“I have the usual shortness of breath I always have before a polo game.”
Diary, July 6
Monrovia [Hewitt’s flagship] gave the order “Let go all lines” at 0810, and we stood out to the anchorage followed by our landing craft; [we] anchored and took them up.
Much photography of Admiral Hewitt and myself with Algiers as a backdrop ...
At 1710 we got finally under way. It is a moving sight, but over all is the feeling that only God and the Navy can do anything until we hit the shore. I hope God and Navy do their stuff. To be stopped now would have the most adverse effect on the future of the world. We will not be stopped.
General Lucas is sharing my cabin and is most excellent company.
GSP, Jr., Message to men at sea
We are indeed honored in having been selected [for] . . . this new and greater attack against the Axis . . . When we land we will meet German and Italian soldiers whom it is our honor and privilege to attack and destroy . . . During the last year we Americans have met and defeated the best troops Germany, Italy, and Japan possess. Many of us have shared in these glorious victories. Those of you who have not been so fortunate now have your opportunity to gain equal fame.
In landing operations, retreat is impossible. To surrender 4s as ignoble as it is foolish . . . However tired and hungry you may be, the enemy will be more tired and more hungry – keep punching. No man is beaten until he thinks he is . . . Civilians who have the stupidity to fight us we will kill. Those who remain passive will not be harmed . . .
The glory of American arms, the honor of our country, the future of the whole world rests in your individual hands. See to it that you are worthy of this great trust.
Diary, July 8
Lots of officers . . . say that they look forward to fishing, farming, etc. after the war. I don’t – I look forward to fighting, here, in Japan, or at home, for the rest of my days ...
I have the usual shortness of breath I always have before a polo game...
After supper I heard more laughing and singing among the men than I have to date. I would not change places with anyone I know right now.
At a small ceremony in Patton’s stateroom, the I Armored Corps flag was taken down and the Seventh Army standard put in its place.
Diary, July 9
Slept as much as possible . . . Some soldiers outside the door were talking and said, “When we get ashore tomorrow, the papers will report that the Marines have landed in Sicily.”
Had the chaplain in after supper to say a prayer.
Alfredo Guzzoni commanded the 200,000 men of the Italian Sixth Army and about 50,000 German troops. He had four excellent Italian divisions at central locations, where they were ready for swift dispatch to threatened sectors. His two German divisions were prepared to counterattack the invasion forces wherever they might appear.
A few minutes before 2 A.M., on July 10, Patton went on deck. “We may feel anxious but I trust the Italians are scared to death.”
The invasion proper started in the early hours of July 10, with an airborne drop. The wind over Sicily was so strong that it scattered the aircraft and dispersed the troops. Very few men found themselves near two vital objectives they were supposed to seize to facilitate the invasion, a bridge near Syracuse in the British zone and an important crossroads on high ground several miles inland from the American landing beaches. British and American airborne soldiers all over the southeastern part of Sicily coalesced into small groups and proceeded to cut telephone wires and to ambush and terrorize small Axis units.
More than seven Allied divisions were to land simultaneously at 2:45 A.M., along 100 miles of shore. Montgomery’s Eighth Army in the somewhat sheltered Gulf of No to landed on schedule along 30 miles of coastline. The troops gained surprise and rolled over the defenders who offered little resistance. Leese’s XXX Corps turned westward to make contact with the Americans, while Dempsey’s XIII Corps prepared to capture Syracuse, Augusta, and Catania in swift succession.
Along 70 miles of coast on the southern face of Sicily, Patton’s Seventh Army experienced some difficulties because the wind reached near-gale proportions. The troops were buffeted by high waves, and the assault landings were delayed. Bradley’s II Corps headquarters directed Middle-ton’s 45th Division, which went ashore near the fishing village of Scoglitti, and Allen’s 1st Division, which hit the beaches near the minor port of Gela. Operating somewhat independently, Truscott’s 3d Division invaded near the port of Licata.
At the outset, the opposition was relatively light. Fire from shore batteries was soon silenced by naval bombardment. Axis planes would appear later that day and harass the ground troops and sink two ships, but the first part of the invasion – getting ashore – seemed successful.
Lucas and Keyes played a large part in that success. Both were on the beach early that morning, organized work parties, and sent a steady stream of units toward their objectives.
Diary, July 10
Things were so complicated that I did not go ashore. I feel like a cur, but I probably did better here.
Hewitt is a perfect fool, but Admiral Lewis, his chief of staff, is good. Having trouble making Hewitt take over prisoners so as to relieve [Army] guards, or move his LSTs, now empty, back for the next load.
God has again helped me. I hope He keeps on.
The fighting became more serious during the afternoon of D-day, particularly in the Seventh Army area. Guzzoni, realizing very early that he could not counter all the landings, committed his resources against the most dangerous threats. He ordered the Germans near the east coast to defend Syracuse; he instructed a German and an Italian division to strike against Gela.
Massing for a counterattack at Gela, German and Italian elements headed for the beaches. Stopped by heavy ground and naval fires, the Axis forces built up their strength for a powerful attack on the following day.
The Americans, who had Licata, Gela, and Scoglitti in hand, recognized that Axis units were terribly close and were probing for a renewed and greater effort still to come.
British troops, meanwhile, took Cassibile and other initial objectives as scheduled. That evening, a column rolled into Syracuse. But when troops went beyond and headed toward Augusta, they were halted by a hastily erected defensive line.
On July 11, the second day of the invasion, Patton, Gay, and Stiller, with several soldiers as bodyguard, departed the Monrovia in the admiral’s barge at 9 A.M., and arrived at the beach 30 minutes later. Patton noticed that two dukws had been destroyed by mines. While his scout car was being de-waterproofed, he inspected several abandoned landing craft that had large holes in their bottoms. A few shells, he guessed from an 88-mm. or a 105-mm. gun, hit the water about 30 yards away.
Patton and his group drove along the coastal road, intending to visit the 1st Division command post. They entered Gela and
decided to call on Colonel Darby, commanding the Rangers. This was very fortunate because, had we proceeded down the road, we would have run into seven German tanks which at that moment were advancing . . . toward the town.
The two Axis divisions launched their attack on Gela, and a battle raged all morning long. American infantrymen, paratroopers, rangers, engineers, tankers, and artillerymen fought well and coolly, and the ships gave splendid support. Several German tanks came so close to the shoreline that the Hermann Goering Division commander informed Guzzoni: “Pressure . . . has forced the enemy to reembark temporarily.” The message was premature. Axis troops never quite reached the beaches. American unloading operations were halted so that everyone on the beaches could fire, for by this time, the ships were unable to shoot – the opponents were too close to each other and fighting at pointblank range. Unable to cross the coastal road, with 16 of their tanks burning on the battlefield, the Axis forces pulled back. Ships’ guns again opened up and hurried them into the hills.
During the height of the action Patton and his party were with Darby in Gela, which was cut off from the 1st Division. At an observation post in the top story of a tall building, Patton “could plainly see the enemy moving across the field, perhaps 800 yards away.”
As the attack seemed to stall, two Axis planes dropped bombs on Gela.
They hit the building we were in twice and also made a hole in the roof of the building across the street, but no one was hurt, except some civilians. I have never heard so much screaming.
When ten American tanks arrived to re-establish contact, Patton sent word to Gaffey. He wanted the gap between the town and the 1st Division closed. He also told Allen to send some tanks to help Darby. Soon afterward, Darby counterattacked, broke the direct threat to Gela, and took about 500 prisoners.
That evening Gay would write in his journal:
It appears to me that Gela was in imminent danger of falling, particularly during the hours before noon, and I personally believe that the Commanding General’s presence in the front lines had a great deal to do with the enemy attacks failing.
Somewhat later, Lucas would write to Eisenhower with respect to what he considered to be “the only serious counterattack” by the enemy:
General Patton was ashore at the time, and I am convinced that his presence had much to do with restoring the situation.
Later, Patton would say,
I personally helped lay some 4.2’s [mortars] at a range of about 900 yards on enemy infantry. The white phosphorus was remarkable in its effect and seemed to make them quite crazy as they rushed out of the ravine, shrilling like dervishes with their hands over their heads [in surrender].
On that same day we used it at about 3000 yards against tanks with some effect. The enemy, both Italian and German, are terrified of white phosphorus, and I personally do not blame them.
Learning that Truscott was all right around Licata, Patton drove to the 1st Division. He met Roosevelt and
talked to him about the failure . . . to carry its objective last night. The chief reason, as far as I can see, is that the division attacked without anti-tank guns and without moving their artillery up.
A little later he encountered Allen, and they had a roadside conference. Fourteen German bombers came over, and when American antiaircraft gunners opened up against them,
quite a number of the fragments from the anti-aircraft hit along the road. One piece struck within, I should think, five to ten yards of General Gay and myself.
At the 2d Armored Division headquarters, “a German battery kept shelling us but was not very accurate”
After arranging for Allen and Gaffey to attack in the morning, Patton returned to Gela
without incident except that I think it is quite unusual for an Army Commander and his Chief of Staff to travel some six miles on a road parallel to the front of two armies and about equally distant between the two. It was quite a lonesome feeling, but not very dangerous. It is good for self-esteem.
While waiting on the beach near Gela for a boat to take him to the Monrovia, Patton
saw the most stupid thing I have ever seen soldiers doing. There were about three hundred 500-pound bombs and seven tons of 20-mm. high explosive shells piled on the sand, and these soldiers dug themselves foxholes in between the bombs and boxes of ammunition. I told them that if they wanted to save the Graves Registration burials, that was a fine thing to do, but otherwise, they better dig a foxhole somewhere else. About the time we got through explaining this to them, two bombers came over and straffed the beach, and all the soldiers jumped right back in the same holes they had dug. I continued to walk up and down and soon shamed them into getting up.
Patton and his party
got back to the Monrovia at 7:00 o’clock, completely wet. This is the first day in this campaign that I think I earned my pay. I am well satisfied with my command today. God certainly watched over me today.
He had reason to be satisfied. Middleton’s 45th Division had taken Comiso and its airfield. Allen’s 1st Division and Darby’s Rangers had tenaciously held Gela. Truscott’s 3d Division had a substantial beachhead around Licata. Most of Gaffey’s sd Armored Division was unloaded. All three landings had been linked into a solid front.
He would have been even more satisfied had he known that Guzzoni had sent the Hermann Goering Division eastward to help block the vital approaches to Messina. For from the moment that Guzzoni learned of the invasion, his overriding concern was to maintain an escape route for the Axis forces in Sicily – through Messina and across the straits to the mainland – should evacuation of the island become necessary.
Hitler was thinking otherwise. He decided to bolster his Italian allies. He instructed Albert Kesselring, his senior officer in Italy, to fly a parachute division from France to Sicily, to move a panzer grenadier division from the Italian toe to the island, and to send Hans Valentine Hube and his XIV Panzer Corps headquarters from southern Italy to direct the augmented German forces in Sicily.
• • •
In his cabin on the Monrovia late in the evening of July 11, Patton was writing in his diary:
Went to office at 2000 to see if we could stop the 8sd Airborne lift, as enemy air attacks were heavy [during the day] and inaccurate Army and Navy anti-air[craft gunners] were jumpy. Found we could not get contact by radio. Am terribly worried.
Early that morning, figuring that the Axis would make a serious attempt to dislodge his beachheads, Patton had ordered a regiment of airborne troops to be flown from Africa and dropped inside his front. This was the quickest way to reinforce his units, but it was also dangerous.
Matthew B. Ridgway, the 82d Airborne Division commander, had been working on this idea of Patton’s long before the invasion. He tried repeatedly to get assurance from the naval authorities that they would respect a cleared corridor for the air transports that would bring the paratroopers to Sicily. Naval commanders were reluctant to guarantee this access, for antiaircraft gunners had to respond quickly to planes appearing suddenly, particularly at low altitudes.
Several days before the landings, Ridgway finally gained the promise of cooperation but only if the air transports followed a designated route, with the last leg of that route over land. He then worked out a course with the air forces and gave the final information to Patton aboard the Monrovia in the Algiers harbor on July 6.
John Lucas arrived aboard the Monrovia at 0815 that morning, and he found Patton, Ridgway, and Joseph Swing in conference – the latter commanded the 11th Airborne Division in the United States and was visiting the theater of operations. Lucas joined them. He later recalled:
They were discussing a message which had just been received telling the route over which the paratroopers were to be brought in by the Air Corps . . . They were all disturbed as to the difficulty of getting this information to the troops who were already embarked [that is, to warn them that paratroopers would be arriving and that there was to be no antiaircraft fire against the planes transporting them]. I asked why important information such as this had been witheld until this late date, and General Patton stated that he had been trying to get it from the Air Corps and Alexander’s headquarters since July 3d, but without success.
Immediately after the meeting, Patton sent a message to all his major subordinate commanders – Bradley, Middleton, Allen, Gaffey, and Trus-cott. “You will warn your command,” he ordered, “to expect flights of friendly troops” on any of the first six nights of the invasion – for he had not decided which night he might need them. The C-47-type planes would approach the coast near Sampieri and follow a northwesterly course. “Flights will pass between 2230 and 2400 hours approximately. Length of flight approximately forty minutes. Flights will drop parachutists or release gliders. Advise respective naval commanders.”
To make sure this warning had been received and disseminated, Swing carried this message ashore at 9:30 on the morning of D-day. He visited all the major headquarters and requested all commanders to notify their troops, especially their antiaircraft units.
On the morning of July 11, having decided that the time had come to bring the airborne troops into the beachhead, Patton informed Ridgway that he wanted them to jump that night on the Farello airfield, which was in American hands. Immediately afterward, at 8:45 A.M., Patton sent a message to his major subordinates: “Notify all units, especially antiaircraft, that parachutists 82d Airborne Division will drop.”
The antiaircraft gunners had a busy day on July 11, for German and Italian air forces launched almost 500 sorties, most of them in the Seventh Army area. A heavy air attack struck beaches and ships at dawn. Another at 6:35 compelled ships to weigh anchor and take evasive action. Once again at 2 P.M., four planes strafed the Gela beaches. Half an hour later, four bombers appeared over Scoglitti. Around 3:30, thirty Junkers 88s attacked the Gela area. And at 9:50 P.M., a large number of German planes flew over Gela and forced the ships to disperse. The antiaircraft responses were heavy.
Hardly had the noise of the last raid died down when Allied transports carrying Reuben H. Tucker’s paratroopers – 2000 men – approached Sicily and crossed the coastline near Sampieri. The leading flight flew peacefully to the Farello airstrip, and at 10:40, the first stick jumped. The second flight was just across the shoreline when a single machine gun on the ground opened fire on the formation. Within minutes a chain reaction occurred, and it seemed that every Allied antiaircraft gun in the beachhead and offshore was hysterically blasting the slow-flying transport planes.
Squadrons broke apart and scattered. Six planes took direct hits as the parachutists were trying to get out of the door to jump. Altogether, of the 144 planes that had departed Tunisia, 23 never returned. Among the paratroopers, there were 82 dead, 131 wounded, and 16 missing. Ridgway, waiting at the airfield, was thunderstruck and helpless.
On the following morning, Patton sent his major subordinate commanders another message. He warned them that the paratroopers did not know the current countersigns and paroles. “Extreme caution must be used to identify before firing on personnel. Issue necessary orders at once to reach lowest units.”
A day later, on July 13, Patton received “wire from Ike, cussing me out” because of the tragedy during the night of the 11th. “He demanded an investigation and statement of punishments for those guilty of firing on them.”
It is my opinion that every possible precaution was taken by this headquarters to obviate firing on our own airborne troops and that the failure to do so was an unavoidable incident of combat . . .
As far as I can see, if anyone is blameable, it must be myself, but personally I feel immune to censure.
Perhaps Ike is looking for an excuse to relieve me. I am having a full report made but will not try anyone [by court martial]. If they want a goat, I am it. Fortunately, Lucas, Wedemeyer, and Swing are here and know the facts . . . Men who have been bombed all day get itchy fingers.
Ike has never been subjected to air attack or any other form of death. However, he is such a straw man that his future is secure. The British will never let him go.
An ensuing investigation was inconclusive in fixing the blame for the incident. Ridgway later summed it up best. He wrote: “The responsibility for loss of life and material resulting from this operation is so divided, so difficult to fix with impartial justice that disciplinary action is of doubtful wisdom.”
• • •
On July 12, Kesselring and Guzzoni, after discussing whether it might be well to evacuate the island at once, decided to fight for time, making sure to hold the vital northeastern corner. According to secret instructions from Hitler, Hube was to conduct operations with a view to saving as many Germans as possible.
Diary, July 12
General Ike . . . came in a light cruiser . . . The only Americans with him were Huebner and Butcher ...
When I took him to my room to show him the situation [on the map], he was not much interested but began to compare the sparsity of my reports with the almost hourly news bulletins of the Eighth Army. I have intercepts of many of them, and they are both non-essential and imaginary in the majority of cases. Furthermore, they are not fighting, and we are. I directed Gay to send in three reports in addition to the regular 1600 situation reports.
Ike also told me that I am too prompt in my replies and should hesitate more, the way he does, before replying. I think he means well, but it is most upsetting to get only piddling criticism when one knows one has done a good job. Ike is now wearing suede shoes a la British...
Left Monrovia with staff in LGT at 1700 [and went ashore].
The first thing Patton did was to see Ridgway and express his regrets over the airborne tragedy.
We have an advanced command post on a nose east of Gela and are sleeping in a huge double house in town, very gorgeous, in marble, etc., with bedbugs in the bed. I had the forethought to use my bedding roll. Stiller captured some champagne and that was all we had for supper excepting a can of cheese.
On that day, in the Eighth Army area, Dempsey’s XIII Corps moved into Augusta when the Germans withdrew to better defensive positions.
Recognizing that the Axis would make a determined stand in front of Catania to deny the coastal road to Messina, Montgomery conceived the idea of bringing Leese’s XXX Corps into the picture. If Leese could strike northward on an interior route and go around the western slopes of Mt. Etna, he would get behind the enemy troops blocking Catania. The best way for Leese to go was along Highway 124. But this road had been reserved for the Americans.
So Montgomery wrote a note and dispatched a messenger with instructions to hand it personally to Alexander. He said he now intended to advance to Messina by two routes. He suggested that the Americans be shifted westward to Gela to give him the interior road he needed. He recommended that the Seventh U.S. Army face westward and take defensive positions.
It was an arrogant message and would disturb the American camp.
Diary, July 13
I am not too pleased with progress of 1st Division . . . I ordered them to keep moving...
Bradley wanted to get Lt. Col. Darby to command the 180th Regimental Combat Team of the 45th Division with the rank of colonel. Darby preferred to stay with the Rangers. This is the first time I ever saw a man turn down a promotion. Darby is really a great soldier. I gave him the D.S.C. [for his action at Gela].
General Wedemeyer asked to be reduced to a colonel so he could get the 180th. I sent him up to command it as a brigadier general. I have no real authority to do this, but like to help a fighting man.
Then came the blow.
Went to lunch at 1250. General Alexander . . . and members of his staff arrived at 1310, so I had to quit eating and see them. They gave us the future plan of operations, which cuts us off from any possibility of taking Messina. It is noteworthy that Alexander, the Allied commander of a British and American Army, had no Americans with him. What fools we are.
Alexander had accepted Montgomery’s suggestion. The Eighth Army was now to head for Messina, the only real strategic objective in Sicily, over two routes – one directly up the coastal road through Catania by Dempsey’s XIII Corps; the other, by Leese’s XXX Corps, along an inland road that would take the troops around the other side of Mt. Etna. The Seventh Army was simply to protect Leese’s flank and rear in order to facilitate his advance to the northern shore of the island.
Patton was outraged, but he restrained his temper and practiced cunning.
I asked General Alexander permission to advance and take Agri-gento, which is beyond the line specified for the front of the Seventh Army. He stated that if this could be done through the use of limited forces, in the nature of a reconnaissance in force, he had no objection.
Rationalizing why he wanted Agrigento, 25 miles west of Licata, but concealing the germ of a more exciting idea, he added:
It is very essential to capture this port as, by so doing, we can obviate the necessity of using Siracusa as a base, thus saving a turn around of 140 miles [by trucks] over bad roads, and also obviating the necessity of using a port in conjunction with the Eighth Army [which could use all the supplies coming through Syracuse].
If we take Agrigento, we can supply [all the Seventh Army forces through ports] . . . This will permit abandonment of [unloading at] the beaches which are difficult and distant.
Having obtained Alexander’s permission to embark on a reconnaissance in force to Agrigento, Patton told Truscott to go ahead. He also instructed Bradley to hand over Highway 124 to the British, then to sideslip the 45th Division west behind the 1st Division and around the other side. He wanted Bradley to move into the interior, heading north.
Bradley was angry. He hated to lose the road. And shuffling the 45 th Division into a new zone was no easy task.
Lucas was upset. He believed that Patton should have expressed his views more vigorously and more firmly to Alexander. As the British liaison officer to the Seventh Army, Colonel Henriques, explained to Lucas, Alexander had no realization that what he stated as a wish was understood by Patton as an order “which it was a point of honor to obey.” A British subordinate disagreed with his superior when he thought that the latter was wrong.
Furthermore, the British failed to appreciate fully the speed with which American troops could operate. American vehicles, particularly the 2½- ton truck, were so much better than British transport that Americans could move more rapidly on roads and cross-country. British observers were constantly astonished how quickly Americans got artillery pieces into position to fire. The self-propelled mounts enabled Americans to start firing in minutes when, in the same conditions, the British would require hours.
Patton’s thoughts were elsewhere.
The tremendous effort [che Italians] put into the construction of bands of wire, pillboxes, etc. proved abortive due to the failure of the enemy to show courage in defending them. Had the Italians and the few Germans with them fought to the limit of their ability, it would have been most difficult to evict them. Mind over matter . . .
Our success . . . was due to our policy of continuous and violent attack . . . We are holding the initiative and must continue to do so.
The people of this country are certainly in a deplorable condition.While not actually starving, they are subsisting on a minimum of food . . . It would be desirable [for us] to increase this [ration] but owing to the difficulty of landing stores, no increase is at this moment possible.
On July 14, Patton worked on a plan to continue his operations westward, “as directed by General Alexander.” Alexander had approved taking Agrigento if it could be done without great effort, but Patton was looking beyond, as a matter of fact, all the way to Palermo. Denied a shot at Messina, he would at least have Palermo, a large city. Its capture would produce headlines shouting the praises of the valor and efficiency of the American soldiers.
To that end, he was already thinking of forming a provisional corps under Keyes. With the 3d Division, the 83d Airborne Division, and a regiment of the 9th Division “which is due to arrive tomorrow,” Keyes could go all the way. Thus, Patton, like Montgomery, would have two corps operating on two routes – Bradley moving toward the northern shore of Sicily, Keyes moving toward Palermo. For the moment, he believed he had to keep the sd Armored Division near Licata in reserve.
Driving to Licata, he congratulated Truscott “most warmly” and talked over with him the possibility of taking Agrigento “by bluff . . . I believe this operation can be successfully carried out with practically no loss and with great advantage to our supply system.” Furthermore, “eventually this place must be taken and if it can be done now, it will be cheaper than waiting.”
Beyond Agrigento:
It is my opinion that when the present line of the combined armies is secured, which will probably be around the 19th, it will be feasible to advance rapidly with the 3d Division and 2d Armored Division and take Palermo. I will bring this question up to General Alexander when the time is ripe.
The Germans, he felt, were “not fighting as well as in Tunisia.” He offered no explanation, but he must have suspected that their main motive was hardly victory but rather an attempt to preserve their escape routes.
Diary, July 14
The Tabor of Goums [a French unit with North African soldiers] . . . landed at Licata this afternoon. As we passed them on the road, I told them in French that I was glad to see them with us. The commanding officer . . . saluted smartly and said, “Nous vous devons beaucoup, mon General, d’etre ici pour le Quatorze Juillet” [We owe you much, General, to be here on the 14th of July – Bastille Day].
The Navy shelled Agrigento and Porto Empedocle to help Truscott’s attack, but his request for bombers was refused because the air authorities had no word from Alexander that the front was to be extended beyond Licata.
Bradley, “a most loyal man,” arrived and reported in great excitement that a captain had apparently taken Patton’s instructions to kill too literally. He had shot between 50 and 70 prisoners
in cold blood and also in ranks – an even greater error. I told Bradley that it was probably an exaggeration, but in any case to tell the officer to certify that the dead men were snipers or had attempted to escape or something, as it would make a stink in the press and also would make the civilians mad. Anyhow, they are dead, so nothing can be done about it.
Wedemeyer returned from the 45th Division, where he had commanded an infantry regiment for several days.
I bet [Vice Air Marshal] Wigglesworth a bottle of whiskey against a bottle of gin that we would take Palermo by midnight on the 23d. He was very skeptical, but I believe without logical reason, that we can do so because I am sure that the enemy, German or Italian, cannot resist our continuous attacks. One Italian prisoner, an officer, is alleged to have said in a captured letter that the Americans were strange people; they attacked all day, marched all night, and fired all the time.
On July 16, he wrote his first letter to Beatrice since the invasion.
Darling B. As you will have seen by the papers, we did it again and are attacking right now . . . and having quite a war. We have captured more thousands of prisoners than [son] George was old [fourteen] when we sailed back from Honolulu. Also a hell of a lot of guns, air planes, rifles, and destroyed a lot of tanks . . .
The enemy has been booby trapping his dead, which has made our men very mad, with the result that there are more enemy dead than usual.
Yesterday I drove over one of our local battle fields and smelled dead men for some ten miles. It is a very strong disgusting odor.
Our losses have been relatively small, but we have lost some good men.
The town I am in is probably known to you as the Germans have broadcast that they recaptured it. They damned near did, but we beat hell out of them. I was right in the middle of it and had a swell time. Some came pretty close, but I earned my pay and probably saved the situation.
Monty is trying to steal the show and with the assistance of Devine Destiny [Eisenhower] may do so but to date we have captured three times as many men as our cousins.
Of all the countries I have ever been in, this is the most utterly damned. Dust, filth, bugs, and natives.
I have a realy fine house but the toilets dont work, and it is full of bed bugs, lice, and roaches. The people are just on the verge of starving and look utterly hopeless, but dont like us and there is a lot of sniping which is bad for us but worse for the snipers.
My CP is on the site of a pagan temple. There is only one pillar left, and that fluted. I would class it as Egyptian as its capital is like a lotus pod. No one here knows any thing about it except that Pliny wrote of it.
Lucas left for Algiers. He carried with him a map showing the daily progress of the Seventh Army.
I also requested him to see that we are not pinned down to the tail of the Eighth Army but be permitted to move west and take Palermo.
Truscott had just taken Agrigento and its satellite Porto Empedocle with little difficulty.
Diary, July 17
General Alexander . . . directs that the Seventh Army protect the rear of the Eighth Army, thus putting the Americans in a secondary role, which is a continuation of such roles for the whole campaign and may find the war ending with us being overlooked. I am flying to Tunis to see General Alexander.
I am sure that neither he nor any of his British staff has any conception of the power or mobility of the Seventh Army, nor are they aware of the political implications latent in such a course of action.
I shall explain the situation to General Alexander on the basis that it would be inexpedient politically for the Seventh Army not to have equal glory in the final stage of the campaign. Arranged a map showing our proposed operation and attached a copy of the order we believe should be written ...
General Wedemeyer and I left . . . at 1210, arrived at Tunis at 1309, and saw General Alexander. He explained that he had planned to do just what I asked but that his chief of staff had failed to tell me when issuing the order. [Patton found this a “pretty weak” excuse.]
He gave me permission to carry out my plan if I would assure him that the road net near Caltanissetta would be held . . . If I do what I am going to do, there is no need of holding anything, but “it’s a mean man who won’t promise,” so I did.
The presence of Wedemeyer at Patton’s meeting with Alexander gave added weight to Patton’s argument. Wedemeyer had been visiting Sicily as Marshall’s representative, and he was returning to Washington and his duties as an important member of Marshall’s staff. Should he intimate that Alexander was directing the Allied ground forces in a nationalistic spirit that favored the British at the expense of the Americans, Marshall was sure to raise the issue with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Huebner, Alexander’s deputy chief of staff, whose role was in effect to make an American point of view available at Alexander’s headquarters, was also present at what must have seemed like a showdown, although everyone was extremely polite. Alexander could not help being embarrassed, and the Americans would soon shift Huebner to another assignment.
Patton gave Wedemeyer two letters to take to Washington, one for Marshall, the other for Handy.
To Marshall, Patton was positive. Everything was going well. The troops were splendid, the Air and Navy fine. If the Navy had a better fuze that would allow shells to burst closer to ground surface, naval gunfire support, he thought, would improve. “The vigor and speed of our attack,” he said, “was ruthlessly pressed forward” His “box score” of prisoners taken and enemy material destroyed, which he attached to his letter, was, he believed, “quite satisfactory.” Lucas and Wedemeyer had been tireless and indifferent to danger, and their suggestions had been of great value.
To Handy, he was somewhat more candid. He mentioned the defects, as he saw them, of the system for getting close air support. The fighting quality of the Germans was less impressive than in Tunisia, but “we must remember that the fighting quality of our own troops has increased so that the differential may be more apparent than real . . . Our equipment is superb,” but Americans had a tendency to want too much. Finally, he thought there was “an exaggerated idea” of the proportion of SOS troops needed to support the combat troops.
Elated by his success with Alexander, he dictated, for his own amusement, a paper that he called a “Summary of Events.” It was really a list of his impressions. Some of them were:
The Italians and Germans spent tremendous effort in time, labor, and money, building defensive positions. I am sure that just as in the case of the walls of Troy and the Roman walls across Europe, the fact that they trusted to defensive positions reduced their power to fight. Had they spent one-third as much effort fighting as they did in building, we never could have taken the positions . . .
The Italian troops . . . have fought very desperately. The German troops . . . have shown gallantry but bad judgment . . .
The naval gunfire support, that is, naval fire put on the beaches from vessels at sea, has been outstanding. We have even called for this support at night and gotten it on the target on the third salvo.
The people of this country are the most destitute and God-forgotten people I have ever seen ...
During the first two or three days . . . the inhabitants were, to say the least, not friendly, but . . . they have become quite Americanized and spend their time asking for cigarettes.
In the United States, Beatrice Patton was helping to enhance her husband’s reputation and legend. Interviewed for a radio broadcast, she said:
He has always felt that wars are won, not by the best tanks or the fastest airplanes, or the most powerful guns, but by the fightingest men. When he jumped from his landing barge into the sea to lead the attack at Gela, he knew they would not let him down. As he said in his order before Morocco: “We shall attack and attack and attack until we are exhausted, and then we shall attack again. A pint of sweat will save a gallon of blood” ...
Invariably he writes of visiting the wounded in field hospitals. He knows what it is to be wounded, for during the last war he was grievously wounded himself, and almost left for dead. During the Tunisian campaign, he visited the hospital clearing station every day, and in his letters he never ceases to marvel at the modern treatment of the wounded. “The blood plasma saves more lives than you could ever believe,” he writes, “and failing the supply of plasma, the soldiers and the nurses give their own” ...
He’s always known that some day his country would need him and that he must be ready. He’s not only a great student of tactics and history, but he brings the past right into the present and applies it to the situation in hand. When he was in Africa, he used to write me about Hannibal...
He believes that God will help him . . . He believes in himself, and he believes in his soldiers. In his battle order before Sicily, he says, “Remember that, as attackers, we have the initiative. We must retain this tremendous advantage by attacking rapidly, viciously, ruthlessly, without rest, however tired, and punching. God is with us. We shall win.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, July 18, 1943
Our battle is still going on and, as you can see from the score sheet, we have a swell bag...
I flew over to Carthage to see Alex yesterday as I did not like something. It was all settled in a nice way and we can keep on attacking. If we should halt, we would loose momentum . . .
I have the diahera and feel poorly, but it only lasts two days.
We will finish this show sooner than any one thinks. After that I don’t know, but it would seem that they will have to keep on using me. Vet[e]ran, what?