted [‘Ubaydallāh] my pardon, do you grant him your pardon too?” The crowd then said, “Yes.” However, ‘Alī declared: “Punish the transgressor. He has committed a great sin, killing a Muslim without a reason,” then ‘Alī turned to ‘Ubaydallāh and said: “You transgressor! If I gain control over you one day, I shall kill you for what you have done to al-Hurmuzān.” Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 510.
52. Some narrators try to mitigate the unjust actions of ‘Ubaydallāh by describing the victim as “a little girl who claimed to be a Muslim [ibnatan ṣaghīra tadd‘ī al-Islām].” Balādhurī, Ansāb (Sā’ir), 490. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 356. Ṭabarī does not add the apologetic commentary on Abū Lu’lu’a’s daughter, but it is clear that an embarrassing problem lay there. Ṭabarī, I, 2795.
53. The original text here states: “The world darkened that day and people became fearful that this was in punishment to them for ‘Ubaydallāh’s murder of Jufayna, al-Hurmuzān and Abū Lu’lu’a’s daughter [wa aẓlamat al-arḍu yawma’idhin ‘alā al-nās fa-‘aẓuma dhalika fī ṣudūr al-nās wa ashfaqū an takūna ‘uqūbatan ḥina qatala ‘Ubaydullāh Jufayna wa al-Hurmuzān wa ibnata Abī Lu’lu’a].” Ibn Sa‘d, V, 15–16.
54. There are various reports in Ibn Sa‘d’s work that attempt to rush the inclusion of Islamic credentials for Hurmuzān, such as when ‘Ammār tells ‘Uthmān, “Fear God, and apply the death sentence [on ‘Ubaydallāh b. ‘Umar], for he [i.e., Hurmuzān] is a Muslim who made pilgrimage.” Ibn Sa‘d, V, 16; Balādhurī, Ansāb (Sā’ir), 492. The report on Hurmuzān’s hajj forms a separate one-liner in a report that has the narrator al-Miswar b. Makhruma declare that he saw al-Hurmuzān performing the tahlīl with ‘Umar during the ḥajj and wearing a ḥibara garment even. Ibn Sa‘d, V, 90.
55. Ṭabarī, I, 3032.
56. Ṭabarī, I, 2869.
57. ‘Umar had used this expression earlier. Abū Ubayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām, Kitāb al-Amwāl (Beirut, 1981), 125.
58. The antithesis in ‘Uthmān’s case involves an incident of analogy between the loss of his signet ring and al-Walīd b. ‘Uqba’s loss of his gubernatorial ring. In the latter case, a group of Kufan religious zealots reportedly stole the ring from al-Walīd’s hand while he was sleeping, and brought it to the caliph to show the governor’s complete lack of alertness (either for being drunk or simple slumber). The fact that al-Walīd did not guard his residence with firm gates (as per the stringent demands of the second caliph from his governors for accessibility to the public) is implicitly used against the governor this time as a means of judging his competence. ‘Uthmān would face a complex issue on that occasion as he tried to balance the image and strength of political authority with the loose credibility of religious evidence and the demands of the law. For details and variations on the background of accusations that led to the loss of al-Walīd’s ring, see Ṭabarī, I, 2845–2848; Ya‘qūbī, I, 165; and Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 521, 523.
59. Ṭabarī, I, 2890–2891. The same account with some variation is recounted earlier under the year A.H. 22 and with an isnād that diverges on Sayf’s authority. Ṭabarī, I, 2668–2669.
60. Ṭabarī, I, 2664.
61. Ṭabarī, I, 2670–2671.
62. It is significant that in Ṭabarī’s description of Shahrbarāz’s encounter with ‘Abd al-Raḥmān the narrator adds a reference to Shahrbarāz as a man “whose origins were from the family of Shahrbarāz, the ruler who had routed the Israelites and driven them out of al-Shām [Syria, including Palestine].” Ṭabarī, I, 2664. Smith, HT, XIV, 35. The intent here was clearly to underline the image of communities in succession (Hebrew and Arab) and the approval by a king who was a symbol of divine wrath and the shaping of historical judgment.
63. Qur’ān 31:33; 35:5.
64. Qur’ān 18:42–44.
65. Ṭabarī, I, 2800–2801: al-Sarī←Shu‘ayb←Sayf←Badr b. ‘Uthmān←his paternal uncle. Humphreys, HT, XV, 3–4.
66. Ṭabarī, I, 2802–2803. There is no isnād here, simply the reference “they say” (qālū). Humphreys, HT, XV, 6.
67. Here ‘Uthmān declares: “Verily God created mankind in truth, and he accepts naught but the truth. Take what is right and give it what is right. Strive for integrity! Uphold it and be not the first to violate it, so that you may share what you have acquired with those who come after you. Keep faith, keep faith [al-wafā ’, al-wafā ’]! Do not wrong the orphan nor one with whom you have made a pact, for God is the opponent of him who wrongs them.” Ṭabarī, I, 2803. Humphreys, HT, XV, 6–7. Note the strong similarity of this letter to the style and content of a statement that ‘Umar earlier issued during the Battle of Qādisiyya. ‘Umar’s exhorting words to Sa‘d then were: “I have been given the feeling that you will defeat the enemy when you encounter him. Therefore cast your doubts away and choose firm faith instead…. Beware of frivolity. Be faithful, be faithful [al-wafā ’, al-wafā ’], because mistaken faithfulness is a virtue, but mistaken betrayal [entails] perdition; it will be a source of your weakness and of your enemies strength. You will lose your predominance, and they will gain ascendance. I am warning you not to be a disgrace to the Muslims and a cause of their humiliation.” Ṭabarī, I, 2230–2231. Friedmann, HT, XII, 25.
68. This division perhaps meant that the letter to the governors was viewed as directed to “al-khāṣṣa” (the state elite) by the narrators and by Ṭabarī.
69. ‘Uthmān here declares: “Verily you are the guardians and protectors of the Muslims and ‘Umar laid down for you [instructions] that were not hidden from us; on the contrary, they were in accordance with our counsel. Let me hear of no change or alteration on the part of any one of you, lest God change your situation and replace you with others [wa lā yablughannī ‘an a ḥadin minkum taghyīr wa lā tabdīl fa-yughayyir allāhu mā bi-kum wa yastabdil bi-kum ghayrukum]. So examine your conduct, for I shall examine what God has required me to examine and watch over [fa-innī andhur fī-mā alzamanī allāhu al-na ẓara fīhi wa ’ l-qiyāma ‘alayhi].” Ṭabarī, I, 2803. Humphreys, HT, XV, 6.
70. Ṭabarī, I, 2803–2804. There is no isnād here, simply the phrase “It is said [qālū].” Humphreys, HT, XV, 7. The uncanny resemblance of these letters to what ‘Umar would say led another source to cap this letter of ‘Uthmān with a conclusion declared before by ‘Umar. After the statement “takallafū wa ibtada‘ū,” al-Māliqī’s version tells us: “‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb stated: ‘The situation of Banū Isrā’īl was stable until their offsprings from foreign women began to multiply. These then began to speak about rational opinion and thus went astray and led the Israelites astray’ [inna amra banī isrā’īl lam yazal mu‘tadilan ḥattā kathura fīhim al-muwalladūn abnā ’ sabāyā al-umam fa-qālū fīhim bi ’l-ra’yy fa-ḍallū wa aḍallū banī isrā’īl].” Al-Māliqī, al-Tamhīd wa’ l-Bayān, 31.
71. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 524–525, 538–539, 543.
72. Sample ḥadīths that represent this ideology can be found in the reported advice of the Prophet to Mu‘ādh, “Obey every ruler, and pray behind every imām, and do not defame any of my companions.” Another ḥadīth has the Prophet declare, “He who obeys the imām is obeying me.” Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 10. That these ḥadīths are included at the outset of a treatise that deals with administrative practice illustrates not only an attempt to strengthen obedience to the state but also the ideologically driven context for the invention of these very practices in the ninth century. A similar message and pattern are evident in the organization of Ibn Zanjawayh’s treatise, Kitāb al-Amwāl, 3 vols., ed. Shākir Dīb Fayyāḍ (Riyad, 1986), 71–86.
73. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al- ‘Iqd, I, 7; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi attributes the statement merely by saying, “the wise men say [qālat al-ḥukamā ’].” al-Ṭurṭūshī, Sirāj al-Mulūk, ed. Ja‘far al-Bayyātī (London, 1990), 196. Al-Ṭurṭūshī categorizes the statement as a ḥadīth, while Ibn al-Ṭiqṭiqā attributes it to ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb and changes its intention to something sedate, suggesting that the statement means that in general people are more anxious about the punishment that a ruler would mete out in the immediate present rather than what will come in the hereafter (“al-nās yakhāfūn min‘a wājil al- ‘uqūba akthar mimmā yakhāfūn ājilahā”). Al-Fakhrī, 57.
74. It should be said here that Ḥudhayfa played a key role in encouraging ‘Uthmān to codify the Qur’ān after he (i.e., Ḥudhayfa) returned from Azerbayjān and reported to the caliph the disputes in the Muslim army over the proper way of reciting the Qur’ān. Sayf b. ‘Umar, Kitāb al-Ridda wa ’ l-Futūḥ, I, 48–50.
75. Sayf b. ‘Umar, Kitāb al-Ridda wa’ l-Futūḥ and Kitāb al-Jamal wa Masīr ‘Āisha wa‘Alī, ed. Qāsim al-Sāmarrā’ī (Leiden, 1995), I, 171.
76. Ibid., I, 170.
77. Ibid., I, 139.
78. Ibid., I, 167.
79. Ibid., I, 166. Mu‘āwiya concludes with a statement confirming the exhortations of the Rāshidūn caliph, “Do not endanger the dominion of God, so that He does not replace you with another people and let you lapse in history [wa lā takhdhilūh (i.e., sulṭān allāh) fa-yastabdil bi-kum ghayrukum wa yudālu ‘alaykum].”
80. Ibn Qutayba, Kitāb ‘Uyūn al-Akhbār, ed. Mufīd Muḥammad Qumayḥa (Beirut, n.d), I, 54 (Muḥammad←Abū Salama←Ḥammād b. Salama←Ayyūb←Abū Qilāba←Ka‘b); Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al- ‘Iqd, I, 8–9; al-Ṭurṭūshī, Sirāj al-Mulūk, 196. Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Jalīs al-Ṣāliḥ wa ’ l-Anīs al-Nāṣiḥ, ed. Fawwāz Fawwāz (London, 1989), 68.
81. Hence ‘Uthmān’s comparison of the opposition to the coalition of enemies who fought the Prophet at the Battle of the Trench (fa-hum ka al-aḥzāb yawm al-aḥzāb). Sayf b. ‘Umar, Kitāb al-Ridda wa’ l-Futūḥ, I, 162.
82. A confirmation of the caliphal authority’s right to dispense in a centralized way with the resources of the treasury is eventually capped in a speech of the caliph al-Manṣūr where he famously declares (not coincidentally on an occasion of pilgrimage, to relate the matter to the Prophet’s final pilgrimage speech and complete the picture of Islamic law in political terms; on this point see conclusion): “O you people, I am only the authority of God in His earth, and I govern you according to His guidance and His direction. I am His treasurer in charge of the fay’, and I work according to His will and divide it according to His wish and give it with His permission [ayyuhā al-nās innamā anā sulṭān allāh fī arḍihi asūsukum bi-tawfīqihi wa rushdihi wa khāzihunu ‘alā fay’ihi bi-mashī ’atihi, uqsimuhu bi-irādatihi wa u ‘ṭīhi bi-idhnihi].” Ibn ‘Asākir, XXXII, 311. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-‘Iqd, IV, 99. Ṭabarī, III, 426–427. Already in Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi’s time, however, al-Manṣūr’s speech had been diluted from its original phrasing (the expression “khāzinhu ‘alā fay’ihi” is replaced with “ḥārisuhu ‘alā mālihi”). The removal of the term “fay’“ from the speech distanced the caliph’s pretension from any direct religious controversy regarding the question of how the booty of conquests (“fay ’” and “ghanīma”) is to be classified and distributed.
83. Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 38.
84. Ibn Zanjawayh, Kitāb al-Amwāl, I, 196. It is interesting to examine the attitude of ‘Umar on this matter. He had reportedly refused to divide the conquered lands on the basis, according to Ibn Zanjawayh, of a reading of the Qur’ānic verse, “Whatsoever spoils of war God has given to His Messenger from the people of the cities belongs to God, and His Messenger, and the near kinsman, orphans, the needy, and the traveler, so that it be not a thing taken in turns among the rich of you. Whatever the Messenger gives you, take; whatever he forbids you, give over” (Qur’ān 59:7–10 [Arberry, II, 268]) (the verse continues in a way relevant to the legal discussion). Ibn Zanjawayh adds that this reading and interpretation were also the advice of ‘Alī and Mu‘ādh to ‘Umar. ‘Umar’s refusal was also based on the view that a division of the conquered lands would leave little or nothing to subsequent generations of Muslim migrants and settlers. The opposition between the practices of ‘Umar and the Prophet on this matter is very clear, and the Prophet’s practice was considered closer to that of ‘Uthmān and Mu‘āwiya later on. As if to show ‘Umar leaning more in the direction of legitimizing ‘Uthmān’s and Mu‘āwiya’s establishment of iqṭā ‘, some traditions add that ‘Umar had vowed in his last year to begin taking the Prophet’s precedent of dividing territory (as was the case at Khaybar) as a new model for granting rights to conquered or abandoned territory. Ibn ‘Asākir, II, 188. In spite of his purported plan to introduce a policy of iqṭā‘, some traditions strongly rallied against considering fay ’ (immovable booty, especially territory) as ghanīma (transferable spoils of war), and at least one ḥadīth stated, “My community shall remain on the straight path so long as they don’t view the fay ’ as ghanīma [mā lam tarā al-fay’a maghnaman].” Al-Mubarrad, al-Kāmil, I, 303. The positions of ‘Uthmān, Mu‘āwiya, and even the Prophet earlier were thus considered to be the projection of the ra’y school of jurisprudence, but not that of the sunna and ḥadīth. Ibn ‘Asākir mentions that those who gave the caliph (imām) permission to dispense with conquered territory include Abū Ḥanīfa, Sufyān al-Thawrī, and al-Shāfi‘ī (the latter, however, making the decision contingent on the community’s consent). Only Mālik b. Anas refused the practice of allocating conquered domains as iqṭā ‘. Ibn ‘Asākir, II, 186.
85. Several reports describing the situation of the Sawād after the conquest reflect a strongly defended legalistic interest. One such account states: “The Sawād was conquered by force. The inhabitants were invited to return and they became ahl al-dhimma, but the property of the royal family and of their followers became booty of those who were entitled to it [fay’ li-ahlihi]. This was what the people of al-Kufa were confused about until the matter lapsed into ignorance [wa huwa alladhī yata ḥajjā ahl al-Kūfa ilā an juhila dhalika], and their view [i.e., that of the Ku-fans] became that [the term] referred to the entire sawād. But the status of their sawād is like this.” Sayf←‘Abd al-Malik b. Abī Sulaymān←Sa‘īd b. Jubayr. Ṭabarī, I, 2375. Another report states: “It was not feasible to divide the booty that had belonged to the Persian king and to those who had gone with him because it was scattered all over the entire Sawād. It was administered for those who were entitled to it [ahl al-fay’] by people whom they trusted and agreed upon. This is what was debated between the ahl al-fay’, not the greater part of the Sawād. When the ahl al-fay’ were in dispute among themselves, the administrators deemed its division between them easy. This is what made the ignorant people confused about the affair of the Sawād.” Ṭabarī, I, 2371–2372. Friedmann, HT, XII, 155. In another, more detailed account, which draws a comparison to what the Prophet did with the conquered land at Dūmat al-Jandal, concludes by saying: “The things which are customarily done are not according to the traditions transmitted by the few. Whoever relates things other than those done by the just imām s and the Muslims is lying about them and staining their honor.” Al-Sarī←Shu‘ayb←Sayf←Abū Ḍamra←’Abdallāh b. al-Mustawrid←Muḥammad b. Sīrīn. Ṭabarī, I, 2374. Friedmann, HT, XII, 158. The entire survey of the status of the sawād is prefaced by a declaration from ‘Umar in which he states: “Those who work according to their passions and are disobedient, their fortune will collapse and they will harm only themselves. Those who follow the sunna, abide by the laws of religion, and adhere to the manifest way [wa man yattabi‘al-sunna wa yantahī ilā al-sharā’i‘wa alsabīl al-nahj]—out of desire to obtain what God has in store for people who obey Him—will do the right thing and will be fortunate.” Ṭabarī, I, 2369. Friedmann, HT, XII, 152. ‘Umar’s speech reflects not only an orthodox opinion of the ninth century but also a moralizing language about custom (sunna and sharā’i‘) that is equally applied in the chronicles to the righteous path in the Sasanid and Islamic periods. It is also worth noting, beyond the case of Dūmat al-Jandal, that a medieval audience probably recognized a link between the story of what was done with the royal estates in Iraq and the conquests of the Jewish oases of Banū al-Naḍīr, Khaybar, and Fadak. The terms applied to describe the nature of the conquered lands are similar (the royal estates are described as “ṣawāfīal-mulk” while the colony of Fadak is described as “khāliṣa”). Ṭabarī, I, 1583. The Prophet also gave iqṭā ‘of the lands of Banū al-Naḍīr to Abū Bakr, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Awf, and Abū Dajjana. Balādhurī, Futūḥ, I, 18–21. Ibn Zanjawayh places more emphasis on justifying the division of Khaybar into iqṭā‘ because the Prophet considered that land a ghanīma (rather than fay’), and because the Prophet was applying the principle stated in the Qur’ānic verse, “Know that, whatever booty you take, the fifth of it is God’s, and the Messenger’s, and the near kinsman’s, and the orphans’, and for the needy, and the traveler… [wa i‘lamū annamā ghanimtum min shay’]” (Qur’ān 8:41 [Arberry, I, 201]). Ibn Zanjawayh, Kitāb al-Amwāl, I, 196.
86. F. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton, 1981), 240. By contrast, Dennet considered reports about ‘Umar’s policies to be historical facts shaped against the background of interpreting relevant Qur’ānic verses. D. Dennet, Conversion and the Poll-Tax in Early Islam (Cambridge, MA, 1950), 37.
87. One report, for example, states that the Sawād was conquered by force (‘anwa), and so was the land between the Sawād and the river Balkh, except for the fortresses, and adds that the inhabitants of this region were invited to make peace (ṣulḥ) and became ahl-dhimma, and that their land remained in their possession. Al-Sarī←Shu‘ayb←Sayf←Ṭalḥa and Sufyān←Māhān. Ṭabarī, I, 2372.
88. Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 58, 60, 64. This principle later also guides the juristic opinion of al-Mawardī. Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya (Beirut, 1985), 242.
89. Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 58. Another tradition defending ‘Uthmān’s granting of land estates also refers to the Prophet and states, “And thus the Prophet saw a virtue in this practice of achieving harmony with the frame of religion and a development for the land. Similarly, the caliphs granted land to those who they saw as furthering the cause of Islam and would be a thorn against the enemy [ka-dhalika al-khulafā’ innamā aqṭa‘ū man ra’ū anna lahu ghinā’ fīal-islām wa nikāya fīal-‘aduww].” Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 62.
90. In the opening volume of Ta’rīkh Baghdād, al-Khaṭīb surveys the legal controversy surrounding the nature of the conquered territory of Iraq (ṣulḥ or ‘anwa, by treaty or force) and the divergent practices of ‘Umar and ‘Uthmān. He cites Abū ‘Ubayd as stating that a number of people found arguments for the iqṭā ‘(wa qad ta’wwal qawmun min ahl al-rukhṣa) in the allotments that ‘Uthmān gave to the companions in the Sawād land. Al-Khaṭīb then builds on this precedent by legitimizing the sale and inheritance of such allotted land. Whatever controversy remained, he cites Abū ‘Ubayd as saying, had to do with agricultural land that was producing a yield (al-arḍ al-mughilla allatī yalzamahā al-kharāj) and not land that contained homes and presumably was not being exploited agriculturally. Otherwise, the author then concludes, some companions ought not to have established their residences in the Sawād region, particularly in the khiṭaṭ of Kufa, as they did and ‘Umar should have disapproved of their practices, which he did not. Ta’rīkh Baghdād, I, 19–20.
91. ‘Umar described his organization of stipends by saying, “I have given you according to your seniority in Islam, not according to your ancestral nobility.” Ṭabarī, I, 2412.
92. In one of the miscellaneous speeches attributed to him, ‘Umar reportedly states: “Everyone has a right to some of this [community’s wealth], whether he has been granted it or not. No one has more right to it than another, except a slave. I am exactly like other people in [this matter of wealth]. But we [are eligible] according to our ranks [as derived] from God’s book and our allotments from the Messenger of God [wa lakinnā ‘alā manāzilinā min kitāb allāh wa qisminā min rasūl allāh]. [It is] a man’s achievement in Islam [wa’l rajul wa balā’ uhu fī al-Islām], his precedence [qidmuhu or qadamuhu] in Islam, his usefulness (ghanā ’uhu) in Islam, and his need [that count]. If indeed I remain alive, the shepherd where he is on the mountain of San‘a shall certainly receive the share of this wealth.” Al-Ḥārith←Ibn Sa‘d←Muḥammad b. ‘Umar←‘Abdallāh b. Ja‘far al-Zuhrī, and ‘Abd al-Malik b. Sulaymān←Ismā‘īl b. Muḥammad b. Sa‘d←al-Sā’ib b. Yazīd. Ṭabarī, I, 2752. Smith, HT, XIV, 118. Ibn Zanjawayh, Kitāb al-Amwāl, II, 569. Although set among other declarations wherein ‘Umar makes his standard affirmations about the equality of Muslims and their success in light of piety, this speech is somewhat different in that it reflects a more royalist (Sasanid) view of hierarchy and social status, which ‘Umar implicitly considers a reason for the wealth differential in society. It is consistent with his utopian vision of eventual equality in society that he not only balances this system of rank with the Islamic system of merit but considers the Islamic goal the reason for the equality he aims to establish in society.
93. The incident seems isolated in Balādhurī’s biography of ‘Umar, but it is clearly included to foreshadow the controversy about a caliph’s right to incorporate some conquered land under the central authority. This is related to the issue of establishing extra reserve land (ḥimā), whether as an agricultural resource of revenue or as a grazing ground for herds of camels and horses needed for the military. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Sā’ir), 464. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 326. ‘Umar’s justification of this action was that the revenues of such lands were needed to defray the expenses of military campaigns and other state-guided projects with a religious purpose. Ibn Zanjawayh, Kitāb al-Amwāl, II, 668–669.
94. As he set about organizing the allocation of the land after the Battle of Qādisiyya, ‘Umar declares: “I am not a king so that I shall enslave you [mā anā bi-malikin fa-asta‘bidukum].” Ṭabarī, I, 2368.
95. ‘Uthmān is cited as the first caliph to have introduced the practice of the feudalistic allotment of land (iqṭā‘). Suyūṭī, Ta’rīkh al-Khulafā ’ (Cairo, 1964), 196.
5. THE ROAD TO CIVIL WAR: ISSUES AND BOUNDARIES
1. Ṭabarī, I, 2907.
2. Sa‘īd’s words here were: “inna man lahu mithla al-Nashāstāj, la-ḥaqīqun an yakūna jawādan,” referring to the estate “al-Nashāstāj,” which Ṭalḥa gained in ‘Uthmān’s time in a swap for land in Ḥijāz and at Khaybar.
3. Ṭabarī, I, 2908.
4. Balādhurī’s version of these events is presented in summary form, and at times seems to conflate Ṭabarī’s accounts of the same events. In Balādhurī’s version, for example, the remark attributed to ‘Abd al-Raḥman b. Khunays, which caused the dispute, shows him marveling at the territory of the Sawād and saying: “Would that the commander [i.e., Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ] owned it and that you (to the guests) owned even better” (Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), I, 529); this seems to assume the initial answer given by Sa‘īd to the guests that Ibn Khunays was misunderstood and probably would wish those present had even better. Balādhurī also shows little accuracy in categorizing these opponents of Sa‘īd, calling them “al-sufahā’” (rabble).
5. By now the reader would have recognized that this conflict was chiefly a misunderstanding, bred by vanity, bravado, and a good measure of the evil eye—all ingredients that shaped a more central image in Iranian memory, namely the way by which the celebrated governor of Khurāsān in the time of Hurmuzd, Bahrām Chubīn, was subverted at an idle moment at court in Ctesiphon. During one banquet held by the emperor to celebrate the conquests of Bahrām in the east, a jealous minister (Yazdān Jushnas) reportedly commented on how really magnificent the bounty must be from which Bahrām sent those few gifts to the Persian emperor’s court. Instilled to suspicion by slanderers (wushāt), Hurmuzd, it is said, began to question the faithfulness (amāna) of his governor and began to turn against him. Dīnawarī, 84–85. This episode would set the Iranian state on a path of tension, eventual civil war, and weakening in the times of Hurmuzd and his successor, Khusraw Parvīz. Mindful of the story’s centrality, Dīnawarī interjects the following comment to drive home the lesson: “Behold here how many a calamity, wars and tribulations such words drove [fa-nẓur kam dāhiyatan dahyā’ wa ḥurūb wa balā’ jarrat hādhihi al-kalima].” Dīnawarī, 85.
6. Balādhurī gives a much longer list of names of the guests of Sa‘īd. It is unclear, however, whether the author means that his list includes all those who generally visited him or those who were present on that fateful day of argument. Balādhurī’s list includes in addition to those mentioned by Ṭabarī: Zayd b. Ṣūḥān (Ṣa‘ṣa‘’s brother), Ḥurqūṣ b. Zuhayr al-Sa‘dī, Shurayḥ b. Awfā b. Yazīd b. Zāhir al-‘Absī, ‘Adiyy b. Ḥātim al-Jawād b. ‘Abdallāh b. Sa‘d b. al-Ḥashraj al-Ṭā’ī (called Abū Ṭārīf), Kidām b. Ḥaḍramiyy b. ‘Āmir, Mālik b. Ḥabīb b. Khirrāsh (from Banū Tha‘laba b. Yarbū‘), Qays b. ‘Uṭāriḍ b. Ḥājib b. Zurāra b. ‘Uds, Ziyād b. Khaṣfa, Yazīd b. Qays al-Arḥabī. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), I, 529. All these events, including the subsequent visit and debate with Mu‘āwiya is recounted by Ibn al-Athīr. Al-Kāmil, III, 137–144.
7. Ṭabarī, I, 2909.
8. The question of who wrote to the caliph from Kufa here diverges. Ṭabarī’s version (through reports by Sayf b. ‘Umar and Wāqidī) states that the ashrāf wrote complaining about this small group of the agitators. Balādhurī’s version, however, based on a report by Abū Mikhnaf, has Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ first write to the caliph, identifying the group of dissidents as al-qurrā ’ (also referred to as “al-sufahā’”), and then states that the qurrā’ wrote on their own to the caliph to describe their complaints more generally regarding the caliph’s style of rule. The letter is interesting for setting a boundary between loyalty and opposition. The dissidents state: “Sa‘īd has gone overboard in the way he has been treating people who are known for their piety, excellence, and honesty [ahl al-wara‘ wa’l-faḍl wa’l-‘afāf] and has led you to do things that are justified by neither religion or morality. We remind you of your duty toward God in ruling the community of Muḥammad, for we are fearful that the corruption of the community will come because of you. You have made your kinsmen dominate affairs [i.e., posts of governorship]. Know that you will find people divided towards you between helpers who are oppressors and those who hold a grudge against you and are oppressed [laka nāṣiran maẓlūman wa nāqiman ‘alayka maẓlūman]. If the helpers shall come to aid you and the oppressed become vengeful, then the word of the community will fall in disarray. We hold God as witness against you, and He is the best witness. You are our leader so long as you obey God, and follow the straight path.” Balādhurī states that the group of the Qurrā’ who wrote the letter but did not sign their names on it were: Ma‘qil b. Qays al-Riyāhī, ‘Abdallāh b. al-Ṭufayl al-‘Āmirī, Mālik b. Ḥabīb al-Tamīmī, Yazīd b. Qays al-Arḥabī, Ḥujr b. ‘Adī al-Kindī, ‘Amr b. Ḥamiq al-Khuzā‘ī, Sulaymān b. Ṣurd al-Khuzā‘ī, al-Musayyib b. Najba al-Fazārī, Zayd b. Ḥiṣn al-Ṭā’ī, Ka‘b b. ‘Abda al-Nahdī, Ziyād b. al-Naḍir b. Bishr b. Mālik b. al-Dayyān al-Ḥārithī, Maslama b. ‘Abd al-Qarī. This list was probably meant to foreshadow the supporters of ‘Alī.
9. Ṭabarī, I, 2909.
10. On these tensions as a reflection of Kufan hostility to Medinan authority, see M. Hinds, “Kufan Political Alignments and Their Background in the Mid-Seventh Century A.D.,” IJMES 2 (1971): 346–367.
11. This parallels the praise the Khārijites would later give to the memory of ‘Umar at Ṣiffīn. The reader would note that this Kufan skirmish at Sa‘īd’s residence foreshadows the mentality and attitude of the social group that would later break with ‘Alī at Ṣiffīn.
12. The political controversy in Kufa in this period is generally used not only as a doorway for understanding the conflict between provincial and central authority but also for shedding light on the motives and social identity of groups such as the Khārijites and the Qurrā’. J. Wellhausen attempted to define the Khārijites’ origins by portraying them as “prodigal sons” of Arab tribes who chose to operate in non-Arab territories to avoid capture and repatriation to their home tribes. He considered Islam, and particularly ‘Umar’s policy of instating them in the diwān, as having given them a legitimate sociopolitical stake in the state. The issue has evoked questions about the social origins of the Khārijites: Were they just marginalized because they were not from Quraysh, Thaqīf, or the Anṣār, or because they were a politically underprivileged group in origin (like the bedouins and a‘rāb). J. Wellhausen, The Religio-Political Factions in Early Islam, trans. R. C. Ostle et al. (Amsterdam, 1974), 11–12. Given the way Ṭabarī’s narratives cast the Kufan precursors of the Khārijites as an archetype of the social group that zealously overinterprets the concept of justice and militantly assaults the state to achieve its goals, it seems difficult to use these narratives when they point to social and provincial origins without running the risk of a circular reasoning. That they were marginalized because they were non-Qurashī, late in conversion, and veterans of the Ridda war and among the rank and file in the Muslim-Persian wars in ‘Umar’s reign is probably sufficiently suggestive of Ṭabarī’s condescension regarding their motives.
13. Ṭabarī, I, 2909–2910. The translation here draws in part on Humphreys, HT, XV, 115. The statement “al-a’imma junna” is a ḥadīth. Muslim, II (pt. 4), 134 (no. 416); IV (pt. 12), 230 (no. 1841). Aḥmad, Musnad, XVI, 453. Ibn Qutayba explains that the ḥadīth is interpreted as meaning that the imāms shield the congregation from going astray during the prayer (al-sahw wa al-zalal). Ibn Qutayba, al-Masā’il wa’l-Ajwiba fī’l-Ḥadīth wa’l-Lugha (Cairo, AH 1349), 19. Another ḥadīth speaks of “al-ṣiyāmu junna.” Muslim, III (pt. 8), 31 (no. 1151).
14. Ṭabarī, I, 2910.
15. Ṭabarī, I, 2912. Humphreys, HT, XV, 116–117.
16. Qur’ān 29:1.
17. Ṭabarī, I, 2913. Translation in brackets is partly based on Humphreys, HT, XV, 118.
18. Ṭabarī, I, 2913. Humphreys, HT, XV, 118.
19. The use of the term “bustān Quraysh” to represent the caliph’s hold on Iraq later finds similar analogies in Ṭabarī. In A.H. 102/ A.D. 721 the Umayyad governor of Khurāsān, Sa‘īd Khudhayna, a descendant of al-Ḥakam b. Abī al-‘Āṣ who was appointed by ‘Abd al-Malik as governor of Khurāsān, would refer to the Ṣughd as “bustān amīr al-mu’minīn.” The Ṣughd had challenged caliphal rule, and Sa‘īd, after restoring control, showed a mild-mannered amnesty to the defeated reminiscent of Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ. The story of rebellion in Khurāsān and the response of the central government was probably meant to show the continuity of a paradigm in representing the challenge from the margin of the traditional Arab tribal base, whether at Medina or Damascus. Alluding to the reader’s knowledge of what happened in Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ’ time in Kufa, Sa‘īd Khudhayna told his Iraqi troops: “Do not pursue them [i.e., al-Ṣughd] anymore. The Ṣughd are the subjects of the Commander of the Faithful [innamā al-Ṣughd bustān amīr al-mu’minīn]. You have defeated them and that is enough, what are you trying to do, finish them off?! Look at yourselves, O people of Iraq, you rebelled against the Commander of the Faithful time after time, and yet he pardoned you and let you go.” Ṭabarī, II, 1431.
20. Ṭabarī, I, 2916.
21. Ṭabarī, I, 2917.
22. Balādhurī does not include either of Ṭabarī’s lengthy narratives on the visit to Mu‘āwiya, and only vaguely speaks of a heated argument between Mu‘āwiya and al-Ashtar, which is clearly formulaic due to al-Ashtar’s later historical prominence. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), I, 532. Balādhurī’s summary version is also only based on the statement “wa qālū [it is said].”
23. Ṭabarī, I, 2917–2918. Humphreys, HT, XV, 122.
24. Qur’ān 32:8.
25. Qur’ān 3:98.
26. Qur’ān 65:3.
27. Ṭabarī, I, 2919–2920. Humphreys, HT, XV, 123–124.
28. Ṭabarī, I, 2920.
29. Ṭabarī, I, 2914. Humphreys, HT, XV, 119. Despite this attack on Ṣa‘ṣa‘a and his tribe, other narratives (continuing from accounts of Abū Mikhnaf) show Mu‘āwiya having a positive attitude toward Ṣa‘ṣa‘a’s brother, Zayd. The latter was reportedly permitted to return to Kufa with some favorable recommendation to Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 532. This exception may be due to Zayd’s greater association with ‘Alī at the Battle of the Camel.
30. If ‘Umar’s profile of rough justice and blunt tone is the role model for Kufans, many of whom were former Ridda folk, and if these episodes are made to appear as reviving past vendettas, then it is also not unlikely that ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Khālid’s harsh remarks are meant to clear the memory of his father, who was often accused by ‘Umar of having treated rebels harshly. From a different angle, it can also be noted that this group of Kufan opposition was probably viewed as some of the troops who once fought under the leadership of Khālid b. al-Walīd in the toughest initial battles on the Iraqi front during the reign of Abū Bakr in A.H. 12/ A.D. 634. As far back as then, a report recounted on the authority of Sayf describes how this group of ahl al-ayyām (warriors of old, typically of the Jahiliyya but here applied to a group that caught up with the early Islamic conquests as well) used to scoff when the name of Mu‘āwiya was mentioned and comment that the battles that came after their initial raids with Khālid were less significant than what they had experienced before (presumably in reference to Mu‘āwiya’s participation in the campaigns after Khālid had established control in southern Iraq; Ṭabarī, I, 2085). Ṭabarī, I, 2077, 2110.
31. Ṭabarī, I, 2929.
32. Ṭabarī, I, 2930.
33. Ṭabarī, I, 2931.
34. This account describes how ‘Uthmān discussed the crisis. ‘Uthmān began by telling those governors assembled: “Every man has ministers [wuzarā’] and counselors. Now you are my ministers, my counselors, and my trusted men. The people have acted as you see, demanding that I depose my governors… so decide what you think is right and advise me.” ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Āmir said to him, “My advice to you, Commander of the Faithful, is that you command them to undertake a jihād that will divert their attention from you. In this way every one of them will be concerned only about himself…”—(This call for busying the dissidents with war is understood by M. Hinds as a sign that the stoppage of the conquests created this unrest; M. Hinds, “Kufan Alignments,” IJMES 2 (1971): 356. Hind’s approach to reading the sources, however, was quite a credulous one, which makes its categories of social and political analysis today as dated as its method of historicization.)—“Then ‘Uthmān came to Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ [thumma aqbala ‘Uthmān ‘alā Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ] and asked him for his opinion. He said, ‘O Commander of the Faithful,… every group has leaders. When these are eliminated, they will disperse and will be unable to agree on anything.’ Then when ‘Uthmān asked Mu‘āwiya’s opinion, the latter said: ‘O Commander of the Faithful, I think it is best for you to send your governors back, on condition that they administer their provinces with care, and I will be the guarantor for you of my province.’ Then ‘Uthmān asked ‘Abdallāh b. Sa‘d his opinion and the latter said: ‘O Commander of the Faithful, in my opinion the people are greedy. Bestow on them some of this wealth and their hearts will incline to you.’ Finally, ‘Uthmān asked ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ his opinion, and ‘Amr said: ‘I think you have perpetrated things against the people that they detest, so resolve to do justice. If you reject [this course], then make up your mind to abdicate. If you reject [that], then be firm in your resolve and continue straight ahead.’ The narrator then says: ‘Uthmān replied: ‘What is wrong with you? May your scalp crawl with lice! Are you serious about this?’ ‘Amr refused to answer him for some time, until [the rest of] the assembly [qawm] had dispersed. Then ‘Amr said, ‘No, O Commander of the Faithful, you are dearer to me than that, but I knew that the people would hear about the statements of every man among us. I wanted them to learn what I said, so they would trust me, and thereby I would bring you good and ward off evil.’” Ṭabarī, I, 2932–2933. The translated excerpts are from Humphreys, HT, XV, 136–137. The account is narrated on the authority of Ja‘far b. ‘Abdallāh al-Muḥammadī ←‘Amr b. Ḥammād b. Ṭalḥa and ‘Alī b. Ḥusayn b. ‘Īsā←Ḥusayn b.‘Īsā←Ḥusayn’s father (Īsā)←Hārūn b. Sā‘d←al-‘Alā’ b. ‘Abdallāh b. Zayd al-Anbārī. Ṭabarī recounts another very similar version of this account on the authority of another chain of transmitters: Ja‘far ← ‘Amr b. Ḥammād and ‘Alī b. Ḥusayn←Ḥusayn←Ḥusayn’s father←‘Amr b. Abī’l-Miqdām←‘Abd al-Malik b. ‘Umayr al-Zuhrī.
35. The arguments between ‘Uthmān and ‘Amr formed a favorite topic with narrators who sought to show that ‘Amr had been betraying the caliph ever since the latter removed him as governor of Egypt and placed Ibn Abī Sarḥ in his stead. Wāqidī’s version of this disagreement is extensive and portrays ‘Uthmān as deeply shaken by ‘Amr’s treachery; he implicates ‘Amr unequivocally in an effort to bring down the caliph. This was not a dispute like the one between ‘Alī and ‘Uthmān, where a maze of ambiguity, indirect responsibility, and moments of naive negligence could exonerate one party or another at various points in the dispute. In a strong rebuke to ‘Amr, when the latter claimed that he had been appointed by ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ‘Uthmān declared, “If I had controlled you as stringently as ‘Umar did, by God, you would act rightly. But I have been lenient with you and so you have been insolent with me.” Ṭabarī, I, 2966. Humphreys, HT, XV, 170.
36. In these words the narrator was drawing on a ḥadīth that describes the punishment for one, in general, who while calling for commanding the good (alamr bi’l-ma‘rūf), in real life does the opposite. The ḥadīth even includes the simile of the millstone. Muslim, VI, 117–118 (no. 2889). This ḥadīth in fact describes a setting where Usāma b. Zayd (rather than ‘Alī) is being exhorted to enter upon ‘Uthmān and advise him to change his ways. The ḥadīth was probably modified in due time by including Usāma rather than ‘Alī in order to distance it from the ‘Alī–‘Uthmān debate. Also, Bukhārī (kitāb al-fitan), IX, 170 (no. 218).
37. Ṭabarī, I, 2937–2938. Humphreys, HT, XV, 141–142. This exchange between ‘Alī and ‘Uthmān is recounted on the authority of al-Wāqidī. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 549–550. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-‘Iqd, IV, 308 (quoting Ibn Da’ab).
38. Ṭabarī, I, 2938. Humphreys, HT, XV, 142.
39. This will become a standard assertion, that ‘Uthmān did not part ways with ‘Umar except in being lenient. Ibn Sa‘d, V, 233.
40. Ṭabarī, I, 2939. Humphreys, HT, XV, 143.
41. Interestingly, here too ‘Uthmān would be anticipating ‘Alī’s insistence that the authority of the caliph is no longer subject to questioning once the bay‘a is completed. Later ‘Alī would comment after he gained the bay‘a as fourth caliph that loyalty to the caliph is mandatory once the oath of allegiance has been rendered to him; as he put it: “innamā al-khayār qabla an taqa‘a al-bay‘a fa-idhā waqa‘at fa-lā khayār; wa innamā ‘alā al-imām al-istiqāma wa ‘alā al-ra‘iyya al-taslīm [the possibility for debate and choices is one that is available before the bay ‘a is obtained. But once it is rendered then the issue of choice or alternatives is closed. It is only a matter of the caliph remaining on the straight path, and the community accepting his rule].” Dīnawarī, 149. ‘Uthmān’s argument for the unquestionable nature of caliphal authority here reflects ninth-century Sunnī political theory.
42. These criticisms include all manner of religious, social, and political claims. To the disputes over small scholastic differences in reading the texts, ‘Uthmān will use the word “al-muḥaqqarāt” (trifles) to describe the argumentation of one reciter (qāri’). Ṭabarī, I, 2931.
43. Ṭabarī, I, 2937. Humphreys, HT, XV, 143. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 550. The account in both Ṭabarī and Balādhurī is attributed to Wāqidī, however, whereas Balādhurī merely opens by saying: “qāla al-Wāqidī fī isnādihi,” Ṭabarī says: “wa ammā al-Wāqidī fa-innahu za‘ama anna ‘Abd allāh b. Muḥammad ḥaddathahu ‘an abīhi...” Balādhurī’s version of this encounter is briefer and clearly based on Ṭabarī. Ibn al-Athīr follows Ṭabarī’s accounts of the debate throughout this section. Ibn al-Athīr, 151–152.
44. According to a pro-‘Uthmān voice, obedience to the imām is necessary even if he is not just. One narrator quotes someone reporting a ḥadīth in a version that says: “He who breaks with the community to cause sedition when it has an imām—by God, he [i.e., the Prophet] did not say ‘a just imām’—deserves to be killed.” Ṭabarī, I, 2935.
45. Ṭabarī states only that Ibn Saba’’s conversion happened in ‘Uthmān’s time, but according to a more detailed report by the same narrator (Yazīd al-Faq‘asī), one of the sources of Sayf, the conversion of Ibn Saba’ happened in the latter six years of ‘Uthmān’s rule, thereby confirming the inauspicious yet synchronic designs of ill-fated events in that latter part of ‘Uthmān’s reign. Al-Māliqī, al-Tamhīd wa’l-Bayān, 55, 88. Al-Māliqī’s account adds that Ibn Saba’ settled among the ‘Abd al-Qays in Basra.
46. Here it is important to draw attention to a later sectarian current that would build upon this principle of waṣiyya (the religious designation and investiture of a successor) as the foundation of ‘Alid succession. U. Rubin, “Prophets and Progenitors in the Early Shi‘a Tradition,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 1 (1979): 41–65.
47. Ṭabarī, I, 2942. Ibn al-Athīr, III, 154.
48. Ṭabarī, I, 2942. Ibn al-Athīr puts it more strongly, saying: “The people of Syria drove him out [fa-akhrajahu ahlu al-shām].” Al-Kāmil, III, 154.
49. Examples of praise of ahl al-shām can be found in Tirmidhī (kitāb al-fitan), IV, 420, 431 (nos. 2192, 2217).
50. Traditional Islamicist and Judaic scholarship has tended to accept the Ibn Saba’ story as reflecting a fact about how Islamic messianism emerged in connection with him (hence the group later to be known as al-Saba’iyya), and that Shī‘īsm was originally related to Ibn Saba’s movement as well. For a survey of this literature, see S. Wasserstrom, Between Muslim and Jew: The Problem of Symbiosis Under Early Islam (Princeton, 1995), 55, 64, 93, 125.
51. This profile of a deceptive Saba’iyya in Medina spearheading and coordinating a conspiracy in the provinces is laid out mostly by Ṭabarī; I, 2950–2951. ‘Alī is shown discovering the role of al-Saba’iyya among the similar claims that Basrans, Kufans, and Egyptians bring to Medina. Ṭabarī, I, 2958.
52. Ṭabarī, I, 2942. The issue of “al-amr bi’l ma‘rūf… [commanding right and forbidding wrong]” has been treated exhaustively by Michael Cook’s famous study with the title that matches the slogan. While extensive in its gathering of information related to this pietistic call, Cook’s book does not consider the polemical deployment of this religious theme in Islamic historiography across Ṭabarī’s narratives on political history. The author also sometimes seems to blur the line between the extra puritanism evident in the concept of “commanding right” when applied to gray-area issues, and more clearly defined distinctions between ḥalāl and ḥarām (the permissible and the forbidden under the sharī‘a).
53. Those who influenced ‘Ammār were, in addition to Ibn Saba’, Khālid b. Muljam, Sawdān b. Ḥumrān al-Sakūnī, and Kināna b. Bishr al-Laythī. It is here worth noting that if part of the message is the attraction of ‘Ammār to the ‘Alid cause, ‘Ammār had reportedly favored the nomination of ‘Alī for succession as early as the shūrā occasion after ‘Umar’s death. Ṭabarī, I, 2785.
54. Ṭabarī, I, 2944. Humphreys, HT, XV, 148.
55. Ṭabarī, I, 2944. Humphreys, HT, XV, 149. Ibn al-Athīr, III, 155.
56. Ṭabarī, I, 2946. Humphreys, HT, XV, 150.
57. Ṭabarī, I, 2949.
58. See chap. 7.
59. The translation of the ḥadīth is: “God’s curse is upon anyone who challenges the established authority of a recognized leader of the community.”
60. Ṭabarī, I, 2952.
61. Ṭabarī, I, 2944.
62. This embellished synthesis of material is best preserved by Abū Mikhnaf’s account. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 552.
63. Ṭabarī, I, 2952–2954.
64. According to al-Aṣma‘ī (citing the report of Abū ‘Awāna), the leaders of the opposition who came to Medina were ‘Alqama b. ‘Uthmān, Kināna b. Bishr, Ḥakīm b. Jabla, al-Ashtar al-Nakha‘ī, and ‘Abdallāh b. Budayl. Al-Madā’inī’s account states that the leaders of the opposition groups were ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Adīs al-Balawī (Egypt), Ḥakīm b. Jabla al-‘Abdī (Basra), al-Ashtar Mālik b. al-Ḥārith al-Nakha‘ī (Kufa). Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-‘Iqd, IV, 292–293.
65. For the unflattering image of al-Sakūn, see ‘Umar’s comments about them in the year of al-Qādisiyya, A.H. 14/ A.D. 636. Ibn al-Athīr, II, 451.
66. Ṭabarī, I, 2954–2955. Murtaḍā al-‘Askarī has previously cast doubt on the historical existence of some individuals, during the Rāshidūn period. His comments, however, were mainly about Sayf b. ‘Umar as having invented many significant Tamīmī characters in order to glorify his own tribe. M. al-‘Askarī, Khamsūn wa Mi’at Sahābiyy Mukhtalaq, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1991), I, 91–176.
67. Ṭabarī, I, 2956–2957. Humphreys, HT, XV, 161.
68. Ṭabarī, I, 2958. Humphreys, HT, XV, 162.
69. The famous statement then was “I will not abandon a present king to another whose fortune I don’t know [lā ada‘u malikan ḥāḍiran li-ākhar lā adrī ma yaṣīra min amrih].” Ṭabarī, III, 772.
70. The use of the verb “ṭalaba” is undoubtedly a pun here on ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib.
71. Ṭabarī, I, 2959. Humphreys, HT, XV, 163–164 (with variation).
72. ‘Uthmān makes similar jibes later in the same narrative, when he declares in the prayer sermon, as the Egyptians had settled in the mosque, “O you enemies! Fear God, fear God! By God, the Medinese know that you have been cursed by the tongue of Muḥammad, so wipe out your errors by doing what is right. For verily Almighty God only eradicates evil with what is good [inna allāha ‘azz wa jall lā yamḥū al-sayyi’ illā bi’l-ḥasan].” Ṭabarī, I, 2960. Humphreys, HT, XV, 165 (with minor modification). The reader would note that the curse ‘Uthmān issues against the Egyptians is identical to the curse ‘Alī issued against the rebels earlier. With the connection of ‘Alī to this text established, it then becomes only a small step before discerning ‘Uthmān’s severe criticism of ‘Alī as he says “inna allāha lā yamḥū al-sayyi’ illā bi’l-ḥasan [God only wipes out the bad with the good]” as a reference to the replacement of ‘Alī later by his son, al-Ḥasan, the latter more favored by Sunnīs generally.
73. The narrators are: Ya‘qūb b. Ibrāhīm←Mu‘tamir b. Sulaymān al-Taymī←Sulaymān al-Taymī←Abū Naḍra←Abū Sa‘īd (mawlā of Abū Usayd al-Anṣārī). Ṭabarī, I, 2963.
74. Ṭabarī, I, 2965, 2989, 2995, 2996. The capture of ‘Uthmān’s messenger on his way to Egypt is a scene described with great dramatic slowness in Balādhurī’s version, based on Abū Mikhnaf. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 555.
75. The idea that summons in the names of leading companions and mobilization letters were circulating in the provinces to rally political opposition against ‘Uthmān is a central motif in the apologetic dimension of the narratives (see above). When ‘Āisha was accused of having circulated a letter mobilizing opposition to ‘Uthmān, she adamantly denied that she wrote anything of the sort (al-A‘mash←Masrūq). Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi then adds his general commentary: “They [i.e., what the public recognized afterward] came to believe that letters were written using her name and ‘Alī’s, as in the case of the letter written in the name of ‘Uthmān to the governor of Egypt. The fabrication of all these letters was the source of the fitna.” Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-‘Iqd, IV, 293.
76. Ṭabarī, I, 2965. Humphreys, HT, XV, 169.
77. Ṭabarī, I, 2969. Humphreys, HT, XV, 172.
78. There are several other instances in which ‘Uthmān is said to have appeared to the public from a perched position (ashrafa ‘alā al-nās). Ṭabarī, I, 3006, 3008, 3011, 3023.
79. A secondary version by Wāqidī makes Muḥammad b. Maslama the one who convinces the Egyptians to return home. Ṭabarī, I, 2971.
80. The contradiction is even more blunt in a variant account related on the authority of Ja‘far b. ‘Abdallāh al-Muḥammadī, who declares that ‘Uthmān sought a respite of three days in his final negotiations with ‘Alī to fulfill the pledges made at home and in the provinces. “I cannot do away with the things they detest in one day,” ‘Uthmān claimed. ‘Alī at first resisted delay, but then agreed to let ‘Uthmān have this amount of time and even spoke to the public to appease them. This version somewhat foreshadows the Taḥkīm, as it portrays ‘Alī keeping to his promise and addressing the public while ‘Uthmān is about to dissemble. In spite of solemn oaths written in a document that ‘Uthmān was going to do away with injustice and remove every governor whom the public disliked, the caliph, as it turned out wanted to use the respite of three days to prepare for war, gathering arms and forming a strong army from among the slaves acquired as part of the caliph’s one-fifths share of the booty. Ṭabarī, I, 2988.
81. Ṭabarī, I, 2972. Humphreys, HT, XV, 175.
82. Ṭabarī, I, 2972.
83. Ṭabarī, I, 2975. Humphreys, HT, XV, 177–178 (with minor modification).
84. Ṭabarī, I, 2975. Humphreys, HT, XV, 178. Ibn al-Athīr, III, 165. Another similar version also on the authority of al-Wāqidī states that ‘Uthmān stayed at home for three days, fearing to go out in public out of embarrassment over what happened. Ṭabarī, I, 2977. See also Abū Mikhnaf’s account. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 554. When word of this scene came to ‘Alī, the latter finally decided in anger to break off all relations with the caliph. Ṭabarī, I, 2978. Finally, it is worth noting that in Abū Mikhnaf’s version of the Saqīfa story, ‘Umar declares with confidence, contesting the Anṣār, “Who would attempt to wrest from us the sovereignty [sulṭān] of Muḥammad and his authority [imāra], seeing that we are his friends and kinsmen [man dhā yunāzi‘unā sulṭān Muḥammad wa imarātihi wa naḥnu awliyā’ uhu wa ‘ashīratuhu], except someone advancing falsehood?…” Ṭabarī, I, 1841. Although at the time ‘Umar was speaking in defense of the primacy of Quraysh, and his political intentions were different from those of Marwān later on, the narrative probably aimed to highlight the growth of the monopolistic albeit impious political claims of Marwān when he defended ‘Uthmān’s rule.
85. Ṭabarī, I, 2976.
86. Ṭabarī, I, 2975. Also Abū Mikhnaf, Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 554.
87. This representation of ‘Alī shows that these scenes were once made more meaningful by actually being staged rather than merely being read.
88. Ṭabarī, I, 2978.
89. The view that an aged ruler must at some point be retired in favor of a younger, more attentive leader is specifically used as an argument in A.H. 29/A.D. 649 when Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī was replaced by ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Āmir b. Kurayz as governor of Basra. At the time, a certain Ghaylān b. Kharasha al-Ḍabbī was reported to have traveled from Basra to Medina and asked ‘Uthmān: “Have you not a younger person to be assigned to govern Basra? How long is this old man [that is, Abū Mūsā] to rule us [ḥattā matā yalī hādhā al-shaykh al-Baṣra]?” Until that point, Abū Mūsā had been governor of Baṣra for six years continuously. Ṭabarī, I, 2828.
90. Writing within the apologetic frame, Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī places the blame on Marwān. In connection with the controversial letter sent to Egypt, al-Zuhrī declares that the companions recognized the letter brought back to Medina to be the forged writing of Marwān. The continued standoff in this account is explained this time by the fact that ‘Uthmān refused to hand in Marwān for punishment. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 558.
91. Ṭabarī, I, 2999.
92. Ṭabarī, I, 2998. Humphreys, HT, XV, 198.
93. Ṭabarī, I, 2999. Humphreys, HT, XV, 198.
94. Ṭabarī, I, 2990. Humphreys, HT, XV, 190.
95. Ṭabarī, I, 3040–3045.
96. Ṭabarī, I, 2995. Humphreys, HT, XV, 195. Al-Wāqidī’s version.
97. Ṭabarī, I, 2989. Humphreys, HT, XV, 189.
98. Ṭabarī, I, 2989. Humphreys, HT, XV, 189. The account of Ja‘far b. ‘Abdallāh al-Muḥammadī.
99. Ṭabarī, I, 3024–3025. Humphreys, HT, XV, 221–223.
100. See accounts in Ṭabarī, III, 780–782. Within a similar frame of seizing the initiative and forestalling future deterioration, al-Mughīra gave advice to ‘Alī, “You can forestall tomorrow’s loss by making a sound decision today [inna al-ḍayā‘ al-yawm tuḍayyi ‘bihi mā fī al-ghad]” Ṭabarī, I, 3082.
101. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 547.
102. The Arabic seems reversed (inna lanā ‘alaykum ḥaqqan, al-naṣīḥatu bi’l-ghayb wa’l-mu‘āwana ‘alā al-khayr rather than inna lakum ‘alaynā ḥaqqan).
103. Ṭabarī, I, 2772. Smith, HT, XIV, 139. The account is narrated by ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Bayān ← Muḥammad b. Yazīd ← Ismā‘īl b. Abī Khālid ← Salama b. Kuhayl.
104. Ṭabarī, I, 2755–2756. Smith, HT, XIV, 121. The account is narrated by ‘Umar (b. Shabba) ← Alī ← Muḥammad b. Sāliḥ ← Mūsā b. ‘Uqba. Ṭabarī’s version of the story does not say that ‘Umar meant Mu‘āwiya in his reference to the young nobleman, but several other sources state this explicitly. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-‘Iqd, IV, 363. Also Balādhurī with slight variation. Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 49. ‘Abdallāh al-Sha‘bī. Ibn Qutayba, ‘(Abū Bakr b. ‘Ayyāsh(b. ṢāliḥUyūn al-Akhbār, I, 62.
105. The events described by Ṭabarī, I, 2869. The construction of the earlier maritime story is influenced by the fact that Mu‘āwiya was the one who had asked ‘Umar for permission to invade Cyprus.
106. H. A. R. Gibb lecture notes. I am grateful to Richard W. Bulliet for making available Gibb’s typescript lectures.
107. Ṭabarī, I, 3006, 3018.
108. Ṭabarī, I, 3012. Humphreys, HT, XV, 210.
109. Ṭabarī, I, 3006. Humphreys, HT, XV, 204.
110. Ṭabarī, I, 3006. Despite al-Ashtar’s hard-line position against the caliph, his name does not surface in the final scene of ‘Uthmān’s murder. This is perhaps done in light of al-Ashtar’s closeness to ‘Alī.
111. Ṭabarī, I, 3013.
112. Matthew 26:51.
113. The metaphor was itself borrowed by the narrator from a Qur’ānic verse that describes a divinely ordained event that brought about a similar collapse of a community. The verse reads, “And when it is said to them, ‘What has your Lord sent down?’ they say, ‘Fairy-tales of the ancients.’ That they may bear their loads complete on the Day of Resurrection, and some of the loads of those that they lead astray without any knowledge. O evil the load they bear! before them contrived [qad makara alladhīna min qablihim]; then God came upon their building from the foundations, and the roof fell down on them from over them [fa-kharra ‘alayhim al-saqfu min fawqihim], and the chastisement came upon them from whence they were not aware” (Qur’ān 16:24–26 [Arberry, I, 289]). This verse describes the parable of punishment that followed a community’s rejection of its prophet, which as mentioned earlier was a theme to which the plight of the third caliph was adapted.
114. Ṭabarī, I, 3020.
115. Ṭabarī, I, 3019. Humphreys, HT, XV, 217.
116. Qur’ān 34:53. Humphreys, HT, XV, 217.
117. Qur’ān 36:50. Humphreys, HT, XV, 217.
118. Qur’ān 59:16. Humphreys, HT, XV, 217.
119. Qur’ān 18:104. Humphreys, HT, XV, 217.
120. Ṭabarī, I, 3019.
121. Qur’ān 20:1 (Arberry, I, 339).
122. Qur’ān 3:167 (Arberry, I, 95). The standard order of sūras in the Qur’ān must obviously be ignored here.
123. The subject is ambiguous here, as is whether the reference is to the caliph or al-Ghāfiqī.
124. An additional detail here from Sayf’s account in al-Māliqī, al-Tamhīd wa’l-Bayān, 139.
125. This was undoubtedly intended to evoke a connection with the title of the future caliph al-Mutawakkil.
126. All sources agree that blood was spilled on this verse. The full details of the story are preserved in al-Māliqī’s al-Tamhīd wa’l-Bayān (138–139), which draws on reports shared by Ibn Sa‘d and Ṭabarī. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 74; Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 574, 585, 591.
6. ‘ALĪ: IN THE IMAGE OF THE PROPHETS
1. Al-Māliqī, Al-Tamhīd wa’l-Bayān, 136. Yūnus al-Ṭanāfisī←Muḥammad b.Yūsuf←‘Abdallāh b. Sallām. Ṭabarī omits this version of the exhortation mentioning Jesus, but includes another reported by Sayf b. ‘Umar that is very similar (Ṭabarī, I, 3017). Both versions are included by al-Māliqī. Ḥadīth literature would preserve the prophetic connections of the story as part of fitan accounts. Hence the famous ḥadīth, “The first of the fitan is the murder of ‘Uthmān [yawm al-dār], and the last of it will be the emergence of the dajjāl.” Ibn ‘Asākir, XXXIX, 447. Al-Hindī, Kanz, XI, 223 (no. 31306).
2. Ibn Sallām declares: “No nation ever killed its prophet and found itself reaching reconciliation until they have shed the blood of seventy thousand people, and no nation ever killed its caliph and reconciled until forty thousand people have died.” Abū’l-‘Arab al-Tamīmī, Kitāb al-Miḥan, 82. Yaḥyā←Yaḥyā’s father←Yaḥyā’s grandfather←Ayyūb b. Khūṭ←Ḥumayd b. Hilāl←‘Abdallāh b. Ma‘qil.
3. The use of the motif of the town overturned by divine vengeance will surface in the speech attributed to Busr b. Arṭāt in A.H. 40/ A.D. 660 when Mu‘āwiya orders him to raid the province of Ḥijāz, which was under ‘Alī’s control. When he arrived in Medina, Busr made a speech from the town’s mosque in which he rebuked the populace, saying, “O People of Medina, You have the parable of the wrongdoers. ‘God has struck a similitude: a city that was secure, at rest, its provision coming to it easefully from every place, then it was unthankful for the blessings of God; so God let it taste the garment of hunger and of fear, for the things that they were working.’ [Qur’ān 16:112 (Arberry, I, 299)].” Ya‘qūbī, II, 197. Along similar lines of reading divine judgment in political events, one narrator perceives in the same light the cause of the punitive campaign that Yazīd unleashed against Medina (in the famous al-Ḥarra campaign). Ibn Sa‘d quotes Mujāhid as saying, “God killed from among them [i.e., the Medinans] a crowd during the fitnas, and later Yazīd dispatched an army to Medina that killed twenty thousand people, and who plundered the town for three days for the complicity of its people in the murder [li-mudāhanatihim].” Ibn Sa‘d, III, 68.
4. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 80.
5. Ṭabarī, I, 2947. Humphreys, HT, XV, 151–152. Balādhurī does not include this important speech attributed to Mu‘āwiya.
6. In fact this speech by Mu‘āwiya bears a great resemblance to a declaration attributed to ‘Umar that seems to have been dropped from Ṭabarī’s chronicle. This declaration, which ‘Umar reportedly made on his deathbed, is recounted on the authority of Mubashshir quoting Jābir, both of whom were sources for Sayf b. ‘Umar on other matters (cited as Mubashshir b. al-Fuḍayl and Jābir b. ‘Abdallāh; Ṭabarī, I, 2450). This account relates that after ‘Umar was stabbed and he became certain of his imminent death, he exhorted the community (awṣā fī khāṣatihi wa jam‘i al-‘āmma—the usual stock phrases of Ṭabarī on such matters), saying: “O people! The succession today in the community of Muḥammad, peace be upon him, is yours [inna al-amra fī ummati Muḥammad ‘alayhi al-salām amrukum]. You are the witnesses on affairs of the community and the people of the shūrā [antum shuhūd al-umma wa ahl al-shūrā]. Whomever you are content with, they shall be content with, and whomever you agree on, they will agree on. This success will stay with you so long as you only seek God and the hereafter as your goal. But if you seek this world and you compete among yourselves over it, God shall take it away from you and transfer it to others. And He will never again bring it back to you [inna hādhā al-amr lā yazālu fīkum mā ṭalabtum bihi wajha allāh wa’l-dār al-ākhira, fa-idhā ṭalabtum bihi al-dunyā wa tanāza‘ tum salabkumūh allāh wa naqalahu ‘ankum thumma lā yarudduhu ‘alaykum abadān]. [I reckon that] if you decide on leadership in my lifetime, it is a guarantee that you will not differ after my death [innakum ina tu’ammirū fī ḥayātin minnī ajdaru an lā takhtalifū ba‘ dī]. Do you know anyone more worthy of this succession [aḥaqqu bi-hādhā al-amr] than this group of six whom the Prophet died while content with?” “No,” they said. “Then I believe it is the sound opinion if you follow my advice and make them the ones to choose the leader for you.” Al-Māliqī, al-Tamhīd wa’l-Bayān, 13.
7. Ṭabarī, I, 3066.
8. Ṭabarī, I, 3076.
9. Ṭabarī, I, 3066.
10. Dīnawarī, 149.
11. Ṭabarī, I, 1696. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 24–25. Muslim, I, 5 (no. 2404). Bukhārī (kitāb al-maghāzī), bāb ḥijjat al-wadā‘, V, 47 (no. 56); 493 (no. 700). Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam, V, 66. Qazwīnī, al-Tadwīn, II, 154.
12. The list of merits that surrounds the image of ‘Alī in the early sources is rich and diverse. Even before the later division between Sunnism and Shī‘īsm that led to the redaction or embellishment of the fourth caliph’s biography as caliph or imām, the earliest sources give praise that deserves close attention. We are told that ‘Alī was the first to convert to Islam (Ṭabarī, I, 1159), the first to pray with the Prophet (Ṭabarī, I, 1160), the one with whom the Prophet established a bond of fraternity (mu’ākhāt) when the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār were ordered by the Prophet to establish fraternal bonds after the Hijra, ‘Alī having arrived too late in Medina to find someone to establish a fraternal tie with (Ibn Sa‘d, III,22). In the military context, we read that ‘Alī was the first to carry the Prophet’s banner into jihād at the Battle of al-Abwā’ (Ṭabarī, I, 1270), and at the decisive Battle of Badr (Ṭabarī, I, 1297). Other traditions say that ‘Alī carried the Prophet’s banner at every battle. Ibn Sa‘d, III, 23. Such instances of firsts and closeness with the Prophet do not appear as random honorifics, but seem to have formed in origin an integral part of the broad narrative.
13. Ṭabarī, I, 3290. Hawting, HT, XVII, 37
14. Ṭabarī, I, 3288. Both—the account of ‘Alī’s passionate prayer for victory and Ibn Budayl’s statement drawing a parallel with Badr—are recounted on the authority of Abū Mikhnaf.
15. Ṭabarī, I, 3335. Dīnawarī, 207.
16. The account of al-Ḥudaybiyya is also in Bukhārī (bāb kayfa yuktab hādhā māṣālaḥa fulān b. fulān), III, 536–537 (nos. 862–863); (kitāb al-khums, bāb al-muṣālaḥa), IV, 273 (no. 408); (kitāb al-maghāzī), V, 388 (no. 553). Interestingly, there ‘Alī is represented as refusing to erase the Prophet’s title of “Messenger of God,” which impels the Prophet to erase it in person in order to avail the Meccans of excuses for war. ‘Alī, according to this version, would have been agreeing with ‘Umar, who also took a stubborn position on that occasion.
17. W. Madelung, The Succession to Muḥammad, 44.
18. Ṭabarī, I, 3475–3476.
19. Although Arberry renders “‘alā ḥīni ghaflatin min ahlihā” in religious terms as a general religious “ghafla” (slumber) of the populace, it can also simply refer to the “time of sleep” or “under darkness.”
20. Qur’ān 28:15–17 (Arberry, II, 87) (except for phrase in brackets).
21. The Qur’ānic verse here reads: “Had the tiding of the dispute come to thee? When they scaled the Sanctuary, when they entered upon David, and he took fright at them; and they said: ‘Fear not; two disputants we are—one of us has injured the other; so judge between us justly, and transgress not, and guide us to the right path.’ ‘Behold, this my brother has ninety-nine ewes, and I have one ewe. So he said, “Give her into my charge”; and he overcame me in the argument.’ Said he, ‘Assuredly he has wronged thee in asking for thy ewe in addition to his sheep; and indeed many intermixers do injury one against the other, save those who believe, and do deeds of righteousness—and how few they are!’ And David thought that we had only tried him; therefore he sought forgiveness of his Lord, and he fell down, bowing, and he repented. Accordingly We forgave him that, and he has a near place in Our presence and a fair resort.” Qur’ān 38:21–25 (Arberry, II, 159–160).
22. Ṭabarī, I, 3373. Hawting, HT, XVII, 123.
23. Ṭabarī, I, 3138. Brockett, HT, XVI, 80.
24. Ṭabarī, I, 3154. Brockett, HT, XVI, 95. Earlier in ‘Umar’s reign ‘Alī had recommended the future of the Kufans—confirming ‘Umar’s dicta about them—by saying, “Commander of the Faithful, by God, al-Kūfa is a place to which one makes a hijra after the Hijra; it is the ‘dome’ of Islam. There will come a day when there is no believer left who does not go there out of longing. God will be made victorious through its inhabitants just as He overcame the people of Lot with stones.” Ṭabarī, I, 2514 (Sayf b. ‘Umar). Juynboll, HT, XVIII, 95.
25. Ṭabarī, I, 3269.
26. Ya‘qūbī, II, 196. Another report on the authority of al-Layth b. Sa‘d has ‘Alī compare the replacement of the Kufans to the exchange of dinars and dirhams, one for every ten. Al-Hindī, Kanz, XI, 356 (no. 31727); Ibn ‘Asākir, I, 320.
27. Ṭabarī, I, 3385. See below.
28. See, for instance, the debate between Ibn ‘Abbās and ‘Alī regarding the optimal strategy of handling Mu‘āwiya’s position as governor of Syria before the declaration of war between the two parties. When Ibn ‘Abbās advised the caliph to keep Mu‘āwiya as governor until he gave his bay‘a, and to dismiss him later, ‘Alī refused this action as a compromise. Ibn ‘Abbās then commented in exasperation, “Commander of the Faithful, You are a courageous man, but you are not an expert in war. Didn’t you hear the Messenger of God say, ‘Warfare is a strategy of guile! [al-ḥarb khid ‘ a].’” Even with this, however, ‘Alī refused to bend. Ṭabarī, I, 3086. The remark, used to characterize ‘Alī, would later be used by ‘Abd al-Malik b. Marwān when he analyzed his opponent Muṣ‘ab b. al-Zubayr. Ṭabarī, II, 805.
29. Ṭabarī, I, 3108. Brockett, HT, XVIII, 48–49 (with minor variations).
30. See account of the embassy below. This line of debating the past has precedents dating to interactions between ‘Alī and ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abbās soon after the Prophet’s death and later after ‘Umar’s death, when the latter reportedly chided ‘Alī for not having asked the Prophet where the succession should go, and for having agreed to enter in the shūrā after ‘Umar’s death.
31. Ṭabarī, I, 3294. Hawting, HT, XVII, 41. The identical tenor and substance of these statements, attributed variously to reports by Sayf and Abū Mikhnaf, should erase any broad confidence that these narratives belonged to these narrators. The break in Ṭabarī’s isnād from Sayf to Abū Mikhnaf after the Battle of the Camel seems very artificial.
32. That ‘Alī permitted the enemy to drink from the wells in his camp was undoubtedly meant to be read symbolically as an unwitting sanction that they would eventually inherit the caliphate. This allusive tangent ran parallel to the great anxiety surrounding the situation at the Taḥkīm when ‘Alī showed his willingness to compromise by erasing his name as caliph from the document against all the warnings of his advisors that such an action reflected ominously on his future rule. Similar warnings are made about ‘Alī’s decision to abandon Medina as the caliphal center in favor of Kufa, predicting that if he does that he will never go back to Medina.
33. Ibn ‘Asākir, XLII, 452–455.
34. The direct treachery at Ṣiffin, for example, is attributed more to ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ, who is considered of an inferior class background in comparison with Mu‘āwiya.
35. Ṭabarī, I, 3278. On a general level, Mu‘āwiya would even admit that he does not command as much “faḍl” (merit) as ‘Alī and that the community recognizes that (lastu adda‘ī annī mithlahu fī’l-faḍl). Dīnawarī,172.
36. ‘Alī’s main speech to the delegation goes as follows: “God sent Muḥammad with the truth and through him provided deliverance from error, salvation from destruction, and the overcoming of division. Then God took him to Himself after he had carried out his mission. The people appointed Abū Bakr as caliph, and Abū Bakr appointed ‘Umar after him, and those two conducted themselves well and led the community with justice. We resented their ruling over us, the family of the Messenger of God, but we excused them for that. Then ‘Uthmān ruled and did things that the people found reprehensible, so that they came to him and killed him. Afterward they came to me, while I was keeping out of their concerns [wa anā mu‘tazil umūrahum], and they asked me to accept the oath of allegiance. I refused, but they insisted and said that the community would never find anyone acceptable but me, and that if I did not, they were afraid that the division would result. So I accepted the oath of allegiance from them. But then I was surprised to find dissension of two of those who had given me the oath of allegiance and the opposition of Mu‘āwiya, to whom God had given neither precedence [ṣābiqa] in accepting the religion nor forebears of good character in Islam [wa lā salafuṣidqin]. He is one of those who were set free [ṭalīq] by the Prophet, and the son of one of them, a member of those ‘parties’ [ḥizbun min hādhihi al-aḥzāb] that persisted in enmity to God, His Prophet, and the Muslims, both he and his father, until they reluctantly entered Islam. But it is a surprise that you take part in his opposition and are led by him, abandoning the family of your Prophet, against which you must not show discord and opposition nor place anyone on the same level. I call you to the Book of God, the precedent of His Prophet, the suppression of what is false, and putting into practice the signs of the religion. That is what I have to say, and I ask God’s pardon for me and for you and for every Believer.” Ṭabarī, I, 3278. Hawting, HT,XVII, 25–26. Dīnawarī preserves only a brief two lines describing this visit, naming the same delegation, and treats it as a secondary account of the central debate between ‘Alī and the enemy delegation. The more primary debate that Dīnawarī focuses on centers on the visit of the Syrian ascetic Abū Muslim al-Khawlānī, to be recounted below. Dīnawarī’s abbreviated version of Ḥabīb b. Maslama’s debate with ‘Alī shows an angry exchange between the two, lacks the methodical debate and Qur’ānic allusion to be found in Ṭabarī, and conflates it with the account wherein ‘Alī declares that he is unable to surrender the murderers of ‘Uthmān because there are twenty thousand of them. Dīnawarī, 181–182.
37. ‘Alī’s remark at the beginning, in which he recognizes the righteous government of Abū Bakr and ‘Umar even though the right of the family of the Prophet was overriden, touches on a key debate in the ninth century about the legitimacy of the caliphate of the less “excellent” (al-afḍal wa’l-mafḍūl). Discussion of this question not only was the basis on which a certain agreement was reached on reconciling the positions of ‘Alī, Abū Bakr, and ‘Umar but was extended by Sunnīs to justify even the caliphate of Mu‘āwiya, since he commanded important political strategic skills.
38. Ṭabarī, I, 3279. Hawting, HT, XVII, 26. Naṣr b. Muzāḥim al-Minqarī, Waq‘at Ṣiffīn, ed. A. M. Hārūn (Cairo,1962), 202. Minqarī’s account has ‘Alī say only, “I do not say that [lā aqūlu dhalika].” On the whole, Minqarī’s account redacts the accounts in favor of ‘Alī.
39. Qur’ān 27:80–81.
40. Ṭabarī, I, 3279. Hawting, HT, XVII, 26.
41. Ṭabarī, I, 3152.
42. From there begins the negative portrayal of the expert Qurrā’ in the sources, with the two main attributes ascribed to them being that they are overly proud and prone to parsing interpretation (ta’wīl). The caliph ‘Umar tends to be the voice most often used against the extremists in this group. For a sampling of such commentaries, see al-Hindī, Kanz, X, 268 (no. 29404), 271 (no. 29417). The selection is placed under the topic of the drawbacks of knowledge (āfāt al-‘ilm). The Khārijites were also prone to citing an apt Qur’ānic verse in artful response to a dispute. See the example of al-Mustwarid b. ‘Ullafa in A.H. 42/ A.D. 662. Ṭabarī, II, 43. A critique of ‘Alī’s erudite citation of the Qur’ān is indirectly conveyed in a different narrative that centers on the dispute between ‘Alī and Ibn ‘Abbās. After ‘Alī reportedly found out that Ibn ‘Abbās had tapped into the governorship’s fund, he rebuked him in a particularly scathing letter that was filled with rhetorical flourish (the letter actually opens with ‘Alī’s invocation of a Qur’ānic verse as a parable perhaps about the situation he was about to address). Although Ibn ‘Abbās usually responded effectively to such challenges, in this particular case he is not quoted defending his position as strongly as ‘Alī does. However, Ibn ‘Abbās does manage to win this debate as well by cautioning ‘Alī to refrain from further slander and stylized comparisons (with the classical texts). Ibn ‘Abbās thus alludes to ‘Alī’s habit of making such boastful rhetorical citings, however in that instance referring to ancient stories. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-‘Iqd, IV, 359.
43. Ṭabarī, I, 2989.
44. Ṭabarī, I, 3292.
45. Ṭabarī, I, 3318.
46. Dīnawarī, 180. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), I, 510.
47. Dīnawarī, 173. Minqarī, Waq‘at, 85–86. Minqarī adds that the messenger commented after leaving, “Now fighting has become permissible.” This line naturally changes the nature of Abū Muslim’s visit and probably reflects the later embellishments of Minqarī over Dīnawarī’s account. After the breakout of the war, and during a lull in the fighting, Dīnawarī redescribes a similar goodwill embassy from Syria that was undertaken by Abū Umāma al-Bāhili and Abū’l-Dardā’. This version—which bears the same structure, albeit much briefer, as the embassy of Abū Muslim al-Khawlānī—also starts out as an independent initiative put forward first to Mu‘āwiya, and then, when the two mediators visit ‘Alī, we are told that they were confronted with the scene of twenty thousand people declaring that they had killed ‘Uthmān. This version ends with the statement that the two men thereafter abandoned the scene of the conflict and settled on an isolated coast. Dīnawarī, 181.
48. Dīnawarī’s version of ‘Alī’s reaction, as this description shows, did not dwell on any ambiguity in ‘Alī’s position, and the narrative did not circle around artistic features of representation as the text of Ṭabarī does. Dīnawarī’s version, unlike Ṭabarī’s, shows ‘Alī answering to the point and describing a situation that was already out of control before he had even assumed the caliphate. ‘Alī’s letter in response to Mu‘āwiya also does not digress to defame the background of Mu‘āwiya, as Ṭabarī’s version does. Dīnawarī’s version of the letter shows disappointment on the part of ‘Alī that ‘Uthmān had died and argues directly to the point that Mu‘āwiya’s demand is no more than a political ploy.
49. Dīnawarī, 174.
50. Dīnawarī, 175. Minqarī, Waq‘at, 54–55.
51. Qur’ān 28:19. This verse, along with its wider context in Sūrat al-Qaṣaṣ (15–22)—starting with “wa dakhala al-madīnata,” until “fa-kharaja minhā khā’ifan yatraqqab”—is extensively used in Ṭabarī’s narratives about the ‘Alids, Khārijites, and the ‘Abbāsid da‘wa in Khurāsān. See Ṭabarī, I, 3366 (applied to the Khārijite Sharīḥ b. Awfā); II, 222 (applied to al-Ḥusayn); II, 1987 (applied during the war between Naṣr b. Sayyār and al-Kirmānī); and II, 1990 (applied to Abū Muslim entering Marw).
52. Ṭabarī, I, 3269. ‘Alī’s order to his troops after they took the wells: “Take only as much water as you need from the wells then return to your camp and let them take their share, for God has made us victorious over them because of their baghy and ẓulm [aggression and oppression].”
53. Dīnawarī, 173.
54. Dīnawarī, 161. A similar comment was made at ‘Uthmān’s assassination, when someone said, “Can the shedding of ‘Uthmān’s blood be permissible but his property remain safeguarded?” Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū‘ Abd Shams), 592. This then set in motion the robbery of ‘Uthmān’s house.
55. ‘Alī’s speech went as follows: “Do not fight them unless they attack you first. You, praise be to God, have a good case and holding back from fighting them until they attack will strengthen it. If you fight them and defeat them, do not kill the fugitives, do not finish off the wounded, do not uncover their nakedness, and do not mutilate the slain. If you reach their abodes, do not tear aside a curtain, enter a dwelling without permission, or seize any of their property apart from what you find in the army camp. Do not do harm against any woman, even if they utter abuse against your honor and vilify your leaders and righteous men, for women are weak of body and soul.” Ṭabarī, I,3282. Hawting, HT, XVII,30.
56. ‘Alī incited his troops as follows: “God has guided you to ‘a commerce that will deliver you from a bitter punishment’ [Qur’ān 61:10] and bring you to the verge of good: ‘belief in God and His Messenger, and jihād in the path of God’ [Qur’ān 61:11], may His name be exalted. He has made His reward a pardon of sin ‘and blessed abodes in the gardens of Eden’ [Qur’ān 61:12]. Then He has informed you that ‘He loves those who fight in His path in lines as if they were a tightly compact building’ [Qur’ān 61:4] so make your lines even like a tightly compact building. Advance the armed man and hold back the unarmed, and grit your teeth, for it makes the swords rebound from the heads. Twist the ends of the lances, for it better preserves the points. Avert your gaze, for that is more calming for the soul and more soothing for the heart. Deaden your voices, for that is better for driving out cowardice and more dignified. As for your banners, neither lower them nor abandon them, and make sure they stay in the hands of the valiant men among you. Those who defend what it is their duty to defend and are steadfast in protecting what it is obligatory for them to protect, they are the guardians who surround their banners and protect them, fighting on both sides of them, behind and in front of them, and not abandoning them. A man has given satisfaction who strikes his opponent hard—may God have mercy on you—and puts his brother on a level with himself, and does not leave his opponent to his brother, so as to acquire blame and become base. And why is it that he should not act thus, one man fighting two opponents while another who has held back his hand leaves his opponent to confront his brother, he himself fleeing or standing looking on? Whoever does that, God hates him. So do not expose yourselves to the hatred of God, praise be to Him, for your place of return is only to God. God, the mightiest of those who speak, said to a people, ‘Flight will not avail you if you flee from death or slaying; in that case you will be allowed to enjoy only a little time’ [Qur’ān 33:16]. And I swear by God that, if you escape from the sword of this world, you will not escape from that of the next. Ask for the assistance of sincerity and steadfastness, for after steadfastness God sends down the victory.”Ṭabarī, I, 3290–3291. Hawting, HT, XVII, 37–38. The italicized line indicates an eventuality that would happen in the description of battle soon afterward in which al-Ḥusayn distinguishes himself but al-Ḥasan holds back and ‘Alī questions him about this. Ṭabarī, I, 3293.
57. Ṭabarī, I, 3298.
58. Ṭabarī, I, 3298.
59. Ṭabarī, I, 3298. Minqarī, 245–248. Minqarī’s version is a lot more elaborate than Ṭabarī’s. According to Ya‘qūbī, Ibn Budayl died in the Battle of the Camel in A.H. 36/ A.D. 656. Ta’rīkh, II, 182. That version, however, also gives a dramatized description of the event.
60. Ṭabarī, I, 3297.
61. Ṭabarī, I, 3297–3298. Stressing the moral value of intention (niyya), ‘Ammār berates ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ for having sold out his religion in exchange for gaining appointment to the governorship of Egypt from Mu‘āwiya, and adds: “You should look ahead to the day when people are judged according to their niyya what your judgment will be [fa-unẓur idhā u‘ṭiya al-nāsu ‘alā qadri niyyātihim mā niyatuka].” Ṭabarī, I, 3319. That heroism could be accomplished for tribal honor was a phenomenon earlier associated with the Meccans at Badr, when they originally insisted on carrying through with their march so that other tribes would hear of their military might. The Qur’ān alludes to this in the verse: “Be not as those who went forth from their habitations swaggering boastfully to show off to men [alladhīn kharajū min diyārihim baṭaran wa riyā’a al-nās]” (Qur’ān 8:47 [Arberry, I, 202]). Ṭabarī, I, 1288. The ḥadīth also warns against riyā ’ in battle. Tirmidhī (kitāb faḍā’il al-jihād), IV, 153 (no. 1646). Muslim, V, pt. 13 (no. 1905), 50.
62. Ṭabarī, I, 3313.
63. Ṭabarī, I, 3316.
64. This evokes the Qur’ānic reference to “ḥamiyyat al-jāhiliyy a” and its wrongful basis. Among the tribe of Tamīm the comment was even more blunt—one soldier, Zaḥr b. Nahshal, encouraged them by saying, “Woe to you! If you are not fighting for religion, then fight for your noble name [in lam tuqātilū‘alā al-dīn fa-qātilū‘ alā al-aḥsāb].” Dīnawarī,195.
65. The focus on Rabī‘a as steadfast supporters of ‘Alī in battle may even have been intended to carry oblique unflattery. For while the tribe of Rabī‘a was the object of praise in the Battle of Qādisiyya (dubbed there “Rabī‘at al-Asad”), it is abundantly clear in Ṭabarī’s narratives that they had been a key base of Mu-saylima’s Ridda movement before, and that some of that clique represented by al-Asha‘th b. Qays, a key supporter of the Ridda, would later insist that the Taḥkīm not consist of two arbitrators drawn from the tribe of Muḍar (recall the famous comment, “We will not allow that both arbitrators be drawn from the tribe of Muḍar [lā yaḥkumu fīnā muḍariyyān]”). Ya‘qūbī, II, 189. Earlier during the Ridda war, one supporter of Musaylima, while acknowledging the latter’s deceitfulness, resigned himself on tribal grounds by declaring, “The liar of Rabi‘a is more well liked to us than the truthful man of Muḍar.” Ṭabarī, I, 1937. With all the fluctuation in Rabī‘a’s fortunes through history, first supporting the Ridda, then joining the Muslims at Qādisiyya, and later playing a pivotal role in the ‘Abbāsid revolution, it is left unclear where the narrators intended the innuendo about ‘Alī’s movement to connect. The role of tribal zeal in the Ridda wars and at Ṣiffīn, however, seems likely to form a link behind the two phases of representation.
66. Ṭabarī, I, 3284–3285. Dīnawarī’s version of a similar confrontation describes a father and son who encounter one another in a duel without knowing each other’s identity, since they were covered with a helmet and armor. As the two throw one another from the saddle and fall to the ground, their helmets fall off and they recognize one another and stop fighting. Dīnawarī, 184. Dīnawarī’s work, to a much greater extent than Ṭabarī and others, contains numerous stories about such individual confrontations (mubāraza) happening before the battle. The author’s focus seems to have centered not only on showing the great hesitance among the conflicting camps to fight one another but also on highlighting the ironic turns of fate these oppositions engendered. One such incident he describes is when a Syrian soldier called Ḥujr al-Sharr found himself confronted by Ḥujr b. ‘Adī; the intention here was clearly to show the confrontation of two men with a similar name. Dīnawarī, 187.
67. Ṭabarī, I, 3303. Minqarī, 262.
68. Ṭabarī, I, 3347. Hawting, HT, XVII, 96–97 (with minor modification). It is not clear whether ‘Alī’s speech was meant as a rebuke, as a somber eulogy, or as a combined reflection on the two camps. The Arabic evokes the tragic lot of both, but puts ‘Alī on a pedestal eloquently preaching, as usual. It is important to note that this speech, like many others of ‘Alī, has minimal rhyme (saja‘) but eloquent flow. Since rhyme was frowned upon as the method of poets and pretender prophets after Muḥammad (see ‘Umar’s disparagement of it), it does not feature much in the early historical tradition. Rhyme, however, would have a bonanza in later Shī‘ī depictions of ‘Alī’s preachings and speeches.
69. Ṭabarī, I, 3348. Hawting, HT, XVII, 97.
70. Ṭabarī, I, 1331–1332. Muslim, VI (pt. 17), 206 (no. 2873). Bukhārī (kitāb al-maghāzī), V, 211 (no. 316). Al-Nasā’ī, Sunan, II, 446 (nos. 1962, 1963).
71. Another instance of resemblance to the Sīra (specifically to the story of the Battle of Uḥud) has already been noted: when the followers of ‘Abdallāh b. Budayl reportedly displayed zealous concern upon hearing a rumor of the Prophet’s death in battle. Ṭabarī, I, 3298, 1406–1407. See above.
72. Ṭabarī, I, 3373.
73. Qur’ān 5:24 (Arberry, I, 132).
74. Ṭabarī, I, 1300.
75. Of the Anṣār, according to Ya‘qūbī, only two joined the camp of Mu‘āwiya: al-Nu‘mān b. Bashīr and Maslama b. Mukhallad. Ta’rīkh, II, 188.
76. Ibn Sa‘d, II, 52.
77. Ibn Sa‘d, II, 151; IV, 19. During preparations for the conquest of Mecca, the Prophet also reportedly commanded Abū Hurarya to call out: “Summon the Anṣār, and let none but an Anṣārī gather.” Balādhurī, Futūḥ, I, 44–45. When the Anṣār gathered, it was clear that a battle with the Quraysh was about to be joined. Abū Sufyan’s last-minute intercession, as is well known, averted war, but apparently the Anṣār briefly grumbled that the Prophet had grown soft regarding his kinsmen. The incident was similar to the argument over distributing the booty of Ḥunayn, and the Anṣār reportedly expressed regret for having challenged the Prophet’s plan.
78. Ibn Sa‘d, IV, 19.
79. Ibn Sa‘d, II, 253.
80. Ibn Sa‘d, II, 181. This segment is omitted in Ṭabarī’s version of the farewell speech, but it must have been in origin absolutely critical for understanding the unraveling of Islamic history after the deaths of the Prophet, Abū Bakr, and ‘Umar.
81. His standard comment on this topic: “O People of the Muhājirūn, You have become a crowd that continues to grow in number, but the Anṣār are the same group that they used to be [innakum aṣbaḥtum tazīdūn wa aṣbaḥat al-anṣār lā ta-zidu ‘alā hay’tihā allatī hiya ‘alayhā]. They represent my side of weakness [al-yawma hum‘aybatī allatī awaytu ilayhā]. Be kind to those who do good among them, and forgive their transgressors their errors [akrimū karīmahum wa tajāwazū ‘an musī’ihim].” Ibn Sa‘d, II, 251.
82. For a survey of the legendary evidence for the descent of the Anṣār from the sons of Hārūn, Naḍīr and Qurayẓa, see M. Gil, “The Origins of the Jews of Yathrib,” JSAI 4 (1984): 203–220.
83. The history of the Jews and the Anṣār in Medina remains caught up in factual readings that accept the purported distinctions of social groups given in the narratives, and so in the traditional references the Jews in Medina (the Banū Qurayẓa, Banū al-Naḍīr, etc.) continue to be viewed as an altogether different set of people from the tribal factions of Medina (the Anṣār). To fully appreciate the foundation of an alternative interpretation one would have to describe a process of anti-Jewish polemic in the early ‘Abbāsid period that crafted a schismatic process in the Sīra and later showed how ‘Alī and Sunnism in general had to cope with these lingering zealous and schismatic trends. Examples of traditional literature that follow a factual reading for Jewish history are G. Newby, A History of the Jews of Arabia: From Ancient Times to Their Eclipse Under Islam (Columbia, SC, 1988), 78–96. N. Stillman, Jews of Arab Lands, 3–21. S. D. Goitein, Jews and Arabs (New York, 1974), 62–67; M. Cohen, Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1994), 22–24, 52–58; M. Gil, “The Medinan Opposition to the Prophet,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 10 (1987): 65–67, where the author declares arbitrarily that the “Muslim traditions are most trustworthy” on these matters. A mild exception to these traditional readings is the tangential comment of P. Crone about storytellers in the early Islamic period and their instrumental role in shaping the well-known narrative about Meccan commerce during the Sīra. “They [i.e., storytellers],” she writes, “must also have invented something, possibly everything, about the position of the Jews” (Meccan Trade, 218–219). Also relevant is the attitude of Bernard Lewis, who seems to place little credence in the historicity of narratives about the Jews of Arabia that is ascribed in the Muslim historiographical tradition, and asserts that the Arabian Jews were probably few in number and are virtually unknown in Jewish historiography. The Jews of Islam (Princeton, 1984), 74, 86. J. Wansbrough, Qur’ānic Studies (Oxford, 1977), 51. Another scholar notes that the Jews of Ḥijāz made no contribution to the history of Talmudic discussions. A. J. Wensinck, Muhammad and the Jews of Medina, trans. and ed. Wolfgang H. Behn, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1982), 37. Also, D. S. Margoliouth, The Relations Between the Arabs and Israelites Prior to the Rise of Islam (Oxford, 1924), 67–70.
84. In this context it is worth noting the letter that Mu‘āwiya reportedly sent to Qays b. Sa‘d b. ‘Ubāda during the war with ‘Alī in which he calls Qays “the Jew and son of a Jew.” Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-‘Iqd, IV, 338. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 33 (quoting al-Madā’inī). Ibn Qutayba, ‘Uyūn al-Akhbār, II, 232 (quoting Ibn al-Kalbī). Generally during the Sīra, however, the Anṣār are referred to as “clients of the Jews” (mawālī yahūd).
85. Sayf b. ‘Umar, Kitāb al-Ridda wa’l-Futūḥ, I, 18; al-Hindī, Kanz, X, 268 (no. 29403). For the Islamic perception of the Qurrā’ in the biblical period, see Ṭabarī, I, 592, 660. See also the relevant ḥadīth, which states, “The largest group of the munāfiqūn are the qurrā ’ [inna akthara munāfiqī hādhihi al-umma la-qurrā’uhā].” Aḥmad, Musnad, XXVIII, 628. A statement of political advice also explains the unsuitability of the Qurrā’ for holding government posts. Ibn Qutayba, ‘Uyūn al-Akhbār, I, 71.
86. It is not coincidental that ‘Uthmān is said to have been reading sūrat al-baqara when he was killed by the assassins (a group that foreshadows the Qurrā’ and the Khārijites). Ṭabarī, I, 3021. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 591. Here one should mention the ḥadīth that has the Prophet declare, “No prophet has guarded my community as carefully as Moses has done.” Suyūṭī, al-Jāmi ‘al-Ṣaghīr, 87 (no.1407).
87. In Aḥmad’s Musnad one tradition about the Taḥkīm describes the Khārijites as being the same group as the Qurrā’ (fa jā ’ athu al-khawārij wa naḥnu nad‘ūhum yawmidhin al-qurrā ’). Musnad, XXV, 348.
88. When they heard about the news of the Khārijite murder of ‘Abdallāh b. Khabbāb and his family, Ṭabarī says, the followers of ‘Alī declared (fa-qāma ilayhi al-nās): “O Commander of the Faithful, Are you going to let these people be in charge of our wealths and families when we are away? Let us first march against them and then when we are done with them we shall march against our enemy in Syria [‘alāma tada‘ha’ulā’ warā’anā yakhlufūnanā fī-amwālinā wa ‘iyālinā? sir binā ilā al-qawm fa-idhā faraghnā mā baynanā wa baynahum sirnā ilā ‘aduwwinā min ahl al-shām].” Ṭabarī, I, 3375.
89. Ṭabarī, I, 3385.
90. Ṭabarī, I, 3410. Hawting, HT, XVII, 162.
91. Ṭabarī, I, 3409–3410. Hawting, HT, XVII, 162.
92. Ṭabarī, I, 3411–3412. Hawting, HT, XVII, 163–164.
93. Qur’ān 44:30–32 (Arberry, II, 208).
94. Qur’ān 7:137 (Arberry, I, 186–187).
95. “Moses, We will not endure one sort of food; pray to thy Lord for us, that he may bring forth for us of that the earth produces—green herbs, cucumbers, corn, lentils, onions” (Qur’ān 1:57 [Arberry, I, 36]).
96. “and they came upon a people cleaving to idols they had. They said, ‘Moses, make for us a god, as they have gods.’ Said he, ‘You are surely a people who are ignorant.’ Surely this they are engaged upon shall be shattered, and void is what they have been doing” (Qur’ān 7:134 [Arberry, I, 187]).
97. “And when you said, ‘Moses, we will not believe thee till we see God openly’” (Qur’ān 2:52 [Arberry, I, 35]).
98. “They said, ‘Moses, there are people in it very arrogant: we will not enter it until they depart from it; if they depart from it then we will enter…. We will never enter it so long as they are in it. Go forth, thou and thy Lord, and do battle; we will be sitting here’” (Qur’ān 5:25–29 [Arberry, I, 131–132]).
99. Ṭabarī, I, 3331. Dīnawarī, 203.
100. If these events realistically happened on a battlefield (i.e., the conversation between ‘Alī and the dissenters), and encompassed the differentials of space and private vs. public decisions, these doubts about ‘Alī would not have been possible, since the dissenters and ‘Alī would only have seen but not heard what ‘Alī’s messenger said to al-Ashtar while far away. However, ‘Alī’s answer, “Didn’t you hear me command him in front of you,” eliminates any possibility that ‘Alī merely placated them. The conversation and the emphasis on the sincerity of ‘Alī would have been apparent only in a situation where all these events could be compressed within a stage setting, where an audience would have seen all actors in proximity to one another and overhearing one another. Only in this context would the refusal of the dissenters in ‘Alī’s camp gain its full meaning as a stubborn answer reflective of the transformed followers and reminiscent of the ancient Israelites.
101. Ṭabarī, I, 3331.
102. It is important to note here that at no point are the prospective dissenters yet referred to as “Khārijites.” The acceptance of the call for the Taḥkīm comes generically from his followers (“qālū...”). Ṭabarī, I, 3329–3330.
103. Ṭabarī, I, 3332. Hawting, HT, XVII, 81.
104. As the well-known ḥadīth states, “There is among you one who will fight over the interpretation of the Qur’ān as I did over its revelation.” Aḥmad, Musnad, XVIII, 296. Ta’wīl was not a favored method for adducing a sound judgment, according to Sunnī Islam (Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, Jāmi ’, II, 194). ‘Umar had reportedly once told Ibn ‘Abbās, “I had thought of appointing you to a provincial governorship, but I feared that you might use the revenues of the conquered lands [al-fay’] according to your ta’wīl.” The account then describes how when ‘Alī appointed Ibn ‘Abbās to the governorship of Basra, the latter did in fact appropriate a share of the revenue as his right because of his kinship relation to the Prophet. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-‘Iqd, IV, 354. The report is attributed to Abū Bakr b. Abī Shayba.
105. Ṭabarī, I, 2989.
106. The analogy between the situations of the two caliphs also relates to descriptions of their debates with opponents. ‘Alī’s debate with the Khārijites later, although partially plausible, is meant to echo the challenges of the Kufan zealots to ‘Uthmān. The Kufan zealots (al-mutasammitūn), according to Ṭabarī’s narratives, later become the Qurrā’ and the Khārijites.
107. Ṭabarī, I, 3359.
108. ‘Alī tried to resist the appointment, telling his followers: “You have challenged me at the start of this, so don’t challenge me on this issue.” However, al-Ash‘ath insisted: “We don’t accept anyone other than him.” Ṭabarī, I, 3333.
109. The various series of episodes describing first the Kufan demand that ‘Uthmān appoint Abū Mūsā al-Ash‘arī as governor of Kufa in place of Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ, and later the Khārijite challenge to ‘Alī at the Taḥkīm when he sought to appoint a skilled debater as his representative finds its root in the time when the Anṣār challenged the appointment by the Prophet of Usāma b. Zayd as leader of the first Syrian campaign. Although during the Prophet’s lifetime the narratives do not identify the Anṣār as the group whom the Prophet debated and silenced over this issue (the group is only identified as al-munāfiqūn, the hypocrites), soon after his death they are directly identified when they repeat the same line of dissent with ‘Umar. Ṭabarī, I, 1796, 1849. Aḥmad, Musnad, IX, 450.
110. Qur’ān 6:56.
111. Ṭabarī, I, 3278. Hawting, HT, III, 128.
112. Nisbas (tribal affiliations) are included in Muslim’s version of the same ḥadīth. Here the name of Zayd al-Khayr al-Ṭā’ī and mention of another man of Banū Nabahān and a man of Banū Kilāb are added. Muslim, III (pt. 7), 161 (no. 1062).
113. This man is identified as “dhū’l-khuwayṣira” in a ḥadīth that gives a variant on the same theme but under different circumstances. In that version the Prophet foretells in a story the coming of al-Mukhaddaj, the famous Khārijite leader who is killed at al-Nahrawān. Bukhārī (bāb al-manāqib), IV, 517 (no. 807). is narrated on the authority of Abū Sa‘īd al-Khidrī. Aḥmad, Musnad, XVIII, 95. The account is also in the Sīra (reported by Ibn Isḥāq), where Dhū’l-Khuwayṣira is identified as a member of the Banū Tamīm. Ibn Hishām, Sīra, IV, 136.
114. Bukhārī, V, 448–449 (no. 638); on the authority of Abū Sa‘īd al-Khidrī. Muslim (bāb i‘ṭā’ al-mu’allafa wa man yukhāfu ‘alā īmānihi), III (pt. 7), 162–163 (no. 1064). Aḥmad, Musnad, XVIII, 192, 227–228. There are variant versions of this ḥadīth (Ibn Sa‘d’s version reads: “sayakūn min ba ‘dī min ummatī qawmun yaqra’ūna al-qur’ān lā yujāwiza ḥulūqahum yakhrujūn min al-dīn ka-mā yakhruju al-sahm min al-ramya… hum shirāru al-khalqi wa’l-khalīqa...” [Ibn Sa‘d, VII, 29–30]). In one version the zealous critic of the Prophet is reported saying, when the booty was divided, “This is a division that was not intended to please God.” This made the Prophet grow very angry but just say, “May God’s mercy be upon Moses. He was hassled in even worse ways but kept patient.” Bukhārī, VIII, 234 (no. 348). Muslim, III (pt. 7), 158 (no. 1062). The event is set at the division of the booty after the Battle of Ḥunayn. An earlier version of this ḥadīth identifies the zealot as a man of the Anṣār; Ṣaḥīḥ, 204 (no. 306). Other versions on the authority of al-Bukhārī include: VI, kitāb faḍā’il al-Qur’ān, 519–520 (nos. 577, 578); IX, kitāb al-tawḥīd, 489 (no. 651); here the zealots are identified as coming from the east and having in common their shaving of the head. In another version, the Prophet, reportedly describing the emergent zealous faction of the Ḥarūriyya, points to Iraq and says, “They will emerge from there.” Aḥmad, Musnad, XXV, 351. Ṭabarī’s full version of the confrontation with the man from Banū Tamīm (dhū’l-khuwayṣira) is set in the year A.H. 8 after the Battle of Ḥunayn. Ṭabarī, I, 1682. Ibn Ḥumayd←Salama←Muḥammad b. Isḥāq←Abū ‘Ubayda b. Muḥammad←Miqsam Abī’l-Qāsim mawlā ‘Abdallāh b. al-Ḥārith b. Nawfal. Of related thematic relevance to this story is Ṭabarī’s report about Sa‘d b. ‘Ubāda’s direct, albeit milder, questioning of the Prophet regarding why the Anṣār were not given as much booty as they deserved. Ṭabarī, I, 1684.
115. Ṭabarī, I, 3373–3375. Ibn Sa‘d, V, 246.
116. Ṭabarī, I, 3375. A variant story describes a similar Khārijite attack on a dihqān called Zādān Farrūkh. Ṭabarī, I, 3423.
117. This is specifically mentioned by Ibn Sa‘d, V, 246.
118. Ṭabarī, I, 3361
119. Ṭabarī, I, 3084. Here the reader would have been expected to recognize echoes from some dissident voices at the scene of the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiyya. When the Prophet conceded to establishing this treaty, we are told that ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb on that occasion, ever the unbending voice in the Islamic camp, voiced criticism of the event when he told Abū Bakr, “Are we not Muslims and they are the polytheists?” When Abū Bakr said, “Yes,” ‘Umar answered: “Then why are we yielding to the lower position?” Abū Bakr here reprimanded ‘Umar, but the latter would not budge, and then came to the Prophet and told him the same thing (“‘alāma nu‘ṭī al-daniyyata fī dīninā?”), to which the Prophet answered: “I am the servant of God and His messenger. I will not disobey His rule and He will not let me go astray […lan ukhālifa amrah wa lan yuḍayyi‘anī].” Here ‘Umar reportedly felt very guilty about challenging the Prophet and humbly gave in. Ṭabarī, I, 1545–1546. Muslim, IV (pt. 12), 141 (no. 1785); Bukhārī’s most detailed version of this event is given under the heading (bāb al-shurūṭ fī’l-jihād wa’lmuṣālaḥa), III, 568 (no. 861). Other versions given by Bukhārī, however, unlike the former, do not show ‘Umar guilt-ridden over his second-guessing of the Prophet. Bukhārī (kitāb al-tafsīr), bāb qawlihi ‘idh yubāyi‘ūnaka taḥt al-shajara ’, VI, 348 (no. 367); (kitāb al-khums), IV, 272 (no. 406). Aḥmad, Musnad, XXV, 340. This story was integrally tied to later events in the way it showed the Prophet being guided, and himself more prone, to the strategic choice, unlike the unlucky ‘Alī later. Although ‘Alī and ‘Umar share the same puritanical language, it is shown that such “puritanism” could be at times misplaced, and that in time the Khārijites would prove to be the followers in this zealous tradition. ‘Umar’s presence and his comments at al-Ḥudaybiyya are consonant with his image as the initial patron of the Kufan tradition of ultra-religiosity. Wāqidī’s account of ‘Umar’s behavior at al-Ḥudaybiyya describes a muffled beginning for Shī‘īsm that almost was associated with ‘Umar. In an account reportedly told by ‘Umar to Ibn ‘Abbās (typically set at a late time, in ‘Umar’s reign), ‘Umar states that he almost rebelled at that juncture of compromise. “Had I found anyone supporting me that day in the pursuit of this cause,” ‘Umar reportedly said, “I would have broken with the community [wa law wajadtu dhalika al-yawma shī‘a takhruju ‘anhum raghbatan ‘an al-qaḍiyya la-kharajtu thumma ja‘ala allāh ‘āqibatahā khayran wa rushda wa kāna rasūl allāh a‘lam].” Wāqidī, Maghāzī, II, 607. ‘Umar’s usage of the term “shī‘a” to refer to potential partisans in the perilous context of what he deemed at the time to be a valid religious controversy was no doubt calculated in the narrative to evoke the eventual error of the Shī‘ī and Khārijite positions later on. See above on ‘Alī’s comparison of the Taḥkīm with al-Ḥudaybiyya. The Prophet later affirmed his unwavering abidance by the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiyya much as ‘Alī recognized the Taḥkīm later. Ṭabarī, I, 1548. ‘Alī’s adamant refusal to allow Mu‘āwiya to continue serving as governor was also intended to be a repeat of ‘Umar’s earlier refusal to let Khālid b. al-Walīd remain in a position of military command (‘Umar’s comment: “lā yalī lī ‘ amalan abadan”). Ṭabarī, I, 2148. The lesson that ‘Umar eventually learned about his mistaken decision at the time, however, was clearly intended by the narrators to appear as having been lost on ‘Alī later on.
120. Ṭabarī, I, 3376.
121. Balādhurī, Ansāb (Banū ‘Abd Shams), 17. Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-‘Iqd, IV, 366–367; al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Bayān wa’l-Tabyīn, II, 115. Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab, ed. Muḥammad Rif‘at Fatḥallāh, 31 vols. (Cairo, 1923–1955), XX, 29–30.
122. A well-crafted story juxtaposing the situations in Mu‘āwiya’s and ‘Alī’s camps describes the relationship between the leader and his followers as such: “Mu‘āwiya summoned the community for a gathering in the mosque (when the hostilities with ‘Alī began), and declared to them, ‘ ‘Alī has mobilized against you with the people of al-‘Iraq, what do you all advise me to do?’… Not one of them spoke up, nor did they even look directly at him [i.e., in humility]. Amongst them, Dhū’l-Kilā‘ then spoke up, saying, ‘O Commander of the Faithful, we entrust you with the sound judgment, and we act upon this with obedience [‘alayka al-ra’y wa‘alaynā al-fi‘āl].’” When ‘Alī made his summons to his followers and asked them the same as Mu‘āwiya had asked of his followers, the story states, “every faction had its own opinion and they argued vehemently amid such a raucous that ‘Alī could not understand what was being said.” ‘Alī then reportedly gave his reflections in the comment, “Mu‘āwiya shall surely prevail over these people then.” Ibn Kathīr, IV (pt. 8), 132.
123. Ṭabarī, I, 3354. Dīnawarī describes this problem in ‘Alī’s camp briefly. Dīnawarī, 211.
124. After he was dismissed from office, Qays b. Sa‘d reportedly traveled to Medina, where he discussed political matters with ‘Alī. Then when news of Ibn Abī Bakr’s murder came to Medina, ‘Alī realized, Ṭabarī says, “that Qays had magnificent skill at strategy [‘arifa anna Qays b. Sa‘d kāna yuwāzī umūran ‘iẓāman min al-mukāyada].” Ṭabarī, I, 3392.
125. Ṭabarī, I, 3454.
126. Ṭabarī, I, 3438.
127. Ṭabarī, I, 3439.
128. Ṭabarī, I, 3439.
129. Ṭabarī, I, 3440.
130. Ṭabarī, I, 3441.
131. In various subtle ways the early chronicles tend to give Mu‘āwiya’s pretensions during the civil war some credible grounds and anticipate his regime. Later medieval chronicles continued further in that direction by commenting in apologetic terms on Mu‘āwiya’s challenge to ‘Alī. Ibn Kathīr is perhaps the most generous of the later orthodox writers in his interspersing the narrative with his own opinions. As he begins to describe the marauding attacks by Mu‘āwiya’s tribal affiliates on ‘Alī’s territories in A.H. 39/ A.D. 659—an action that is merely stated in the early chronicles to show the difficult situation of ‘Alī with his followers—Ibn Kathīr seems to praise Mu‘āwiya’s actions. He prefaces the account of the raids by saying: “In that year, Mu‘āwiya prepared many armies [jahhaza juyūshan kathīratan] and dispersed them to the frontier outposts of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. He [i.e., Mu‘āwiya] did that after he saw that ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ’ agreement with Abū Mūsā to depose ‘Alī had gained acceptance [qad waqi‘at al-mawqi‘], [and] thus thought himself deserving of [people’s] loyalty, and because the armies of ‘Alī, which were drawn from the Iraqis [ahl al-‘Irāq], were not obeying [‘Alī’s] orders… In such a situation, [Mu‘āwiya] thought himself more deserving than [‘Alī] of leadership if the situation was to remain as such.” Ibn Kathīr, IV (pt. 7), 331. In other words, Ibn Kathīr was saying, Mu‘āwiya was doing ‘Alī (and the community of Muslims) a favor in sending out these “armies” (raids) because he was allowing the opportunity for a better recentralization of the Islamic state. That ‘Alī and Mu‘āwiya were in conflict is not an issue for Ibn Kathīr anymore, since he considers the continuum of succession to the Umayyads in Syria acceptable and wants to use different arguments to prepare the legitimacy of Mu‘āwiya. The elements of the Sunnī argument were all brilliantly deployed: 1) Mu‘āwiya considered the agreement of the two arbitrators to be valid. 2) ‘Alī was unable to hold together his followers and thus was a caliph without an army. 3) The situation in Iraq was leading to chaos and thus needed the Syrian army to step in to fill the security vacuum. All these factors made Mu‘āwiya thus believe that he was more deserving than ‘Alī of leadership [awlā minhu idh kāna al-amru kadhalika]. And still, with such wording, Ibn Kathīr hedges the religious sincerity of Mu‘āwiya by implying that even if Mu‘āwiya’s opinion was a misreading of the situation, it was a carefully rationalized opinion—an ijtihād [“awlā” rather than “aḥaqq”]—and so Mu‘āwiya was free of sin whatever the actual religious parsing of the situation was.
132. The failures in responding to Mu‘āwiya’s incursions were not always the result of delayed action. Sometimes they resulted from a commander dissembling to ‘Alī’s cause, such as when al-Musayyib b. Najba al-Fazārī allowed his opponent, a fellow tribesman (‘Abdallāh b. Mas‘ada al-Fazārī), to slip away from a besieged fortress after ‘Abdallāh beseeched him to consider the importance of filial ties. Ya‘qūbī, II, 196–197. When ‘Alī heard of what had happened, he did little to punish Musayyib except to scold him for his idhān (duplicity), and then reassign him to a position of minor importance, that of collecting the charitable contributions (ṣadaqa) in Kufa.
133. The inclusion of these speeches varies among the medieval sources. A sampling can be found in the following literary works: Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-‘Iqd, IV, 66–81; al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Bayān wa’l-Tabyīn, II, 50–56; Ibn Qutayba, ‘Uyūn al-Akhbār, I (pt. 2), 256–258. Generally these speeches are listed among others that are attributed to Abū Bakr, Mu‘āwiya, and al-Ma’mūn, and frequently the fabric of ‘Alī’s speeches is no different as religious exhortation from those attributed to the other caliphs (especially al-Ma’mūn). There is little reference in most of these speeches to events or personalities that can connect their texts to the historical narrative (as for example in the famous speech of Ziyād b. Abīhi or even ‘Alī’s famous khuṭbat al-jihād). Later medieval writers such as Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn Kathīr omit nearly all of ‘Alī’s speeches, with the exception of the two speeches he makes after the death of Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr (it is quite telling that in these speeches ‘Alī blasts the character of his followers [ahl al-‘Irāq], which was a theme that strongly served Sunnī interest when taken out of the tragic context of the caliph’s other speeches), and his final pious testament. Such later writers were clearly dubious about a component of imāmī philosophy in these speeches, and even more anxious about attributing to ‘Alī through these profound speeches more religious wisdom than the other Rāshidūn. Earlier medieval chronicles, however, did not follow the same agenda of such strict orthodoxy. Ṭabarī, for example, while not including the whole range of wisdom sayings and speeches to be found in Ya‘qūbī’s Ta’rīkh or Ibn Abī’l-Ḥadīd’s Nahj al-Balāgha, gives enough examples of these speeches to indicate the wider source from which they were extracted. The context of this earlier source was clearly not Shī‘ī per se but parabolic and inspired by the prophetic storytelling techniques that praised ‘Alī but did so within the tragic context of stories that emulated the histories of the prophets. The aim of that discourse was not simply to outline the worthiness of ‘Alī for the caliphate, as Shī‘ī sources would have it later, but to show the tragic turning away of ‘Alī’s community at key junctures in the fourth caliph’s career.
134. Ya‘qūbī, II, 202–204.
135. It is quite revealing that the best reply and compliment one listener, Jāriya b. Qudāma, could give to ‘Alī after hearing him give one speech is to praise his eloquent style of teaching (“fa-ni‘ma al-adabi adabuka”). Ya‘qūbī, II, 198.
136. Ṭabarī, I, 3412. Hawting, HT, XVII, 164–165.
137. The reference here is indirectly ironic, as the narrator evokes the Sīra tradition about angelic support that the Prophet received at the Battle of Badr.
138. Ṭabarī, I, 3412–3413. Hawting, HT, XVII, 165.
139. One is reminded here of Muḥammad’s strategy of gaining the gradual cooperation of the group described as “al-mu’allafatu qulūbuhum” (the tentative converts), a strategy that would have been viewed not only as a historical event dealing with a group of tentative converts but as an everyday example that confronted the ruler within his own community.
140. Qur’ān 9:33; 6:19.
141. Qur’ān 6:162–163.
142. Qur’ān 3:102–103.
143. Qur’ān 2:83.
144. Qur’ān 5:2.
145. Ṭabarī, I, 3162–3163. Hawting, HT, XVII, 220–222.