“Now we are just sitting and watching the bosch dig in, but it won’t be long now. Of course the weather is bad for us but it is worse for him”
Patton gave no impression of discouragement at a press conference held at 8 P.M., September 23. On the contrary, he was jovial.
Patton: I always feel at these meetings we should have on black hoods over our heads as in the Inquisition.
Question: [when was the Third Army going to start moving again?]
Patton: [Not] till we get supplies . . . There is no point in making a slow advance and you can’t make a rapid advance because we haven’t got the stuff right now. We can fight hard for five days and then we’ve got to throw rocks.
Question: Metz?
Patton: It is a hard nut. If we could get the supplies we need and with three good days of weather, we could take it. In fact, I am not going to get those soldiers killed until we have things on our side . . .
Question: Once through the Siegfried Line, will the advance be much like the last push?
Patton: I think we will go like shit through a tin horn.
Question: Rhine defenses formidable?
Patton: Only on account of the moat effect of the Rhine River, which has quite a rapid current.
Question: First Army on easier terrain?
Patton: Sure. How the hell do you think the son-of-a-bitches are getting along? But don’t tell them that I said that.
Question: Metz tougher than the Siegfried Line?
Patton: Yes. They have larger forts. They’ve been building forts there since Louis XVI. Our 105’s bounced off them and didn’t even nick them.
Question: Are you getting your share of the supply situation?
Patton: Yes, but unfortunately we cannot make five barley loaves and three small fishes expand as they used to ...
Question: Was Metz ever captured in history?
Patton: Not by assault. In 1871, the fort was, I think, starved out.
Question: Have you any indication of German secret weapons?
Patton: Bullshit.
Question: We making use of propaganda?
Patton: We drop about five or six leaflet bombs every day. The Psychological Warfare people make them up. I don’t know what they say.
Question: What effect are they having? Any? Or much?
Patton: I don’t believe so ...
Question: Will the improvement of the supply situation make possible a limited advance or a static situation?
Patton: It is my earnest effort to keep it from becoming static because that is a poor way of fighting. The best way to defend is to attack, and the best way to attack is to attack. At Chancellorsvilie, Lee was asked why he attacked when he was outnumbered three to one. Lee said he was too weak to defend.
Question: Will the Nazis go underground when the Allies get to Germany?
Patton: Six feet...
A man was reported [at West Point] for wasting toilet paper, and he said that he could not have been more careful if he had used both sides ...
Well, gentlemen, I repeat, whatever I said will not be used against me.
Patton drove to Nancy, met with his three corps commanders, and arranged a defensive front. He also instructed them to make limited attacks so that when the Third Army resumed the offensive, “as we will, we will have a good take-off line.”
Haislip was “very depressed’- by the prospect of leaving the Third Army, and Patton was “equally depressed” to think of losing him.
He formalized his orders in a letter of instruction the following day, reiterating that the acute supply situation had required Eisenhower to direct the Third Army to assume the defensive. But the change in attitude, Patton warned, had to be concealed from the enemy. Otherwise, the Germans would move troops from the Third Army front to oppose other Allied efforts. Because of that and because he wanted a suitable line of departure when offensive operations resumed, he ordered no digging in, no stringing of wires or mines. The troops on the defensive were to erect a thin outpost zone backed at suitable places by powerful mobile reserves. All artillery pieces were to be ready to take all possible avenues of enemy tank attack under heavy fire. Weyland was to be prepared to bring his fighter-bombers into action. Meanwhile, he wanted limited offensive operations
in consonance with our reduced scale of supply. Utmost parsimony will be used in expenditures of gasoline and ammunition consistent with the economy of the lives of our troops.
In closing, I desire to again compliment all of you on the magnificent dash and skill which you have shown in the operation to date. We only await the sign to resume our career of conquest.
Diary, September 25
My plan for taking the defense is to . . . rectify the line, thereby maintaining the offensive spirit in the troops so that when we will attack, we will not be pacifists.
On that day Operation Market-Garden came to an end. At a cost of almost 12,000 casualties, Montgomery secured a corridor of 65 miles into the Netherlands and gained bridgeheads across the Maas and Waal rivers, but not across the Rhine.
A wire from Marshall asked Patton to make contact, when convenient, with Marshall’s landlady during World War I at nearby Gondrecourt.
Taking three pounds of coffee and five pounds of sugar, Patton and Gampanole departed “in the pouring rain . . . We were glad of the excuse to go,” he informed Beatrice. “It was not the Germans who have stopped us, but higher strategy. Don’t worry.”
They learned from the mayor, who was touched by Patton’s visit, that Marshall’s friends no longer lived there and had moved to the south of France.
Driving to Chaumont, Patton and Campanole had a meal at the Hotel de France where, 27 years earlier, Pershing, Harbord, Colonel de Cham-brun, and Patton had lunched when they selected Chaumont to be the headquarters of the AEF.
After visiting Pershing’s house and the barracks where Patton’s offices had been located, they went to Langres, which “looked very natural” – apparently nothing had changed,
but we had no time to stop and drove on to Bourg. The first man I saw in the street there was standing on the same manure pile which he undoubtedly stood on in 1918. I asked him if he had been there in the last war, and he replied, “Yes, General Patton, you were then here as a Colonel.” Then we had an Old Home Week. He offered to show me around the town, which I really didn’t need, but nevertheless I permitted him to do this. I visited my old office, my billet, and the chateau of Madame de Vaux and took pictures.
It was all very nostalgic.
September 27 was a “big day for visiting firemen.” No less than nine generals called. Spaatz was
all for the Third Army. I have the air force in my pocket. As usual, Lee is a glib liar. Hughes was very much depressed at having to sit at the same table with him.
The problem – “and it will be a scandal some day” – was that Lee made “no preparation at all for Line of Communication troops” and was now asking for between eight and eleven infantry battalions “to do his dirty work.” He was also using all the vehicles from the newly arriving divisions “because he has failed in his supply set-up. I cannot understand why Eisenhower does not get rid of him.”
A telephone call from Bradley apprised him that Devers would take the XV Corps – “May God rot his guts.” He “felt very low. Must trust in God and my destiny.”
He tried to get drunk, he told Beatrice, but could not, “so for the first time since Palermo am taking a green pill” – probably for his digestion or to sleep.
If you were here, I would cry on your shoulder. Willie is no use. Some times I almost think that the fates are against me. Then I remember all the time I have “made a heap of all my winnings” . . . I took a long walk alone – not even Willie. Put two officers in arrest for speeding and felt better.
Patton visited the front to rid himself of his blues. He noted two machine guns so placed that they could hit nothing except at extreme ranges even though the ground they were supposed to cover was within 400 yards’ range. The reason was that the officer who emplaced them was standing when he chose the positions, thus putting his eyes about five feet above the guns. At that elevation, one could see everything. At the muzzle of the guns, one could see nothing. “I can never understand why some officers are such fools.”
On his way home a shell burst close enough to throw dirt on his jeep and a second shell struck just beside his jeep about eight feet from the side of the road. “Luckily this shell was a dud or these lines would not be written”
The hurt and the resentment remained. “As usual, Devers is a liar and, by his glibness, talked Eisenhower into giving him the [XV] Corps.”
Eddy phoned early on September 29, and asked Patton to come to Nancy as soon as he could. Patton flew there and discovered that the 35th Division was being attacked by at least one German division, possibly two. He instructed Eddy to use the 6th Armored Division to help the 35th. Eddy was reluctant to do so because if they failed, they would be destroyed on the far side of the river. Patton said “that was a damn good reason why they wouldn’t fail, and reminded him that Cortez burned his ships.”
Patton telephoned Gaffey and told him - “unless the XX Corps was worse off than I thought” – to have Walker send Eddy a combat command of the 6th. The troops started to move toward Nancy in 15 minutes, a marvelous execution.
Returning to his headquarters because Eisenhower and Bradley were coming, Patton had a guard and a band to welcome them. After lunch Eisenhower talked to a group of officers who represented all the divisions and the two corps headquarters in the Third Army. “He explained the situation in a lucid manner and assured us that eventually we would get supplies and make a main effort.”
After Eisenhower and Bradley departed, Patton had all the officers into his map room, where he explained that the Third Army would defend by attacking locally
as and when we can get the supplies. As I see it, the Germans want both Metz and Nancy. They have Metz, so are content and will stay quiet there. Therefore, they will put all their efforts, which are not excessive, to recapturing Nancy because they realize, as I did when I captured it, that Nancy, and particularly Chateau Salins, is the doorway to . . . Germany; therefore they will keep on attacking and get killed.
He had a bad scare on September 30. He had sent Gaffey to the XII Corps, and at 3 P.M., Gaffey phoned and said that Patton “had best come to Nancy as fast as I could.” He flew, arrived in 45 minutes, and found that Eddy had ordered two regiments of the 35th Division holding the woods west of Chateau Salins to withdraw. Gaffey had heard Eddy give the order, had not protested, but had sent for Patton.
“I was very angry.” Two-thirds of the 6th Armored Division was available, and Patton had told Eddy the day before to commit the armor if the Germans attacked. “Why Eddy did not do so, I cannot make up my mind.”
Eddy was at the 6th Armored Division command post, so Patton and Gaffey drove there and sent for Baade, the 35th Division commander. Patton told all three generals, Eddy, Baade, and Grow, that “I was disgusted with them.” He wanted the 6th to counterattack in the morning at the latest – that evening if the troops could get across the river by then. He also ordered the generals involved to lead their troops personally “to make up for their shortcomings.” Baade was to go to the front. Grow was to retake the woods “or not come back.” Patton was tough because he felt that giving up the ground would be a tremendous boost to German morale – like presenting them with 100,000 men.
Patton then phoned the XX Corps and told Walker to collect trucks to be ready, on call, to move a regiment of the 90th Division, so that if the 35th broke, “as it may well do,” there would be an additional unit available.
Eddy was very manly in assuming full responsibility for the withdrawal order, but I cannot understand his frame of mind. He worries too much. I will do all the worrying necessary. The corps commanders must fight. I would get rid of him but I do hot know of any other any better except possibly Harmon, now commanding the 2d Armored Division. One explanation of Eddy’s emotional failure may be that earlier in the afternoon, he, Gaffey, and Grow were all nearly killed by shell fire, and Gaffey’s aide . . . and Grow’s aide were hit. This may, unknown to them, have shattered their nerves.
After I got through cussing them out, I told them the same thing I told Truscott in Sicily, namely, “Now I will go home as I know you will win.” I feel they will. If I stayed, it would show lack of confidence. We must remember that the German is not a superman ...
It is now 0010, October 1, and I have heard nothing. I have called the chief of staff, XII Corps, and find that he is asleep, so things are probably all right.
Diary, October 1
The attack of the 6th Armored Division to restore the salient of the 35th Division west of Chateau Salins jumped off at 0600 and the situation was well restored by 1200 . . . So much for hysteria. All that was necessary was a vigorous attack. Had I let Eddy retire 5 kilometers, as he was about to do, it would have been heralded in Germany as a great victory . . . I have again earned my pay.
He and Stiller drove to Nancy on October 2, then to the woods where the fighting had taken place. He presented Bronze Stars to two regimental commanders in the 35th Division. He visited P. Wood, called on Grow, saw Baade, who had been wounded in the chin, and gave him a Bronze Star. He went to the hospitals in Nancy and talked to about 200 wounded men. “I think I did a good job. Today morale seemed high.”
Wood sent Patton a paper he wrote on the employment of armored divisions, then added that he hoped “we can get a little time out for maintenance and regrouping soon.” Everyone, he implied, was getting tired by the continuous commitment to combat.
Unfortunately, no relief was in sight. There were too few divisions for the front.
Mrs. Congressman [Edith Nourse] Rogers called. She was very full of venom and innuendo, and wanted to get my opinions for her political advancement. I was very careful to give her none. She is a congenitally dishonest woman but does not know it.
A battalion of the 5th Division opened an attack on Fort Driant on the morning of October 4, the beginning of what Patton hoped would eventually become a full-scale attack that would result in the capture of Metz.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to son George, October 4, 1944
Today, we are assaulting one of the old forts around Metz and have got two platoons of tanks inside the fort. However, this is not all you have to do because most of the defenders are under about 15 yards of concrete and the question of getting them out is difficult. I am trying an experiment of pouring gasoline down the ventilator pipes and then lighting them. I think this should at least keep the Germans from getting cold feet.
Letter, Summerall to GSP, Jr., October 4, 1944
While the world is amazed by your generalship, I am equally amazed and honored that you can take time to write me so generously in the midst of the burdens that you bear. It is only the great soul and the great intellect that can preserve proportion and give to the smaller things in life their niche in the vast structure of their power. This you do as no one else has done ...
From all who write or talk to us, we hear of the devotion of your men to you.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Summerall, October 4, 1944
Ever since we seized the crossings over the Moselle at Nancy we have had very severe and vicious fighting, not exactly on World War I principles but more analagous to it than anything we have had yet so far.
The other day we had a very curious psychological incident occur. One division, which had been fighting for about 60 days, suddenly came to the conclusion that it was beaten and got permission from the corps commander to withdraw ...
The simple statement on my part that they would attack removed the nervous tension. It is really amazing what the determination on the part of one man can do to many thousands. There was no more sense in their retreating than there ever had been, yet, had I not personally intervened, they would certainly have done so. I am not saying this in a boastful way, but simply as illustration of the funny things which happen in battle . . .
Yesterday we started an assault on one of the principal forts south of Metz . . .
As you know, these forts are mostly underground, and it is very difficult to root the Germans out . . .
So far we have never failed in any operation and I can see that it is desirable to inculcate in the German mind that when the Third Army attacks, it always succeeds. If we get this fort, the problem of taking Metz will be greatly enhanced.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Col Robert H. Fletcher, Leesburg, Va., October 4, 1944
I agree with you that the press has been too good, but there is nothing I can do to stop it . . . I presume right now that since I am not advancing sixty miles a day, I am considered a failure, but, as a matter of fact, I have killed more Germans lately than I did during the whole of the fast advance.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Frederick Ayer, October 4, 1944
While the papers are somewhat reticent of the valorous deeds of the Third Army, we have had up until the day before yesterday some very vicious fighting...
Don’t mention to anyone that an American division thought about retreating. ..
Right now . . . one of the old Vauban type forts, much reinforced recently . . . We took it with tanks, which is probably the only time in the history of war that a fort has been taken with tanks. When I say taken, I am a little optimistic, because we have about a third of it, and the Germans have the rest...
The weather is as bad as it could be for offensive operations. It rains every morning, beginning about 5:00 o’clock and stopping about 11:00 o’clock. It then clears up and makes the ground as slippery as grease, so it is very hard to use the tanks, and it also slows up our truck movements bringing in supplies.
You will not hear anything exciting about us for some time but I think when you do, it will be quite exciting.
Patton directed the XX Corps “to completely occupy Fort Driant if it took every man in the corps.” He said he could not allow an attack by the Third Army to fail. Two days later, things were
going very badly at Fort Driant. We may have to abandon the attack since it is not worth the cost. I was over optimistic in letting the 5th Division start, but I hate to crush initiative.
Diary, October 7
Generals Marshall and Bradley came in . . . The whole staff was present, and we went over the plans for the Fort Driant operation and also those for the attack by the XII Corps tomorrow. As usual, General Marshall asked very incisive questions, but we could answer them. He was more pleasant than usual and regretted that he had to go and see General Montgomery in the morning and so miss the battle.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, October 8, 1944
George [Marshall] asked me what I wanted and I said to take the Third Army and the XIX TAC to China. He seemed agreeable. So – we wont occupy Germany. I am glad as there is a rumor that Beedle will be boss there – I can stand only so much!
I had a ring side seat at quite a battle to day . . . We attacked with three divisions just to prove we were still in the ring. We could see the tanks moving and some times the infantry, three large towns were burning brightly. In one, the flames – yellow ones – were over 2,000 feet and black smoke went to 4,000. Air fighter bombers were roaring and diving into it and we had a radio over which we could hear the pilots talking, like this: “The bastards are using flack on Tom. I am going down to get him – I got him . . .” Then huge globs of black smoke and loud noises. Then you could see the tracers from the tanks and houses burst into flame and hundreds of prisoners marching in the fields . . .
It wont get much in the press, but we had close to 90,000 men in action, 20,000 bigger than Gettysburg . . .
Of course we will get a hell of a counter attack at dawn and I hope kill more Germans. Peace is going to be a hell of a let down.
Diary, October 8
I noticed a tendency in McBride to be content with less than perfect performance and reluctant to use all his troops. Eddy tolerates this. There was a hill held by a few Germans and no visible effort was being made to secure it before dark, so I ordered him to put in his reserve and take it . . . The hill fell readily. The whole tempo of our infantry attack is too slow.
At Verdun on October 9, Bradley explained to the three American Army commanders that Simpson’s Ninth U.S. Army was to go under Montgomery’s command.
Bedell Smith arrived and, as usual, was very assertive and, as usual, knew nothing. Bradley took him down quite hard, and he was better thereafter. At one point in the conversation he said to Bradley that any soldier should know so and so. Bradley replied that he thought he had more combat experience than Smith and did not care to be criticized. After that Smith was much more tolerant...
The Fort Driant show is going sour. We will have to pull out.
Diary, October 10
I believe that General Marshall and General Handy were very well pleased with what they saw. I have never known General Marshall to be so nice and human.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Dillingham, October 11, 1944
You are probably busier than I am. As a matter of fact, commanding an Army is not such a very absorbing task except that one has to be ready at all hours of the day and night . . . to make some rather momentous decision, which frequently consists of telling somebody who thinks he is beaten that he is not beaten.
Patton had Walker explain to Bradley the situation at Fort Driant. Patton recommended pulling out, since “the glory of taking the fort is not worth the sacrifices in men which it would demand.” Bradley concurred. The attack was definitely called off.
The ammunition allowance for the Third Army was cut drastically – “about 7 rounds per gun per day for 155’s and not much better for 105’s . . . This will defer our big attack until November.”
For the most part, the units conducted vigorous patrolling, small-scale thrusts, and limited objective attacks, as they reinforced and strengthened their bridgeheads across the Moselle and prepared to resume the offensive.
To the key members of the newly arrived 26th Division, Patton talked about the lessons of combat, the offensive spirit, and “particularly on fire and movement. I am sure that if I could get the American infantryman to shoot his rifle, we could win the war much more cheaply”
He studied plans for his next operation, still unscheduled because of ammunition shortages. “The sooner we can start this the better, as the enemy continues to dig and mine ahead of us.”
Eisenhower and Devers came for a visit. “Devers was full of himself, as usual, but is a clever man.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Frederick Ayer, October 18, 1944
We have an officer of quite high rank here who is very pompous . . . One of his current hobbies is sanitation. Recently, on inspecting a company he noticed that every man had a fork in his left-hand shirt pocket. The General asked the reason for this. The soldier questioned replied that in order to carry out the General’s wishes as to sanitation, they never passed the bread by hand, but if anyone wanted a piece of bread he stuck his fork in it and took it. The General said that that was excellent and complimented the man.
On going outdoors he noticed that every soldier had a string hanging out of the lower part of his fly. He asked why the string and was informed that the string was for the purpose of getting the penis out without touching it with the hand, again complying with the General’s idea of sanitation.
The General was much pleased and complimented the soldier again. But suddenly an idea struck him and he said, “That is all right, but how do you get it back?” The soldier replied, “I don’t know what the others do, but for myself, I use my fork.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Eisenhower, October 19, 1944
I have today written General Bradley that if he can give me 2,000 tons of ammunition . . . and then guarantee a like amount daily, I can initiate an attack any time. I have learned from you to fight on a shoestring, and I realize further that the enemy is fighting on a shoestring which is more frayed than ours.
On the way back from a visit to the corps and divisions, he remarked a shell landing about 300 yards from his vehicle and duly noted it in his diary.
He wrote Beatrice some random observations. Omar “the tent maker” liked to have large discussions and took no chances. There were 65 newspaper correspondents with the Third Army. “I did not remember the lovley colors of the trees in the fall here. They are not as brilliant as ours at home but are very effective.” Montgomery’s airborne show was “heroic but that is all you can say for it.” The only thing he wanted for Christmas was “some suspenders.”
Bradley and Allen came to lunch, and Patton told them he knew there was insufficient ammunition for all three American Armies to attack, but certainly there must be enough for one. His Third Army could jump off on two days’ notice.
Bradley is too conservative – he wants to wait until we can all jump together, by which time half our men will have flu or trench foot. I argued all I could, but the best I could persuade him to do was to say I could jump off any time on or after the 5th of November . . . I wish he had a little daring.
“I nearly lost the Third Army this morning – by getting killed,” he wrote Beatrice on October 24. The Germans shelled Nancy with a huge 11-inch railroad gun during the night. They seemed to be after Patton, and at 4:30, three rounds landed near his house, broke all the windows, and struck and partially demolished a dwelling across the street, trapping some people in the debris. Hearing some “hollering in French,” Patton dressed, went out, and helped rescue the inhabitants.
He described the episode to his wife and son in a lighthearted way, endeavoring to be humorous, but he added: “If they start shooting to night I am going in the cellar which is bomb proof.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, October 26, 1944
I think I got GCM [Marshall] to release the names of the officers [to the press]. When he and I were talking to Walker, I said - forgetting that George has no sense of humor – that Mrs. Walker was about to divorce him. GCM brissled up and said, no, she wont, I’ll talk to her. I then said that all he had to do to save the family life was to release the fact that Walker had commanded a corps because the grounds for divorce were that Mrs. Walker thought he was a slacker. . .
I only wear the shiny helmet in the back areas and have never ridden in a tank in battle.
He made a speech at the Red Cross Doughnut Dugout, and the men there cheered for five minutes.
Truscott spent the night. He was soon to take command of the Fifth Army in Italy. “His promotion has been well deserved and he has invariably done a good, but never a brilliant job. I am very proud of him.” Clark was moving up to command the Army Group in Italy, while Alexander took the place of Wilson, who was going to Washington to succeed Field Marshal Sir John Dill, who had died.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, October 31, 1944
I find it very difficult to get exercise. This locality is more German than French, and my people fear that I will get killed if I go out to walk. However I do escape sometimes ...
You had better send me a couple of bottles of pink medicin. When I am not attacking I get bilous . . .
Willie just heard the planes and is hiding under a chair. He hates bombs.
He inspected a colored tank battalion. “They gave a very good impression but I have no confidence in the inherent fighting ability of the race.” Contrary to Patton’s expectation, the battalion performed exceptionally well in combat.
Diary, November 2
Bradley came in and explained the next plan. The First and Ninth can’t go before the 10th. He asked me when I could go.
I said, “Twenty-four hours from when you say go.”
He said, “Any time on or after the 8th, when you get a forecast of one good day [’ s weather].”
I said, “O.K., but in any case I will jump on the 8th, bombers or no.”
He agreed...
I feel 40 years younger.
He made talks to seven divisions in turn, the subject being, according to Gay, “the honor which had been given to that Army in being allowed to make the offensive,” which if conducted with dash and persistence, could end the war.
Patton was then surprised to learn that the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, veteran troops who had no need of a pep talk, were hurt because he had not spoken to them. “I did not include them . . . as there is nothing about war I can tell them” He addressed them too.
Diary, November 5
Had a bad case of short breath this morning – my usual reaction to an impending fight or match.
Went to church. Devers was waiting to see me when I returned. He seemed most cooperative and said he would push the XV Corps along on our right [to help the Third Army attack].
Had Marlene Dietrich and her troupe for lunch. Later they gave us a show. Very low comedy, almost an insult to human intelligence.
Patton met with the correspondents attached to the Third Army at 4:30 P.M., November 6. “Sometime ago” he said,
I told you we were going to be stopped for a while, and I was correct. Now, we are going to start again . . . You all do some lying and say this is simply what we called in the last war “correcting a line.” In other words, I do not want the Germans to start moving reserves [against the Third Army] until they have to.
In response to a question:
If you catch these bastards in Metz, you may have to kill them all, but by scaring them I hope they will have to run, in which event, there will be some very fine killing . . .
Question: Is the objective unlimited?
Patton: I don’t know anything beyond Berlin.
Question: [will the immense air activity tip off the operation to the Germans?]
Patton: Personally, I don’t give a good damn . . .
Question: [do the Germans have much strength in the Maginot Line?]
Patton: Yes, they have. This reminds me of years ago when we first started making armored cars. Everybody wanted to put more and more armor on them . . . The Chief of Cavalry then said, “Gentlemen, I have always feared that in the next war someone would get killed.” The sooner we start, the less time the Germans will have to fix things up.
Question: Well, it’s been a long time since we’ve gotten any real news.
Patton: Well, you gentlemen have been very patient. Now remember, I want these junior officers given breaks in this. They walk in the shit and sleep in the mud. They don’t have a nice warm office like this, and you men should give them the breaks . . .
Hardly anybody below the division general staffs knows this thing, and don’t even talk about it at mess because it could cost a great many thousands of lives. I know I can trust you.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, November 6, 1944
I just this morning finished one of my pre election speaking tours in which I talked to nine different divisions and drove in an open peep several hundred miles in the rain ...
If we would only get a good day we would have the greatest air support ever, but it is raining like hell – what a country.
I am having indigestion and the heaves as I always do before a match. I suppose I would be no good if I did not; it is not fear as to the result but simply anxiety to get started.
I hope Courtney does not delay too long [to attack on his front] or I will pull the whole pack [of Germans] in on me – well all the more glory.
Diary, November 6
We were to have 300 heavy bombers on the Metz forts today, but the weather was so bad that it has now been postponed until tomorrow. It is useless to put any confidence in the air at this time of year.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, November y,
We jump off in the morning with ten divisions. I have commanded up to thirteen but never attacked all at once with so many. I cant see how we can loose . . .
The weather is vile so we will get no air support, but that is not too bad as the enemy will not get tipped off . . .
The plans for the show are good and the men are keen and we have plenty of ammunition and enough gas. I think we will get to the Rhine. If we do, we will cross . . .
If it is clear in the morning, I have a swell O.P. from which I can watch the kick off.
Diary, November 7
Two years ago today we were on the Augusta approaching Africa, and it was blowing hard. Then about 1600 it stopped. It is now 0230 and raining hard. I hope that too stops.
I know of nothing more I can do to prepare for this attack except to read the Bible and pray. The damn clock seems to have stopped. I am sure we will have a great success.
At 1900, Eddy and Grow came to the house to beg me to call off the attack due to the bad weather, heavy rains, and swollen rivers. I told them the attack would go on. I am sure it will succeed. On November 7, 1942, there was a storm but it stopped at 1600. All day the 9th of July, 1943, there was a storm but it cleared at dark.
I know the Lord will help us again. Either He will give us good weather or the bad weather will hurt the Germans more than it does us. His Will Be Done.