“The important thing in any organization is the creation of a soul which is based on pride.”
IN THE SPRING of 1941, Patton learned that his division would take part in large-scale maneuvers or war games later that year. General Headquarters in Washington was planning the exercises. GHQ, as it was called, was the highest command post in the army. Officially under Marshall, it was actually headed by Marshall’s chief of staff, Lesley McNair, who used the faculty and the facilities of the Army War College to supervise and administer a vast training program throughout the army. Maneuvers brought together large units and put them through war problems or mock battles to test not only the efficacy of training methods but also the proficiency of commanders, staffs, and troops. It was an important occasion, for individual and unit performances would be measured and graded.
Thinking ahead to his own participation, Patton wrote to Lieutenant Colonel W. C. Crane, a friend who was a member of McNair’s staff. Some of the old rules for judging the performance of units, Patton suggested, might not apply to armored divisions in general and to his in particular; and they should not be allowed to hamper the new methods of operation being developed.
I fully realize that unsolicited comments are not greatly valued. Nonetheless, since you and I had considerable experience in umpiring, I beg leave to call your attention to the following comments of the Umpire Manual [which are out of date] ...
I think it worthy of note that the primary function of an Armored Force is to disrupt [enemy] command, communications, and supply.
Since an armored division could do more than what was prescribed in the regulations, he believed it desirable to have a member of the Armored Force with considerable rank and, by implication, an understanding of Patton’s methods present as an umpire whenever armored divisions were employed. Furthermore, commanders who failed to use imagination should be severely penalized. Units that followed routine practices were
not playing the game. The effect of surprise as to time or direction of attack should be given tremendous weight. In reading over the rules, I find no emphasis placed upon this . . .
Bombers, like artillery, depend for their effectiveness on ammunition supply. Nevertheless, bombarding aviators fly blithely . . . without taking out time to reload the bomb racks. This gives a wholly erroneous impression as to the efficiency of aviation . . .
For God’s sake, do not get me mixed up in this Umpire business, as I am wholly desirous to command this division, upon the successful operation of which my whole future will depend.
The value of aircraft as adjuncts to armored operations was very much on Patton’s mind, and he soon wrote to Crane again. “The following letter,” he said, “can be used by you in any way you see fit, provided you do not stick my neck out too far.” The war in Europe, he thought, thus far demonstrated the importance of armored units supported by motorized infantry and light, tactical bombers. Yet – “now I will be particularly outspoken” – the aviators believed that strategic bombardment alone could win the war, even though strategic air forces had failed “to do anything except bomb, ineffectively, unprotected cities.” The Army Air Corps had little interest in helping ground troops, but the airmen should be forming and training observation, attack, parachute, and air infantry units.
I am personally getting so air-minded that I own an aeroplane and expect shortly to have a pilots license. Next time you come here I may be able to take you for a ride if you have sufficient insurance.
Patton left it to Crane to determine whether it was “expedient” to mention anything to McNair. Patton was “not trying to cut ahead of any of my superiors,” but he believed that “new ideas are what are winning this war.” However, “crusading is an expensive pastime. I do not wish to lock horns with the GHQ Air Force or anyone else.” If Crane found Patton’s suggestions worthwhile, he could bring them forward simply as ideas “and not mention my name even in your sleep. I leave this matter to your discretion.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Mrs. C. L. Scott, Fort Knox, May 13, 1941
Since General Scott was probably wholly responsible for my promotion, it was really not necessary for you to write [congratulations], which makes it all the nicer that you did.
We moved out to our new house in the woods last night and nearly froze to death.
The new house was about ten miles from the officers’ quarters on the main post and close to a cantonment area known as Sand Hill that had been specially built for his division. While his men entered into the new barracks, the Pattons left the glistening white stucco house that suggested the polish and precision of the parade ground and settled into a rough but spacious log cabin more in keeping with the spirit of field service. Built by the Army Engineers and containing several additional amenities paid for by the Pattons, the house sat in a large grove of southern pines at the top of a rise overlooking an oval driveway connecting a dozen tiny huts where the members of his staff lived. Less than three miles distant was the headquarters, several barracks-type buildings, where Patton and his staff worked.
To McNair:
The thing I believe which we must remove from the minds of the high command is that the direct charge against anti-tank guns over open country is as impracticable as is a cavalry charge against barbed wire. Trusting that you will pardon my imposing on your time.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Crittenberger, June 2, 1941
My dear Crit: I enclose a copy of the address I gave to the entire 2d Armored Division . . . You are probably one of the few people with sufficient historical knowledge to recognize the opening gambit as a meticulous copy of General Bonaparte’s address to the Army of Italy in the spring of 1796 . . .
As you will see from my remarks, I am obsessed with the idea that tanks should be used as quail-shooting weapons and not as buffaloes.
In other words, mobility and firepower were more important than shock action, which he compared to a buffalo stampede.
As a matter of fact, he doubted that “our chief enemy is armored divisions. In my opinion, armored divisions will avoid each other to the limit of their ability.” They were simply too powerful to risk a head-on collision.
Patton sent Stimson a copy of his address, realizing “that neither your limited time nor the merits of my remarks justify your reading them, but . . . so far as I know, it is the first time a division commander ever talked to all the men in his division at one time.”
GSP, Jr., Address to officers and men of 2d Armored Division, May 17, 1941
You men and officers are, in my opinion, magnificently disciplined . . . You cannot be disciplined in great things and undisciplined in small things . . . Brave, undisciplined men have no chance against the discipline and valor of other men. Have you ever seen a few policemen handle a crowd? . . .
The salute is the mutual greeting of respect and loyalty between members of a fighting organization . . . Pride is the greatest thing that a man can have . . . pride in demonstrated ability . . .
An armored division is the most powerful organization ever devised by the mind of men . . . An armored division is that element of the team which carries out the running plays. We straight-arm, and go around, and dodge, and go around . . .
We must find out where the enemy is, we must hold him, and we must get around him . . .
One of the greatest qualities which we have is the ability to produce in our enemy the fear of the unknown. Therefore, we must always keep moving, do not sit down, do not say “I have done enough,” keep on, see what else you can do to raise the devil with the enemy...
You must have a desperate determination to go forward. When we beat them, we will beat them by attacking sooner and harder than they do...
There are no bullets in maneuvers, and things sometimes get a little dull. But play the game; don’t lie in the shade, don’t pretend you are manning an anti-aircraft gun or a machine gun while you are lying down. Be on your toes, if an aircraft comes over you, track it with your gun and pretend you are shooting hell out of it. If a tank or an infantryman approaches you who is an enemy, do the same thing; play the game. If you have to charge, go fast; if you have to retreat, do so, but as slowly as possible . . . The umpires have the job of representing the bullets . . . You will never get anywhere if you make them mad. Do what they tell you and do it promptly, and pretty soon you will find that they err in shading the decisions in your favor. Try, above all things, to use your imagination. Think this is war. “What would I do if that man were really shooting at me?” That is the only chance, men, that you are going to have to practice. The next time, maybe, there will be no umpires, and the bullets will be very real, both yours and the enemy’s.
In closing I wish to congratulate every officer and man of the zd Armored Division for the honest effort and enthusiastic support he has demonstrated, and I want to be able to say the same thing at the close of each of the maneuvers in which we take part. And each time, I know that we will be better, and by the time the last maneuver comes off, we will be ready and anxious to meet anything that anybody can provide for us to lick.
GSP, Jr., Address on Orientation in Maneuvers, May 1941
Our purpose in assembling both umpires and unit commanders here this morning is three-fold. First, I want all of you to meet each other. Second, I want to reiterate the tactical doctrines of this division so that commanders will enter the forthcoming maneuvers with our desires clear in their minds and so that the umpires will know what we are trying to do. Finally, I want to restate those duties of an umpire which my experience and observation have shown me to be ot particular importance.
So far as tactics are concerned, it is the doctrine of this division to attack weakness rather than strength . . .
I can conceive of nothing more futile than to send expensive tanks against a prepared position. The doctrine for so doing was originally written by me and was based on the fact that in 1918 tanks were invincible, but a careful analysis of what the Germans have done leads me to a totally different solution for present day armored forces . . .
There is an old Chinese saying . . . “a look is worth a thousand words.” This means that the commanders of each element in rear of the reconnaissance must be close up to attain full knowledge of what has transpired in front of them ...
By attacking, you induce the enemy to think you are stronger than he is ...
I wish to assure all officers and all men that I shall never criticize them or go back on them for having done too much but that I shall certainly relieve them if they do nothing. You must keep moving . . .
I am very insistant that all commanders who have an umpire take him absolutely into their confidence. He is not a stool pigeon or a hostile spy. If he knows what you are trying to do he can be useful and be at the point of combat. If he does not know what is going to happen, he is simply unnecessary baggage . . .
I want to bring to the attention of every officer here the professional significance which will attach to the success or failure of the 2d Armored Division in the Tennessee maneuvers. There are a large number of officers, some of them in high places in our country, who through lack of knowledge as to the capability of an armored division are opposed to them and who would prefer to see us organize a large number of old-fashioned divisions about whose ability the officers in question have more information. It is my considered opinion that the creation of too many old type divisions will be distinctly detremental and that the future of our country may well depend on the organization of a considerably larger number of armored divisions than are at present visualized. Therefore it behooves everyone of us to do his uttermost to see that in these forthcoming maneuvers we are not only a success but such an outstanding success that there could be no possible doubt in the minds of anyone as to the effectiveness of the armored divisions. Bear this in mind every moment.
By this time the soldiers in Patton’s division were thinking of themselves as “trained blitzmen,” “blitztroopers,” “tops” among the nation’s military men. They considered themselves “the most powerful striking force ever evolved,” possessed of “terrifying strength,” the “juggernaut of the battlefield,” and “ready for the real thing.” How good they were would soon be tested in the maneuvers.
In mid-June, the division traveled to Camp Forrest, Tennessee, its movements, according to the newspapers, “shrouded in secrecy.” Reporters speculated that the “much vaunted” outfit, “America’s answer to the panzer division” would take part in the games. Patton advertised his division’s nickname, “Hell on Wheels,” described his organization as “the most powerful striking force the human mind has ever developed,” and characterized his tactics as “Hold ‘em by the nose and kick ‘em in the pants.”
In its first contest, the division was unimpressive. Infantry denied the tankers freedom of movement and blunted their drive. It was a setback, perhaps due to stage fright, maybe overconfidence, and Patton was officially criticized for failing to coordinate his operations.
The criticism stung, then spurred him to greater effort. After the units shifted and realigned for the next game, the division reconnoitered during the day and attacked during the night. In a four-pronged drive from Lynchburg to Manchester, Patton’s men captured the “enemy” command post at 9 A.M. on the following morning and took the commanding general and his staff “prisoner.” Two hours later, long before the scheduled end of the game, the maneuver was over.
By slashing and unorthodox tactics, Patton redeemed himself and proved the validity of his training and operational methods. The fact that McNair was present to witness the swift movements of the armored division stimulated Patton to even greater daring.
In the next maneuver, Patton employed blitzkrieg tactics, knifed through the “enemy” defenses, and compelled the opposing force to surrender. Again the maneuver was over ahead of time. By virtue of Pat-ton’s speed, the entire action took nine hours instead of the allocated two days.
Finally, with Stimson on hand, Patton’s division swept around the opposing defenders, cut their lines of communication, disrupted the “enemy” rear area, and captured the town of Tullahoma, the objective of the operation. Once again, the unexpected movements of the division terminated the game several hours ahead of schedule.
The highlight of the games was the performance of the 2d Armored Division. No unit was more aggressive. Patton had made his men believe they were first-rate soldiers and fighters, and their confidence in themselves, their military skills, and their efficiency were apparent to all.
For the inhabitants of the area, the maneuvers spread a panorama that brought wonder and delight over things they had never seen before – military machines and equipment in profusion, the tanks, trucks, artillery pieces, and airplanes that soon became commonplace; troops building bridges, pitching tents, or taking cover in ditches against simulated air attack; soldiers on weekend pass congesting the sidewalks and filling the restaurants in Tullahoma, Shelbyville, Manchester, and Chattanooga. What people remembered best of all was General Patton, whose exploits soon became legend.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Mrs. Hancock Banning, July 2, 1941
We just got back from a very pleasant maneuver in Tennessee where I think the division covered itself with credit, in fact, it established so high a standard that we will have difficulty in maintaining it but nevertheless we shall do so.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Stimson, July 8, 1941
In spite of the long march, in some cases over 110 miles, every fighting vehicle in the division, except two tanks and a scout car, got to the place it was supposed to be in time to deliver the attack . . . It was a great performance on the part of the men and I was very proud of it.
This morning I gave an illustrative talk to all the men and officers trying to show them the big picture so that they would know not only what they individually had done in each problem but also what the division as a whole had accomplished. I further took occasion to point out many errors which I made and which we will correct before the next maneuver – or war – whichever the case may be.
I trust that you enjoyed what you did see of the maneuvers. Your presence was a great stimulus to the men and officers.
Scott submitted an efficiency report on Patton and called him “Superior.”
Of 60 general officers of his grade that are personally known to me, I would give him number 5 on this list. Further remarks: A most energetic and capable commander who is quick in his decisions and vigorous in their execution.
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas T. Handy, commander of an artillery unit in Patton’s division, was transferred to Marshall’s office in Washington, and Patton expressed his “real regret” over losing Handy, who would become one of Marshall’s closest subordinates and would eventually gain the four stars of a full general.
The criticism Patton received during the Tennessee maneuvers annoyed him, and he sought to explain his actions. Writing to Floyd Parks, a member of McNair’s staff, Patton said that he was “not making excuses but rather pointing out what I consider to be misconceptions . . . as to the principal functions of an armored division.” He had read most of the umpire reports, and he took exception to many of them.
For example, coordination was a “fine old military word” and could be applied to describe the operations of Alexander the Great, Napoleon, or Allenby. It was not quite the same for armored divisions.
When you are using a sabre or a bayonet, you can to a degree control (coordinate) the weapon during the lunge. When you are throwing hand grenades, you can only give them initial impetus and direction. You cannot control (coordinate) these missils during flight. Armored divisions are of the nature of such missils.
It is none the less noteworthy that in every operation in which this division took part, the several elements (grenades) composing it arrived at the place intended at the time desired.
By saying repeatedly that the armored division failed to launch concentrated or mass attacks, the umpires gave the “greatest compliment possible.” The desire for mass action came from “undigested memories” of the teachings at Leavenworth and the War College or from reading about the tank battle of Cambrai in World War I, when tanks were invincible and invulnerable. That condition no longer existed, “and hence the use of tanks in mass is futile and suicidal.”
The widespread belief that the function of an armored division was to attack and destroy the enemy was “erroneous.” The correct role was to get astride the enemy’s lines of communication in the enemy’s rear and disrupt his command and supply systems, thereby immobilizing him and making him vulnerable to destruction by the infantry.
“Several Umpires criticized me” for leaving his command post. A commander could sit there during an old-time infantry fight without particular harm because information arrived slowly and there was no need for a commander’s instantaneous reaction. “Were the commanding general of an armored division to sit anywhere with information three hours old, his units might well be from 15 to 25 miles from the point indicated on the map.” In other words, the rapidity of battle, he thought, made it necessary for the modern commander to operate away from his command post and closer to the fighting troops, a notion he had exercised in World War I – he made no mention of this in his letter – to the discomfiture of his superiors.
Furthermore, a division commander at maneuvers had a dual mission. Not only did he exercise command but he had to be in position to see how well the troops were carrying out what they had learned in training. “He cannot get this knowledge at a desk.”
We just finished three days of intensive training, beginning with the squad and ending with the reinforced battalion . . . I am convinced that this method of instruction, which I believe I invented, is the best and quickest possible. I believe that as a result of it we have provided means which will make it very difficult for the ever increasingly effective anti-tank weapons to halt us or cause us serious casualties.
“You would be surprised,” he wrote a friend, “at the profound ignorance in higher places as to the use of tanks. People are still obsessed with the belief that tanks are invulnerable and try to send them head-on into prepared positions.” Instead, tanks tried “to avoid a fight and put their energy into disrupting the rear areas of the opposition.”
When Patton received a phone call from Parks, who suggested that it might be better for Patton’s future if he curbed his flamboyance, Patton replied:
I shall try to follow your precepts, but I do not intend to be colorless in spite of the fact that pure white, which as I remember is a lack of all color, is the popular color at present among aspirants to military preferment.
No one could have been more colorful than Patton, who appeared on the cover of Life magazine’s “Defense” issue of July 7, which featured stories and photographs of the armed forces and lauded the work of the division in the maneuvers. Standing in the turret of his tank, holding binoculars, wearing a 2d Division patch over his left pocket, a shoulder holster and pistol, a helmet with chin strap, rings on the third and fourth fingers of his left hand, and an appropriate scowl, Patton epitomized the tough, solid professional soldier with more than a touch of personality.
A letter from the editor told him how much the division had done for the magazine. Replying, Patton said,
Remember that the article in Life did as much for the 2d Armored Division as the 2d Armored Division could possibly have done for Life. The important thing in any organization is the creation of a soul which is based on pride, and no member of the division reading your magazine could fail to be filled with pride.
On July 8, he assembled all members of the division and, using four very large maps, showed what the organization had done during the Tennessee manuvers. He then made these remarks:
The purpose of what I have just said is to show each of you the big picture, the picture of what the whole division did, not just what you individually accomplished. My personal opinion is that you accomplished every task set with remarkable efficiency and with minute exaction as to time . . .
Certain instances require correction.
Owing to the fact that all of us have been, so to speak, going to school for almost a year, we have to a degree acquired the student complex, that is, we have a tendency to wait instructions rather than proceed on our own initiative . . .
People must try to use their imagination and when orders fail to come, must act on their own best judgment. A very safe rule to follow is that in case of doubt, push on just a little further and then keep on pushing. ..
The issuance of an order is the simplest thing in the world. The important and difficult thing is to see: first, that the order is transmitted; and, second, that it is obeyed . . .
There is still a tendency in each separate unit . . . to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire . . . That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get harmony in music each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins. You musicians of Mars must not wait for the band leader to signal you . . . You must each of your own volition see to it that you come into this concert at the proper place and at the proper time . . .
There is a growing instance in this division of a disease common to the motorized age. It is called waffle-ass, and results from sitting down too much . . .
When we went on the maneuvers, I told you that I wanted you to wear the shoulder patch so that people would know that you were members of the 2d Armored Division. As it turned out, the shoulder patch was not necessary because your soldierly bearing, meticulous attention to military courtesy, and your neatness in dress told the world to what unit you belonged. You should be very proud of the impression you made on everyone who saw you, from the Secretary of War . . . and General McNair, on down. If you will but keep up the good work, and I know that you will, you will make your shoulder patch something which will cause as much dread to the enemies of your country as it causes pride among your friends.
In closing, I wish to congratulate every man and every officer for his individual effort in proving to the world that the 2d Armored Division is as good as they come.
On August 5, he called all his officers together and lectured them in preparation for the Louisiana maneuvers:
If brevity is the soul of wit, repetition is the heart of instruction. Hence, what I am about to say will have a familiar ring . . . but I want you to pay the strictest attention so that the points which I will emphasize shall become ingrained into the very depths of your minds.
He concluded: “If you do your part as leaders, the men of the 2d Armored Division will make it utterly irresistible in maneuvers or in war”
Chaffee, the first chief of the Armored Force, propelled the U.S. armored and mechanized units into modernity. In the process he overworked himself. In the summer of 1941, he was diagnosed as suffering from terminal cancer. He died in August.
Scott, who commanded the I Armored Corps, was the most likely candidate to replace Chaffee. Patton would then probably move up to succeed Scott in command of the corps.
Instead, Marshall selected as Chaffee’s successor Jacob L. Devers, a West Point classmate of Patton’s and an enthusiastic polo player. Devers was solid and a hard worker. He had the quality of persistence, and enjoyed the reputation of having accomplished successfully every task he was assigned. An artilleryman, he represented a compromise between the infantry and cavalry interests in the Armored Force. Furthermore, since Patton was stressing the mobility of armor and tending to use the light tank as the horse had been used, Devers would supply balance by making sure that the firepower of the armored divisions received proper attention.
Devers had trained troops in the United States during World War I. He completed his military schooling at Leavenworth and at the Army War College. He served in Panama, commanded the Provisional Brigade of Washington, D.C., where Marshall used him as a troubleshooter, and then headed the 9th Infantry Division, which he activated and trained with a sure hand. Marshall saw him as a dedicated, dependable officer who eschewed publicity and flamboyance and who projected a quiet air of authority and no-nonsense.
Appointed to the position on August 1, Devers revitalized the Armored Force headquarters. He stimulated the improvement of guns, particularly self-propelled pieces to support mobile tanks. He devoted much attention to obtaining better tank engines, suspension systems, and designs, as well as better communications and ammunition. He also attracted young and vigorous officers to the Force and facilitated the dissemination and discussion of new ideas.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Devers, July 28, 1941
My dear Jake, I was very glad to get your letter . . . and learn that you got my belated wire of congratulations.
I am looking forward to having you stay with me at Benning when you come.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to his wife Beatrice, August 9, 1941
I was very much impressed with Devers, he has developed a lot and is a very fine leader. It is easy to see how any one comparing him to Scotty would be inclined toward Devers unless he knew how realy smart Scotty is inspite of his chipmunk expression. So far as I am concerned, I think the change will not be to my disadvantage.
Devers is so sure of himself that I am certain he has a drag with the President and Pa Wat. [Watson, the President’s military secretary] both, but the final decision of the high man in the Army will be the result of war and not friendship.
The Louisiana and Texas maneuvers in August and September involved about 400,000 men, including, for the first time, the I Armored Corps. Scott directed the operations of the 1st and sd Armored Divisions working together, plus about 100 supporting aircraft. According to the umpires and the observers, Patton and his division rode “roughshod” over the “enemy” and distinguished themselves. Scott received some criticism for lacking firm control.
Letter, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, Third Army commander, to GSP, Jr., October 9, 1941
I was constantly impressed by the high morale, technical proficiency, and devotion to duty of the personnel of the 20 Armored Division . . . Your leadership has produced a fighting organization.
The Patton mythology continued to grow, and many letters complimenting him and the division arrived. His division, he wrote Pershing, had been in ten maneuver attacks and in every one
we obtained our objective. I am quite sure this is a unique record both as to success and as to number of operations . . . However we are not through yet. Today we are having a combined maneuver . . . and beginning on the 30th we march to North Carolina, where we shall be on maneuvers until the first of December. I hope that our luck will continue and that at the completion of this last bunch of maneuvers we shall still have been universally successful.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to his sister Nita, October 23,
I was very much pleased with the maneuvers and believe that unquestionably our present army is better in every category than that with which we fought in 1917-18. We have the same trouble now that we had then, namely that the young officers are not sufficiently indoctrinated with basic military knowledge. Nothing can help this situation but time. I think that in another eight months we will see a great improvement. We are getting rid of a lot of older officers, both regular and national guard, who were either too old or too worthless for the jobs they held.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Devers, October 23, 1941
My dear Jake, I read with great interest the release of your address to the Society of Metals. I believe it is the best summation of the purpose and present organization of the Armored Force that I have seen...
The combined operation . . . was very satisfactory . . . We were able to get nearly 96 guns in action and at no time were we without a powerful artillery support.
GSP, Jr., Lecture to the 2d Armored Division, October 25, 1941
I have showed you . . . briefly . . . the big picture of what the division did. This will enable each of you to insert yourselves into the picture and know why it was that t at that or this place on that or this day you were particularly tired, particularly hungry, or particularly choked with dust, and why the enemy invariably withdrew.
Before I tell you how good you are, I want to again emphasize certain tactical errors of which we were guilty.
We still fail to use every weapon every time . . . Each time we fight with only one weapon when we could use several weapons, we are not winning a battle; we are making fools of ourselves.
He ended by saying: “I further wish to congratulate all of you, and particularly myself, on being members of such a division; and it is my fond belief that we will get better and better.”
At the end of October Patton traveled with his division to the Carolina Maneuver Area. The war games held throughout most of November proved to be another test of the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions employed as a team. Patton and his men were a sensation. His control and coordination of his units were superb, and the division figuratively ran wild. What observers noted was a drive on the part of Patton that came close to obsession, the will to win. Everything was justified – even breaking the rules – if it led to victory. Marshall, who flew down from Washington to watch the final exercises, was highly impressed with Patton’s performance and behavior. The willingness to dare characterized Patton’s movements, and it had considerable effect on those who pondered the unspoken question, If the United States went to war, would the American citizen-soldiers fight? Under Patton, it was evident, they would.
Those who staged and umpired the maneuvers implicitly criticized Scott’s leadership, and early in December Scott relinquished command of the I Armored Corps and went to the Middle East to be the senior American military observer with the British.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Scott, December 3, 1941
I want to tell you how much the 2d Armored Division appreciated serving under you, and I wish to state emphatically that we were tickled to death with all the jobs you gave us and only regret that we were not able to do more harm to the enemy [during the maneuvers]. Our failure, if any, was not for lack of trying.
The maneuvers clearly demonstrated, Patton wrote for Devers’ “very private ear,” that the Armored Force should have controlled the infantry rather than the reverse. “As it was, we were reduced to the speed, physical and mental, of the infantry.” Under the circumstances, “General Scott performed a magnificent job.”
“We all feel,” Patton wrote Parks, “that General Scott . . . did a swell job, and we regret that some adverse criticism of him has been made.”
There are a great many rumors around as to the future of various officers in the [Armored] Force, including myself. Personally, I have no excuses to make, and I believe that the 2d Armored Division is superior to any division in the Army . . . However, this may be only a pious hope on my part.
Letter, Scott to GSP, Jr., subject: Commendation, December 5, 1941
After observing the work of your division . . . I desire to commend you, the officers and all enlisted men . . . for the esprit de corps, the energy, the endurance, the initiative, and the fine fighting spirit evidenced throughout this most strenuous and exacting work [in the maneuvers].
The highest compliment that I can pay you and your command is to state that in the most difficult situations, when the enemy was pressing from all sides, when our own and the enemy’s tactical dispo-tions were obscure, and when exacting and intricate night movements were ordered, I could always count on you and all the elements of your command being in the right place at the right time to meet effectively any hostile opposition.
By December, the array of major opponents in World War II was complete. Attacking Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, as well as Hong Kong and Malaya, Japan, which had been at war with China for a decade, brought the United States and Great Britain into the Pacific conflict. Japanese actions against French and Dutch possessions further expanded the contest. On the European side, Great Britain remained at war with Germany and Italy, while the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 broadened that struggle. German and Italian declarations of war against the United States immediately after Pearl Harbor further enlarged the scope of the fighting. France, defeated in 1940, concluded an armistice with Germany and Italy and, under the Petain government, sat on the sidelines. Franco’s Spain remained neutral.
“In view of the heightened tempo of the emergency,” Patton wrote Devers several days after Pearl Harbor, he indicated the officers in his division who merited promotion. “Please do not imagine,” he said,
that I am trying to over-stress the virtues of the officers of this division to the disparagement of officers of other units, but my sense of loyalty demands that I bring the long maneuver experience and loyal service of these men to your attention.
An article by Edgar Snow in the Saturday Evening Post lauded the division and extended further the widespread feeling that Patton had stamped his personality and drive indelibly on his men. As one officer would later say, “I shall not soon forget the 26. A.D. nor your fine example of leadership . . . I only hope that it may always keep the fine cutting edge you gave it.”
Patton assembled all the members of the division on December 20, and explained the conduct of the Carolina maneuvers. He closed with the following:
Remember that war exists. Probably the next time we face opponents they will not be friendly enemies but malignant foes. Next time you will be opposed not by white flags but by hot lead. But you will be just as effective . . . and that means completely so ...
Tactically I made mistakes, both in training and in operations, which I am now correcting through further education of myself and the officers of this division . . .
At all times we have been preparing for war . . . We are ready; and I shall be delighted to lead you against any enemy, confident in the fact that your disciplined valor and high training will bring victory...
Put your heart and soul into being expert killers with your weapons. The only good enemy is a dead enemy. Misses do not kill, but a bullet in the heart or a bayonet in the guts do. Let every bullet find its billet – in the body of your foes.
Many of you have not been fortunate enough to have engaged in combat, and owing to the foolish writings of sob-sisters and tear-jerkers, you may have erroneous ideas of what battle is like. You will read of men – imaginary men – who on the eve of battle sit around the camp fire and discuss their mothers, and their sisters, and their sweet-hearts, and talk regretfully of their past life and fear foolishly for their future. No one has a higher or a more respectful devotion to women than I have; but the night before battle you do not sit around a fire . . . You go to sleep and have to be kicked in the butt in the morning so as to start the war. You have not dreamed of dying or worried about your boyhood. You have slept the sleep of fighting males eager for the kill.
Battle is not a terrifying ordeal to be endured. It is a magnificent experience wherein all the elements that have made man superior to the beasts are present: courage, self-sacrifice, loyalty, help to others, devotion to duty. As you go in, you will perhaps be a little short of breath, and your knees may tremble . . . This breathlessness, this tremor, are not fear. It is simply the excitement every athlete feels just before the whistle blows – no, you will not fear for you will be borne up and exalted by the proud instinct of our conquering race. You will be inspired by magnificent hate.
Remember that these enemies, whom we shall have the honor to destroy, are good soldiers and stark fighters. To beat such men, you must not despise their ability, but you must be confident in your own superiority.
Before leaving for the Middle East, Scott submitted an efficiency report on Patton, declaring him to be “Superior.” In his remarks, he noted, “Of 80 officers known personally in the same grade, I rate him number 5. A great leader – highly practical and aggressive.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Pershing, January 13, 1942
Unless something happens in the next few days, I shall be in command of the I Armored Corps, which is supposed to consist of two armored divisions and a motorized division. It will be a very interesting job, and, of course, I hope to get some place where I can do a little fighting as soon as possible . . .
Our equipment is coming along splendidly and is very high class. I believe that the troops throughout the Army, and particularly in the Armored Force, have attained a very high standard of proficiency. Of course, there is still a lot of dead wood in the officer personnel. However . . . there are some men of 60 who are younger than many men of 40, and I believe that their services should be retained.
Two days later Patton received command of the I Armored Corps, the headquarters of which was transferred to Fort Benning.
From the Military Service Publishing Company, Patton ordered a book entitled Generalship, Its Diseases and Their Cure.