“I have to keep working on my belief in destiny, and poor old destiny may have to put in some extra time to get me out of my present slump.”
PATTON AND HIS SEVENTH ARMY headquarters would remain in Sicily and inactive for more than four months. To a large extent this stemmed from the presence in the Mediterranean theater of three American lieutenant generals, Clark, Patton, and Bradley, in that order of seniority.
The only immediate task was reserved to Clark, who, while Patton and Bradley were busy in Sicily, prepared his Fifth Army’s invasion of the Italian mainland. Bradley was named his understudy and would take his place if Clark became a casualty. Bradley was also being considered for advancement to command an Army in the United Kingdom for Overlord, the cross-Channel attack scheduled for the spring of 1944. Expecting Bradley soon to go to England, Eisenhower asked Patton to fly to North Africa and become familiar with Clark’s plans, particularly the landing operation near Salerno code-named Avalanche.
“I seem to be third choice,” Patton noted morosely; then with a flash of spirit, “but I will end up on top.”
Diary, August 31
To Mostaganem . . . Went to meeting for discussion of final plans for Avalanche . . . Spent night with Clark in my former villa. He left for his office after supper, so I had no chance to talk to him.
Diary, September 1
Went to Gruenther’s office and talked to him for perhaps forty-five minutes on my experiences at Husky. He was interested in administrative matters, but not at all in tactics. However, he did ask me what I thought of the plan for Avalanche. I was very tactful, but could not help calling his attention to the fact that the plan uses the Sele River as a boundary between the British X Corps and the U.S. VI Corps, with no one actually on, or near, the river. I told him that just as sure as God lives, the Germans will attack down that river.
He said their plans provided for ample artillery to be ashore by 0630 on D Day to stop any German counterattack.
Of course plans never work [as expected], especially in a landing. I suggested this, but it did not register.
I can’t see why people are so foolish. I have yet to be questioned by any planner concerning my experience at Torch, yet Torch was the biggest and most difficult landing operation attempted so far.
Patton’s judgment of the Avalanche plan was incredibly perceptive. He pinpointed exactly what would happen. Neither corps making the invasion near Salerno would take hold of the Sele River, and a German counterattack down the Sele valley would threaten to reach the sea, come close to splitting the British and Americans, and prompt serious thoughts of evacuating the beachhead.
Drove to Oran to have a look at my old training area. I was impressed with the discipline of the 34th and 36th Divisions and also of the SOS troops. However, I was shocked at the number of non-employed SOS troops walking around town. There are enough men in the SOS at Oran to provide the infantry with two divisions or to provide ample replacements for all the troops in the Seventh Army, and many of these men were initially trained as infantry.
He put his finger on a chronic problem that would hamper the army throughout the war – the lack of sufficient infantry replacements for the wounded, injured, and sick.
Letter, Arvin H. Brown to G$P, Jr., September 2, 1943
Last Sunday I attended the services in which the memorial plaque which you gave in honor of, and to the memory of, Dick Jenson was dedicated . . . . Throughout the whole service there stood out in sharp relief in my mind the two leading characters in this beautiful drama of life – the gallant young officer who has gone on before us, and his heroic general who never forgets.
Diary, September 2
Flew to Algiers . . . Ike sent for me . . . and lectured me . . . I realize that I acted precipitately [in the slapping incident] and accepted his remarks in the spirit intended. I feel that he likes me. Of course he should.
He told me that the Seventh Army would be dispersed, that Brad was to go to England to form a new Army and plan [the cross-Channel attack].
I told him I was a pretty good planner, but he said I did not like to do it – in that, it seems I am like him, or so he said (compliment?).
News of Bradley’s departure seemed to have little effect on Patton. Perhaps he was dissimulating his disappointment. Perhaps he failed to understand the meaning of Bradley’s transfer. Perhaps he felt that Eisenhower was simply alerting him to a possibility that had yet to materialize. Perhaps he hoped that Bradley’s advancement to command an Army signified a similar advancement for him – to command a group of Armies. He was, after all, the only experienced American Army commander in the European theater, and he had more combat as the top American field commander than anyone.
Whatever his true reaction, he was uneasy, worried over his future, probably concerned over the extent to which the slapping incident had hurt him. He was senior to Bradley, and he felt that he should have been chosen for the job in England.
Flew back to Palermo . . . A day or two in Algiers almost kills me. No one there seems to be interested in the war, and one cannot escape the feeling that the so-called Allied Headquarters is a British headquarters commanded by an American . . . Only Hughes, Lucas, and [T. J.] Davis made any complimentary remarks concerning the activities of the Seventh Army in Sicily. It was so apparent that it is probably intentional, the most charitable assumption being that since the Seventh Army made the Eighth Army look like thirty cents, it is felt inadvisable, from an inter-Allied standpoint, to give any credit to the Seventh Army . . .
In the clippings from the U.S. . . . the fall of Messina received scant notice.
Diary, September 3
Recovered from Algiers.
Diary, September 4
Recovered some more.
Montgomery’s Eighth Army crossed the straits of Messina on September 3 and, against very slight opposition, landed in the toe of Italy. This was the first Allied invasion of the European continent.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, September 4, 1943
This, [operation] is the first battle since I left home that I have had to listen to on the radio, and it is quite trying. Of course Monty has a habit – a good one – of never letting out any news till it is big news. So thus far we only know that the landing was O.K. Some of our guns . . . supported it ...
It always takes me about three days to get over a trip to Alger. One should wear chain mail to avoid the knife thrusts. It would be amusing if it were not serious.
Of course, one can never tell, for strange things happen, but I rather believe I will be out of circulation along with the ever victorious Seventh for a while. Omar is going to see Jake [Devers in London, where Devers commanded ETOUSA], and John Lucas gets his [Bradley’s] outfit. I was told that I was too impetuous to do what Omar has to do. Apparently I am a man of deeds not words. Except when I talk too much . . .
Well, luck and fate have been with me thus far, so I don’t worry.
I wish I could be less criptic, but if I ever return, I will keep you awake a lot talking over my experiences. Don’t worry. I love you.
He was beginning to see Bradley’s eventual role, to sense that Bradley was outstripping him, and to feel slighted.
Even then, two cables were on the way to him. They would reveal starkly that Clark and Bradley had the choice assignments and that Pat-ton would remain unemployed.
The first said that the “Seventh Army will not continue as an Army.” The’2d Armored, 1st, and 9th Divisions were earmarked for return to the United Kingdom. The 8^d Airborne and 45th Divisions were about to go to Italy under the Fifth Army. The 3d Division would probably move to Italy too. No combat troops would stay under Patton.
The second, paraphrasing a message from Marshall, confirmed Bradley’s appointment to command the First Army in England for the Normandy invasion and indicated Patton’s probable – though still uncertain – role in that operation: “The prestige of Seventh Army would prove to great advantage in that follow up.”
Patton did not want the follow-up role. He wanted to lead the invasion.
Diary, September 6
Got two radios this morning ...
The second one ruined me ...
It is very heartbreaking. The only time I have felt worse was the night of December 9th, 1942, when Clark got the Fifth Army . . . I feel like death but will survive – I always have.
I called in all the heads of the staff sections and had the two telegrams read.
I said, “Gentlemen, what you have heard is secret and will not be discussed nor mentioned to your assistants. I believe in destiny and that nothing can destroy the future of the Seventh Army. However, some of you may not believe in destiny, so if you can find a better job, get it and I will help you all I can. You may be backing the wrong horse or hitched your wagon to the wrong stars. In any event, we must go right on like we knew nothing, so that the enemy will fear the potential threat of the Seventh Army.”
I feel that none of them will leave me.
No one did.
Ike sent two inspectors over to question soldiers about my alleged brutality to them. He said he did it in my behalf, to counteract untrue stories. I think this may be true but fear that it is to protect Ike.
And yet I believe in my star.
Patton had figured that the Seventh Army would go to England to prepare for Overlord. He and his staff were experienced in amphibious operations and in combat. They had planned and executed two successful landings in Morocco and Sicily. They were the obvious choice for the amphibious assault in Normandy, the climactic operation in Europe. That Clark’s Fifth Army had been selected for the invasion of Italy, which was bound to develop into a subsidiary operation, and that Bradley had functioned in a relatively minor capacity in Tunisia and Sicily gave credence to this logic. Certainly no American had Patton’s battle prestige, his record of proved success, his reputation for winning.
It seemed odd to him that Marshall and Eisenhower ignored all this. Why did they bypass him, choose others for no good reason that he could understand? Were they trying to keep him from becoming too great a hero?
What he could not know was that the image he consistently tried to project was sometimes terrifying to those above him who were responsible for expending American lives and winning the war. Eisenhower had mentioned to Marshall “those unfortunate personal traits of which you and I have always known,” the tendency at times “to display exceedingly poor judgment and unjustified temper.” These were the occasional flashes of instability, hardly perceptible except to those who knew him well. He had alternative periods of moodiness, almost depression, and high elation, almost hysteria. He appeared sometimes to be petulant, even childish.
All this prompted his superiors to question his capacity for self-control. That tiny doubt led to reconsideration of his fitness for higher command.
Yet it was impossible to overlook his driving power over his subordinates, his military genius, his intuitive knowledge of what the enemy was about to do, his awesome proficiency in handling combat units, his outstanding battle leadership, his ability and willingess to take risks. And that too provoked questions of his balance and judgment. For he was capable of being impetuous, so it seemed, and perhaps too ready to gamble.
The slapping incident appeared to confirm the impression. Patton was mercurial, impulsive – and so, ultimately, undependable. And perhaps he had talked too much about the British cousins.
The cross-Channel invasion was much too important to be staked on a single roll of the dice, or to be jeopardized by the slightest tinge of interallied antagonism. In a venture that required the closest Allied partnership to attain the final victory in Europe, Bradley seemed better.
Bradley was balanced, sound in judgment, and experienced. He had grown in stature. He was less apt to make mistakes. That was why he was selected for a position that was bound to increase in responsibility and authority. Marshall had already asked him to develop an Army Group headquarters “to keep pace with the British planning and requisitions.”
Yet whatever faults Patton embodied, he was too valuable to discard. His prestige, reputation, proficiency, and genius would be utilized —but at a level no higher than the command of a field Army.
Unknown to Patton, Marshall informed Eisenhower that he was working on a list of recommendations for permanent – Regular Army – promotions, which governed retirement rank, and he wanted Eisenhower’s advice. On Marshall’s list was Patton.
Letter, Eisenhower to Marshall, September 6, 1943
With respect to Patton, I do not see how you could possibly submit a list . . . on combat performance to date and omit his name. His job of rehabilitating the II Corps in Tunisia was quickly and magnificently done. Beyond this, his leadership of the Seventh Army was close to the best of our classic examples. It is possible that in the future some ill-advised action of his might cause you to regret his promotion. You know his weaknesses as well as his strength, but I am confident that I have eliminated some of the former. His intense loyalty to you and to me makes it possible for me to treat him much more roughly than I could any other senior commander . . . In the last campaign he, under stress it is true, indulged his temper in certain instances toward individual subordinates who, in General Pat-ton’s opinion of the moment, were guilty of malingering. I took immediate and drastic measures, and I am quite certain this sort of thing will never happen again. You have in him a truly aggressive commander and, moreover, one with sufficient brains to do his work in splendid fashion . . . Incidentally, I think he will show up even better in an exclusively American theater than in an allied one . . .
Bradley . . . is, in my opinion, the best rounded combat leader I have yet met in our service. While he possibly lacks some of the extraordinary and ruthless driving power that Patton can exert at critical moments . . . he is among our best.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, September 7, 1943
Your saying that I learned how to make our men fight is amusing as now it is held against me, that I made the Seventh Army too bloody minded – you cant please every one ...
I know why we [the Seventh Army] were soft pedaled [in the press]. It was in consonance with the oriental custom of face saving and possibly necessary. I hear that in London we stole the show.
Bradley, who would travel to the United States before going to England, came to tell Patton goodbye.
Diary, September 7
We had quite a long talk and I told him a lot of my best ideas to tell General Marshall. I suppose I should have kept them to gain reputation by springing them myself, but I am not built that way. The sooner they are put into effect, the better for our army.
Bradley has a chance to help or hurt me with General Marshall. I hope he chooses the former course, but I did not ask him to.
My resilient nature worked all right and today I am almost back to normal. But I have to keep working on my belief in destiny, and poor old destiny may have to put in some extra time to get me out of my present slump.
Diary, September 8
[Italian] Armistice just declared . . . I fear that as a soldier I have too little faith in political war. Suppose the Italians can’t or don’t capitulate? . . It [is] a great mistake to inform the troops, as has been done, of the signing of an armistice. Should they get resistance instead of friendship [during the amphibious landings at Salerno], it would have a very bad effect.
He was right again. The Italian surrender was announced on the evening of September 8, as Clark’s invasion convoys were approaching their anchorages in Salerno Bay. The news was broadcast over ships’ speakers, and there was an immediate letdown, even though officers tried to tell the men that Germans rather than Italians were likely to meet them on the beaches at dawn.
While Clark’s Fifth Army stormed ashore, Patton worked all day on his report of operations in Sicily. He found it “a very tedious business” – perhaps because he was thinking of Clark’s landings – “but necessary and, I hope, useful.” He noted that he could “now chin myself five and a half times and [I] do it three times a day.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, September 10, 1943
I woke up this morning happy as a lark and started to write you a story about some imaginary ghosts I have met in the palace but at 8:30 I got a letter according to which I have done those things I ought not to have done and left undone those things I ought to have done and am a sun of a gun. So my joie de vivre left and there is no ghost story ...
My only hope is that Waynes war may take me out of the lime light. Else I will soon be helping you cut branches off trees [at home]...
I guess you are the only one who loves me – I reciprocate.
The letter he referred to questioned his possible misuse of prisoners of war.
“Sometimes,” Patton wrote in his diary,
I almost believe that there is a deliberate campaign to hurt me; certainly it is hard to be victimized for winning a campaign. Hap [Gay] thinks the [British] cousins are back of it because I made a fool of Monty.
Patton flew to Bizerte and accompanied Alexander to see the surrendered Italian battle fleet sail by on their way to Malta.
A great many jokes among the British officers to the effect that the ships passing us were ghost ships, since the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy had definitely sunk them all on various occasions.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Arvin H. Brown, September 12, 1943
I believe that a man can only do his best, and that if the Supreme Being wishes him to go far, his best will be useful. If He does not wish him, his best will be useless. In any case, the best must be done. For example, no planning on the part of Napoleon or Hitler could have gotten them where they are except for fortuitous circumstances, probably injected by said Supreme Being, but the fact that two such miscreants did get as far as they got shows that we should take what we get and be thankful and not try to overdirect our affairs.
At the moment I am about completely recovered from the let-down which I have always experienced after a fight or at the end of a football or polo season. It is undoubtedly true in my experience that the pressure of high responsibility developes in one latent powers of which one had never dreamt, and that at the cessation of the extreme emergency, the neutralization of these powers produces a sort of lethargy.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Mrs. M. B. Horan, September 12, 1943
So far as exercise is concerned, it is a most difficult thing to obtain. I do go swimming two or three times a week in the most lovely water that I have ever seen and on a beach that has Wakiki absolutely pushed off the map. Before taking my swim, I run about half a mile and find it quite tiresome as the sand is very soft.
I have also rented from an Italian nobleman a starboat in which I sometimes get a chance to go sailing, particularly on Sundays. I also have a horizontal bar in my room on which I chin myself before each meal.
During battle there is no incentive to eat. We all feel it . . . so we all lose weight. After battle there isn’t much else to do so we all eat too much, but up to the moment I have not lost my girlish figure.
The fighting in the Salerno beachhead was touch and go.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, September 13, 1943
Waynes picture came out too soon, poor chap. He is having quite a show at this moment. I may get in yet as a relief, who knows.
Diary, September 13
General Dillon, Provost Marshal of AFHQ, came to tell me all my sins against the Geneva Convention. I was very nice to him . . . I suggested that he talk to the Archbishop on the treatment, said to be inhuman, of the Italian prisoners . . . Dillon talked with him and apparently the Archbishop did his stuff. He told Dillon that I had been like a father to the Italian prisoners, so that probably cleans up the allegations about my unnecessary roughness. Well, that hurdle is past.
Diary, September 14
Things are going worse with the Fifth Army. Last night they flew in a regimental combat team of the 82d Airborne to help out. It is noteworthy that when I asked similar assistance last month, I was told that the 8sd was too valuable to be wasted as infantry. Fortunately, we won the fight without them.
Our 3d Division starts to go over to Italy tomorrow. I trust they do not arrive too late. I guess Clark needs them badly as he is on the defensive.
Truscott went over this afternoon in a torpedo boat [to prepare for the arrival of his division] . . . He told me that Ike said to him that I am the only General who can inspire men to conquer. That was very nice of Ike, but I wish he would give me a chance to do some more conquering.
Why did I not go to Italy? But perhaps my luck is still holding – I feel sure it is.
If Clark failed in Italy as Fredendall had failed in Tunisia, would Pat-ton be called upon to rescue American prestige and gain victory?
Clark instructed his staff to prepare a plan for evacuating the VI Corps and landing it on the X Corps beaches, or the reverse.
Diary, September 15
Had dinner with . . . Alexander and Lemnitzer last night, on their way to investigating the situation in Italy . . . They were seriously talking about the possibility of having to withdraw. The Germans attacked . . . down the Sele River just as I told Gruenther they would, and they have apparently cut the X Corps and the VI Corps in two. The only comfort I got out of it is the fact that my military judgment was proved correct. I hope they can stop them –a withdrawal would hurt our prestige and surely prolong the war . . .
Just saw a dispatch from Navy in which it seems that Clark has re-embarked. I consider this a fatal thing to do. Think of the effect on the troops – a commander, once ashore, must conquer or die.
Diary, September 16
Truscott got back last night and says that situation is o.k. He feels that the British and Americans fought badly, that Clark split up units like a map problem, but that actually the Germans had very few troops and were just bluffing.
This was a perceptive remark. Although the Germans would have liked to gain a great victory and throw the Allies into the sea, they were fighting primarily to insure the withdrawal of their troops below Salerno, those opposing Montgomery. The Germans would soon start retiring slowly up the boot of Italy.
Diary, September 17
Ike came in by plane . . . on his way to visit Fifth Army. Clark wants to relieve Dawley from the VI Corps but needs Ike to hold his hand. I urged Ike to let Keyes have Dawley’s place, or if Lucas got that, to let Keyes have II Corps. I told Ike I was willing to fight a corps under Clark. I would serve under the Devil to get a fight. He said Clark and I were not soul mates so he could not do it. When I first heard that Ike was coming, I thought it might be to relieve Clark, but no such luck.
I am to go to England and get an Army, probably under that victorious soldier, Jake Devers [who had never been in combat]. Destiny had better get busy.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, September 17, 1943
Geoff may get a. corps. If he does, I will loose him but as I have lost every thing else – at least for the moment – I can let him go ...
Things are going fine with Fifth Army. Lucien and Troy are both over there. So the Seventh is a nebulous hypothesis, although for a while I thought I would have a chance to get my fingers singed on the chestnuts. All I can think [to console himself] is that I have been apparently out three times now and have so far bobed up ...
I have met some nice French people so have a chance to practice my French.
Diary, September 18
Orders came through for Lucas to report to Fifth Army, I think in replacement for Dawley . . . and for Keyes to command the II Corps. I was delighted.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, September 19, 1943
Yesterday I felt like the Ancient Mariner: “Alone, alone, all all alone” as both Lucas and Geoff were going ...
I am approaching an irreducable minimum but it has happened before and I have survived.
Eisenhower was writing Marshall to give him some ideas on the cross-Channel attack, which Eisenhower believed that Marshall would command. Understanding that Marshall would have two American Armies, Eisenhower felt that Patton could very well have one of them. Many generals, he said, usually thought of battle in terms of concentration, supply, maintenance, and replacement first – and only afterward of attack. This conservative type of leader was necessary because he prevented disaster.
But occasionally, under particular conditions, boldness was an overriding need. That was Patton’s strength. He “thinks only in terms of attack as long as there is a single battalion that can keep advancing.” Moreover, he had a “native shrewdness” that enabled him to keep his men supplied with sufficient ammunition and food, no matter what. Eisenhower doubted that he would ever consider Patton for command of an Army Group, but as an Army commander – under a sound and solid superior who could use his “good qualities” without being blinded by his love of “showmanship and histrionics” – Patton could do “as fine a job as he did in Sicily.”
Letter, Arvin H. Brown to GSP, Jr., September 21, 1943
I suppose you know where you are, and perhaps some favored few likewise are aware of your whereabouts, but the multitude are wondering with forced calm where and when you will put in your next appearance. When you disappear, you disappear in a sort of personal blackout. It resembles black magic and recalls the fairy tales of our youth when the prince possessed the power to render himself invisible. In your case, the important thing is that you will reappear at a place and at a time that will be most inopportune for the Axis gang.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, September 21, 1943
How does the press for the ever valorous Fifth compare with that for the Seventh? The few intercepts we pick up here are very cleverly worded, but it is hard for me to judge ecuably . . .
I have met two groups of French people who got stranded here in 1940. Campy [Colonel Nicholas Campanole, who had been in Mexico with Patton, who was a linguist, and who headed the Civil Affairs staff section] and I have had two meals with them and I find that during my two months lay off from French, my language has improved. Of course these people are more at home with Italians, so speak French slowly, like the Greeks at Saumur.
Diary, September 21
I realize I did my duty [in Sicily] in a very tactless way, but so long as my method pleased the God of Battles, I am content.
Lucas relieved Dawley in command of the VI Corps just as the battle for Naples started. It was, he said, Sicily over again. Same rough, rugged terrain, same mountain roads, more cover, same demolitions, but fewer mines. My experience in Sicily and especially what I learned from sitting at your feet has been worth a million dollars to me.
Diary, September 22
General Dawley came in this morning on his way home. He was most manly and restrained, I gather that there was constant interference [with him] and vacillation on the part of Clark, and near duplicity on the part of Gruenther. I also think that Dawley lacked drive and that McCreery of the X British Corps complained that Dawley did not keep him informed. I forgot to ask if he kept Dawley informed – I doubt it.
Took a trip . . . over the railroad . . . extremely interesting, and unnecessary precautions were taken for my safety in that we were preceded and followed by pilot trains and when we stopped for lunch, sentinels mysteriously evolved from out of the bushes. However, it is very pleasing to see that your own men think so much of you – the rest can go to hell.
Diary, September 23
Finally finished my notes on the Sicilian operation . . .
Went to tea with some upper middle class Italians. Women very fat.
His notes turned out to be 22 pages of single-spaced typing, arranged in four parts – amphibious operations, combat, tactical and technical observations, and notes on corps and Army. Most of the material he had already recorded in letters to McNair, Handy, and others – practical suggestions, always concrete and to the point, on functions, procedures, and equipment. Some typical comments:
The greatest importance must be placed on enthusiastic elan and self-confidence on the part of the troops making the initial assault. Battle is a violent and elemental occupation. Men to conquer in battle, particularly in a night landing, must be imbued with this elemental viciousness. A landing operation which does not continue its attack is bound to fail.
In any landing operation confusion is bound to occur. This is due to the fact that in spite of the best intentions, landing craft do not land where they are supposed to and stores get ashore regardless of categories. The main thing is to get the men and the stores ashore. If they are there, they can be used. If we waste time trying to get them ashore in some preconceived order, they will not be available.
The final note read: “The American soldier . . . is a peerless fighting man.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, September 24, 1943
I just repine and sweat, but things will change all at once. They better.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Kenyon Joyce, September 26, 1943
At the moment I have not the faintest idea when, if ever, I shall be employed, but I hope for the best.
Diary, September 26
Campy, Codman, and I went to supper with some Italian people at a little villa by the sea. It was very pretty, and we danced to a cracked victrola and ate many horrible things. At least we killed off another day of uncertainty. I am getting awfully fed up.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Frederick Ayer, September 26, 1943
Ever since I got to Sicily I have been going to Catholic Churches, largely for political reasons but also as a means of worshiping God because I think he is quite impartial as to the form in which he is approached...
I had all the non-Catholic chaplains in the other day and gave them hell for having uninteresting services . . . I told them that I was going to relieve any preacher who talked more than ten minutes on any subject. I will probably get slapped down by the Church union...
This afternoon I am going out on a picnic with an Italian banker and his family. Certainly the horrors of war have not affected the family, because the two daughters are very pretty and the mother must way at least 300 pounds. The daughters should never appear in public with her because you can see even now traces of the ability to put on the same amount of weight.
Every once in a while I become completely amused at the amount of formality accorded me, particularly when I think that within a reasonable time I will be riding a solitary bicycle from Green Meadows to Hamilton. Now when I go abroad, the sirens of motorcycles scream, armored cars pursue me, and to cap the climax, the other day I went on a private train on a private railway with a pilot train ahead of me to-see that the rails were not mined, and a second pilot behind me to see that some malign influence did not jam into my sacred rear ...
It was very amusing and I know that it accounts for the stuffiness of many generals. As long as I can see the funny side of it, perhaps I am safe.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to McNair, September 27, 1943
So far as the future of the Seventh Army is concerned, I am completely in the dark but trust that I shall have another chance to fight somebody somewhere.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Stimson, September 2jA 1943
As far as we can learn here, the Fifth Army seems to be doing a splendid job. My only regret is that I cannot be twins and be with them too.
Diary, September 28
Mixed armies [with British and American corps] will not work – I think they are a British scheme to gain command. All their Army commanders are four-star [generals] so they will always [out]rank us.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, September 29,
Send [me] clippings on Wayne. He is doing his damdest to get a press, and I am wondering what luck he is having .. .
Things are just as dull for me as they were in Rabat last March so something may turn up. I wish I could be sent some where where I had no relations [British cousins] to bother with. I am sure that it would be better for all concerned ...
I am certainly fed up with idleness.
Diary, September 29
Ike has recommended me to command an Army in UK. I knew that and can’t see how he could have done otherwise. I have been very successful three times. Clark is having his first trial and to date has gone very slowly ...
Butcher says that the British are deliberately trying to build Monty as the hero of the war. That is why they are not too fond of me. One British general said to Lemnitzer, “George is such a pushing fellow that if we don’t stop him, he will have Monty surrounded” I know I can outfight the little fart any time.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Albert W. Kenner, September 30, 1943
I sometimes think that it is disadvantageous to do too well, and my present lack of occupation may be traceable to this cause. On the other hand, I have been extremely lucky. This is the fourth time when I seem to have worked myself out of a job and in every case, without any activity on my part, I got a better one.
Clark took Naples on October 1, and Patton wrote him:
My dear Wayne: . . cannot refrain any longer from writing to tell you how proud we all are of the way you and your Army are getting forward. Please accept our most sincere congratulations on the capture of the biggest city ever taken by an American Army.
Early in October, President Roosevelt sent to the Senate for approval the nominations of five temporary (that is, for the duration of the war only) lieutenant generals to be advanced to the permanent rank (which would be retained in retirement) of major general – Wainwright, Mac-Arthur’s successor in the Philippines and a prisoner of war; Joseph Stil-well, commander of the U.S. forces in China, Burma, and India; Patton; Brehon Somervell, head of the Army Service Force; and Joseph McNar-ney, Marshall’s deputy chief of staff.
Patton wrote his wife in great excitement about “a lucky day.” He received “a lot of clippings” from Beatrice; a magazine story, largely her doing, on the “Life of General Patton,” which was “fine"; an article in Reader’s Digest entitled “ ‘Old Man Battle’ which is not too bad.” Then he went to dinner with Admiral Davidson who gave him a teletyped newscast about the nominations for permanent major general. “All this built up my fallen arches of self confidence quite a lot.” Adding further joy was “quite a nice letter from F.D.R. him self.”
However, I am still very uncertain asto where I am going to fight, if at all, and when is a mystery. I am not as jealous of Wayne as I was, for I think that his party may well be an anti-climax . . .
Must go out and exercise now.
Letter, Hughes to GSP, Jr., October 4, 1943
Words fail me when I start to tell you how glad I am that you have been nominated . . . There are advantages in keeping one’s shirt on, are there not, even though it be a hairshirt.
Telegram, Eisenhower to GSP, Jr., October 4, 1943
I am highly delighted that the War Department and the President have recognized the value of your contributions by nominating you as a permanent major general. You have lived up to every one of the expectations I have held for you during the past 25 years, and I know that every job the government may give you during this war will be performed with the same dash, energy, and determination that have characterized all your action during the past 10 months.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Eisenhower, October 6, 1943
Please accept my most sincere thanks . . . It is my personal conviction that you, and you alone, are responsible for the promotion, as you have been for every other promotion I have received. I have run out of proper words to thank you, so you can just put the nth power on my remarks and let it go at that.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Marshall, October 7, 1943
I am very deeply appreciative of this honor and feel, as in all cases, I owe the distinction to your generosity.
Senatorial approval of nominations was usually a mere formality, and everyone assumed that the Senate would act at once. For no particular reason, the Senate delayed.
Eisenhower sent Bedell Smith to Washington to confer with Marshall on European strategy. Among the items he listed for Smith to do: “Discuss qualifications of General Patton, particularly as an assault Army commander . . . His talents should not be wasted.”
Diary, October 4
Much mail and clippings and candy. Have to start walking again, much as I hate it.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Mrs. G. C. Marshall, October 4, 1943
I really appreciate very much what you said about the men [in the Seventh Army]. They are wonderful soldiers, and we are mutually crazy about each other.
Diary, October 5
Went to tea with . . . about a dozen upper crust people present and it was very nice, except that a famous pianist was there who insisted on playing me things in D minor, which were terrible to hear . . . The people . . . are exactly the same sort you would meet in Boston or New York and talked about the same things.
Diary, October 6
Keyes . . . took off for Italy [with his II Corps headquarters], I hate to see him go, as anyone who serves under Clark is always in danger. I told Geoff to be careful never to mention the Seventh Army and to always win.
I wish something would happen to Clark.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to his son George, October 6, 1943
I realize, as you well know, the difficulty of being a turn-back, and I am sure you are conducting yourself correctly in not taking advantage of your position ...
I am sure that those turn-backs who associate with their old classmates are on the road to ruin, because as you say, neither class respects them...
Naturally, with the publicity I have gotten, you are a marked man, and it is a good thing to be a marked man if you live up to the reputation. More people fail through being unknown than through being known ...
Do not try to save money on clothes. When the Cadets get found [flunk out] at Christmas, as they will, if any of them are near your size, get him to sell you the clothes and have them recut. You cannot have too many clothes, and they must be always well pressed . . .
Self-confidence is the surest way of obtaining what you want. If you know in your own heart you are going to be something, you will be it . . . Do not permit your mind to think otherwise. It is fatal...
So far as I am concerned, I do not know what is going to happen, but I am sure, with the same self-confidence which I am preaching to you, that something will happen, and that when it does, I will make a success of it.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Marshall, October 7, 1943
I have been having great difficulty in getting exercise, as when I walk I am followed by a crowd, presumably admiring, and when I run the crowd thinks that there is a fire. The other day I discovered an abandoned riding hall in the Palace and told the Italian Cara-binieri that I should like to use it. This morning they had a grand opening with 120 men in full uniform with plumes and sabers and a mounted band. This was followed by jumping and then by monkey drill. It was all very reminiscent of Fort Myer.
Diary, October 7
If I can ride daily, my exercise problem will be solved. I can ride during lunch and so will not have to eat.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, October 7, 1943
The other day I had tea with a very fat Bourbon Princess with a black beard which she shaves. The Chateau is realy lovely. On the Rococo side . . . built in 1710 and is very well preserved.
In some way the Princess is very rich. She talks bad French at the top of her powerful lungs. Yet when she was young, she must have been quite lovely. She has good features.
She has a girl friend who should be a wrestler but is a famous Pianoist. All she can play are Etudes and Movements, but she does that with utter abandon and great power. I have never seen such fore arms. Codman says she is not so hot, but she sounded authentic to me. I made a hit by not talking during the playing – you taught me that – so now she thinks I love music and threatens to have a musical evening “where we will just play, not eat or drink” Certainly an inexpensive system if the piano stands up.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Charles F. Ayer, October 8, 1943
I am now in the position of Mr. Micawber, that is, waiting for something to turn up.