“All I need is another war.”
DURING MARCH AND APRIL, Patton indoctrinated his subordinates in his methods of making war. He visited, inspected, and talked with the troops, he had long conversations with his senior officers, and he issued a series of papers – letters of instruction – in which he listed his tactical or combat principles. They were his fundamental beliefs on warfare, polished and refined, the essence of his professional knowledge, reflection, work, and experience. Throughout, he stressed confidence and imagination, power and will, drive and efficiency.
His first letter of instruction, dated March 6, had the purpose of orienting the “officers of the higher echelons in the principles of command, combat procedure, and administration which obtain in this Army” and which were to “guide you in the conduct of your several commands.” Among them were:
Everyone was to “lead in person.” A commander who failed to obtain his objectives and who was “not dead or severely wounded has not done his full duty.”
Commanders and staff members were to “visit the front daily . . . to observe, not to meddle . . . Praise is more valuable than blame . . . Your primary mission as a leader is to see with your own eyes and be seen by your troops while engaged in personal reconnaissance.”
Issuing an order was worth only about 10 percent. “The remaining 90 percent consists in assuring . . . proper and vigorous execution” of the order.
Persons who did not rest did not last. When the need arose, “everyone must work all the time, but these emergencies are not frequent.”
The farther forward the command posts were located, the less time was wasted in driving to and from the front.
Everyone was “too prone to believe that we acquire merit solely through the study of maps in the safe seclusion of a command post. This is an error.”
Maps were necessary “in order to see the whole panorama of battle and to permit intelligent planning . . . A study of the map will indicate where critical situations exist or are apt to develop, and so indicate where the commander should be.”
Plans had to be “simple and flexible . . . They should be made by the people who are going to execute them.”
There could never be too much reconnaissance.
Information was “like eggs: the fresher the better.”
Orders were to be short, to tell “what to do, not how.” An order was “really a memorandum and an assumption of responsibility by the issuing commander.”
In battle it was “always easier for the senior to go up [to the front] than for the junior to come back.”
Warning orders were vital and had to be issued in time, “not only to combat units but also to the Surgeon, the Signal Officer, the Quartermaster, the Ordnance Officer, and the Engineer Officer who . . . too have plans to make and units to move. If they do not function, you do not fight.”
Every means had to be used “before and after combats to tell the troops what they were going to do and what they have done.”
The responsibility for supply rested equally “on the giver and the taker.”
Commanders were to “visit the wounded personally” and frequently.
Decorations were to be awarded promptly.
“If you do not enforce and maintain discipline, you are potential murderers.”
Walking wounded and stragglers sought “to justify themselves by painting alarming pictures.”
Fatigue made “cowards of us all. Men in condition do not tire.”
And finally, “Courage. DO NOT TAKE COUNSEL OF YOUR FEARS.”
Disseminated throughout the Army, this guidance was widely discussed on the subordinate levels. The rules laid down by Patton began to shape the outlook, character, and personality of the Army, for they were authoritative and full of common sense, they cut through the fabric of training to the heart of combat, and – most important of all – they represented the professional thought of the Old Man, who knew what he was talking about.
• • •
Patton inspected Oliver’s 5 th Armored Division and was displeased. The artillery was “distinctly bad in that it was distinctly not good.” The uniforms were “bad and dirty. There was no attempt to have all the men dress alike. The men were very negligent, and the condition of the quarters, kitchens, and latrines was bad.” A 35-minute talk to the officers seemed to have a
good result . . . I get the impression that the division will fight diligently but not brilliantly as it lacks finish, class, and polish – in a word it lacks a good leader.
Robert C. Grow’s 6th Armored Division “had a finish entirely lacking in . . . the 5th.”
Asking Walton Walker to correct Oliver “as painlessly as possible” – for the 5th “does not quite click” – Patton suggested that Walker find a pretext to take Oliver with him when he inspected the 6th, which was
pre-eminent in all the defects I noted in the case of the 5th . . .
In order to avoid individious comparisons, it might be desirable to take either Grow or Wood with you when you inspect the 5th . . .
However, I do not propose to tell you how to do the job. What I want is to see the 5th . . . brought up to the level of the 6th and 4th. There is not a great deal of time to waste.
Letter, Stiller to Mrs. Patton, March 12, 1944
You have more reason to be proud of “your man” than even you know.
He is the real “Leader” of this war. And before it is over he will again demonstrate it in no uncertain terms.
I am very proud of the privilege to serve with him.
I will never let him down. And will do my very all to return him to you. When the job is Finished.
You can depend on it.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, March 12, 1944
All I need is another war. Of course I have become a legend and everyone says had George been at Salerno or at the [Anzio] beach, things would have been different – frankly I think they would, but in the next show they are expecting a lot from a bad start, so I will realy have to put out – I will.
Captain Basil H. Liddell Hart, Britain’s foremost military historian, analyst, and publicist, called on Patton, and they had a long discussion of military procedures, weapons, and the general course, strategy, and lessons of the war.
“Liddell Hart,” he told Beatrice,
has developed a great love for me. He is very well read but badly balanced and has no personal knowledge of the facts of life so far as war is concerned – in that he is not alone. He is a funny looking man, tall and skinney.
For his part, Liddell Hart found Patton stimulating and enjoyable, hardly like his photographs in the newspapers and the lurid stories circulating about him. Patton was dynamic and full of interesting ideas.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, March 16, 1944
D is having a party shortly so I will have to go back to town again. It is a most boring drive after the first few times and takes nearly five hours. Besides, they blitz the town but not here ...
All the cousins are convinced that had Wayne and I been reversed, all would have been well – who can say?? ...
I now have a loud speaker truck like a politician which permits me to make inspirational talks at will.
Well there is no other news I can divulge except the pronunciation of Peover – pronounced Peaver and by the process of natural evolution by the soldiers [from Pee over to] Piss over.
Putting Gaffey over Gay, he explained, was “a question of self-preservation so . . . I did it. Not too noble, I fear. However, I do feel easier in my mind, and the two get on well together.”
He drove to London to attend a reception given by Eisenhower at Claridge’s. All the “high” British and Americans were there except Brooke and Montgomery. “Some people were unkind enough to say that Montgomery was absent as he could not bear to be second fiddle.” Cunningham and others “took special trouble to look me up.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, March 21, 1944
I have been working for two days with pad, stenographer and glue pot on a new letter of instructions on the art of slaughter. It is most tedius as most of it is taken from former letters I have written, but one can only say a thing once and I have said most of them so often...
We are at the usual state in planning when every thing seems a perfect mess. But it will all smooth out in a week or so – I should be used to it but I am not.
About 1000 officers and men arrived from the United States to bring the Third Army headquarters up to strength. Patton had them form in ranks in front of Peover Hall and made a speech of welcome and of exhortation. After the men marched off, he addressed the officers. Then he had the chiefs of the staff sections and their assistants in his office and talked to them. All the talks “went over in good shape.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, March 24, 1944
I have just finished “inspiring” them . . . I reassured them as to their futures. I told them that I was just as much their father and as deeply concerned for their welfare as Courtney [Hodges] had been...
All my life I have abhored speach makers and now I seem fated to make them all the time. I hope I don’t get the bug and rant and orate...
Things are shaping up pretty well now but I wish we had more of the killer instinct in our men. They are too damned complacent – willing to die but not anxious to kill.
I tell them that it is fine to be willing to die for their country but a damned sight better to make the German die for his. No one has ever told them that...
The B[ritish] have suffered and are mad, but our men are not . . .
Roman Civilization fell due to the loss of the will to conquer, satisfaction with the status quo, and high taxes which destroyed trade and private enterprise, and eventually forced people out of the cities. The cycle is returning ...
I love you and your letters.
An impressionable young man was among those lined up before the steps of Peover Hall, “a half Victorian” he noted, “half Georgian manor house.” He and the other new arrivals had heard rumors in New York just before sailing that Patton would replace Hodges in command of the Third Army.
Therefore, when General Patton walked out on the little terrace, three steps above us . . . the surprise was no less exciting than it was official. Most of us had never seen him in the flesh, and when the drum, ruffles, and bugles sounded the General’s march, we stood transfixed upon his appearance. Not one square inch of flesh [of everyone there was] not covered with goose pimples. It was one of the greatest thrills I shall ever know.
You stood at rigid attention during the General’s march, but that towering figure impeccably attired froze you in place and electrified the air. The march ended and the General took one step forward.
In a somewhat boyish, shrill yet quiet voice, he said quickly, “At ease, gentlemen, I suppose you are all surprised to see me standing there in place of General Hodges. Such are the fortunes of war. But I can assure you that the Third United States Army will be the greatest Army in American history. We shall be in Berlin ahead of every one. To gain that end, we must have perfect discipline. I shall drive you until hell won’t have it, but a pint of sweat is worth a gallon of blood. We are going to kill German bastards – I would prefer to skin them alive – but, gentlemen, I fear some of our people at home would accuse me of being too rough.”
At that point General Patton slyly smiled. Everyone chuckled en-joyably.
He talked on to us for half an hour, literally hypnotizing us with his incomparable, if profane eloquence.
When he had finished, you felt as if you had been given a supercharge from some divine source. Here was the man for whom you would go to hell and back.
Robert S. Allen, who would become Koch’s deputy G-2, was among those assembled in front of Peover Hall. He later remembered that it was a raw, gloomy, early spring day. Patton stood on the wide manor steps dressed in a handsome, tight-fitting, brass-buttoned battle jacket, the first that Allen had seen, plus pink whipcord riding breeches and gleaming high-topped riding boots with spurs. He carried a long, hand-tooled riding crop. On his left stood Gay, on his right Willie.
As Allen recalled, Patton complimented them on their reputation as a capable and hard-working group under his predecessor. He had no doubt they would perform the same way for him. They could not afford to be damned fools because in battle damned fools became dead men. Men were inevitably killed and wounded in combat, but there was no reason for increasing losses by incompetence or carelessness. He never permitted either quality among his staff members.
They were fighting the war for three reasons – to preserve traditional liberties, to defeat the Nazis who wanted to destroy American liberties, and simply to fight – men liked to fight and always would. Only sophists and crackpots denied the latter. They were goddamned fools, cowards, or both. Whoever disliked fighting would do well to ask for a transfer now, for Patton wanted no part of him and would kick him out later.
“That’s all, gentlemen, and good luck.”
At Chester, the temporary home of the Royal Naval College, Patton inspected the corps of cadets ranging in age from fourteen to sixteen. He later wrote Cunningham:
There was one Cadet standing at attention when I was inspecting him who had a fly crawling around his eye, and he never winked. I believe that this is the epitome of discipline.
On March 26, Hodges having been promoted and officially transferred to the First Army, Patton formally assumed command of the Third Army.
He flew to London and talked with John Lucas. Patton afterward thought that Lucas
was timid at the Anzio beachhead. He said he did not feel justified in expending a corps. He did not expend it because he did not try. Had he taken the high ground, he might have been cut off, but again he might not have been. Without the high ground in his possession, the landing was useless.
I feel very sorry for Lucas as I think he knows he did wrong, yet thinks he did his duty.
At a nice ceremony Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, representing the King, decorated Patton, Bradley, and Eddy with the Companion of the Bath. “Don’t wince, Patton,” Brooke said, “I shan’t kiss you.” He also said that Patton had earned the decoration more than any other American. “He probably said the same thing to each one – he is of the clerical type.” The decoration was “quite a large white enamel and/gold cross worn around the neck and is quite pretty.”
Ike said, “I wish the Americans could be as smart as the British.”
Patton chatted with William Phillips, Eisenhower’s political adviser, who was
terribly worried how to prevent fraternization between Germans and Americans during the first seven months of our occupation. I told him he was crossing a bridge before he got to it and that, anyway, nothing could stop fraternization ...
Sometimes I wish people would take this war more seriously. Everett and I are the only ones that seem to give a damn.
“I am a pretty good judge of a fighting man when I see one,” Mrs. Marshall wrote, “and I am expecting great things in the near future from you.”
He was off to Northern Ireland to inspect the XV Corps headquarters, and the 5th and 8th Divisions.
A young officer in the 8th Division, Edward C. Williamson, had a mixed impression of Patton. By chance he was near the carefully guarded entrance to the Artillery headquarters at Fivemiletown, when Patton and his party arrived in a whirlwind of jeeps. A handful of military policemen jumped out, Tommy guns bristling, and Patton drove in.
Later that day Williamson learned from his battery commander that Patton interviewed the key artillery officers on their combat readiness. Patton maintained his severe soldierly mien and appearance, but his behavior was mild, his questions were perceptive, his statements direct and pertinent. His professional advice emerged naturally out of enormous military experience and knowledge.
Still later, on the lawn of the Enniskillen manor, came the famous Patton speech to the entire division. Williamson reflected that the show was worthy of a Latin American general or a Southern demagogue. He thought Patton’s talk was mostly bombast interlarded with profanity, and he had the distinct feeling that Patton came close to advocating the killing of prisoners. It was more than apparent that the enlisted men were enthralled and thrilled, as well as moved, by the general’s words.
What Patton did, Williamson decided, was to project one type of figure for the enlisted men, quite another for the officers. Both worked and worked well.
Returned to Peover Hall on April 4, Patton learned from Gaffey that a War Department inspector was in London in connection with the killing of prisoners in Italy. He was indignant.
I tried two men, a captain and a sergeant for it, and they pleaded at the trial that I had ordered them to do it. When the question of trying these two men for what was clearly barefaced murder came up, some of my friends advised me not to do it . . . However, I did not believe then and do not believe now that I can condone murder for my own benefit.
He had forgotten his initial reaction to the news in Sicily. When Bradley had reported the incident, Patton had brushed it aside as having no consequence. It was probably Bradley, along with Middleton, who had persuaded Patton to court-martial the captain and the sergeant.
When I addressed the 45th Division in Africa just before sailing for Sicily, I got pretty bloody, trying to get an untried division to the sticking point . . . However, I made no statements by which the wildest stretch of the imagination could be considered as directing the killing of prisoners.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, April 4, 1944
Some fair haired boys are trying to say that I killed too many prisoners. Yet the same people cheer at the far greater killing of Japs. Well, the more I killed, the fewer men I lost, but they dont think of that. Sometimes I think that I will quit and join a monestary . . .
Patton went to London to talk with Middleton about the shooting in Sicily, particularly to see whether Middleton remembered Patton’s two addresses as he did. “His memory of what I said was the same as my own and was also corroborated by Stiller and Codman, who were present”
“The two men who did the murdering” did so on July 14 near the Butera airfield. The captain captured 43 Germans, five of whom were in civilian clothes, either in whole or in part, and he had them all shot without trial. The sergeant was conducting 36 prisoners to the rear and when he was well out of the battle zone halted them at the side of the road and killed them. “In my opinion both men were crazy.”
But he was worried, and at Hughes’ suggestion, he wrote Surles “an accurate account of the incident so that if any unscrupulous correspondents got wind of it, Surles could immediately state the facts.”
He was pleased to have a report from his son-in-law’s commanding general in Italy:
I consider Jim Totten the ablest battalion commander in his sector. He is crafty and has the best eye for terrain, that I have ever seen. His battalion positions are invariably the best to be had. As a result he has been hurt least by counter battery and enemy action.
He was tickled by an amusing story about himself. Someone overheard a heated discussion between Wedemeyer and Eisenhower about Patton. Finally, Wedemeyer said, “Hell, get on to yourself, Ike; you didn’t make him, he made you.”
His second letter of instructions appeared on April 3. Addressed to corps, division, and separate unit commanders, it stressed
those tactical and administrative usages which combat experience has taught myself . . . to consider vital. You will not simply mimeograph this and call it a day. You are responsible that these usages become habitual in your command.
Among the items were the following:
Formal guard mounts and retreat formations, as well as regular and supervised reveille formations, were “a great help and, in some cases, essential to prepare men and officers for battle, to give them that perfect discipline, that smartness of appearance, that alertness without which battles cannot be won.”
Officers were always on duty, and their duty extended to every individual, junior to themselves, in the U.S. Army – “not only to members of their own organization.”
There was “no approved solution to any tactical situation. There is only one tactical principle which is not subject to change. It is: ‘To so use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wounds, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum time/ “
Battles were won “by frightening the enemy. Fear is induced by inflicting death and wounds on him. Death and wounds are produced by fire. Fire from the rear is more deadly and three times more effective than fire from the front.”
“You can never be too strong.”
“Never yield ground. It is cheaper to hold what you have than to retake what you have lost. Our mortars and our artillery are superb weapons when they are firing. When silent, they are junk – see that they fire.”
“A good solution applied with vigor now is better than a perfect solution ten minutes later.”
Few men were killed by the bayonet; “many are scared by it.”
The M-1 was “the most deadly rifle in the world. If you cannot see the enemy, you can at least shoot at the place where he is apt to be.”
There was “no such thing as ‘Tank country’ in a restrictive sense. Some types of country are better than others, but tanks have and can operate anywhere.”
The successful soldier won his battles cheaply so far as his own casualties were concerned, “but he must remember that violent attacks, although costly at the time, save lives in the end.”
• • •
On April 7, at St. Paul’s School in London, Patton attended a briefing on the invasion. Montgomery opened with a two-hour talk. Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commanding the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces, and Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey, commanding the Allied naval forces, followed.
The Navy was still quite gloomy and had lots of reasons why the thing would fail. But it was interesting to note that in the talks there was much better mutual understanding between the Air, Navy, and Ground troops than there had been at a similar meeting we had in Algiers before we took off for Sicily. I think that much of this good understanding has been due to General Eisenhower’s efforts.
After lunch, Bradley, Gerow, and Collins presented their plans. Then came Dempsey and his corps commanders. “As usual they were much more prolix than we are.”
The Prime Minister made the last talk and the best. He said, “Remember that this is an invasion, not a creation of a fortified beachhead.”
During Montgomery’s lecture, it was interesting to note that I was the only Army commander of the four Army commanders involved to be mentioned by name. The other three he mentioned by number [of the Army].
At dinner with Eisenhower, McCloy, McNarney, Bradley, and Bedell Smith, Patton noted that
McNarney jumped on Ike about the mishandling of replacements in Africa, which is correct, and they are doing a worse job here . . .
I had quite a talk with them trying to justify an initial overstrength of 15 percent...
The efficiency of a division is not measured by its shortage in personnel. A shortage of 10 percent in personnel reduces the effectiveness of a division about 20 percent, and as the losses increase, the efficiency decreases in almost geometrical ratio.
I can’t get anyone to realize this. That is because none of our topflight generals have ever fought.
As usual, Bradley said nothing. He does all the getting along and does it to his own advantage.
I expect I take chances because at heart the army is not my living and besides, I am a soldier – a simple soldier.
Referring to the Inspector General incident, Ike said, “You talk too much.”
I said, “If you order me not to, I will stop. Otherwise I will continue to influence troops the only way I know, a way which so far has produced results.”
He said, “Go ahead, but watch yourself.”
All of them but me are scared to death. I shall certainly attempt to say nothing which can be quoted.
He told Beatrice that “the friends of freedom” were trying “to cook up another incident” on “some unnecessary killings – if killings in war are ever unnecessary” Very circumspectly, he said that plans called for the Third Army to capture Brittany in a month, but some people were wagering that Patton would do it in a week. He thought he could – “if they ever let me get started.” His late start bothered him, for
I fear the war will be over before I get loose – but who can say? Fate and the Hand of God still run most shows...
I started my German lessons this morning. My machine has the identical conversations in both French and German so I do them both and am about to go mad.
“No doubt your colleague Gen. Clark is a very able general,” Beatrice’s half brother Charles F. Ayer wrote,
but many of us here believe that if Gen. Patton had been in command of the Italian enterprise, things would have gone along more smoothly.
Patton replied that he appreciated
your remarks concerning the relative merits of myself and certain other people, in which remarks I, with due modesty, concur. However, don’t tell anybody this.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, April 12, 1944
You say that when I come back I will be so famous that we will have no private life. I doubt that. Soldiers are forgotten pretty quickly...
There seems to have been an unwitting conspiracy to make me loose my self confidence, but so far it has failed ...
Well if I can survive till the fighting starts I will be o.k.
He called a staff meeting to discuss a new directive for employing the Third Army on the Continent. “It is pretty general,” he admitted. All it meant was “that when we get to France we will fight.”
I have a feeling, probably unfounded, that neither Monty or Bradley are too anxious for me to have a command. If they knew what little respect I had for the fighting ability of either of them, they would be even less anxious for me to show them up.
Diary, April 15
Not a damn thing I can do. All the staff is working, and we are doing all right.
On April 15, Patton issued his third letter of instructions, this one pertaining to the separate tank battalion attached to each infantry division. Once again he enumerated the thoughts that governed his ideas of tactics. Some of them were:
Because of “a slavish adherence to the precept that ‘Tanks should be used in mass,’ we are not gaining the full advantage from the separate tank battalions.”
“Any weapon which is not actively engaged in killing Germans is not doing its duty”
Battles were “simply an agglomeration of numerous small actions and practically never develop according to pre-conceived notions. Therefore our killing weapons must be as close as possible to the fighting zone.”
Whether tanks or infantry should lead an attack was always a problem. In general, the infantry went first “against emplaced and known antitank guns, large anti-tank minefields, and terrestrial obstacles such as bridges and defiles.”
Tanks usually preceded infantry “against scattered minefields or minefields of the new, so-called Boot type mines, against normal artillery and infantry positions, and against any type of counter-attack.”
Tanks were to “keep out of villages, where they are at a tremendous disadvantage and cannot utilize their power. Block houses and strong points without anti-tank guns are duck soup for tanks.”
Finally, the skillful commander used “the means at hand, all weapons, for the accomplishment of the end sought, the destruction of Germans.”
He graciously added that these notes were
based largely on the advice of Major General T. H. Middleton who has had great success in the use of tanks and infantry in the manner above described.
As a follow-up, Patton asked Walker to have an armored division put on a demonstration of how infantry and tanks should work together. “My purpose is to get these people indoctrinated with the idea of using everything they have.”
Patton was reading Arthur Bryant’s The Years of Endurance on the Napoleonic Wars, and he told Beatrice that it was a “swell book” and
fine to buck up ones self confidence and reinstall faith in Providence but not in Destiny. The latter is not going to play much of a part [in the invasion] and it is too bad.
However inspite of local and transitory discouragements, I am sure that I am needed, for no one else can do the things which must be done. It is something like fishing. You know the fish are there but you trail your hook a long time between strikes. No one I think can plan his future. Those who try fail, as Wayne did. But any one can school his mind so that if opportunity nocks, he can use it fearlessly.
At the moment all the stress is on unostentatious men who are not criticized because they are colorless ...
As I have often said, none of us would be contented unless he were God, and God too probably has to make concessions.
Patton issued his fourth letter of instructions on April 17, this on the employment of tank-destroyer units. Some of his strictures were:
The main purpose of tank destroyers was “to knock out tanks. Secondary usages include direct or indirect fire to reinforce artillery fires; destruction of anti-tank weapons, pill boxes, permanent defensive works; and the support of infantry in defense of beach-heads and bridge-heads”
Tank-destroyer units were “not self-supporting, consequently they will be employed in close cooperation with other arms” – infantry, armor, and artillery.
The use of tank destroyers in defense “must not be stereotyped.”
• • •
Patton had a long conversation with McCloy, McNarney, and Lee.
Mr. McCloy asked me what I thought of Monty. I said first that I preferred not to answer, and then on being pressed, I said I thought Monty was too cautious and would not take calculated risks.
Both McCloy and McNarney urged me to say nothing that would get me criticized, as it was possible that if I get in trouble again, someone would bring up a resolution in the Senate demanding my recall. I told them that my methods had produced men who would fight, and I would be untrue to myself if I failed to use them, regardless of what happens to me. McNarney kept saying that the thing for me was to keep out of trouble so that I could lead the men. Mc-Cloy said that he would see that I command an Army in France in spite of hell.
“I liked McNarney quite well” he wrote Beatrice. “He seems ruthless but very intelligent.”
“I liked McNarney quite well” he wrote Beatrice. “He seems ruthless but very intelligent.”
I had been kicking to him about more replacements and as he left, he said, “If I were God, what beside replacements would you ask me for?” I said to fight this Army in France. That seemed to please him, as I could have asked for a lot of things ...
I leave in the morning to visit fat Walker and his corps and to make a couple of speeches to new divisions.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Keyes, April 25, 1944
We are in the clutches of the masterminds [planners] here with the inevitable result that we are changing our plans oftener than our underclothes. I have been consulted no more than I was when we went to Sicily ...
The staff here is functioning very well but has not got the same drive which the old Seventh Army possessed to such a marked degree...
The new divisions which I have so far inspected are really very high class, and I am sure that if we can get them through the first shock of battle, they will be splendid. I am inclined to think, and Middleton agrees with me, that these troops will do very well even the first time ...
I do not believe I will ever do as well without you as I have done with you, and hope that before this show is over we again have an opportunity to combine our matchless intellects.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, April 25, 1944
I had to drive over 700 miles. If one was on a vacation it would have been and in fact was a lovley drive, as spring has at last come and the country is beautiful. All the hawthorne and bracken are in bloom ...
Lady Astor is dying to meet me. So is Lady Duff Cooper. What a life.
He was about to be in trouble again.