CHAPTER 28 Breakout

I was very nervous all morning because it seemed impossible to get any definite news and the clock seemed to have stopped.

Bradley arrived at 1500. Walker and Haislip were already here. Bradley showed us the Army boundaries. These are rather cramped so far as the Third Army is concerned, as we have to slide through a very narrow bottleneck between Avranches and St. Hilaire.

The leading elements of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions had burst through the Avranches bottleneck and were already in Brittany and headed, respectively, to Rennes and Brest, but above Avranches all the roads were congested and everyone seemed to be on the move.

Bradley is worried about an attack west from Mortain [to Avranches]. Personally I do not give much credence to this, but by moving the 90th Division I can get it forward and also cover the exposed flank [open to Mortain]. I started this movement by truck at once.

In this case, Bradley had more intuition —or better intelligence information – than Patton.

Gaffey, Harkins, Haislip, and myself then visited the VIII Corps to coordinate the movement of the 90th Division through the rear areas. This is an operation which, at Leavenworth, would certainly give you an unsatisfactory mark, as we are cutting the 90th Division through the same town and on the same street being used by two armored and two other infantry divisions. However, there is no other way of doing it at this time.

I remained at the VIII Corps headquarters. I found that Middle-ton, in spite of what I had already told him, had failed to send any infantry with the 4th Armored Division but had decided to send one infantry division with the 6th Armored on Brest, and the other infantry division along the north coast behind [Brigadier General Herbert] Earnest’s task force.

Middleton was concerned by a large concentration of German troops reported to be at St. Malo.

I . . . directed him to send the 8th Infantry Division behind Wood, with one regimental combat team, motorized [to follow the 4th Armored Division closely]; and to send the 79th infantry Division behind [Grow’s] 6th, similarly arranged; and to use Earnest[’s Task Force A] . . . to move along the north road.

to secure the seventeen miles of trestle on the railway in the vicinity of Morlaix, because if this piece of trestle is destroyed, the capture of Brest will have little value.

I cannot make out why Middle ton was so apathetic or dumb. I don’t know what was the matter with him. Of course it is a little nerve-wracking to send troops straight into the middle of the enemy with front, flanks, and rear open. I had to keep repeating to myself. “Do not take counsel of your fears.”

Bradley simply wants a bridgehead over the Selune River. What I want and intend to get is Brest and Angers.

We just had word that the 4th Armored Division is 15 kilometers north of Rennes . . .

The 6th Armored Division is at Pontorson, where Beatrice and I spent a night in 1913.

These truck movements of large numbers of infantry are very dangerous and might be almost fatal if the Germans should spot them [from the air], particularly if there is a traffic jam. I have all available staff officers out at critical points and have told Haislip to be personally at Avranches to see that the 90th Division gets through without a jam. I am going there myself in the morning, as I have a feeling something may happen . . .

Compared to war, all [other] human activities are futile, if you like war as I do.

I have insisted for months that George keep his shirt on. For months and months I have stood up for him and his staff against everybody. I have succeeded in getting George into the fight at a time when we needed fighters.

I was fearful that he had been cowed by the fools who didn’t realize that a fighter couldn’t be a saint or a psychiatrist when the job was to kill Germans. Or cowed by those who didn’t like pearl handled pistols, or fancy uniforms, or all the little idiosyncracies that are George.

And now what? All the thousands who would have torn him down will rise to cheer and shout “I told you so”

East of Avranches we caught up with the 90th, which is moving along the road between the See and the Selune Rivers. The division is bad,, the discipline poor, the men filthy, and the officers apathetic, many of them removing their insignia and covering the markings on helmets. I saw one artillery lieutenant jump out of his peep and hide in a ditch when one plane flew over at a high altitude firing a little. I corrected these acts on the spot. I got out and walked in the column for about two miles, talking to the men. Some were getting rides on guns and the others made no comment. I called them babies and they dismounted. They seemed normal but are not in hard condition.

The 90th Division, in Eisenhower’s words, had not been “well brought up,” that is, not well trained in the United States and had had a particularly grueling initiation into combat in the Cotentin. But McLain and Weaver would soon turn it into a hard-hitting outfit.

I told Haislip to get the 5th Armored Division down at once and have it cross the See River east of Avranches by fording. Also to alert the 83d to follow as soon as the traffic situation permitted.

With Middleton’s VIII Corps turning from Avranches westward into Brittany, Patton was starting to commit Haislip’s XV Corps eastward toward the Mayenne-Laval line in anticipation of an order on the following day that would shift the bulk of the Third Army toward the Seine.

With Patton much more interested in the eastward developments, he paid little attention to Middleton.

Bradley arrived about 1600 and, with some embarrassment, stated that he had been waiting for me at the VIII Corps, and as I had not arrived there, he had taken the responsibility of telling Middleton to move the 79th Division to the east near Fougeres.

I said that I would [concur], but that I did not agree with him and feared he was getting the British complex of over-caution. It is noteworthy that just about a year ago to the day I had to force him to conduct an attack in Sicily.

Patton’s method was to move so rapidly that a German counterthrust would have no chance of getting started.

[Ira T.] Wyche [79th Division] was at VIII Corps headquarters, and we decided to shift him to the XV Corps and use the 83d in place of the 79th to follow the 6th Armored Division [to Brest]. I dictated the necessary orders to put these operations into effect.

Diary, August 3

Collins of the VII Corps is having a lot of trouble northwest of Mortain, and is also causing us trouble by using areas of this Army for his own rear echelons, particularly the road running north through Brecey.

There was actually much confusion among supply and service units of the VII and VIII Corps, caused mainly by the rapidity of the movement to Avranches and Brecey, and also by the insertion of the Third Army into the campaign. Putting the XV Corps into the battle added to the congestion.

As of 1800, things are very satisfactory. The 79th is in Fougeres; the 5th Armored . . . is between the 79th and 90th Divisions.

These three divisions formed the XV Corps, and they were headed eastward.

The 4th Armored Division has by-passed Rennes, headed on Vannes. The 6th Armored Division has passed Dinan and is being followed by one regiment of the 83d. Earnest is investing St. Malo. I did nothing.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, August 3, 1944

I was out all day yesterday but except for an air plane that straffed a little I saw nothing. I stayed in to day but will have another look in the morning. It always scares and lures me like steeplechasing.

Diary, August 4

Left at 1000 with Codman and Stiller. We had an L-29 armored car and a peep. I rode in the peep with Codman, and Stiller preceded us in the armored car via Avranches-Pontaubault-Pontorson-Comborg-Merdrignac.

This was a long drive to catch up with Grow’s 6th Armored Division, and Patton whooped with joy every time they ran off one map and had to use the next in series.

We passed one combat command . . . and found Grow just leaving. The 6th is too careful, and so gets shot up. I told them to use more dash and keep going [all the way to Brest].

Satisfied that Grow would drive westward, Patton returned to the other front. Eisenhower had decided to swing the bulk of the Allied forces in Normandy definitely eastward toward the Seine River because of the obvious disintegration of the German defenses around Avranches. In furtherance of this concept,

Bradley wants the XV Corps . . . to attack the Mayenne River between Mayenne and Laval, direction Le Mans . . . Sent for Haislip, gave him the order, and started him.

He also began to assemble Walker’s XX Corps for commitment to the campaign.

P. Wood got bull headed and turned east after passing Rennes, and we had to turn him back on his objectives, which are Vannes and Lorient, but his overenthusiasm wasted a day.

Wood wanted to go eastward too. That was where the action was, not in Brittany, which he could see was going to become a backwater of the war.

Gaffey woke me . . . to show me an order, Middleton to Wood, which gave Wood a defensive role. We changed it.

Middleton was still thinking in terms of the battle of the hedgerows in the Cotentin, meticulous advances, carefully denned boundaries, strict attention to security. It was difficult for him to adjust to the new mobile warfare in August.

GSP, Jr., Notes on France, 1944

This is my fourth trip to France, and each time I have been impressed with the feminine leadership. This is particularly evident even now among the little children. The girls are the leaders; the men, or little boys, simply follow in their wake. I am sure that this is a sign of decadence.

After nearly two years of being accustomed to the inarticulate shapes of the Arab women, the over-stuffed profiles of the Italians, and to the boyish figures of the British women, the obtrusive and meticulously displayed figures of the Norman and Brittan women is quite striking. In a way they remind one of a British engine with two bumpers in front and powerful driving wheels behind . . .

The road into Brittany is full of reminders of William the Conqueror and of his unwilling guest Harold, for in their campaign against Dinan they passed through Coutances where even yet the most striking cathedral I have ever seen in France stands as evidence of the uneasy conscience of William’s successors.

The bridge south of Avranches undoubtedly had its predecessor in William’s time, and from there the road leading to Dol and Dinan is undoubtedly the same one traversed by William and Harold, hawk on fist.

It was in the sands either south of Avranches or near Mont St. Michel that the rescue took place.

Nearly everyone of these towns has all or part of a castle, and these are more eloquent than anything else of the difference in warfare which has occurred in the last 900 years. One air bomb or salvo from our 240’s would breach any castle which in those days sustained sieges measured in years . . .

In Brittany . . . the people are exactly as they were when I saw them last in 1913, except that I fail to see any old gentlemen with black sailor hats or ribbons hanging down their back. All the French people, either in Normandy or Brittany, have shown a very splendid spirit and are not feeling sorry for themselves. There is plenty of food, the only shortage being coffee and sugar. The artificial coffee is very good, tasting better than Sanka. The man who invented it may have a future after the war . . .

While thanks to our Air Force we have total air supremecy in the daytime, the Germans still come out at night and bomb us very diligently. Just what they accomplish, I do not know, but... on occasion their efforts are quite annoying. The motors of the German bombers are not synchronized as are ours, so you can always tell them by their throbbing hum, which has the same effect as mosquitoes. They buzz around and every once in a while you hear the coughing grunt of the bombs. On one or two occasions they came so close we could hear them whistle. There is nothing you can do about them – they either hit you or they don’t, but man being a fool is prone to worry.

Diary, August 5

Talk over Army boundaries with Bradley and Hodges. I succeeded in getting the boundary . . . I desire as it keeps me on the outside – on the running end.

To Beatrice:

The waiting was pretty bad and lasted well after Bastile day, but now we are in the biggest battle I have ever fought and it is going fine except at one town we have failed to take . . . I am going there in a minute to kick some ones ass.

Diary, August 6

I went to the Headquarters VIII Corps to see what is delaying the capture of St. Malo. Apparently it is simply the fact that the people are so damn slow, mentally and physically, and lack self-confidence. Am disgusted with human frailty. However, the lambent flame of my own self-confidence burns ever brighter.

St. Malo was holding out because it was garrisoned by skillful and tenacious defenders who were more numerous than American intelligence had anticipated and who were fighting from excellent defensive positions. [Robert] Macon’s 83d Division was engaged in siege warfare.

While directing this static battle, Middleton was trying to keep control of three charging commands, off, so it seemed, to the ends of the earth. Grow was on his way to Brest, and it was difficult to know where he was, what he was doing, what he was running into. Wood, driving toward Lorient, was also distant and relatively uncommunicative. Earnest had disengaged his task force from the battle at St. Malo, slipped away, and, at Patton’s order, was hurrying along the north shore of Brittany to capture the vital trestle near Morlaix.

Patton, of course, was also trying to keep track of these developments in the west. In addition, he was looking after his units in the east, where Haislip’s XV Corps was driving across the Mayenne River toward the LeMans-Alenc.on line, and where Walker’s XX Corps was starting south toward Angers and the Loire River.

He wrote Kenyon Joyce that day:

We are having one of the loveliest battles you ever saw. It is a typical cavalry action in which, to quote the words of the old story, “The soldier went out and charged in all directions at the same time, with a pistol in each hand, and a sabre in the other.”

The battle was moving, and it was exciting, fast-breaking. The advances, particularly when compared with those in the Cotentin, were spectacular, dizzying.

Yet he found time on August 6 to write to his nephew Neil Ayer who had just entered West Point.

You will catch hell [as a plebe] but . . . the best thing to do is to think about how soon it will be over and you will be an Upperclass-man...

The sure road to success at West Point, and also in life, in my opinion, is to make no excuses and to get in no arguments.

When I was a Plebe, we were drilling one day and the Cadet Corporal in charge gave an order which I failed to obey, although all the other members of the squad did. He said, “Mr. Patton, why the hell didn’t you do what I ordered?”

I replied, “I wasn’t paying attention, Sir.”

After that I had no more trouble but was held up as the model Plebe. That is a good tip to follow.

Another good tip is never to write anything disagreeable home. They can do nothing about it except worry . . .

Pay particular attention to the appearance of your clothes – see that they are pressed even if you have to sleep on them to press them.

See that they are clean, and always brace more than you are supposed to.

The people who catch hell are the people who try to get by. The ones who do their full duty are soon respected by the Upperclassmeii and left alone.

Another thing, never talk to your classmates or Upperclassmen about your family. The fact that you are fortunate in coming from a wealthy family will not help you at the Military Academy, and can hurt you . . .

Stand on your own feet, which I am sure you are well capable of doing.

I should be very glad to have you drop me a line at any time.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Mrs. T. Taylor, Pasadena, August 6, 1944

I should certainly consider it a great honor to be little Dick’s Godfather. I am sure that he could never find a more God-fearing, God-damning Godfather than myself.

Diary, August 7

The bridge at Angers is intact, and as our telephone lines were blown out, I sent Gaffey . . . to pick up a combat team of the 5th Division and . . . to attack and take Angers; also directing the division to send a battalion to Nantes. I am doing this without consulting Bradley as I am sure he would think it too risky. It is slightly risky, but so is war.

We got a rumor last night from a secret source that several panzer divisions will attack west from . . . Mortain . . . on Avranches. Personally, I think it is a German bluff to cover a withdrawal, but I stopped the 80th, French sd Armored, and 35th [Divisions] in the vicinity of St. Hilaire just in case something might happen.

This was a fine intuitive feeling. Something did happen. In the early hours of August 7, the Germans attacked with three panzer divisions, overran Mortain, and drove west toward Avranches. Fierce defensive fighting by the 30th Division and a strong Allied air effort stopped the German thrust. Because Patton had halted three divisions near the attack area in case they were needed, Bradley let him continue his sweep around the Allied right flank with Haislip’s XV Corps.

Haislip took Le Mans on August 8, and Patton was thinking of sending him north to drive toward Alençon, then on S£es. This would start a gigantic encircling movement that would trap not only those German forces counterattacking from Mortain but also the bulk of the German troops in Normandy. What would eventually be known as the Argentan-Falaise pocket was taking shape.

Patton really preferred to head eastward to Chartres or Dreux before turning north, for this would be a deeper envelopment and more certain to cut off all the Germans in Normandy, “but Bradley won’t let me.” Even though he thought that the northward turn toward Alençon and Sées, and eventually toward Argentan, which Bradley approved, was too close in or too shallow, he was happy enough to get it started.

Hughes and I drove to Dol to see the VIII Corps, then on to near St. Malo where the leading regiment of the 83d Division has its command post. Macon . . . is doing well . . .

When Macon saw me coming with Hughes, he turned quite pale – I presume imagining that Hughes was to relieve him, so I called out, “Fine work,” and he felt better. At the moment he needs more praise than blame.

When I got back [to his headquarters] I wrote an order for the attack of the XV Corps. Hughes and Kenner said it was historic – I hope so.

This was the order sending Haislip on a 90-degree turn to the north toward Alençon.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, August 8, 1944

This Army had a big day . . . I am quite tickled and not at all worried although I have been skating on the thin ice of self confidence for nine days.

I am the only one who realizes how little the enemy can do – he is finished. We may end this in ten days.

When he had to order the destruction of a rather large city – St. Malo, “I hate to do it, but war is war. Usually I have not bombed cities.”

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, August p, 1944

We are getting on as well as in Sicily but the forces are so large – 12 divisions to me alone – that the supply system is collossal.

If I were on my own, I would take bigger chances than I am now permitted to take.

Three times I have suggested risks and been turned down and each time the risk was warranted.

Diary, August 9

Visited the XV Corps to see that they get going [to the north] . . . Since there is a gap, and a large one, between Mayenne and LeMans [between the First and Third Armies], we moved the 8oth Division . . . into it as a precautionary measure.

On the outskirts of Brest, Grow was attacked in the rear by Germans leaving Morlaix. He turned his division around, dispersed the German movements, and captured a general, whom he sent to Patton.

Patton had him in for a talk.

I had two sentinels with fixed bayonets at my truck – usually I have more. I had one table and one chair so he had to stand. He was a good type man 58 years old and had fought well.

Gay’s Journal, August 9,

Lt. Gen. [Karl] Spang, captured near Brest was brought to the headquarters . . . Through an interpreter, Patton interviewed him as follows:

Patton: I have had the opportunity of interviewing other German generals whom I have captured, but never under circumstances so adverse to the cause of Germany.

Spang: (He saluted.)

Patton: I regret that the General, who is a professional soldier, should feel obliged to continue a useless struggle. However, I am not asking anyone to stop fighting . . . The small force of Germans in the Brittany Peninsula are opposed by an American corps of 100,000 men, and there are more than a million more Americans attacking to the east.

Spang: By orders of the Higher Command, we had to continue to fight.

Patton: As between soldiers, I have nothing but respect for your attitude.

Spang: I was personally fighting until the very last minute and had fired the last round of my pistol, but was completely surrounded by your armored wagons and had no other alternative. I didn’t want to surrender, but was waiting for a round of ammunition to hit me.

Patton: I stated that I had nothing but respect, but I regret that brave men must be killed in a hopeless cause.

Spang: (He saluted.) I cannot voice a personal opinion about that.

Patton: I appreciate his feelings. You can tell the General that we will keep him here tonight and tomorrow he will be processed through normal prisoner of war channels to the States eventually.

Spang: (He saluted.)

Pattdn: An American officer . . . will see that he gets anything he wishes, and he will get his dinner and breakfast and be taken care of tonight – and we hope the German bombs don’t get either of us.

Spang: (He saluted twice.)

Diary, August 10

Flew to 12 th Army Group, as I am worried about the hole in our line from St. Hilaire to Mayenne, and also another gap southwest of Alencon. The people at army group headquarters did not take any interest as Bradley feels that there is/no danger, but anyhow I am concentrating the 7th Armored at Fougeres just in case of trouble.

It was odd for Patton to be so conservative in his view and for Bradley to be so cavalier. Actually, the Germans were thinking of and had started planning an attack through one or the other of the two gaps. But the pressure being exerted by all the Allied armies – Crerar’s First Canadian (which had become operational in the closing days of July), Demp-sey’s Second British, Hodges’ First U.S., and Patton’s Third – would prevent the Germans from launching any offensive and soon compel them to begin withdrawing from Normandy.

Diary, August 11

Visited XV Corps . . . I could not find LeClerc of the zd French Armored, as he was running around the front, although I followed him further up than caution should have permitted . . .

Got home to find that Gaffey had not yet got the VIII Corps going, so we can release the 4th Armored [from Brittany]. I was quite angry.

Since Brittany had become relatively unimportant, Patton was trying to move as many units out of Brittany as he could. The 4th Armored Division was the first one he wanted to dispatch to the more important operations oriented on the Paris-Orleans gap.

But Wood was at Lorient, holding and containing a substantial German garrison that had barricaded itself inside that fortress city. Since Grow faced a similar situation at Brest, against an even larger German force, and since the operations at St. Malo had yet to be entirely completed, Middleton felt – with Bradley’s support – that no units should be withdrawn from Brittany until the business there was finished.

Meanwhile, Patton was forming in his mind possible combinations of divisions and corps he could send to the east. The planning and execution involved in these movements were enormously complicated. Each division numbered more than 15,000 men and thousands of vehicles. To get them on specific roads at appropriate times so they would not interfere with the movements of others required exceptional and ruthless scheduling and timing.

Diary, August 12

Decided to put the XII Corps, under Cook, southeast of the XV Corps, that is, on the right flank . . . This will permit us to retain a stranglehold on the Brest Peninsula, having two combat teams of the 6th Armored Division take over [at Lorient] from the 4th, if Bradley consents. Middleton came and I explained it to him. He was disappointed [to lose forces] but nice as usual . . .

Cook came in and we talked over his mission. He understands [what to do] . . .

Visited the Chateau Fougeres. It is one of the best, from a military point of view, that I have ever seen because the dwelling part of it was destroyed by Richelieu and people have not lived in it and improved it. It has only been taken twice until we took it, although it dates from 1100.

The XX Corps jumped off this morning.

Editorial, “General Patton” Washington Star, August 12, 1944

Ever since the invasion of Sicily, the German high command and its forces in the field have had a healthy respect for General Patton. They know a good commander when they see one and are mauled by him. The unfortunate slapping incident did not change their opinion of the man, nor did any of the intemperate criticism of him in this country. During his long absence from combat, they have been speculating a bit nervously about where he might turn up next. Now they think they have the answer. According to the Nazi news agency Transocean, they strongly suspect that he is in France commanding “the Third American Army.” This news agency respectfully adds that he is “an exponent of mobile warfare.”

General Eisenhower’s headquarters has made no such announcement and no Allied communique has even hinted about “the Third American Army” or the whereabouts of General Patton. Nevertheless, although the Germans may be all wrong, they cannot be blamed if they suspect that something new has been added to our power in France. And since General Patton is most certainly “an exponent of mobile warfare” and since our forces are spreading and racing like a prairie fire right up to the environs of Paris, the Nazi agency’s report is at least logical and may yet be confirmed as true. And if it is, all the loose things said about General Patton in the past will seem worse than childish. A great number of Americans would be happy to see this one come to pass, vindicating a man who may be short on diplomacy but whose qualities as a fighting officer are beyond dispute.

Diary, August 13

This morning we decided that since the XX Corps was hitting nothing, we had best send it northeast, east of Le Mans . . .

The XV Corps . . . has taken Alencon and the Sees-Argentan line and is in battle to the north. This corps could easily advance to Falaise and completely close the gap [between Argentan and Falaise and thereby encircle two German Armies], but we have been ordered to halt because the British sowed the area between with a large number of time bombs [dropped from the air]. I am sure that this halt is a great mistake, as I am certain that the British [actually thq Canadians, moving fram Caen to the south] will not close on Falaise.

Three days later he added:

After I had telephonic orders to halt from Leven Allen . . . I again called him at 1215 and asked if he had any orders to permit me to advance [north beyond Argentan]. I told him . . . it was perfectly feasible to continue the operation. Allen repeated the order [from Bradley] to halt on the line and consolidate.

I believe that the order . . . emanated from the 21st Army Group, and was either due to [British] jealousy of the Americans or to utter ignorance of the situation or to a combination of the two. It is very regrettable that the XV Corps was ordered to halt, because it could have gone on to Falaise and made contact with the Canadians northwest of that point and definitely and positively closed the escape gap [through which the Germans on August 13 were starting to withdraw].

Bradley stopped the corps because it was already across the boundary separating the 21st and 12 th Army Groups; Americans were operating in the British-Canadian zone. Out of consideration for coalition courtesy, Bradley halted further incursion and awaited an invitation from Montgomery to continue the advance. Under the mistaken impression that the Canadians could more easily close the pocket from the north, Montgomery made no sign for Bradley to move.

Bradley had other reasons. He was concerned about the 75-mile gap stretching between the XV Corps of the Third Army and Collins’ VII Corps of the First. He felt too that the Germans, who were withdrawing from the pocket, which had yet to be closed, might stampede and overrun Patton’s divisions at Argentan. As he later said, he preferred a firm shoulder at Argentan rather than a broken neck.

Restrained at Argentan, yet seeking to continue his movements, Patton had an idea of how to get into motion the deeper envelopment he had earlier suggested. He wanted to pinch off the two German Armies by sending another encircling column to the Seine River.

What he was thinking of was

getting the XX Corps moving on Dreux and the XII Corps on Chartres, the XV Corps remaining where it now is. In this formation I can turn from north to southeast without crossing columns and can shift divisions between corps at will . . .

It should be a very great success, God helping and Monty keeping hands off.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, August 13, 1944

This is better and much bigger than Sicily and so far all has gone better than I had a right to expect. L’audace, Paudace, toujours Faudace...

Our losses have been very light and we have killed five thousand and captured over thirty thousand. It’s a great life but very dusty.

When I eventually emerge [from the obscurity] it will be quite an explosion. I have stolen the show so far and the press is very mad that they can’t write it.

Destiny is quite pleased but conceals it. Omar is fine.

A lot of bombs just fell and Willie is most unhappy. I hope they have finished [bombing] for the night.

With such interesting things happening, it is funny there is so little to say ...

This is probably the fastest and biggest pursuit in history.

Diary, August 14

In exactly two weeks the Third Army has advanced farther and faster than any Army in the history of war . . .

To visit Haislip whom we found quite pepped up. I told him of my plan to move the XX Corps on Dreux and the XII Corps on Chartres.

I then flew back . . . to see Bradley and sell him the plan. He consented, and even permitted me to change it so as to move the XX Corps on Chartres, the XV Corps on Dreux, and the XII Corps on Orleans. He will also let me keep the 80th and give Middleton an infantry division from the First Army to replace the 6th Armored in Brittany.

It is really a great plan, wholly my own, and I made Bradley think he thought of it. “Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first we practice to deceive.”

I am very happy and elated.

I got all the corps moving by 2030 so that if Monty tries to be careful, it will be too late.

What he did was to split Haislip’s corps, leaving three divisions at Argentan and sending the other two and the corps headquarters toward Dreux. This gave him, in effect, three corps heading eastward toward the Seine River and the Paris-Orleans gap.

It was tremendously exciting. This was heady warfare fought by divisions and corps rather than by platoons, companies, and battalions as in the Cotentin. Showing an audacity bordering on the reckless, Patton was the perfect leader in exactly the right place at the right time to exploit the fast-moving and fast-changing situation.

Diary, August 15

Patch and the Seventh Army landed . . . [in southern France] this morning...

The number of cases of war-wearies (the new name for cowardice) and self-inflicted wounds have dropped materially since we got moving. People like to play on a winning team.

Leclerc of the 2d French Armored Division came in, very much excited . . . he said, among other things, that if he were not allowed to advance on Paris, he would resign. I told him in my best French that he was a baby, and I would not have division commanders tell me where they would fight, and that anyway I had left him in the most dangerous place. We parted friends.

There was every intention to let the French armored division enter Paris first. What alarmed Leclerc was that if the two American divisions of the XV Corps reached the Seine River at Mantes-Gassicourt, they would be 30 miles from the capital, much nearer than anyone else and certainly much nearer than the French at Argentan. Perhaps the march of events would dictate the entry of Americans into Paris rather than the French.

But the liberation of Paris was still in the future.

Summerall was writing to Mrs. Patton. He had just heard the news of the invasion of southern France, and he knew that Patton must be leading it. He had also learned that Senator Reynolds would now press for Patton’s confirmation as permanent major general.

Diary, August 15

Bradley came down to see me suffering from nerves. There is a rumor, which I doubt, that there are five panzer divisions at Argentan, so Bradley wants me to halt my move to the east on the line of Chartres . . . Dreux, and Chateaudun. His motto seems to be, “In case of doubt, halt.”

I am complying with the order, and by tomorrow I can probably persuade him to let me advance [farther].

I wish I were Supreme Commander.

CHAPTER 28Breakout

CHAPTER 28
Breakout