“Ike is more British than the British and is putty in their hands. Oh God, for John J. Pershing.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, March 30, 1943
Benson is trying to break through. I went with him part way and got shot at quite a little but not too close ...
My old fear o£ fear came up again to day. There was a bad place on the road that they were shelling quite accurately. I began to find reasons why I need not go any further but of course I did and nothing happened.
I attatched Dick Qenson] to Chauncy [Benson] for the operation to get him blooded. There will possibly be a big tank battle in the morning. We are trying to cut Rommel off and he don’t like it ...
On the defensive the Italians fight well. The Germans are very tough and well fed and cockey, especially the officers, but we are beginning to catch them...
The hardest thing I have to do is to do nothing. There is a terrible temptation to interfere but actually the men on the ground have to do the fighting and by and large they are doing well but there is room for improvement.
... I agree with Fred [Ayer] that I get a lot of cheap publicity and fear that I shall get a lot more. There are 49 correspondents and photographers here sniping at me.
Last night we had an alarm. It was air [alert] but I thought it was ground [attack] and ran out with my carbine. The old lust of close battle [is] hot as ever though I admit I hate shells and bombs.
Diary, March 31
This morning things look pretty bad. We seem to be stuck everywhere...
Benson’s attack . . . broke through ...
Eddy called me and asked that I change the plan . . . I told him it was too late. Had I listened to him, Benson would not have got through. Sometimes I earn my pay. One must be chary of ever changing a plan ...
Beedle Smith and McCreery came . . . with a plan which I suggested the day before yesterday. It would have worked then. Now, as usual with them, it is too late.
I told Beedle about my getting orders that were too detailed. He will speak to General Alexander. I also think I got Beedle to see that battle-hardened troops are necessary for Husky [Sicily] – they are...
I called Ward on the phone and told him to put on an attack . . . and, if necessary, to take losses up to 25%. Our people, especially the 1st Armored Division, don’t want to fight – it is disgusting.
I feel quite brutal in issuing orders to take such losses, especially when I personally am safe, but it must be done. Wars can only be won by killing, and the sooner we start the better; also an attack by the 1st Armored at Maknassy will pull the enemy off from Benson and possibly from Ryder.
I sent Bradley up to see what is the matter with Ryder. Ryder must hold on.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, April 1, 1943
Darling B. Dick Jenson was killed this morning. I have asked Beedle Smith to wire you and to notify Echo [his mother].
It was my fault in a way but this I did not tell Nita or Echo in the letters I have just written. We were putting on a tank attack under Chauncy [Benson] and were short staff officers so I sent Dick and Bradley sent his aid[e].
The attack went very well and this morning Bradley and two other generals went out to the C.P. While they were there 12 J.U. 88’s bombed it. Every one jumped in a slit trench. Bradley was not ten feet from Dick. Unfortunately a 500 pound [bomb] hit right on the edge of the trench Dick was in and killed him instantly. It was concussion that got him. He never knew a thing. He was not mangled in any way.
We brought him to the cemetary here at Gafsa and will bury him at 4:00 P.M. Gaffey and I went out to see his body wrapped up in a shelter half. I knelt down and kissed him on his forehead. He was a great character and loyal long suffering friend. I shall miss him very much.
I feel very sorry for Echo. I cut a lock of his hair and sent it. I will send all his trinkets as soon as I can find them.
We are having quite a battle but are doing well. I hope we keep on. The air bombing is pretty bad but there is not much one can do about it. I may be next [to die] but doubt it. I still have a lot to do.
Diary, April 1
[Jenson’s] watch stopped at 1012. I am terribly sorry as he was a fine boy, loyal, unselfish, and efficient. As soon as he was brought in, I went to the cemetery with Gaffey. He was on a stretcher rolled up in a shelter half. We uncovered his face and I got on my knees to say a prayer, and all the men did the same. There was some blood from his mouth, but he was not mangled, and I doubt if he was hit. There was a small stone bruise on his forehead. I kissed him on the brow and covered him up.
At 1600, Stiller, Sgt Meeks, Sgt. Mims, and I went to the cemetery. Dick was on a stretcher wrapped in a white mattress cover. We had a squad and a trumpeter, but did not fire the volleys as it would make people think an air raid was on. The corps chaplain read the Episcopal service and he was lowered in. There are no coffins here, as there is no wood. Lt. Stiller, Lt. Craig, Sgt. Meeks, and Sgt. Mims carried the stretcher. They were all his friends ...
He was a fine man and officer. He had no vices. I can’t see the reason that such fine young men get killed. I shall miss him a lot...
[McCreery] directed that the tank attack be called off . . . One cannot change plans in war.
The plans of the Allied High Command are all about 3 days to a week too late, and too timid. When we took Gafsa we were told to halt at El Guettar. We waited there from the 19th to the 22d and gave Boches time to bring the 10th Panzer [Division] down from the north. At the same time they told me to take Maknassy and halt on the hills just east. . . Here I failed by not personally backing the attack on the heights. Ward fooled around for 3 days and let the enemy build up and then he attacked with great personal courage but failed to take the ridge. However, I [had] asked to take the whole gth Division in with the 1st Armored and was only allowed to take [part] . . . Not enough ...
This morning McCreery told me to continue the attack with infantry. Now at 5:00 pm I get a note from Alexander suggesting, but not ordering, the use of armor. I will start with infantry and use armor if I get the chance.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Keyes, April i, 1945
Poor Dick Jenson went west this morning . . . I am terribly distressed ...
I think we should bend every effort to get battle-hardened troops for the other operation [Sicily]. As you know, the 1st and 9th have both now had amphibious and mountain warfare . . . The 1st [Armored] needs discipline arid training, and the 26. [Armored] needs battle experience ...
I am really more broken up over Dick than I can express. I did not know how fond I was of him.
Several weeks later he explained to his brother-in-law in more detail what had happened at Benson’s command post.
They had three big radio sets working and made the mistake of not moving the command post about every four hours. The result was, in my opinion, that the Germans intercepted on the three radios and figured that it must be something big and so deliberately sent 12 bombers – I believe they were JU 88’s – to wipe it out.
They dropped about 36 500-pound bombs and only killed three men and wounded several others.
The bomb that caught Jenson was within a foot of his slit trench, and the concussion killed him. There wasn’t a hole in him, but he was perfectly dead. He never knew what hit him.
General Bradley . . . was in the next trench, not five yards away, and wasn’t hurt.
One man got a direct hit, and we could not find him for three days when we began to smell pieces of him, but we never found any portion of his body. Another man sitting in a tank was killed by concussion, and the tank was somewhat damaged in its electrical appliances, but was not materially injured.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Frederick Ayer, April 1, 1943
This is the dirtiest place I have ever been. It was built by the Arabs and occupied by the French and then by the Italians. Every part of it smells like a very old toilet and most of it is. You cannot drink any of the water, eat any of the fruit, or use any of the latrines. If and when I get back to America, I am going to build myself a large bathroom and live in it.
In the United States, huge posters were being printed and distributed to factories. They had a few lines of text in large characters:
Old Blood & Guts attacks Rommel
“Go forward!
“Always go forward!
“Go until the last shot is fired and the last drop of gasoline is gone and then go forward on foot!”
— Lieut. General George S. Patton, Jr.
Dare we working here do less?
Diary, April 2
The action was very slow, due to strong enemy resistance, very difficult country, and the fatigue of our troops ...
Had letter from Alexander asking that I relieve Ward. Radioed AFHQ for Harmon [to take Ward’s place]. Photographed Dick’s grave and had some flowers put on it.
Our air cannot fly at night, nor in a wind, nor support troops. The Germans do all three, and do it as the result of three years’ experience in war. However, in all fairness . . . there is less wind on the German airport near the coast than there is on Thelepte airfield in the mountains.
The Situation Report, called Sitrep, was a routine paper produced every day to inform higher and adjacent headquarters of what had happened during the preceding 24 hours. The II Corps Sitrep of April 1, mentioned that front-line troops in the corps area had been “continuously bombed all morning” by German planes. The reason, according to the Sitrep, was: “Total lack of air cover for our [ground] units has allowed German air force to operate at will.”
No doubt reacting to the death of Jenson, killed by German planes, Patton sent the same message out over his own signature.
When Air Marshal Conyngham, Alexander’s air officer, read the Sitrep, then Patton’s reiteration of the accusation, he became enraged. He immediately sent his own message to all headquarters in Tunisia, as well as to Eisenhower’s AFHQ. The facts, he said, were that II Corps had lost 4 men killed and a “very small number wounded.” Having at first regarded the corps Sitrep as an April Fool joke, Conyngham hoped that the II Corps was not trying to use the “air force as an alibi for lack of success on the ground” If Patton’s Sitrep was “in earnest,” “it can only be assumed that II Corps personnel concerned are not battleworthy in terms of the present operation.” He suggested that “such inaccurate and exaggerated reports should cease” and that the II Corps Sitrep was only a “false cry of wolf.” This of course enraged Patton.
Diary, April 8
I got the most outrageous telegram . . . from Air Marshall Conyngham. He accused me of being a fool and of lying. He said that our calls for air support were due to the fact that American troops were not battle worthy and used the cry of wolf for lack of air support as a means of excusing our slow advance ...
We had 15 men killed, 55 wounded, and sustained 51 air attacks, in which 161 [German] planes took part.
At noon, Chief Air Marshall Tedder, Lt. General Spaatz, and some boy wonder by the name of [Laurence] Kuter arrived, and Tedder said at once, “We did not only come about the Conyngham signal but because we wanted to see you.”
I told them I was glad to see them and that I intended to take up the telegram officially [that is, make an issue of it]. They were clearly uncomfortable and talked a lot about [Allied] air superiority. At the height of this [conversation], 4 German planes flew right down the street not 50 feet from the window, firing machine guns and dropping small bombs. No one was hurt.
The appearance of the German planes could not have been more felicitous in proving Patton’s contention. When the aircraft had gone, Kuter later remembered, Tedder asked Patton how he had arranged the German demonstration. Patton responded, “I’ll be damned if I know, but if I could find the sonsabitches who flew those planes, I’d mail each one of them a medal.”
Later that day, Conyngham’s headquarters put out another message: “Signal relating to air operations on II Corps front . . . is to be withdrawn and cancelled.”
At about the same time, in a letter to Eisenhower, Patton made known his feelings. Conyngham’s first telegram, he said, “naturally . . . made us quite mad and very disgusted.” His second telegram, Patton said, was “an altogether inadequate apology to United States troops.” He thought that Conyngham “should make a categorical apology for his specific criticisms of our soldiers.”
Diary, April 4
Conyngham asked if he could call on me around noon. As I felt I might not want to eat with him, I had lunch early. He arrived at 1215. I asked him to come in, but made no motion to shake hands. I also asked Gaffey to be present.
Conyngham started by saying, “I am dreadfully sorry for that horrible signal. I want to apologize and do what I can to make amends.”
I said, “So far as I personally am concerned, I am willing to accept your apologies and forgive you for indicating that I was a fool, etc., but I cannot accept an oral apology for your calling 60,000 American soldiers unbattleworthy and failing in their duty.”
He said, “I would never have done it but I had received a barrage of requests all day. I am proud of my air force and will not have them criticized.”
He spoke quite loud and I responded, equally loud, that my men had been under barrage all day due to what I considered was his fault. Then I added, “Pardon my also shouting, but I too have pride and will not stand for having Americans called cowards. I have asked for an official investigation. If I had said half what you said, I would now be a Colonel and on my way home.”
He cooled down and said, “I am awfully sorry. What can I do to make amends?”
I said, “If you will send a message specifically retracting your remarks about the lack of battleworthiness of our men, and send it to the same people to whom you sent the first message, I shall consider the incident closed.”
He said, “I will.”
I then offered him my hand and took him to lunch. When he left, he said, “I can’t thank you enough. You have been very generous.”
I said, “It is always easy to be generous to a gentleman who admits his mistakes.”
We parted friends, and I think we will now get better air support than ever before. I was rather proud of myself, as I was firm, but moderate. I doubt if he ever sends the telegram of retraction because Ike will tell him it is not necessary ...
After I got through with Conyngham, I felt ill with pains in my back, so I inspected the front lines but was not fired at.
On the following day, Conyngham informed Eisenhower and Alexander that he had visited Patton to express his regret that his message had been misinterpreted
as a slight to American forces . . . I explained that a mistake in transmission had caused signal to read “Two Corps personnel concerned” instead of ‘Tew Corps personnel concerned.” I gladly renewed assurance of my regard for American forces . . . General Patton and I agreed to cancel the mutual signals which constituted the incident and to consider the matter ended.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Conyngham, April 5,
Please accept on the part of myself and the officers and men of II Corps our most sincere appreciation of your more than generous signal.
Personally, while I regret the misunderstanding, for which I was partially responsible, I cannot but take comfort and satisfaction from the fact that it gave me an opportunity of becoming better acquainted with you, because to me you exemplify in their most perfect form all the characteristics of the fighting gentleman.
On the file copy of this letter retained by Patton, he added in pen: “The sentence, ‘for which I was partially responsible/ I put in – though a lie – to save his face. I may need his help some day in another matter.”
In a message to Alexander, Patton asked that a telegram be sent to acknowledge with gratitude “the magnificent [air] support” received by the II Corps.” He added, “I am sure that however unfortunate the misunderstanding may have been, it has had the effect of drawing us closer together.”
“So far as I know,” he wrote in pen at the bottom of the letter, “this suggested telegram was never sent.”
Eisenhower assured Patton that he had taken up the “adverse criticisms” before receiving Patton’s message. He realized how chagrined Pat-ton was and understood why Patton felt that some public retraction or apology was required. However, complete Allied teamwork was all-important and there was little point in “demanding the last pound of flesh.” He was certain that Conyngham appreciated the gravity of his error. There was “a certain amount of unwise distribution of your Sitrep,” but he had no intention of pursuing the matter further. All senior officers had to work together to defeat the Axis, and a frank and friendly exchange of views would avoid irritations. He refused to permit criticism “couched along nationalistic lines” and hoped that Patton would fully present his views to Alexander when necessary.
He added a postscript. A copy of a telegram just received from Conyngham indicated that the incident had been entirely cleared up. Eisenhower was delighted, “but the principles I have enunciated are still applicable.”
In Patton’s handwriting: “It is noteworthy that had I done what Conyngham did, I would have been relieved. Ike told me later that he could not punish Conyngham because he was a NewZelander and political reasons forbad. Unfortunately I am neither a Democrat or a Republican – just a soldier.”
On April 3, Alexander sent Patton his “Notes on Future Operations.” There was to be a change in the Fondouk area, where the 34th Division had been in action several days. In accordance with Patton’s orders, Ryder had carried out a demonstration – making noise rather than attacking seriously – since the purpose, according to Patton’s understanding, was to threaten, but not actually to make, a drive through the pass toward Kairouan. The American presence alone provoked a prompt and strong reaction on the part of the Axis. Because a thrust beyond Fondouk would interfere with an Axis withdrawal up the coastal plain, German and Italian troops counterattacked and almost sent Ryder reeling back. Precisely because Fondouk had become vital to the Axis, Alexander increased the Allied strength there. He ordered Lieutenant General Sir J. T. Crocker’s IX British Corps to take command and to bring in the British 6th Armoured Division and 128th Infantry Brigade. Together with the 34th Division, these units were to make a real offensive effort. Thus, Patton’s II Corps would lose Ryder. With the locus of the battle shifting northward, Fondouk had first priority on troops and supplies. This meant that Patton would have to furnish artillery units and other elements from his forces in the south.
In the El Guettar area, Alexander wanted the 1st and gth Infantry Divisions to defend against possible enemy incursions up the Gabes road and at the same time make the enemy think that an American breakthrough on that road was imminent.
At Maknassy, he wished “the most aggressive action possible when the enemy starts his withdrawal from this area.” He wanted very active reconnaissance to insure early warning of any signs of enemy withdrawal.
And finally, as soon as Montgomery broke through the Axis positions in the south, the 9th Division was to move to a new front being established in the north near the Mediterranean.
Patton was outraged, but Eisenhower had given him his marching orders, and he said nothing. He confided his reaction to his diary:
The U.S. troops get wholly separated and all chance of being in at the kill [the final battle in Tunisia] and getting some natural credit is lost. Bradley and I explained this to Ike and he said he would stop it. He has done nothing. He is completely sold out to the British. I hope the Press at home gets on to it. Brad and I have decided to saw wood and say nothing. If he [Eisenhower] falls, it is not our fault. I hope the Boches beat the complete life out of the 128th Brigade and 6th Armored Division. I am fed up with being treated like a moron by the British. There is no national honor nor prestige left to us. Ike must go. He is a typical case of a beggar on horseback—could not stand prosperity.
Diary, April 4
Sent Bradley to Maknassy to tell Ward he was to be relieved. While Alexander has written me a letter asking that I relieve him, I did not use this as a cloak for my act. I should have relieved him on the 22d or 23d, but did not do so as I hate to change leaders in battle, but a new leader is better than a timid one.
Alexander had made his reservations on Ward known to Eisenhower, who had insisted that Alexander inform Patton.
Diary, April 5
General Bull [Eisenhower’s deputy, who had been visiting Tunisia] left for Algiers to see Ike. His attitude is, I think, unfortunate. He is very critical of all we do and is very prone to argue in favor of the British. Bradley and I had a long talk and decided to answer any questions Bull propounds . . . but to volunteer neither advice nor information. We feel that the U.S. is being sold out for a theory, and that the theory is bad. There is no attempt to aggrandize the American Army. We have fought continuously for 19 days and have never given ground. The Eighth Army has fought 5 days. We have pulled the 10th and 21st Panzer [Divisions] off them and it is gently – not too gently – intimated to us that we are not doing our best . . . We asked at noon today for night reconnaissance [aircraft] tonight. Were told that it was operationally impossible, as the Air Force had other more important duties – probably sleeping. Result, we will be unable to tell whether the enemy withdrew after his feint, as we think, or whether he is still waiting to attack [us]. We have no information as to Eighth Army.
Eisenhower was writing to Patton: “Alexander has told me that your corps is not to be pinched out of the coming [final] campaign.” The II Corps was to have “a definite sector and mission.”
Diary, April 6, 1943
Benson . . . was very slow and put on a half-hearted attack . . .
When things looked bad yesterday, I decided not to leave Gafsa alive. Bradley was with me. The decision was a comfort and did much to harden our hearts.
Diary, April 7
A phone message from McCreery to the effect that our tanks were timid, and that we were to push on regardless of losses. I had already ordered Benson to break through and damn the expense.
Geoff Keyes came last night to talk about “Husky” so I asked him to come with me . . . I stopped at Benson’s command post and told him he must succeed or else, and that I was disgusted with his slowness yesterday. I asked him to push on until he got into a big fight or hit the ocean.
We went to the OP of Colonel [Edward] Randle. The ground is appalling. Had a good view of Benson’s advance, which was meeting little resistance except from long range fire. I called Gaffey to tell him to have Benson move faster. We then drove back and headed east on the Gabes road [behind Benson}. We found Benson eating lunch – riot much – so I told him to stop eating and get out in front, and he moved out. He was being delayed by a mine field. We drove through the mine field . . . At this time there was only one jeep and one scout car ahead of my jeep and everyone told me I was going to be killed. I told Benson . . . keep pushing for a fight or a bath [in the ocean] . . . Shortly after I turned back, Benson’s advance guard made contact with a patrol of the . . . Eighth Army. As it was, I had no idea they [the British] were around and was simply doing my duty as I saw it. I don’t think there was any danger in it.
Over a thousand prisoners were taken by Benson’s force.
Patton’s exploit was courageous; it was personal leadership at its finest. But meeting British instead of Axis troops meant that the Italo-Germans had escaped to the north.
How Patton would have liked to slash into the flank of the withdrawing Axis forces!
At 1940 [that evening] Brigadier Holmes, 18 Army Group, called me on the telephone and I told him that we had broken through and that Benson was going to the sea. He told me to order him back...
In the morning we had been ordered to push on regardless of losses. After having spent thousands of casualties making a breakthrough, we were not allowed to exploit it. The excuse is that we might interfere with the Eighth Army . . . One can only conclude that when the Eighth Army is in trouble, we are to expend our lives gladly; but when the Eighth is going well, we are to halt so as not to take any glory. It is an inspiring method of making war and shows rare qualities of leadership, and Ike falls for it. Oh! for a Pershing.
I must have been more tired than I realized. Went to bed at 2200 and never woke until 0600. Sic Transit Gloria Mundi.
A letter from Keyes came a few days later:
I noticed in the papers that the Eighth Army had made contact with your corps, which seemed rather odd, inasmuch as the meeting took place some fifteen miles inside their boundary.
That brought the fighting in the south around Gafsa, sometimes called the battle of El Guettar, to an end.
GSP, Jr., II Corps General Orders 2$, April 8, 1943
Soldiers of the II Corps: after 22 days of relentless combat in mountains whose ruggedness beggars description, you have won the battle of El Guettar. Each one of you, in your sphere, has done his duty magnificently.
Not alone on the front line where death never ended his gruesome harvest, but everywhere else, all of you have demonstrated your valor and constancy.
Over countless miles of dusty, wind-swept roads, often under fire from the air or from artillery . . . under the most rigorous field conditions . . . in small, isolated groups or as individuals . . . [against] the lurking hazards of mine fields . . . [you] gave, as ever, proof of . . . untiring devotion and splendid courage ...
Due to your united efforts and to the manifest assistance of Almighty God, the splendid record of the American Army has attained added lustre.
He sent letters of commendation to Allen and Eddy, praising them and their men, who “never faltered” and who, “undeterred by cold, lack of sleep, and by continued losses” conquered in “relentless battle,” and whose “valorous exploits have brought undying fame” and “added new and imperishable laurels to the proud record of the United States Army.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, April 8,
I have just won a pretty big battle ...
Of course we lost plenty . . . Of course many are wounded and will be back soon ...
Our job was to pull stuff away from the Eighth Army. We sure did...
Yesterday . . . Chauncy [Benson] with about 90 tanks . . . did not go fast enough so Geoff . . . and I went along. After a while . . . there was only a peep and a scout car in front of us . . . About a mile after I quit we made contact with the Eighth Army. It is just as well that I was not there, as it would have looked theatrical . . .
It has not been a too pleasant war. Some times I have ridden in [horse] shows when I knew the judges were hostil. Well it is the same here. D is one of them ...
Some day the truth will come out and the sawdust baskets will be full. I do just what I am told to the best of my ability and ask no favor or make no explanations. How I wish JJPfershing] was twins...
I think it likely I will soon return to Rabat to get ready for a bigger and better show. I think things will sort of peter out here, at least so far as we [Americans] are concerned, JJP being absent.
If the papers say I have been relieved, don’t worry. I was only pinch hitting here. Bradley will take over the trouble. He is a swell fellow.
Diary, April 8
This morning a new boundary was assigned to the II Corps [now] consisting of [only] two infantry divisions . . . [and] precludes us from breaking through [the Eastern Dorsale and interfering with the Axis withdrawal]. Just what becomes of one infantry division and one armored division [remaining in the II Corps] is not said.
At lunch McCreery called, and, after his usual giggle, said that the 34th Division needed a medium artillery battalion [at Fondouk]. I replied, “I thought you would,” and heard him shudder, so I added, “You see, we always think alike.”
McCreery also said that he might have to ask Patton to take the Faid Pass, just above Maknassy, to help the attack at Fondouk. “I had expected that too and had already sent a medium tank battalion up.”
Diary, April 9
I have worried a lot over the future of the II Corps and the American army, so this morning Bradley and I decided to go and have a look at the battlefield, from the enemy side . . . After seeing how strong the [enemy] position was, I don’t wonder that we took so long to take it. I wonder that we ever drove them out...
McCreery brought Field Marshal Lord Gort [Governor of Malta] to lunch. Gort is not an inspiring type. McCreery gave us the new setup.
The II Corps, with the 9th and 34th Divisions and half of the 1st Armored, was to move to north Tunisia and deploy to attack Bizerte. The 1st Division was to be withdrawn from operations to get ready for Husky.
It may be for the best...
Things look pretty good but I fear the [newspapers will make too much of a play about me. I have not yet begun to fight.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Surles, April 10, 1943
I was pitch-forked into this thing on one day’s notice and only commanded the corps for 10 days before going into battle. Probably that accounts for not having demoralized it. As a matter of fact, I think I considerably improved it...
I cannot too strongly express my admiration for the unwavering and cheerful fortitude of the American soldier. He is a great fellow . . . I do not deserve or desire publicity, but I do believe that everything that can be handed to the American soldiers, whether they be in the front lines or on the lines of communication, should be handed to them.
On April 10, he left at 8:30 A.M. to see how the 1st Armored Division was preparing its attack on Faid pass.
Harmon was in his command post, and so far as I could see, nothing had been done but issue orders ...
Went to see McQuillin, who was to lead the attack and get him started. When we got there, nothing had been done either. McQuillin told me, with evident pride, that he had just issued the orders. I asked him where the leading elements were and he did not know, so I took Harmon and went forward.
We were assured that Sidi-bou-Zid could not be entered because it was full of mines and booby traps. We drove through it with impunity and went up a dirt road toward the Pass – no mines.
At last we came to the engineers, who had just removed 10 mines. I told the reconfnaissance elements] to move off the road and push on. Lost two half-tracks but saved hours of time.
We finally got to the pass south of Faid and found that mines actually existed but were pretty thin, so we walked through the minefield to encourage the others. Mines are largely a mental hazard and must not be treated too seriously. I think my walking through the minefield saved about three hours.
We sent Harmon’s aide . . . to kick McQuillin along. On the way back we met two [reconnaissance] companies . . . coming up the road through some artillery, but no tanks, yet clearly tanks should have led, as we were at the pass and might be counterattacked – no flexibility of mind, no desperate desire to get forward [on the part of McQuillin].
I left Harmon at Sidi to push [the attack], and drove along the main road to Sbeitla. I was assured it was mined. I heard later that the troops were much impressed by seeing me in the minefields. There was no danger. My luck in being at the right place at the right time held.
We got home about 1900 after some 300 miles in a jeep.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Frederick Ayer, April 10, 1943
It was quite a show while it lasted, and our soldiers displayed a truly remarkable fortitude. It makes you proud to be an American . . . The fact that the whole area is covered with contact mines makes walking over it very irksome.
The II Corps After Action or Operations Report for the period March 15-April 10, a detailed record of the fighting, closed with Patton’s tribute to the troops:
The conduct of our troops under the most difficult of terrain obstacles, and in the face of a crafty and experienced enemy operating from carefully prepared positions, was courageous and unfaltering. Their valorous conquests have caused the enemy to fear them. Likewise their courageous exploits have earned for them the respect of their brothers in arms of other [Allied] nations. By their deeds of the past twenty-five days they have added luster to the imperishable laurels and proud record of the United States Army.
Alexander phoned early on April 11 and asked Patton to lunch to discuss the coming operation. Conyngham was there
and greeted me as a long lost brother. At the end of the meal he took me aside and said, “I deeply appreciate your most generous letter.” I replied, “It was from the heart.” And the lightning did not strike me dumb [as a result of the lie], but I think I will get plenty of air [support] from now on.
Patton asked Alexander whether the II Corps would be under the First British Army during the new attack to Bizerte.
He was uncomfortable but said that the question of communication made it necessary. I said I preferred to be under the 18 Army Group direct. He said that if at any time I did not get on with General Anderson, I was to call him direct. (A very improper procedure.)
He was sure that the British neither hoped nor expected the Americans to do anything in the final attack on Bizerte and Tunis. “If, by chance,” Alexander said, “we [the British] are about to enter Tunis, I will send for an American and a French Combat Team to march in with us.” Pat-ton thought this was an insult, “but I failed to see it on purpose.”
He said he believed that going under the British First Army was hardly right. It was not so much a question of communication or supply as of national prestige. If America were not represented as an independent force, it would be very unfortunate.
On the way home Patton became increasingly convinced that the II Corps should all be present, including the 34th Division. He wrote Alexander saying that if the 34th were withdrawn as a result of poor showing in battle – at Fondouk – it would be useless in the future. Furthermore, since it was a National Guard unit from a portion of the country where pacifism was rampant, its removal “on the say-so of a British general” would have very far-reaching political repercussions.
God damn all British and all so-called Americans who have their legs pulled by them. I will bet that Ike does nothing about it. I would rather be commanded by an Arab. I think less than nothing of Arabs.
Diary, April 12
The 34th Division . . . did not do too well, but that was largely because Crocker sent it on an impossible mission with both flanks open. After we had drawn off the Germans, the British came in and took their hill. I feel all the time that there must be a showdown [with the British] and that I may be one of the victims. Ike is more British than the British and is putty in their hands. Oh, God, for John J. Pershing.
Driving home I passed a Roman mile post that must have been there 1,300 years. How young we are! Visited hospital this P.M. Some pretty sick men but all cheerful.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, April 13, 1943
On the 10th, the 1st Armored forced the pass at Faid against practically no opposition. However, they did it in a remarcably short time, for which I was personally responsible ...
It now seems probable that I will turn over the rest of this to Omar and get back to planning my next realy big job. I hate to quit fighting, but on the other hand it may be best for my reputation, as I look ascance at some of the arrangements now pending . . .
I have spent the day writing letters of commendation to individuals and divisions. Some of the latter don’t deserve them, but I have to counteract adverse criticism from other sources. Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad. It looks to me like destruction of some people was imminent...
The nurses are doing a swell job ...
I saw one poor devil yesterday missing a leg. I asked him how he felt and he said fine, since you came to see me.
I suppose I do some good but it always makes me choke up. I have no personal feeling of responsibility for getting them hurt, as I took the same chances, but I hate to look at them.
Diary, April 13
Bradley . . . went to Hq. 18 Army Group . . . to arrange details for the transfer of the II Corps to the north flank and to repeat my urgent request that we not be put under First Army. His primary mission was to secure the participation of the 34th Division . . . He succeeded . . . [The possible political repercussions] did the trick. Our real reason was to get the maximum number of troops into the area so we could make a real effort. I feel that the British don’t want us to make a success. They have asked me to come to a conference in the morning. I feel that this may be a prelude to putting a British officer on our staff. Ike will be there and I will be interested in his reaction. I think it probable that he may send me back to work on “Husky.” I would like to finish this fight but shall not argue, as it seems to me that I am in the hands of fate, who is forging me for some future bigger role.
Patton wrote to Devers:
You may smile when I tell you that the confidence you expressed in me in your last letter was a constant source of comfort and inspiration to me.
Diary, April 14
Bradley and I left this morning in two cubs to meet Ike at Haidra . . . I got stuck in fog so landed at Thelepte and took some gas from an ambulance. Tried it again and got through. Bradley in second cub did not make it – went back to Thelepte and came on by car. Ike also landed at Thelepte and came in by car . . . When he met Bradley and me, he never mentioned our victory – some leader.
We three saw Alexander who, be it noted, did not come to the airfield to meet his alleged boss, Ike. Ike talked a lot and let Alex do just what he wanted to. Ike said that he “did not consider himself as an American but as an ally” And he told the truth. What an ass and how tragic for us. He is all heated up about “Husky” and said that he felt that I should let Bradley carry on in Tunisia and go back to work on “Husky.” I said that if I was to go, today was the best time, as it would permit Bradley to make the arrangements for the next move. Eisenhower agreed to this and wrote me an order to publish to the corps.
I hate to quit a fight but feel that I had best do so as I fear that on the north flank, where Alexander has put us, there is no future; also the II Corps will be under the First British Army. I fear the worst...
I have been very fortunate so far. I hope the Lord keeps helping me. Saw Clark – he was sour as a pickle. I think I have passed him, and am amused at all the envy and hatred I wasted on him and many others. .Looking back, men seem less vile.
Letter, Eisenhower to GSP, Jr., April 14, 1943
With the successful completion of that phase of the Tunisian operations for which I placed you temporarily in command of the II Corps . . . I hope that you . . . personally will accept my sincere congratulations upon the outstanding example of leadership you have given us all.
Successful he had been – in rehabilitating the II Corps and giving the men a fighting spirit, in following his orders strictly, and in leading his troops to a victory of sorts. But he regretted the cautious mode of operation by the British which had prevented him from unleasing a smashing drive against the flank of the withdrawing Axis forces, who held the passes of the Eastern Dorsale and marched virtually undisturbed into northern Tunisia. Now a final battle would have to be fought. And the American part would be up to Bradley.
Diary, April 15
II Corps Headquarters starts north this morning. Stiller is taking my three radio scout cars and jeep back by road with most of my staff. Gay, Sgt. Meeks, and I are driving to Constantine via Timbad .. . . (Timgabia) . . . founded by Trajan in 200 or 100 a.d. It is a wonderful sight . . . Arch of Trajan, and thousands of houses . . . The ruts made by the chariot wheels are six inches deep . . . I was tremendously impressed with this monument of a great and vanished race. Yet I have fought and won a bigger battle than Trajan ever heard of...
I had dinner [in Constantine] at Spaatz’ mess. All his staff is British, and he and all his men are for a separate air force. This is absurd. The system of command by cooperation, which we now have in joint operations with the Navy, would simply be accentuated. There must be one commander for ground, air, and sea. The trouble is, we lack leaders with sufficient strength of character. I could do it and possibly will. As I gain in experience, I do not think more of myself but less of others. Men, even so-called great men, are wonderfully weak and timid. They are too damned polite. War is very simple, direct, and ruthless. It takes a simple, direct, and ruthless man to wage war. Some times I wonder if I will have to laugh at myself for writing things like the above. But I think not. I have developed a lot and my never small self-confidence has vastly grown. I am sure that with God’s help I will succeed at “Husky” and so on to the end, which is far distant.
Before leaving Gafsa I picked some nasturtiums in the yard, and Gay, Sgt. Meeks, and I went to the cemetery to tell Dick goodbye. There are more than 700 graves there now.
Letter, Mrs. Jenson to GSP, Jr., April 15, 1943
My dear George. Thank you so much for your letter and also for the beautiful tribute you paid Dick. You gave him the happiest years of his life. After his Father’s death, you took his place, and his admiration and affection for you was unbounded. The “old man” could do no wrong. I quite agree with you that he should not be moved from Africa. His personal belongings I would like to have . . . [With] undying gratitude to you for making it possible for Dick to do the things he wanted to do.
II Corps Draft General Orders, April 15,943
Upon the victorious completion of the operation for which I was placed in temporary command of the II Corps . . . I desire to again express my deep appreciation of the valor, loyalty, and unfaltering endurance of the officers and men ...
It is my fondest hope that I shall again have the opportunity to command some or all of you, because I feel that you exemplify the highest type of American manhood.
I would be truly derelict in my duty and untrue to my heart if I failed at this time to pay homage to our glorious dead and valorous, uncomplaining wounded. God Bless the II Corps.
A telegram from Marshall: “You did a fine job and further strengthened confidence in your leadership”
Diary, April 16
Spent a while looking around Constantine ...
Had a long talk with Spaatz on air support. I think he will do, but he lacks any idea of discipline. He flew us to Algiers in his plane. Butcher met us, and I spent the night with Ike. It appears to me that Ike is acting a part and knows he is dammed near a Benedict Arnold, and is either obeying orders (if so, he does it in a soldierly way without squealing) or else the British have got him completely fooled. In any case he is usually not telling the truth. He is nothing but a Popinjay – a stuffed doll. The British are running the show on the sea, on the land, and in the air. They are running it to their advantage and are playing us for suckers, not only in a military way but politically also.
The British dictate what troops come, what quantity and type of supplies we give the French, and how and where our troops are used.
There is no excuse for moving the II Corps to the north flank, where the ground is unsuitable for a main attack. We should have gone in at Medjez-el-Bab.
Lt. General Cocran, the s.o.b., publicly called our troops cowards. Ike says that since they were serving in his corps that was O.K. I told him that had I so spoken of the British under me, my head would have come off. He agreed, but does nothing to Cocran.
Bradley, Everett Hughes, General Rooks, and I, and probably many more, feel that America is being sold. I have been more than loyal to Ike and have talked to no one and have taken things from the British that I would never take from an American. If this trickery to America comes from above, it is utterly damnable. If it emanates from Ike, it is utterly terrible. I seriously talked to Hughes of asking to be relieved as a protest. I feel like Judas. Hughes says that he and I and some others must stick it out to save the pieces. I am not sure, but I love fighting and if I asked to be relieved, I would not even be a good martyr.
Diary, April 17
I talked very plainly to Ike this morning – strange to say he took it – but he has a sophist argument, probably provided by the British, for everything he has done. I told him he was the reverse of J. J. Pershing. He quoted the time in March 1918 when Pershing put every American at the disposal of Foch. I countered with the time of August in the same year when General Pershing told Foch that unless he issued orders for the concentration of an American Army, Americans would not fire a shot nor move a vehicle nor train. St. Mihiel was the result.
Had lunch with Hughes who . . . is more rabid than I am. Also, he points out, with justice, that Ike cannot even enforce discipline nor police regulations in Algiers.
Left at 1400 in a C-47 loaned by Spaatz and got in to Casablanca at 1800. Keyes and Harkins met me. I have been gone 43 days, fought several successful battles, commanded 95,800 men, lost about ten pounds, gained a third star and a hell of a lot of poise and confidence, and am otherwise the same.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, April 17, 1943
Darling B. Well the campaign or battle or what ever they call it lasted 43 days and I am back where I was and will be here or hereabouts for a while. Hewitt and Jim Hall and I are working together again.
Where the [newsjpapers heard of my reform in smoking and drinking, I dont know, but as a result everyone . . . wants to send me cigars and whiskey. It is very amusing. I think that is the way Grant got his cancer ...
On the way home we drove to a place called Timgad . . . the finest ruin I have ever seen. Three public baths, a theater very well preserved, a public library with the plate giving the name of the rich man who donated it, a temple to Jupiter with columns six feet thick, a temple to Janus, a forum, a Christian church, and a whore house. The principle streets were paved in gray stone and the little streets in black stone. The sewer still works and there are several toilits with carved stone seats in which the water still runs. Right at the entrance there is a fountain still running after 1700 years.
What I cant figure out is how all these ruins got covered with earth but they all are.
I flew around quite a lot in a cub and passed many nameless ruins of villas, past houses, and ruins that I cant even place. The climate must have been much better then than now to have supported such a civilization.
I agree with you that I am too popular with the press but now I think they will take a crack at me. In a way as a cover plan [to deceive the enemy about the next operation]. It will be a good thing, so don’t worry. The people who count know why what is, is. George [Marshall] sent me a wonderful telegram all by him self . . .
There was one fine thing done when the 10th Panzer attacked us. One platoon . . . died to a man. The last thing they were heard yelling was come on you hun bastards.
On the 7th I put 130 guns on two bosch battalions with 50 rounds per gun, rapid fire, the first 20 gave white phosphorus [shells], the next 25 high explosive. My idea was to make them think an attack was coming and then kill them. It worked perfectly. Hap [Gay] visited the place and he said it was a mess, just pieces of men laying around. Our infantry walked in with out a casualty. Prior to that they had assaulted five times . . . I was very proud of my little shoot.
We actually counted 800 fresh graves due to other fighting and we must have missed many as the ones counted could be seen from the main road. We had plenty too ...
I am inclined to think that some people here are too optomistic.
Diary, April 18
Got up late . . . and went to church.
Diary, April 19
Worked on lessons from Tunisia.
His “Notes on Combat” summarized his observations of the Tunisian campaign. Some of them were:
Commanders and staff officers who spent their time “sitting in front of a map, plotting situations” were of little value; they had to “go to critical points to see that orders are being executed on time.”
Plans had to be simple and never changed.
Officers had to have self-confidence and men confidence in their officers.
Officers had the “paramount duty to set the example in courage. They must be the last one to take cover and the first one to leave cover. They must not show emotion except the emotion of confidence”
“It is absurd to believe that soldiers who cannot be made to wear the proper uniform can be induced to move forward in battle. Officers who fail to perform their duty by correcting small violations and in enforcing proper conduct are incapable of leading.”
In night attacks, “the more noise and light produced the better.”
“Death in battle is a function of time. The longer troops remain under fire, the more men get killed. Therefore, everything must be done to speed up movement.”
“During the attack, infantry must not dig in until the final objective is reached. If they do, they cannot be restarted. Furthermore, it is natural for them to think that when they are told to dig in they have accomplished their mission.”
“To employ a unit smaller than a battalion against an active enemy is to invite disaster.”
“Junior officers in reconnaissance units must be very inquisitive.”
“Mines produce a greater effect on the mind than on the body. There is a very real danger of troops becoming too mine-conscious. When mines are encountered on a road, there is a tendency to sit still until they have been removed. In many types of terrain it is possible to avoid the mine field by moving off the road . . . Since the main purpose of the mine field is to delay, the thing to be avoided is delay. Violent and reckless methods must be used to pass mine fields.”
Officers in battle had to be easily distinguished, and thus had to wear their rank. “When men see a marked helmet they know it is an officer. These markings are not visible at a range beyond 200 yards, therefore the timid excuse that they produce sniping is of no value. Sniping occurs beyond that range.”
Diary, April 20
Gompleted notes on Tunisia and read up on next show.