CHAPTER 29
Pursuit

“I have never given a damn what the enemy was going to do or where he was. What I have known is what I have intended to do and then have done it. By acting in this manner I have always gotten to the place he expected me to come about three days before he got there.”

THREE ESPECIALLY WELCOME PIECES of news reached Patton on August 16. The first was the capture of Chateaudun, Dreux, Chartres, and Orleans by the Third Army.

The second was his appointment to Major General, Regular Army, with date of rank from September 2, 1943.

The third was Eisenhower’s public announcement that the Third Army was actively participating in the campaign and that Patton commanded it. All the achievements of the past two weeks could now be revealed in the newspapers – the marvelous breakout from the Cotentin and the subsequent pursuit of the defeated German forces, the extending right arm that had encircled the two German armies in Normandy at Argentan, the immense area of France that had been liberated, from Brest in the west more than 250 miles to the east.

Hooray, hooray, hooray! Keyes wrote him when he heard the news on the radio. The anouncement only confirmed what Keyes had felt – that Patton’s Army must be responsible for the big gains.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, August 16, 1944

I supposed you had guessed it. We took Brittany, Nantes, Angers, LeMans, and Alencon and several other places still secret but just at the moment the fear of they has stopped us on what was the best run yet . . . I feel that if [I were] only unaided I could win this war. But people evolve enemy armies [out of the air] and every one ducks . . .

I visited two Evac[uation] Hospitals to day and for the first time our wounded wanted to go back and fight – on the winning team at last...

Well I am delighted and know that your long loving loyal confidence in me is justified.

Letter, Harbord to GSP, Jr., August 16, 1944

You have been patient under a good deal of misrepresentation and some adversity and you have come through as I always knew you would, and are the greatest American cavalryman of your time or any other time that I know of.

A young member of the Army headquarters was elated. He could finally tell his family how proud and lucky he was to be with Patton, “the greatest commander who ever lived”

The Reverend G. Cyril Green of Knutsford wrote to say that Patton had “changed the whole face of the war.”

It was true. Patton’s leverage had transformed a local breakthrough into a theater-wide triumph. He had dissolved the specter of static warfare and spread the excitement of mobile operations.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Stimson, August 16,

Now that I am released to the public, I can . . . write you very briefly about our operations.

It was very evident when we broke through at Avranches that the situation indicated taking calculated risks. As a matter of fact, these risks were not so great because I have – or think I have, a sixth sense as to when I think the enemy morale is shaken. It is certainly shaken now so that we could do what we did with great impunity, and the results have proved this to be a fact. . .

I have to leave now to inspect one of the corps but I could not start out without telling you on this first day which I am public property how deeply beholden I am to you for your considerate confidence in me.

Diary, August 16

To Chartres, which had just been taken, and met Walker at the bridge . . .

[Then to XV Corps] Haislip in the vicinity of Mantes [on the Seine River] . . .

When I returned to Third Army headquarters at 1830, Bradley called up and directed that I use the 2d French, 90th, and 80th Divisions to capture a town called Trun about halfway up in the gap [still separating the Canadians and the Americans, there to meet the Canadians and close the Argentan-Falaise pocket]. He said that Gerow of the V Corps [in the First Army] would arrive in a couple of days to take over the command of these divisions as his own corps had been pinched out.

I told him that pending the arrival of Gerow, I would make a temporary’ corps with Gaffey [like the Provisional Corps he had created for Keyes in Sicily].

Gaffey left [for Argentan] at 2000 with orders to attack tomorrow morning.

At 2330, Bradley called up and told me to withhold the attack [to Trun] until he, Bradley, ordered it.

I delivered this order.

Life is rather dull.

Patton could not understand the propensity to delay in the interest of orderliness. To him, it was essential to press home advantages, to keep the enemy off balance, to drive ruthlessly.

Bradley was trying to avoid a disastrous head-on collision between Canadians and Americans.

Diary, August 17

At 0700, Gerow called from Gaffey’s headquarters north of Argentan, saying he was there with a small staff, ready to take command.

I told him that since Gaffey had arranged the attack, which might come off at any moment, Gaffey should run it and he, Gerow, could take over as the opportunity afforded.

I could not talk to Bradley on the radio as it is too dangerous, so I decided to fly up and see him.

The weather was so bad that I could not take off until 1200, arriving at headquarters 12th Army Group at 1250. Hodges was there, also under the impression that Gerow was commanding. The temporary corps [under Gaffey] . . . is attacking in conjunction with the rest of the First Army, and for this reason it is sound that Gerow should run it.

Imagining that something like this would happen, I told Gay before I left headquarters that I would call him on the radio and that if Gerow was to take over at once, I would simply say, “Change horses.”

I therefore called Gay on the phone and gave the phrase, adding that the attack should take place at once on same objectives. I doubt whether in the history, of the world an attack order was ever shorter.

Gay recorded the incident as folllows. He received a phone call from 12 th Army Group at 1430, and Patton came on the line.

Patton: Swap horses. Start attack. Initial objective four miles southeast of present assigned objective. When initial objective is taken, continue to original objective [Trun], thence on.

Gay: What is meant by thence on?

Patton: Another Dunkirk.

This, no doubt, was the origin of the remark attributed to Patton and later widely quoted – that in a conversation with Bradley, when he was pleading to be allowed to go beyond Argentan, he supposedly said, “Let me continue, and I’ll drive the limeys into the sea.”

By “another Dunkirk,” he meant that if Gerow’s corps reached Trun and found no Canadians there, Gerow was to continue as far as he could go

Gay then phoned Gaffey and repeated the message. Gaffey put Gerow

on, and Gay gave the message to him.

Gerow: What do you mean by swap horses?

Gay: It means you in place of Gaffey.

Gerow: Did this come from Eagle 6? [Bradley]

Gay: It came from Lucky 6 [Patton], who at that time was with Eagle 6.

Gaffey came back to the Third Army headquarters, and Gerow decided it was too late in the day to execute Gaffey’s plan of attack. Gerow drew up his own plan and issued orders for the attack to start the following morning. Thus, the change in command gave the Germans 24 additional hours to extricate troops from the pocket.

To some extent this was Patton’s fault. In the absence of a corps headquarters or commander at Argentan, he had asked McBride, the 80th Division commander, who was the senior officer among the three division commanders in the Argentan area, to exercise a loose sort of coordination. Had Patton sent Gaffey to Argentan immediately to take Haislip’s place, Gaffey might have launched his attack to Trun 24 hours earlier than the actual jump-off.

In any event, the Canadians took Trun and the Americans Chambois and thereby closed the Argentan-Falaise pocket, where the Germans lost 50,000 troops. The considerable numbers who had escaped soon discovered they were threatened by another encirclement at the Seine River.

Haislip’s corps will press the attack to secure Mantes and thereby close to the Seine . . .

I will close [turn] the XX and XII Corps to the north to support this movement. We got the directive for this operation at 2210.

The XV Corps will attack in the morning.

I phoned a warning order over the radio to the XX Corps, but could not say where. However, I happened to meet Walker on the road and told him the general idea ...

I fear that Cook [XII Corps] is out of this war with bad arteries. He is a fine man and very sorry about leaving, and I am sorry to have him go...

LeClerc cut up again today and Gaffey had to ask him categorically whether he would disobey a written order.

Leclerc, finding himself committed to attack under Gerow near Argentan, was aching to go to Paris. After the pocket was closed, Gerow’s V Corps, including Leclerc’s division, would be ordered to liberate the capital.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to H. H. Arnold, August ij, 1944

The swell job which your Air Force, particularly . . . the fighter-bombers of the XIX Tactical Air Command under General Weyland, is doing. After we got the enemy on the move, the tanks pushed him so hard he could not deploy but had to stick to the roads, and the fighter-bombers would then come down and get him. For about 250 miles I have seen the calling cards of the fighter-bombers, which are bullet marks in the pavement and burned tanks and trucks in the ditches ...

Tooey Spaatz was over here the other day and has provided me with an airplane which I deeply appreciate.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Marshall, August 17, 1944

Due to the confidence reposed in me by yourself and General Eisenhower, I had the opportunity, as you know, of resuming active operations . . . Since that time we have captured about 47,000 Germans, killed some 10,000, and wounded an undetermined number. We have also been very fortunate in destroying tanks and various sorts of motor vehicles.

The cooperation between the Third Army and the XIX Tactical Air Command . . . has been the finest example of the ground and air working together that I have ever seen ...

We are still troubled by the lack of initiative in officers, especially in the lower grades, both on the battlefield and on the march. I have seen many instances where officers were sitting in their vehicles, doing nothing, when had they been active, as they were instructed to be, and gone forward, they could have removed the temporary road block or other hindrances...

It is a great pleasure and privilege to work with General Bradley and General Hodges ...

So far as I am concerned, I have made no statements or permitted any quotations, and I shall continue to follow this policy.

Again thanking you for your many acts of forebearance and confidence.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Maj. Gen. J. A. Crane, August ij, 1944

I have given up wearing two pistols, at least on the outside. I now wear one on the belt and one under my arm, the latter for social purposes only. We are having a hell of a war here, out-Sicilying Sicily.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, August 18, 1944

The family [Canadians] got Falaise . . . I could have had it a week ago but modesty via destiny made me stop . . .

This Army covers so much ground that I have to fly in cubs most places. I don’t like it. I feel like a clay pigeon . . .

I have no apetite. I never do when I am fighting. It is a good thing as it is hard to get exercise . . .

Courtney is realy a moron . . .

Omar is O.K. but not dashing. All that I have to do [I do] over protest. I just pushed on a lot and will be warned of over extension when the phone works. Luckily it is out for the time [being].

Omar was picked for his present job long before the slap.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Harbord, August 18, 1944

The operations which the Third Army have been fortunate enough to conduct in a successful manner were largely the result of the efforts of General Bradley’s Army prior to my arrival on the scene. I was simply fortunate in being able to exploit the successes he had initiated...

Our chief success was due to the fact that we cut the armored divisions loose and did not tie them to the infantry. However, we always kept one combat team of infantry motorized so that in the event of a serious situation, they would be available within a few hours to the armored divisions ...

Our losses so far have been extremely small, and we have inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy . . . His loss of materiel is something unbelievable.

I deeply appreciate the confidence which you reposed in me during the dark hours of my career and trust that I have in some measure justified this confidence.

He sent exactly the same letter to Summerall.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Frederick Ayer, August 18, 1944

I have had quite a lot of fun personally ...

We have been going so fast that our chief difficulty consists in our inability to emulate Ariadne and keep our spiderweb behind us. Our supply people, however, have really done marvels and we have always had sufficient of everything...

For purposes of secrecy, we are usually 48 hours ahead of where the papers say we are, because we never release our locations until the German radio has published them.

The weather has been just as good as it was for the Germans in 1940, and also for them in Poland in 1939 . . .

The part of France we are now in has suffered hardly at all except at the railroad stations where we have bombed all the tracks, but these are being repaired very rapidly.

Diary, August 18

In spite of the fact that I dispatched an order by armored car to the XV Corps at 2000 last night, which was an extension of the warning order sent by radio phone, the message did not reach them until 0600 today. Regardless of this fact, they jumped off and reached Mantes, meeting with small opposition . . .

I visited Cook at the hospital. His circulation is so bad that he has no feeling in his hands or legs below the elbows and knees, and his toes are turning black. It is impossible for him to walk a hundred yards. After a long conversation, in which I was very frank and honest, I told him that in justice to himself and his men, I could not retain him in command. It was a great blow to us both.

Letter, sister Nita to GSP, Jr., August 19, 1944

Dear Georgie: Well you are surely getting your revenge on all the slimy jealous toads who tried to do you harm. More power to you. They cannot keep a good man down and my Gosh, as I have said before, you are a natural leader of men. Papa is proud of you these days, I know, and yearning over his fair haired boy.

Time magazine had the nerve to ring up and tell me that they (of all people) had always been so sympathetic with you!!! I had to be polite but it was hard. The nerve of some magazines!!!!

That nasty Tom Trainer from the L.A. Times who is one of your correspondents dared to say when he was home and giving a speech that your men did not like you. I should be very happy if he could be made to eat his words, for never was a bigger lie!!!!

Lordy I wish I could see you going down by the Arc de Triumph in your tank. You are a modern knight in shining armour, and that is one trouble, the Toads do not like knights in shining armour, they like home town boys who sold papers on the street when the weather was cold, in other words newsmen do not LIKE GENTLEMEN.

Diary, August 19

I flew to Chateauneuf, then drove, via Dreux, to Mantes, and saw the Seine. I then flew to St. James, headquarters of the 12th Army Group...

Bradley had just returned from a visit to Monty and Ike. He now has a new plan. He thinks there are still Germans east of Argentan and in order to check up on this pocket, he wants me to move the 5th Armored Division of the XV Corps north along the west bank of the Seine to Louviers, while the XIX Corps of the First Army comes up on its left . . . The British were asked to do this but said they could not move fast enough.

This was true.

I asked if the 79th could make a bridgehead at Mantes [in other words, cross the Seine], and was given reluctant permission.

I then asked if I could take Melun-Fontainebleau and Sens. By getting these, in addition to the crossing at Mantes, the line of the Seine becomes useless to the enemy.

Bradley said it was too risky, but eventually I talked him into letting me try Monday, the 21st, if I do not receive a stop order by midnight, Sunday, the 20th.

I also asked for a plan of future operations and an inter-Army boundary, extending well to the front so I can plan supply – to the present time the boundary has always stopped at the front line.

To placate Montgomery, Eisenhower is going to put the Ninth Army between him [Montgomery] and the First Army and let them turn northeast, while the First and Third Armies go east. There is also some talk of sending the VIII Corps south over the Loire [River] at Nantes to clear up the area.

Bradley also declined to let me withdraw the 6th Armored Division from Brittany for fear of a possible [German] attack from the south [across the Loire]. In my opinion, such an attack is wholly impossible because the bridges are out, there are very few Germans [south of the Loire], and those that still exist [there] have to walk [meaning, have no transportation]. Therefore, even if they cross at the Loire, they can do no harm.

How right he was about the Germans south of the Loire would soon become apparent. About 20,000 troops stationed along the Atlantic coast south of Bordeaux started marching to the northeast to avoid the converging drives of Patton’s Third Army and of Patch’s Seventh Army coming up the Rhone valley. Harassed by French Forces of the Interior and by Allied aircraft, they would soon send word they were ready to surrender.

Codman flew to Vannes and brought my old friend, General Koechlin-Schwartz, French Army, of the Langres days [in World War I], up to spend the night. He said, “Had I taught 25 years ago what you are doing, I should have been put in a madhouse, but when I heard that an armored division was headed for Brest, I knew it was you”

He said that the trouble with the French army of 1940 was that for ten years they had taught, thought, and practiced defense, never attack. I reminded him that at Langres [at the staff college] he had said, “The poorer the infantry, the more artillery it needs; the American infantry needs all it can get.” He was right then, and still is.

I phoned the XV Corps to attack [across the Seine as well as down the left bank] and will have the XX and XII Corps commanders in tomorrow to explain what to do.

Civil life will be mighty dull – no cheering crowds, no flowers, no private airplanes. I am convinced that the best end for an officer is the last bullet of the war. Quelle vie [What a life].

Stiller notes, no date

We had just finished pushing up to and against the Seine River at Mantes-Gassicourt; returned to our headquarters and on arrival were informed by the chief of staff that General B.fradley] was on his way and was “fit to be tied.” He wanted to see Gen. P.fatton],

About ten minutes after our arrival, Gen. B. arrived and he immediately launched into the fact that they had had a big conference and decided that the Third Army shouldn’t go beyond . . . Dreux . . . and Chartres . . . [and toward] the Seine . . . [so as to] leave an escape route . . . for the Germans in the Falaise pocket . . .

After Gen. B. had informed Gen. P. [he] was not to advance any further and that was that, Gen. P. told Gen. B. that since he was already to the Seine River, in fact had pissed in the river that morning and had just come from there, what would he want him to do – pull back .. ?

After much discussion Gen. B. told him how strong the people [Germans] were in the Falaise pocket and didn’t think Gen. P. would be able to contain them, and it was his orders to leave an escape route to the east [for them].

Gen. P. asked him if he ever knew him to give up a piece of ground he had taken.

Gen. B. said, “No, but this was different.”

Gen. P. said that he could and would hold it, if Gen. B. would agree.

So it was agreed that he would hold what he had, which he did, thereby closing the escape route that they had been wanting to hold open.

Gen. B. left Gen. P.’s headquarters quite cheerfully, after saying to Gen. P. – “It certainly is a pleasure to talk to someone who is sure and confident. The picture looks much different from here. But for my sake, stay put there now – don’t advance any further across the river. I’ll try to sell them this, but – “ etc.

After Gen. B. left, I remarked to Gen. P. – “Well, you certainly charged his battery.”

Gen. P. said, “I did what?”

I said, “You charged his battery. I don’t think he will have any trouble starting his engine for a few days now.” . . .

[Without this] crossing of the Seine . . . Montgomery might well still be sitting on his “Caen.”

Stiller’s recollections were somewhat jumbled, but the flavor of his description was not too far off the mark.

Diary, August 20

One combat team of the 79th . . . crossed the river at Mantes with little opposition.

This was the first Allied unit across the Seine.

Had in Walker of the XX Corps and Eddy [who had replaced Cook] of the XII Corps and told them to get ready to move out at daylight Monday, the XX on Melun and Montereau, and the XII on Sens. I gave them one code word, “Proset,” which means “halt in place,” to be used in case Bradley loses his nerve at the last moment.

I always have a funny reaction before a show like this. I think of the plan and am all for it, and then just as I give the order, I get nervous and must say to myself, “Do not take counsel of your fears,” and then go ahead. It is like a steeple chase – you want to ride in it and then when the saddling bugle goes, you are scared, but when the flag drops, all is well.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, August 20, 1944

Unless I get a stop order in the next two hours, we are jumping again. On paper it looks very risky but I don’t think it [really] is.

Manton Eddy who took over Doc’s corps asked me when I told him his job: “How much shall I have to worry about my flank?”

I told him that depended on how nervous he was.

He has been thinking [that] a mile a day [was] good going. I told him to go fifty and he turned pale ...

Every one in this part of the country has quit work and stand along the roads cheering, throwing kisses or apples and offering wine, all as presents. I get quite an ovation, but all soldiers get some.

It will be pretty grim after the war to drive ones self and not be cheered but one gets used to any thing.

I used to wave back but now I just smile and incline my head – very royal.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to son George, August 21, 1944

I believe that by now you know where I am, but if you know what I am doing, you are smarter than the Germans.

We have been having a swell time, and I trust that good fortune continues to attend our efforts.

I have used one principle in these operations . . . and this is to —

’’Fill the unforgiving minute

“With sixty seconds worth of distance run.”

That is the whole art of war, and when you get to be a general, remember it!

I have never given a damn what the enemy was going to do or where he was. What I have known is what I have intended to do and then have done it. By acting in this manner I have always gotten to the place he expected me to come about three days before he got there.

We are having another try this morning which is the most audacious we have yet attempted, but I am quite sure it will work. [Handwritten:] It worked! We got the bridge at Sens before he [the Germans] blew it. That is worth a week.

The great difficulty we have experienced here is that we have moved so fast and so far that we are nearly always out of communication. However . . . [the service and supply] people have done a job which will be studied for years ...

Remember that in academics as in war the great thing is self-confidence. If you have self-confidence you have everything. Without self-confidence you have nothing.

Diary, August 21

We have, at this time, the greatest chance to win the war ever presented. If they will let me move on with three corps, two up and one back, on the line of Metz-Nancy-Epinal, we can be in Germany in ten days. There are plenty of roads and railroads to support the operation. It can be done with three armored and six infantry divisions . . . It is such a sure thing that I fear these blind moles don’t see it.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, August 21, 1944

We jumped seventy miles to day and took Sens, Montereau, and Melun so fast the bridges were not blown. If I can keep on the way I want to go I will be quite a fellow . . .

We are going so fast that I am quite safe. My only worries are my relations not my enemies.

Well I will stop and read the Bible so asto be ready to have celestial help in my argument tomorrow to keep moving.

Letter, Stimson to Mrs. Patton, August 21, 1944

The attack in which he has been the commander of the leading forces bids fair to result in one of the most decisive victories the American army has ever achieved, and the daring and energy by which his work has been characterized are so dramatic that they will never be forgotten.

According to a radio broadcaster’s description:

A fiction writer couldn’t create him. History itself hasn’t matched him. He’s colorful, fabulous. He’s dynamite. On a battlefield, he’s a warring, roaring comet . . .

Columnists, correspondents, and troops have called him Old Blood and Guts, Hurry Up and Wait, Buck Rogers, Six Gun, Flash Gordon, the Green Hornet, the Man from Mars, Iron Pants, and that Disciplinary So and So . . .

The world knows Patton mainly as a roaring, brilliant man of battle. But General George Patton is also a devotee of Kipling, Service, and Burns. He has written two volumes of poetry . . .

Striding across a battlefield, two 45-caliber Colt revolvers strapped to his hips, or riding his tanks, with his head poking out, cased in a huge helmet, his eyes glare, and he roars encouragement, orders, advice, and oaths all at once.

As Patton has said, “You can’t run an army without profanity.” As his men say, “You’ve never lived until you have been cussed out by General Patton.” Veterans of the African campaigns used to say when they heard a demolition charge explode nearby: “That’s General Patton telling General Eisenhower something— in confidence.”

Back in the days when Patton first started to climb in Army rank, his friends warned him to tone down his speech. As he said then: “I’ve got to be dignified, dammit.”

The story is told that once at Fort Benning, when tanks were needed for men to train and supplies were held up, Patton bought them from Sears Roebuck on his own responsibility. And reported solemnly to Washington bigwigs that he had found “a new source of supply.”

Patton understands the psychology of battle. His pep talks before and after battles are sometimes beautiful enough to be called reverent – sometimes scourging . . .

Yes, Patton will be a legend. To his men he is one of the greatest fighting generals alive.

Diary, August 22

Flew to 12th Army Group at 1130 to see Bradley about my plan, but found he had gone to see Eisenhower and Monty, so left my plan with Allen. It seems that Bradley has an almost identical plan, only he uses two Armies.

I told him that I feared that Middleton was through as an active commander, as he is too querulous.

Middleton was preparing to launch an all-out attack to take Brest, and he kept saying he needed more troops, more ammunition, more air support, and more time. He remembered the difficulties and hard fighting at St. Malo, and he anticipated even more at Brest. He would be right.

Diary, August 23

The brother of the Swedish Consul in Paris, a man named Ralph Nordling, and a group of other French individuals from Paris were in camp with a proposition. I immediately thought that this might be the asking for a surrender [on the part of Germany] . . . It turned out that these people simply wanted to get a suspension of hostilities in order to save Paris, and probably save some Germans. I sent them to Bradley.

There had been a spontaneous uprising in Paris on August 19, headed by the police, and the German commander in the city concluded an armistice with the Resistance to prevent harm to Paris and its inhabitants. In the mistaken belief that the armistice would terminate on the 23rd, Nordling and his small group traveled to the Allied forces to request that regular troops be sent to liberate Paris at once in order to prevent the Germans from destroying the city. This spurred Eisenhower to change the Allied plans and to dispatch the 2d French Armored Division, under Gerow’s V Corps, to the capital.

[Juin] came in . . . and he was quite complimentary and said that my daring was Napoleonic. He also said that the soft place in the Siegfried Line [or West Wall, defending the German border] is through Nancy Gap. I had come to this conclusion simply by a study of the road map. It is my belief that wherever you see numbers of good roads, the going is good. I am not particularly interested in the strength of the line itself, because I believe that American troops can break any [defensive] line ...

To go east as I planned, I need two more divisions . . . so I decided to see Bradley . . . I rather hate to go east with only four divisions...

When I got to Laval, Bradley was waiting for me on his way to see Ike and Monty. He was quite worried, as he feels that Ike won’t go against Monty and that the American Armies will have to turn north in whole or in part [to support Montgomery] . . . Bradley was madder than I have ever seen him and wondered aloud “what the Supreme Commander amounted to.” ....

It occurred to me that we must go north [rather than east]. The XX Corps from Melun and Montereau and the XII Corps from Sens can do it faster than anyone else. By heading on Beauvais . . . [the XV Corps can] cross at Mantes and paralleling the Seine, open that river to the British and Canadians, and have our supplies come across at Mantes, thereby reducing the present [supply] haul by 50%.

This is the best strategical idea I have ever had. I sold it to Allen. If Bradley approves, he has only to wire me, “Plan A,” by 1000 tomorrow. If I do not hear anything by that time, I shall then move east as already decided in “Plan B.” I am having the staff put both plans in concrete form. This may well be a momentous day.

Patton’s Plan A was very much like the hook he had fashioned from Le Mans to Argentan. It projected a sweep to the north to Beauvais, which would cut off and encircle the bulk of the German troops remaining in France. The disadvantage was that it would send American divisions across the projected paths of advance of the British and Canadian Armies.

I cannot understand why Monty keeps on asking for all four Armies [to be] in the Calais area and then [move] through Belgium, where the tanks are practically useless now [because of the numerous canals] and will be wholly useless this winter. Unfortunately, he has some way of talking Ike into his own way of thinking,

I told Bradley that if he, Hodges, and myself offered to resign unless we went east, Ike would have to yield, but Bradley would not agree and said we owed it to the troops to hold on, because if we left, the pickings [other jobs] were poor.

I think other motives activated him. I feel that in such a showdown we would win, as Ike would not dare to relieve us.

The real issue was the shape of future operations. Montgomery had opened an argument with Eisenhower on August 19, when Eisenhower decided to cross the Seine River without pause and gave Bradley permission to do so. Plans drawn before the invasion had the British and Canadian Armies going around the Ardennes region on the north while the two American Armies moved around the Ardennes on the south. Montgomery contended that the Allied thrust beyond the Seine and toward the German border should be concentrated rather than dispersed, and further, that the most important objectives lay in the north, in his zone of operations – the V-i and V-2 rocket-missile launching sites in the Calais area, the Rhine River, which was closer to his forces than to the Americans, the Channel ports, particularly Antwerp, required to support the growing Allied establishment on the Continent, This became known as the narrow-front approach.

Eisenhower favored a broad-front advance, with all the Armies continuing to move forward in order to stretch the German defenses and, more significantly, to preserve equal glory for the Allied forces. As Supreme Allied Commander, he had to prevent the British or the Americans alone from winning the final victory. Triumph had to be shared.

Since the speed of the advance during the breakout and pursuit was making it increasingly difficult for the Communications Zone to supply the Armies across the lengthening distance from the supply dumps near the invasion beaches, Montgomery believed that some Armies should be halted so that sufficient supplies could go to the Armies operating in the most important zone.

Bradley and Patton felt that they were responsible for the swift gains in August, Bradley by Cobra, Patton by his reckless exploitation, and they saw no reason why they should be halted in favor of British-Canadian progress.

Diary, August 24

BBC said this morning that Patton’s Third Army had taken Paris. Poetic justice. It will be refuted, but no one will pay any attention.

The announcement was premature by one day. A small contingent of Leclerc’s division, now operating under Hodges’ Army, would get to the Hotel de Ville in Paris at midnight, and the entire division, reinforced by the U.S. 4th, would liberate the city on the 25th. Although it made sense, given the disposition of the troop units, to have the First Army liberate Paris, Patton resented being denied the pleasure of entering the city as a conquering hero.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Keyes, August 24, 1944

You would certainly like this kind of a war, and you are the only man I know with the cold nerve to do uncomplainingly the things I have been demanding, and get them done in spite of being told that it was impossible...

To attack with the limited forces I have now left available – since I occupy a 300 mile front [and had lost the XV Corps to Hodges] – I am taking chances, but I am convinced that the situation in the German Army warrants the taking of such risks, and I am sure that if we drive him hard enough now, we will cause the end of the war in a very few days. I may be super-optimistic, but I don’t think so.

Diary, August 25

Bradley called and asked me to come to his headquarters at Chartres at 1100. The cathedral is not hurt and is very lovely. All the glass has been removed; it is quite light. I said a prayer for continued success.

Hodges was at Bradley’s, and we got our new directive. The First Army of nine divisions will cross the Seine at Melun and Mantes, both of which places were captured and bridgeheads erected by the Third Army. He [Hodges] will then drive in the general direction of Lille. The Third Army with seven divisions . . . will advance in the direction of the line Metz-Strasbourg. The direction is part of my plan.

Diary, August 26

On via Nemours to beyond Montereau to the Headquarters 5th Division under Irwin. They have done a grand job and are full of pep. I complimented them and gave them some DSC’s.

Then drove back via XX Corps to Melun, where we crossed the Seine on a pontoon bridge, along with elements of the 3d Armored Division, who cheered me. Thence to Headquarters 7th Armored Division. I told Sylvester very clearly that I was not satisfied with his division, either as to looks or progress, and that he had to do better at once.

I then flew to headquarters XII Corps to see Eddy on the Sens-Troyes road. While I was there P Wood, 4th Armored, called to say he was in Troyes.

The 80th Division is to be assigned to the XII Corps today, so it will be able to carry out the new movement. Eddy asked when he should move, and I told him at 0800 on the 28th. He is not used to our speed yet, so was a little surprised.

When I got to camp [back home] I found that a flock of Red Cross doughnut girls had descended on us.

Among them was Jean Gordon, his niece, a beautiful and charming young lady from Boston, with whom he had for some time had a close relationship. Beatrice had alerted her husband to Jean’s presence in Europe, and he had replied on August 3: “The first I knew about Jean’s being here was in your letter. We are in the middle of a battle so [I] don’t meet people. So don’t worry.”

Diary, August 27

XX Corps took Nogent last evening and will continue on Reims. XII Corps is moving on Chalons via Vitry, leaving the 35th Division to cover the right flank. I am doing this [leaving the 35th] on the order of higher authority, as personally I do not believe there is anything south of the Loire.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to son George, August 28, 1944

We are really having a swell time and have just captured Chateau Thierry, which, while it was fought before you were born, you probably know about...

At the present time, my chief difficulty is not the Germans but gasoline. If they would give me enough gas, I could go anywhere I want . . .

I know how you must feel not being in the fight, because I felt the same way for almost a year myself, but just keep your shirt on and something will happen.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, August 28, 1944

We . . . will be in the big cathedral town by dark if all goes well. At the moment it is four hundred and ten miles from one flank of this Army to the other. That is the longest swath I have yet cut but it is so big that it is a little impersonal.

Diary, August 28

Today was the first day that I have received letters and clippings from home which appeared subsequent to the announcement of my commanding the Third Army, and I spent a very pleasant evening reading them . . .

Bradley came in at 10:30, and I had to beg like a beggar for permission to keep on to the line of the Meuse [River]. What a life.

Bradley told Patton that the emphasis in supplies would go to the First Army, which was in support of the British and Canadians who were heading toward the more important objectives. Furthermore, higher authorities had required Bradley to turn 3000 tons of supplies daily to Paris—to nourish the civilian population – and these items would, of course, be unavailable to the Third Army.

Diary, August 29

Went carefully over the situation. There is no real threat against us from anywhere so long as we do not let imaginary dangers worry us . . .

I told Eddy to move on Gommercy in the morning, and Gay will visit Walker and have him move on Verdun.

While at XII Corps, I found that, for unknown reasons, we had not been given our share of gas– 140,000 gallons short. This may be an attempt to stop me in a backhanded manner, but I doubt it. I will go to see Bradley in the morning and straighten the thing out. The fact that we can talk only by radio link is a great drawback because the enemy can hear this if he is listening, and I do not wish him to know we are short of gasoline.

Diary, August 30

To Chartres . . . Bradley, Bull (Ike’s G-3) and Leven Allen were all talking when I arrived. I asked to present my case for an immediate advance to the east and a rupture of the Siegfried Line before it can be manned.

Bradley was sympathetic but Bull – and I gather the rest of Ike’s staff – do not concur and are letting Montgomery overpersuade Ike to go north. It is a terrible mistake, and when it comes out in the after years, it will cause much argument.

The British have put it over again. We got no gas because, to suit Monty, the First Army must get most of it, and we are also feeding the Parisians.

When I got back . . . I found that Eddy . . . had told Gaffey during my absence that if he pushed on to Commercy, he would arrive with no gas, so Gaffey told him to halt near St. Dizier. I told Gaffey to run till his engines stop and then go on, on foot. We must and will get a crossing on the Meuse. In the last war I drained ¾ of my tanks to keep the other ¼ going. Eddy can do the same.

It is terrible to halt, even on the Meuse. We should cross the Rhine in the vicinity of Worms, and the faster we do it, the less lives and munitions it will take. No one realizes the terrible value of the “unforgiving minute” except me. Some way I will get on yet.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, August 50, 1944

I am headed for the Meuse, which I will get...

I have to battle for every yard but it is not the enemy who is trying to stop me, it is “They” ...

No one else ever tries as hard. But they are learning. Now the infantry rides the tanks, guns, any thing that moves, to get forward. It is not pretty, but it works. Look at the map! If I could only steal some gas, I could win this war. Sad 10 say a colored truck company did steal some for me by careful accident. Also I captured about a million gallons [of German gasoline]; it is poor gas but runs a hot engine.

We are now in our ninth CP northeast of Sens. The woods are full of nice black berries, of which I ate too many. I hope to get to Brest tomorrow to put some pep in that show. It is 420 miles away but I have secured a big plane.

Weather very bad for flying.

In his journal Gay noted the feeling around the headquarters that the diminishing supply of gasoline available was a plot to stop the Army from continuing its successful advances.

There was no plot, no conspiracy. As a matter of fact, there was not even a shortage of gasoline on the Continent. There was plenty of fuel in supply dumps near the invasion beaches and ports. The trouble was, there was no way to get enough of it forward to the leading units. The Red Ball Express, a dramatic expedient by the Communications Zone, was no real solution, for the consumption of gasoline by the trucks on their increasingly longer round trips decreased the amounts brought to the combat units. The breakout and pursuit had simply moved too fast to allow the logisticians to set up an orderly and adequate system of support.

Even Patton in his darkest moments realized this.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Dill, August 31, 1944

If you hear that we have been halted, it will be for reasons other than enemy activity, for so far we have beaten him wherever we have met him, and shall continue to do so whenever permitted.

The strain on our vehicles and our supplies has, of course, been heavy, but the supply officer of this Army has done an amazing job, and we can continue to go at any time that we are wanted.

He flew to Brittany with Bradley and talked with Middleton, who had opened his attack on Brest on August 25, with more than three divisions. The garrison of 40,000 Germans was fighting from excellent fortress positions and under first-rate leadership. It would take nearly three weeks, along with hard fighting, heavy air attacks, and a high expenditure of artillery shells, to capture the city, which by then would be demolished.

Why they persisted in this siege-type warfare to take a port city which they agreed would be useless was later explained by Bradley, as recorded by Patton:

He said to me, with reference to the Brest operation, “I would not say this to anyone but you, and have given different excuses to my staff and higher echelons, but we must take Brest in order to maintain the illusion of the fact that the U.S. Army cannot be beaten” More emotion than I thought he had. I fully concur in this view. Anytime we put our hand to a job we must finish it.

Patton spent the night with Bradley. Simpson was there, and they all arranged that he and his Ninth Army would take over Brittany and the Brest operation. He would also contain the German pocket at Lorient, using the 94th Division, which had just arrived on the continent, to relieve the 6 th Armored Division, which would then move east to Troyes and rejoin the Third Army when gasoline again became plentiful.

Bradley definitely wants us [Third Army] to go east but cannot persuade Eisenhower. This is the last day that Montgomery commands the U.S. troops, for which we all thank God!

On September 1, Eisenhower, while retaining his position as Supreme Allied Commander, replaced Montgomery in command of the Allied ground forces as had been planned long before the invasion. As Army Group commander, Montgomery continued to direct the British and Canadian Armies. In order to remove any appearance of demotion for Montgomery, he was promoted to field marshal.

Diary, September 1

At 0800 we heard on the radio that Ike said Monty, was the greatest living soldier and is now a Field Marshal. I then flew up to the Command Post and worked on administrative papers for the rest of the day.

Where, oh where, he wondered with real heartache, was the deserved tribute to him? He was the greatest living soldier. He had transformed Bradley’s local and limited breakthrough in the Cotentin into the glorious breakout and pursuit that had carried all the Allied Armies virtually to the German border. He had pulled off a great blitzkrieg. He had given color and tone and dizzying success to the campaign. He had provided the southern jaw of the pincer encircling the German Seventh Army at Argentan and again at the Seine. He had overrun a vast part of France – from Brest to Verdun, a distance of 500 miles. All this he had done in a single month.

Eisenhower was right to have kept Patton on the Overlord team. No one but Patton could have done what he did.

He must certainly have wondered whether his brilliant feat in August was the fulfillment of his destiny. Bigger, better, faster, and more spectacular than Sicily, his accomplishment in Normandy placed him squarely in the forefront of the great military leaders of all time. What else remained? How could he ever perform more spectacularly? Yet he must have decided that there was to be more. The war was not over yet. His destiny still lay ahead. There would be greater triumphs.

The press had filled its headlines with his name, and he had captivated and titillated the imagination of the world. Yet “they” were failing to award him the applause he merited; “they” were preventing him from continuing his victories. His troops had barely managed to get across the Meuse River at several places, and there his Army ran but of gasoline, sputtered, and stopped.

Hodges, along with Dempsey, continued to receive the dwindling supplies of fuel and would carry on the pursuit for almost two more weeks. No wonder Patton later became convinced that the absence of gasoline denied him the chance to end the war then and there.

Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, September i,

Realy I am amazed at the amount of ground the Third Army has taken, and it is chiefly due to me alone ...

They all get scared, and then I appear and they feel better ...

The Field Marshal thing made us sick, that is Bradley and me.