“I am the only true gambler in the whole outfit”
PATTON WAS SUMMONED to Washington on July 30 because President Roosevelt decided to launch a military venture with the British. In that first large-scale Anglo-American endeavor, Patton was to have a prominent place.
American and British strategists had agreed to make an eventual cross-Channel invasion of German-occupied Europe, and already in 1942, American troops and materiel were arriving in the United Kingdom to prepare for that operation. Eisenhower and Mark Clark were in London and directing that buildup – Eisenhower as commander of the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA), Clark in command of the II Corps, under which the units were grouped.
But it soon became evident that a full-scale invasion was impractical for the immediate future because the Allies lacked sufficient means to carry it out. The landings were postponed, although the stockpiling continued.
Churchill and Roosevelt were anxious to initiate some offensive action in 1942, primarily to keep the U.S.S.R. in the war. Hitler’s invasion in mid-1941 had sent the Russians reeling, and German advances in the second year of campaigning might well bring the Russians to collapse. Whatever diversion the Western Allies could create would aid the Soviet Union.
Roosevelt finally accepted Churchill’s suggestion for an invasion of French North Africa, which required fewer resources, could go more quickly, and would perhaps meet little French opposition. Allied troops in Tunisia would threaten the Axis forces in Libya and assist the British army in Egypt.
Code-named Torch, the invasion of North Africa was to have two main landings. The Northern Task Force, consisting of American and British troops, was to sail from the United Kingdom and land on the northern coast of Africa, inside the Mediterranean. The Western Task Force, wholly of American composition, was to steam across the Atlantic and land on the western coast of Africa. The latter was to be under Patton’s command.
There were no German or Italian troops in Morocco, Algeria, or Tunisia, for under the terms of the armistice in 1940, the French promised to defend their North African possessions against invasion.. Since relations with the British had deteriorated after the evacuation from Dunkirk, the subsequent capitulation, and the British bombardment of the French fleet, the French forces in North Africa were certain to give British invaders a hostile reception. But if the French harbored thoughts of fighting the Axis to redeem their defeat, as the Allies hoped, perhaps the traditional Franco-American friendship would make them less inclined to oppose an invasion that appeared and purported to be wholly American.
Thus, Eisenhower became Commander in Chief of the Allied forces – all the participating American and British contingents, including ground, naval, and air components. He assembled a staff of British and American officers to plan the operation, and this became known as the Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ).
In Washington, Patton and a small staff he had brought with him from the I Armored Corps headquarters – Gay, Lambert, Conklin, and Muller – were temporarily assigned to Marshall’s office. Occupying a few rooms in the Munitions Building, they studied the preliminary plans already in existence, familiarizing themselves with the conditions, concepts, requirements, problems, and objectives of the operation.
Because Tunisia was close to substantial Axis air forces in Sicily and Italy, the Allies decided to land in Algeria, perhaps near Oran or Algiers; they would then drive eastward and hoped to overrun Tunisia before large numbers of Italian and German troops entered to oppose them. The Allies would also invade Morocco in case Franco’s Spain entered the war on the Axis side and cut the straits of Gibraltar. A bridgehead near Casablanca would preserve a direct line of communications to the United States. The trouble was that the normally heavy swells in the sea offshore would endanger an assault, perhaps even make a landing impossioie.
Since the operation was scheduled to take place in October or November, there was precious little time to prepare and coordinate what would be an extremely complicated venture. In order to facilitate the planning, Marshall sent Patton to London for discussions with Eisenhower.
As he had in the past when leaving for war, Patton started a journal.
Diary, August 5
Got word at 6:00 P.M. last night to fly to United Kingdom. This morning arrived Washington Airport. . . Got on four-motored strato-liner . . . all on plane going to war, but all the talk was of fishing and shooting. Very normal.
Brigadier General James H. Doolittle, Colonels Kent Lambert and Hoyt Vandenberg, Captain Lauris Norstad, and several others were in Patton’s party.
Diary, August 6
Slept well most of the night. . . Up at dawn. We were over clouds. This was good, as we could hide in them if attacked . . . Arrived London . . . Billeted at Claridge’s Hotel.
Diary, August 7
Reported to Ike. Spent morning working on plan. Talked to many people. London seems just half alive with very few people, even soldiers, about. All the women are very homely and wear their clothes badly.
Diary, August 8
Big talk for four hours. I said that Northern Task Force was being favored at expense of Western Task Force. Finally got some change. No one likes the plan, but we will do it...
The food is very expensive . . . All women at dinner in dining room hideous.
The major difficulty in the planning was the paucity of available troops. If the French resisted, the likelihood of getting ashore was slim.
Diary, August 9
Read and discussed operation all day ...
Had supper with Ike and talked until 1:00 am. We both feel that the operation is bad and is mostly political. However, we are told to do it and intend to succeed or die in the attempt. If the worst we can see occurs, it is an impossible show, but, with a little luck, it can be done at a high price; and it might be a cinch.
Diary, August u
Raised Hell with staff ...
Big US Navy parley . . . They are certainly not on their toes.
It is very noticeable that most of the American officers here are pro-British, even Ike . . . I am not, repeat not, pro-British.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, August u, 1942
It looks as if my birthday [November 11] may be quite an important date.
This place is not too badly bashed in; in fact the ruins have been so well cleared that one does not notice them.
The person who drives me when I get a car, which is not often, is Pvt. Kay [Summersby], a lady whose father is a Lt. Gen. It is quite embarrassing to have her get out and hold the door open for me.
Women also man or woman most of the anti-air guns and barage baloons.
London looks like a dead city in that there are no motor cars except military and a very few taxies on the streets and very few people. It is always black out and realy black. The night before last I had dinner with Ike and tried to get back here at 1:00 A.M. There were no taxies so I walked and would have been walking yet had I not run into a policeman who, by scent apparently, took me here.
All of us think that if there ever were any pretty women in England they must have died. They are hideous, with fat ankles . . .
I bought a pair of shoes for $30.00, but there is nothing else for sale. The coffee is artificial and one is always hungry. The only filling thing is mush and blue milk. You get two pieces of butter the size and thickness of a quarter and very little sugar.
The only thing they seem to have lots of is smoked salmon and decayed grouse.
On the other hand, they take long weekends and get to the office at ten. It is very funny.
I am treated with great reverence as a prospective hero. The Brit, officers too are fed up with the youth movement, and so far as I can see, the generals are about my age but less well preserved. They take two hours for lunch, at which repast there is little to eat. All the whiskey is cut and the beer is like water.
Because the Navy representatives said “that the means do not exist for a second attack” the planners decided to invade with only the Northern Task Force.
I think this is fortunate for me, so far as a longer life goes, but it is bad for the country – very dangerous in fact. Ike is not as rugged mentally as I thought; he vacillates and is not a realist.
A single landing was soon dismissed as too risky, and the planners continued to discuss a variety of objectives inside and outside the Mediterranean, using various combinations of forces.
To maintain the fiction that Torch was wholly American and also to preserve continuity in planning in execution if Eisenhower became incapacitated, he appointed Clark his deputy.
“I doubt the wisdom of it,” Patton commented. “He may be too intrusive.”
This negative reaction was deceptively mild, for Patton resented Clark’s increasing importance. Clark was quite junior to him. He had graduated from West Point eight years after Patton. In 1941, Patton was a major general, Clark a lieutenant colonel. A year later, Clark was also a major general. Although Eisenhower had already surpassed Patton and was now a lieutenant general, he was an old friend. Clark was relatively unknown. Patton respected his undoubted ability and energy and envied his close relationship with Eisenhower. But if something happened to Eisenhower, Clark would become Patton’s boss and probably a lieutenant general as well. Patton was sure he would hate to see that take place.
A telegram from Washington raised basic questions about Torch, and Eisenhower, Clark, Patton, and Doolittle went over the possibilities and problems. All but Patton felt that the odds against the invasion were too high. “I said it was 52 to 48 against us, but I favored going on.” Later all agreed that “it was better than even money we could land, but a poor bet we could get Tunis ahead of the Bodies.”
I feel that we should fight, but for success we must have luck . . . We must do something now. I feel that I am the only true gambler in the whole outfit.
The nub of the problem concerned the potential French resistance. If the French contested the invasion, Eisenhower informed Marshall, they could, “in view of the slowness with which Allied forces can be accumulated . . . so delay and hamper operations that the real object of the expedition could not be achieved, namely the seizing control of the north shore of Africa before it can be substantially reinforced by the Axis.” In short, the operation had more than a fair chance of success only if the French forces were “so badly divided by internal dissension and by Allied political maneuvering that effective resistance will be negligible.” Hardly less important was the need for Spain to remain “absolutely neutral.”
Diary, August 17
Things seem to be jelling and I have gotten a lot of valuable information. Supposed to go back [to Washington] tomorrow. Had a drink with Clark at his flat. I do not trust him yet but he improves on acquaintance. Ike is getting megalomania.
Summing up for Marshall the results of the conference in London, Eisenhower remarked that Patton had quickly absorbed “the essentials of his problem” and had worked in a “very businesslike, sane but enthusiastic” manner. Eisenhower was delighted that Marshall had chosen Pat-ton to lead the American venture.
Several days later Patton and his staff left for home. They were thoroughly familiar with the operation that still had, in Eisenhower’s words, “so many indefinite or undetermined factors.” The plan for what was now called the Eastern Task Force was rather firmly fixed, but the plan for Patton’s Western Task Force was “less firm” because it resulted from “preliminary studies” made by a “skeleton staff.”
As soon as Patton returned to Washington, he would have to work up a final and detailed plan for his part of the invasion.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Devers, August 22, 1942
Should you be in Washington, I would like very much to see you :.. .. first, because you are one of my dearest friends; second, because I think you would be interested in hearing orally what I cannot put on paper; and third, because I would like to have the opportunity ot personally thanking you for all the good turns you have done for me during the thirty odd years of our service together.
He wrote a long letter to his orderly, giving him detailed instructions on how and where to send his clothes, suitcases, pistols, boots, and other personal possessions and telling him that Meeks would soon be ordered east to join Patton. He concluded: ‘"Please give my best to Virgie” – the sergeant’s wife – “and an extra bone to each of the dogs.”
By now the concept of the invasion was emerging more clearly. There would be three major landings. Two forces would sail from the United Kingdom and land inside the Mediterranean, probably on the coast of Algeria, then move overland to the east and conquer Tunisia. Patton would come ashore near Casablanca.
Eisenhower wrote Patton that he felt like a circus lady riding three horses without knowing exactly where any was going to go. But he was happy that Patton was part of the act.
Devers told Patton that he was pleased with Patton’s role. He was sure that Patton would do the job. His success would mean that Devers had succeeded too.
Patton remarked to Doolittle that they were getting everything they asked for in the way of men and equipment. Yes, Doolittle said, “They always give the condemned man what he wants to eat for his last meal.”
Scott, returned from the Middle East and assigned to Fort Knox, sent Patton a copy of a talk he had made on his observations of combat.
“You can’t imagine how delighted I was to get your letter with the enclosed speech,” Patton replied. “Your speech is one of the finest military documents I have ever read, and I have practically memorized it.”
His immediate job, he explained,
envisions a landing operation in the face of enemy resistance. At first, I was somewhat worried, but after considering my luck and the high class of troops to be engaged, I am now perfectly satisfied that, so far as my part in it is concerned, the operation will be a complete success. If it is not, I always have an easy way out, and in view of my long and pleasant life, not a bad way out either. However, I do not mean to indicate that it is now time for you to start saving up for flowers for my funeral – although if you have any friends in the Axis, it might be well to contemplate fitting floral tributes for their demise.
A week or so later, when Scott mailed Patton some notes, Patton responded by saying:
I believe that they are practically a bible for the operations intended.
The more I dig into this thing, the more I am sure that the only thing that will win it will be leadership, speed, and drive, plus sound tactics. I have secured Gaffey and Truscott . . . with the belief that their leadership will assure the success of two operations. I shall be in the middle one myself. I have also secured Geoffrey Keyes as deputy commanding general, so that when I pass into the beyond, there will be somebody to carry on.
Spiritually, I have complete confidence, in fact certainty that we shall succeed, although when studied logically it looks almost impossible. However, wars are only won by risking the impossible. If you have any inside track with the Lord, please use it in my behalf.
Diary, September 24, 1942
The plan has finally [been] settled, and I feel very calm and contented. It still can be a very desperate venture if the enemy does everything he should, and we make a few mistakes. I have a sure feeling we will win.
Yet he was well aware of the uncertainties ahead. He told Eisenhower that the picture was still “gloomy,” but that Eisenhower could
rest assured that when we start for the beach we shall stay there either dead or alive, and if alive we will not surrender. When I have made everyone else share this opinion, as I shall certainly do before we start, I shall have complete confidence in the success of the operation.
The invasion was now definitely to consist of three major landings. The Eastern and Central Task Forces, both sailing from the United Kingdom, were to come ashore, respectively, near Algiers and Oran, Algeria. The assault landings would be carried out mainly by American troops. After the initial forces were safely ashore, British troops under Kenneth Anderson were to land and strike eastward into Tunisia, to seize Bizerte and Tunis and prevent Axis forces from coming into the country. Patton’s Western Task Force would sail from Hampton Roads, Virginia, land near Casablanca, and be ready to move, if necessary, into Spanish Morocco.
Patton divided his own task force into three task groups. One under Truscott was to touch down near Mehdia and capture Port Lyautey. The other two – under Jonathan W. Anderson and Ernest N. Harmon – after going ashore near Fedala and Safi, were to converge on and take Casablanca from the landward side.
The major dangers came from the prospect of bitter French resistance and high seas off the coast. If the surf was rough, the Navy might be unable to carry the assault forces in small craft to the landing beaches.
Clark arrived in Washington to coordinate the final arrangements and to make sure that the planners in Washington and London were working on the same assumptions and toward the same objectives. On the same day Keyes reported as Patton’s deputy commander.
Diary, September 28
As far as I am concerned, General Clark has explained nothing. He seems to me more preoccupied with bettering his own future than in winning the war. He seems to me slightly ill at ease . . .
Our Navy is certainly very pessimistic as to the possibility of effecting a landing at Casablanca. I feel that in spite of all, we will succeed there.
Keyes’ . . . firm character and level head have been very comforting to me.
Major General Daniel I. Sultan came to talk about an invasion of the Dodecanese Islands he expected to lead from the Middle East. He was unaware that “his bogus plan,” as Patton called it, was part of a deception to draw Axis attention away from North Africa. To deepen the credibility of the operation, Patton “lied to him . . . I hated to do it.”
A few days later Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall stopped for a brief visit. He had headed the II Corps before relinquishing it to Clark, who took the corps headquarters to England. With Clark now Eisenhower’s deputy for Torch, Fredendall again received command of the corps. On his way to London, he would head the Central Task Force, which would land near Oran. “I am glad he has a job as I feel he has been badly used.”
On October 4, Patton went to West Point to say farewell to his son,
Marshall sent for Patton to ask about Harmon. “I said Harmon was all right. The future will show, but I think he is.”
Patton spent a night aboard the cruiser Augusta, flagship of Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, who commanded the naval elements of the Western Task Force. A landing rehearsal the next morning at Solomon’s Island, Maryland, was less than satisfactory. “The timing of the landing by the Navy was very bad, over 40 minutes late to start with, but all we can hope is that they do better next time.”
The joint planning carried out by Patton’s and Hewitt’s staffs was often stormy. For example, army officers wished the ships loaded so that items needed on the beach first would be stored last. Navy officers had their own ideas and regulations on how to utilize space, insure safety, and the like. Patton was frequently enraged, and his high, squeaky voice, shrilling with profanity, could often be heard in the corridors of the Munitions Building. He resented what he thought was the Navy’s “attempt to issue orders to me.” At one point the Navy considered asking the army to replace Patton with someone easier to work with. When tempers frayed and debate seemed at an impasse, Handy, John E. Hull, and Albert C. Wedemeyer of Marshall’s office and Charles M. Cooke of Ernest J. King’s Office of the Chief of Naval Operations smoothed out the difficulties and restored calm and order if not always amity.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Walter Dillingham, Honolulu,, October 9,
Dearest Walter: . . . I am writing you not a goodby but an aloha...
Of all the men I have met in a long life, I have liked you best . . .
You gave me the best advice and incidentally the most unselfish advice I ever had. We were having our last practice game before the Inter Island [polo championship tournament] and my team was doing badly and I was cussing hell out of them. After the game you took me up to the house, soothed my spirit with a long drink and told me what an ass I had been . . . You simply suggested that when men were doing their best, it was foolish and useless to cuss them. I have never forgotten nor have I repeated my error. As a result I am eledged to have trained the best division in the army and as a result of that I have my present job ...
Little B’s husband is in Europe as a Lt. Col. and Ruth-Ellen’s is soon to go. George is a plebe at West Point and I have only two polo ponies left, so why should I linger too long ...
This seems a very poor letter as a vehicle for really deep emotions but under the circumstances it is the best I can do.
Give my love to the family and the horses ...
If you write me [a letter] it may, unless my number is up, reach me.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Devers, October 14, 1942
I have now reached the situation which you and I have felt many times before – after the ponies have been shipped for an important match, one’s worries seem to disappear. I believe that we have done everything humanly possible and that this expedition contains the best trained troops of all arms this country can produce . . .
While I expect to write you many more letters, it is humanly possible that this may be the last one. Therefore, in closing, I want to thank you from the bottom of my heart for the many good turns and magnificent backing you have given me during my entire career, and particularly since I have been serving under you.
With affectionate regards to Georgia, I am your devoted friend and admirer.
Charles P. Summerall, who had commanded the 1st Division and V Corps in combat in World War I, who later became Army Chief of Staff, and who in retirement was President of The Citadel, a military college in Charleston, had great affection for Patton, whom he had known at West Point and in France. He wrote to Beatrice to praise her husband. “We shall hear great things of him,” Summerall predicted, “for he is one of our [nation’s] chief assets.”
Patton was in Norfolk to inspect the loading. “While things were not perfect, they were satisfactory . . . I am just a little worried about ability of Truscott. It may be [my] nerves.”
There were so many regulations, he noted, on how to deal with the civilian population of Morocco that “if I do all the things set out, there will be no [time for] war.”
He and Beatrice “called to pay respects to Secretary of War. Met General Marshall, Field Marshall Dill, and a British lieutenant general dining there. Interesting but felt out of place;”
Stimson too was sorry he had been unable to have a word in private, and he wrote to tell Patton so and to give his blessing. Patton had won his assignment, Stimson said, because he could guarantee the leadership, courage, and fighting qualities needed for success. The only advice that Stimson extended was to ask Patton to avoid the impulse to sacrifice himself. He was needed, not only for the landings but also for the subsequent operations in what was sure to be a long war. He was confident that Patton would get ashore and stay. “Go to it,” he concluded, “and may God bless you and care for you and bring you back safe!”
Patton was well aware that success in the North African endeavor was badly needed. In the Pacific the Air Forces were gaining triumphs by their raids against Japanese bases, a campaign capped by Doolittle’s bombardment of Tokyo in April; the Navy achieved momentous victories at Coral Sea and Midway in May and June; the Marine Corps fought ashore at Guadalcanal in August; but the army surrendered in the Philippines in May after Douglas MacArthur was ordered to Australia, and many Americans, including Patton’s friend, Jonathan M. Wainwright, were prisoners. On the European side of the conflict, large fleets of bombers were striking the German-occupied Continent, but the war at sea was going badly, the Dieppe raid in August, by a force largely Canadian in composition, had been disappointing, and the Germans were driving deeply into the Soviet Union. Much of the outcome of the war seemed to depend on the courage and skill of the untried Americans who would lead the North African invasion.
That recognition added to the enormous strain of the past few weeks. Patton supervised a constant planning and scheduling process that involved the final training, feeding, and care of thousands of men scattered in camps and stations along the East Coast, some as far as Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He then had to move them to the port of embarkation for the sea voyage. He had to oversee a multitude of details connected with securing, servicing, and loading weapons and equipment, as well as items of supply. He had to be sure that everyone and everything were ready for the initial combat test of American troops in the European sector of the war.
He was consequently tired and, at the same time, exhilarated. All the preparations excited him. He loved the burden of responsibility and the power of commanding a venture where every single piece had to fit into a predetermined pattern. To be at the head of the first combat force sent from the United States to engage in operations against the European enemies made all the prior work, all the previous study, all the dedication worthwhile.
As Patton pondered the general situation and, more especially, the position he had reached, he was satisfied that his fate was being shaped toward a supreme achievement, and he became sentimental. Was Morocco to be his destiny, his final adventure? If so, he would glory in it.
He wrote a good many letters on October 20, leaving instructions that they were to be mailed only after the invasion. To Mary Scally, his nurse, who had worked for the Patton family for many years and who was living with his sister Nita:
When Nita gives you this letter, I will either be dead or not. If I am, please put on a good Irish wake; if I am not, get busy with the Pope. In any case, please accept my sincere love and appreciation for all you have done for Nita and myself. Affectionately,
To Mrs. Francis C. Marshall, widow of Patton’s first company commander:
Now that I am about to start on a big adventure, I should be remiss if I failed to write you, because, as you well know, you and General Marshall were an inspiration and guide in the first and formative years of my service, and I believe that whatever success I have attained, I owe largely to the influence of you and the General.
To retired Major General Andr£ W. Brewster, a member of Pershing’s staff in France: “Before starting on the Second World War I wish to bid goodbye to one of the men who in the First War did so much for me.”
To retired Major General James G. Harbord, Pershing’s chief of staff:
Probably unknown to yourself, you have been one of the chief inspirations of my military life. Your high sense of duty, honor, and loyalty have inspired me to attempt to the best of my ability to imitate you.
As you know, George is at West Point and should it be necessary for me to pass out of the picture and not return, I would appreciate it if you could keep an eye on him and give him such help and advice as you think fit.
I cannot thank you for all you have done for me.
And to his brother-in-law Frederick Ayer:
In spite of my faults you have always treated me as a real brother and I have felt that way towards you. I do appreciate what you have been and done, to me and for me. My admiration for you as a man is without limit. You also have my devoted love as have all your family.
The job I am going on is about as desperate a venture as has ever been undertaken by any force in the world’s history. We will have to meet and defeat superior numbers on a coast where one can only land 60% of the time. So my proverbial luck will have to be working all out. However, I have a convinced belief that I will succeed. If I don’t, I shall not survive a second Donqurque (if that is how you spell it). Of course there is the off chance that political interests may help and we shall have, at least initially, a pushover. Personally I would rather have to fight – it would be good practice. However in any event we will eventually have to fight and fight hard and probly for years. Those of us who come back will have had some interesting experiences.
And further, when we get back we will have a hell of a job on our hands [to reshape the country]. I should like to have a crack at [it]...
I am enclosing a sealed letter to B. which you are only to give her when and if I am definitely reported dead. I expect you to keep it a long time ...
Letters even to me will probably be censored, so avoid political and financial statements you don’t want others to read.
This all sounds very gloomy, but is not really so bad. All my life I have wanted to lead a lot of men in a desperate battle; I am going to do it; and at fifty-six, one can go with equanimity —- there is nothing much one has not done. Thanks to you and B., I have had an exceptionally happy life. “Death is as light as a feather; reputation for valor is as heavy as a mountain.”
Diary, October 21
Saw General Marshall for 45 minutes at 8:15 am. He was very friendly and helpful. He gave me the inside on the Glark-Fredendall switch. Apparently Clark made a big impression on the Prime Minister.
He told me to influence Hewitt but not to scare him. I mentioned Admiral Hall as a fine influence for us and the General immediately asked, “How old is he?” I said, “As he was in the class of 1913, he was probably 53 or 54.” His comment was, “My, how old we all are.” Marshall lacks imagination but has an unusual mind.
Called on General Pershing. He did not recognize me until I spoke. Then his mind seemed quite clear. He looks very old. It is probably the last time I shall see him, but he may outlive me.
It turned out that Patton was right on both counts.
I said that when he took me to Mexico in 1916, he gave me my start.
He replied, “I can always pick a fighting man and God knows there are few of them. I am happy they are sending you to the front at once. I like generals so bold that they are dangerous. I hope they give you a free hand.”
He recalled my killing the Mexicans and when I told him I was taking the same pistol, he said, “I hope you will kill some Germans with it.”
He also said that he hoped I got a chance to kill someone with my sword whip.
He said that at the start of the war he was hurt because no one consulted him, but was now resigned to sit on the sidelines with his feet hanging over. He almost cried. It is pathetic how little he knows of the war.
When I left I kissed his hand and asked for his blessing. He squeezed my hand and said, “Goodbye George, God bless and keep you and give you victory.”
I put on my hat and saluted when I left, and he returned it like he used to, and 25 years seemed to drop from him. He said that when he started World War I, he was just my age. A truly great soldier.
Admiral Hewitt and I reported to the President at 2:00. He greeted us with, “Come in, Skipper and Old Cavalryman, and give me the good news.”
Hewitt brought up a request from the Prime Minister for an exchange of four of our destroyers for four British. This would be fatal at this late date as each vessel has a very definite gunfire support mission, and the British could not take it over.
The President said, “Hewitt, fix up a counter proposal. I never say no, but we can stall until it is too late.” He then gave Hewitt a lot of advice about how to moor a ship to keep it head to wind by a stern anchor. He had done this once with a yacht.
I had fixed up the meeting with the hope that he would put some heat on Hewitt about the necessity of landing [no matter what the sea conditions]. As nothing came of it, I said, “The Admiral and I feel that we must get ashore regardless of cost, as the fate of the war hinges on our success.”
He said, “Certainly you must,” and that was that. A great politician is not of necessity a great military leader.
Handy and Hull came to say goodbye and we had a long talk. They are fine men and should have commands.
Wrote paper for Bea on care of horses.
He thanked Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, Chief of the Army Service Forces, “for the courteous and splendid assistance which all persons in the Services of Supply . . . demonstrated towards us.” He made known his appreciation to Handy “for the constant and magnificent support which you have given us. If we fail, it certainly will not be your fault; if we win, yours should be most of the credit.”
He was glad to receive a note from Field Marshall Sir John C. Dill, the British representative in Washington to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and a close friend of Marshall’s. Dill told him that Patton’s inspiring leadership was the most important ingredient for the success of the imminent operation.
Diary, October 22
Called on Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, Gen. Somervell, and Admiral Cooke, all very nice.
Left War Department at 11:15. Packed tin suitcase. Had lunch. Bea went with me to airport. General [George E.] Stratemeyer asked her to ride to Norfolk, and we saw many of the ships [in the harbor from the plane].
Keyes and I inspected loading . . . all very orderly. I asked a QM [quartermaster] captain how things were going. He said, “I don’t know, but my trucks are getting on all right.” That is the answer; if everyone does his part, these seemingly impossible tasks get done.
When I think of the greatness of my job and realize that I am what I am, I am amazed, but on reflection, who is as good as I am? I know of no one.
All of us are relieved that the strain is over, and the staff and all the men I have seen are cheerful and full of confidence . . . I feel that we have all done our full duty and will succeed.
To Beatrice on October 23: “It will probably be some time before you get a letter from me but I will be thinking of you and loving you.”
Halfway around the globe that day, British forces in the Middle East under General Sir Harold Alexander, more specifically the Eighth Army under General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, attacked Field Marshall Er-win Rommel’s Italo-German army at El Alamein, Egypt. If the British could push Rommel’s forces into Libya, and if the Anglo-Americans in Torch could seize and overrun French North Africa, particularly Tunisia, they would threaten the Axis troops on both sides.
Letter, Summerall to GSP, Jr., October 23, 1942
You are so eminently qualified by experience and leadership that success would never be in doubt . . . Our men must have the fighting spirit and there is no one who can instill this like you. Your method of influencing by your personality and constant presence with your troops insures their loyalty and sacrifice. Men must have forceful leaders and you measure up to their ideals.
The army and the country are in desperate need of success and you are bound to change the situation where you go to positive results.
Diary, October 23
Today Captain Emmett [who commanded the troop transports] talked [to the troops] for three hours and said nothing. I talked blood and guts for five minutes and got an ovation.
Came aboard the Augusta at 2:45. I have the Captain’s cabin, very nice ...
Men and officers in fine spirits . . .
Now that it is up to the Navy, we are all relaxed. [Admiral] Hall impresses me more all the while. Saw Stiller. George Meeks is much impressed and says that he is setting an example to the sailors.
This is my last night in America. “It may be for years and it may be forever.” God grant that I do my full duty to my men and myself.