“We have to push people beyond endurance in order to bring this war to its end.”
THE FIRST INTIMATION Patton had of the German Ardennes counter-offensive came in a telephone call from 12 th Army Group, which instructed him to move an armored division from Walker’s XX Corps to Middleton’s VIII “to help repulse a rather strong German attack.”
Unaware of the extent of the German effort, Patton protested. He said that the Third Army had paid “a very heavy price in blood in the hope of a break through at Saarlautern and Saarbrucken,” and consequently his Army needed the division in case the Germans extended their attack into his area. In his opinion, he told Bradley, moving the armored division would play into the Germans’ hands.
Bradley admitted my logic but took counsel of his fears and ordered the... move.
I wish he were less timid.
But then on reconsideration, “He probably knows more of the situation than he can say over the telephone.”
He was beginning to sense the importance of the German counterattack.
Diary, December 17
The German attack is on a wide front and moving fast . . . This may be a feint... although at the moment it looks like the real thing. If the Germans . . . are intending to attack me, we will stop them as we are very weli placed . . .
Had the V and VIII Corps of the First Army been more aggressive, the Germans could not have prepared this attack; one must never sit still.
Everything was ready to move his headquarters to St. Avoid, but he decided to wait until the tactical situation in the Ardennes cleared.
Bradley phoned and said he might have to call on Patton for two more divisions to help contain the Germans.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Maj. Gen. Fox Conner, Hendersonville, N.C., December 17, 1944
Yesterday morning the Germans attacked to my north in front of the VIII Corps of the First Army. It reminds me very much of March 25, 1918 [LudendorfFs final offensive] and I think will have the same results.
I have always felt that the war will be terminated east of the Rhine, and I am convinced that this attack by the Germans will be very thoroughly smashed, and they will have nothing left.
Bradley telephoned at 10:30 A.M., December 18, and asked Patton to bring his G-2, G-3, and G-4, to Luxembourg for a conference as soon as he could. He added that “what he was going to suggest would be unacceptable to me, but that he wanted to see me.”
Within ten minutes after receiving the call, Patton, Koch, Maddox, and Muller departed for Luxembourg.
When Patton arrived, Bradley said,
“I feel you won’t like what we are going to do, but I fear it is necessary.”
He then showed [on the map] that the German penetration is much greater than I had thought.
He asked me what I could do. I told him that I would halt the 4th Armored and concentrate it near Longwy, starting at midnight, and that I would start the 80th in the morning on [meaning, to] Luxembourg. I also said that I could alert the 26th to move in 24 hours if necessary. He seemed satisfied.
This was rather a large shift of units, complicated as well as risky. Yet Patton had reacted instantly.
He telephoned Gay, Third Army chief of staff since Gaffey’s assumption of 4th Armored Division command, and said:
Stop Hugh [Gaffey] and McBride [80th Division] from whatever they are doing. Alert them for movement [elsewhere]. They should make no retrograde movement at this time, but this is the real thing and they will undoubtedly move tomorrow. They will go under General M. [Millikin, III Corps]. Arrange to have sufficient transportation on hand to move McBride. Hugh can move on his own power. I am going to leave here and stop to see Johnnie W. [Walker]. It will probably be late when I come home.
Almost immediately Maddox telephoned and asked Gay to have John Millikin (III Corps) and his G–2, G–3, and G–4, come to the Third Army headquarters for a conference; they were to be prepared to spend the night.
While Patton was returning from Luxembourg, Bradley phoned Gay. He said that the situation was deteriorating and that
it was practically a sure thing now we would move the 80th and 4th, and he wanted to know if Gay thought one combat command of the 4th could be moved tonight.
Gay replied he knew it could. Furthermore, he was sure that the 80th and the remainder of the 4th Armored could move early the next morning.
Bradley asked to have Patton telephone him at 8 P.M.
Patton “drove home in the dark, a very dangerous operation, which I hate.”
He phoned Bradley at 8 o’clock, and Bradley said:
The situation up there is much worse than it was when I talked to you. Move Hugh and McBride at once, one combat command of Hugh’s to move tonight, if possible. Destination, Longwy. Have Millikin report to Allen at my command post at 1100 tomorrow. You and a staff officer meet me for a conference with General Eisenhower at Verdun at approximately 1100. I understand from General Eisenhower that you are to take over VIII Corps as well as the offensive to be launched by the new troops coming into the area.
At 8:15, Patton and his principal staff officers met with Millikin and his. They discussed the plan “insofar as it was known,” and agreed on the routes that the 4th Armored and 80th Divisions would use to move against the Germans.
This change in plans required calling off a big air bombardment scheduled on the Siegfried Line in front of the XII Corps, which now, for a while at least, would have to assume a defensive posture.
The more Patton thought about the German bulge into the American lines, the more he thought that the best thing to do would be to let the Germans penetrate for 40 or 50 miles, and then make a bold move to cut them off in their rear and destroy their entire thrust. This might end the war altogether, but it would take great nerve and aplomb to permit the Germans to roll forward, for they had a massive force in the Ardennes.
In conformance with Hitler’s bold concept, the Germans assembled 25 divisions and committed 20 to the attack along a 60-mile front between Monschau and Echternach. Taking advantage of a heavy fog on the morning of December 16, and of forecasts for bad weather during the following days, three German armies, totaling 200,000 troops, struck about 80,000 Americans of the VIII Corps – composed of newly arrived divisions breaking in and battered divisions recuperating in a quiet sector – rolled westward across northern Luxembourg and Belgium, and headed for Antwerp, about 100 miles away. Within a few days they pushed a bulge into the American lines, a salient stretching about 50 miles almost to the Meuse River.
If they crossed the Meuse, they had a good chance of taking Antwerp, thereby destroying the foundation of the Allied supply system. They would also split the Allied Armies. They would, therefore, delay the Allied drive into Germany and presumably give Hitler the opportunity to negotiate for peace in the West.
It was an ambitious vision, a stroke of genius on the part of the Fuehrer, even though his generals doubted that the German resources, that late in the war, were strong enough to attain Hitler’s goal.
On December 19, at 7 A.M., Patton met with his principal staff members, as well as with Eddy, Millikin, and the VIII Corps Artillery Officer. He outlined his plan “insofar as he knew it.” An hour later he met with his entire general staff and Weyland and his staff. He
explained the change in plan and told them we would have to make rapid movements, which would depend on them. I then made a rough plan for operations based on the assumption that I would use the VIII Corps and the III Corps on any two of three possible axes [roads] . . . I made a simple code, one copy of which I left with Gay so that if I was ordered to execute the operation, I could call him on the phone [and get it started].
He also talked with Gay about a new boundary between the XII Corps and Devers’ 6th Army Group, made arrangements about which units might be attached to the III Corps in Luxembourg, and sketched possible directions of action.
At 9:15, Patton and Harkins departed for Verdun, which they reached at 10:45. Eisenhower, Bradley, Devers, Tedder
and a large number of staff officers were there. Ike had the SHAEF G-2 give the picture and then said he wanted me to get to Luxembourg and take command of the battle and make a strong counterattack with at least six divisions. The fact that three of these divisions exist only on paper did not enter his head.
These three divisions had virtually been wiped out by the Germans.
He said he was prepared to take [go over on] the defense from Saarlautern south and asked Devers how much of the line he could takeover.
Devers made a long speech on strictly selfish grounds and said nothing.
Bradley said little.
I kept still, except that I said we needed replacements.
But that was an old story.
Ike said, “When can you attack?”
I said, “On December 22, with three divisions; the 4th Armored, the 26th, and the 80th.”
This was the sublime moment of his career.
Later, Patton added:
When I said I could attack on the 22d, it created quite a commotion – some people seemed surprised and others pleased – however, I believe it can be done.
It was a very short time for unscrambling forces set up to operate one way and putting them together to go in a different direction.
He [Ike] said he was afraid this was not strong enough, but I insisted that I could beat the Germans with three divisions, and if I waited [to get more divisions into the effort], I would lose surprise.
Tedder urged me to get rid of the XX Corps, but I wish to hold it and use it for a possible rest area.
Patton’s proposal was astonishing, technically difficult, and daring. It meant reorienting his entire Army from an eastward direction to the north, a go-degree turn that would pose logistical nightmares – getting divisions on new roads and making sure that supplies reached them from dumps established in quite a different context, for quite a different situation. Altogether, it was an operation that only a master could think of executing.
Eisenhower approved.
In much the same way that Hitler’s Mortain counterattack in August foreshadowed his much larger Ardennes counteroffensive, Patton’s turn of Haislip’s eastward-moving XV Corps to the north to Argentan resembled what he would now do with his Army, a wheeling movement to Bastogne. Patton would break off his attack in the Saar region, face to the north, and thrust into the German flank while Devers extended his left to cover the front that Patton was vacating in the Saar.
“Ike said in departing, ‘Every time I get a new star I get attacked.’ ”
He had been promoted just before the battle of Kasserine Pass. And now he had recently received his fifth star to become general of the army.
“I said, ‘And every time you get attacked, I pull you out.’”
Before leaving Verdun, I directed [in a telephone call to Gay] that the 26th and 4th Armored move at once on Arlon via Longwy, and the 80th move on Luxembourg. The 4th had actually pulled out last night, and the 80th started this morning on Thionville and received instructions there to move on Luxembourg.
He drove to the XX Corps to explain the situation to Walker and “decided to spend the night there” because he hated to drive during darkness and invite the possibility of being captured. Rumor had it that the Germans were using troops who could speak English and were dressed in American uniforms in order to kidnap Eisenhower and other high-ranking Allied commanders.
He sent Codman to Nancy to get the Third Army headquarters started moving to Luxembourg.
Prince Felix of Luxembourg
also spent the night with Walker. Obviously he is afraid to stay in Luxembourg, not from personal reasons, but because it would be a great feather in the Germans’ cap to catch him.
Diary, December 20
In the morning I drove to Luxembourg arriving at 0900. Bradley had halted the 80th Division at Luxembourg and had also engaged one combat command of the 4th Armored Division in the vicinity east of Bastogne without letting me know, but I said nothing.
While I was there, Ike called and he and Brad had a long talk. He told Bradley that he was putting in Monty in operational control of the First and Ninth Armies, due to the fact that telephonic connections between Bradley and those two Armies was difficult. As a matter of fact, telephonic communications were all right, and it is either a case of having lost confidence in Bradley or having been forced to put Montgomery in through the machinations of the Prime Minister or with the hope that if he gives Monty operational control, he will get some of the British divisions in [to the fight]. Eisenhower is unwilling or unable to command Montgomery.
Patton’s speculation was interesting but beside the point. Although telephonic communications, as Patton said, were all right from Bradley’s headquarters to Hodges and Simpson, the physical distances to the Army headquarters – around the deep bulge driven into the American line – made it difficult for Bradley to confer personally with his Army commanders. In a fast-changing situation, face-to-face consultation might be required, and Montgomery was closer at hand to take necessary action.
Bradley resented Eisenhower’s decision precisely because it might be misinterpreted as a loss of confidence in Bradley’s efficiency at a time of great emergency. Moreover, it would enable Montgomery to press for his reappointment to the Allied ground force command.
Patton
Drove to Arlon and saw Middleton, Millikin, Gaffey, and Paul. The VIII Corps is fighting very well, but at the moment consisting of nothing but remnants, except in the case of the 101st Airborne Division, which is holding Bastogne. In Bastogne there is also one combat command of the 9th Armored Division and one of the 10th Armored, two companies of tank destroyers, and some colored artillery.
I told Middleton to give ground and blow up bridges so that we can get the enemy further extended before we hit him in flank. However, on Bradley’s suggestion, in which Middleton strongly concurred, we decided to hang on to Bastogne, because it is a very important road net, and I do not believe the enemy would dare pass it without reducing it.
This decision committed the airborne troops and the other units to their heroic defense of Bastogne, where Anthony McAuliffe, in temporary command of the 101st while Maxwell Taylor was in the United States, would respond to the German ultimatum to surrender with his famous “Nuts.”
Ordered up all the self-propelled tank destroyer battalions and division tank battalions I could get hold of. I ordered Eddy to move his headquarters and artillery at once to Luxembourg. I ordered the 35th to move to Metz at once and pick up replacements. I told Gay to fill the 90th and 95th Divisions [with replacements], and to put anything that was left in the 4th Infantry Division [which had been initially struck by the Germans]. I told the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions to cannibalize their anti-tank gun units and other units to fill up their infantry riflemen . . . I also got up ammunition, hospitals, and bridges [to the new area] . . . I also ordered the 5th Infantry Division to move to Luxembourg.
In a dazzling display of footwork, he rearranged the compositions of his corps.
I have no staff officers [with me] and conducted the whole thing by telephone through Gay and a fine staff at Nancy...
This has been a most wonderful move on the part of the whole Army. We will attack at 4:00 A.M., December 226..
An important figure in the whole new situation was Gay, who remained at Nancy to coordinate the mass movement to the north.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, December 21, 1944
Though this is the shortest day of the year, to me it seems interminable. We shoot the works on a chestnut pulling expedition in the morning.
I am very confident that a great success is possible and I hope certain.
Yesterday I again earned my pay. I visited seven divisions and regrouped an Army alone. It was quite a day and I enjoyed it ...
I have a room in a very nice hotel with heat and a bath which is fine.
The Bosch landed a lot of para troops in our uniforms for the purpose of murdering Ike, Brad, me, etc. . .
The situation is very reminisent of Mar. 25, 1918, and I think the results will be similar.
Remember how a tarpon always makes one big flop just before he dies.
We should get well into the guts of the enemy and cut his supply lines.
Destiny sent for me in a hurry when things got tight. Perhaps God saved me for this effort.
Diary, December 21
Ike and Bull are getting jittery about my attacking too soon and too weak. I have all I can get. If I wait, I will lose surprise ...
The First Army could, in my opinion, attack on the 22d if they wanted (or if they were pushed), but they seem to have no ambition in that line.
The enemy may attempt to put in a spoiling attack from the vicinity of Echternach ...
I had all staffs, except the VIII Corps, in for a conference. As usual on the verge of an attack, they were full of doubt. I seemed always to be the ray of sunshine, and by God, I always am. We can and will win, God helping. . .
I wish it were this time tomorrow night. When one attacks, it is the enemy who has to worry. Give us the victory, Lord.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, December 22, 1944
We jumped off at 0630 and have progressed on a twenty mile front to a depth of seven miles. I had hoped for more but we are in the middle of a snow storm and there were a lot of demolitions. So I should be content which of course I am not . . .
I think that this move of the Third Army is the fastest in history. We moved over a hundred miles starting on the 19th and attacked to day all ship shape and Bristol fashion.
With a little luck I will put on a more daring operation just after Xmas.
Replacements are the bottle neck. I took 8,000 out of my rear echelons and made doeboys of them. If others would do the same, we could finish this show in short order.
John Millikin is doing better than I feared. I told him he had to go up and hear them [the shells and bullets] whistle. I think he will.
In his diary he judged that the attack of the III Corps was making “fair progress.” The troops would continue pushing ahead during the night.
Bastogne was still holding out, and Patton was planning to drop supplies into the town from the air.
I am satisfied but not particularly happy over the results of today. It is always hard to get an attack rolling.
I doubt if the enemy can make a serious reaction for another 36 hours. I hope by that time we will be moving.
The men are in good spirits and full of confidence . . .
We now have 108 battalions of corps and Army artillery supporting this attack – in other words, 1,296 guns of 105 or bigger. I don’t see how the Boche can take this much artillery ...
The situation at Bastogne is grave but not desperate.
Diary, December 23
We have not done so well today as I had hoped but have advanced from two to five miles and have beaten the enemy wherever we have met him . . .not yet reached Bastogne, but they are re-supplying it by air . . .
The weather today is fine. We had seven groups of fighter-bombers, eleven groups of medium bombers, one division of the Eighth Air Force, and some RAF planes helping us. I hope it got results.
Diary, December 24
This has been a very bad Christmas Eve. All along our line we have received violent counterattacks, one of which forced . . . the 4th Armored back some miles with the loss of ten tanks. This was probably my fault, because I had been insisting on day and night attacks. This is all right on the first or second day of the battle and when we had the enemy surprised, but after that the men get too tired. Furthermore, in this bad weather, it is very difficult for armored outfits to operate at night . . .
In the XX Corps all is quiet, and a very low grade of troops is opposing Colonel Polk —in fact Polk is insulted because he said, “They are nothing but Poles with ulcers.”
I believe the German General Staff is running this attack and has staked all on this offensive to regain the initiative. They are far behind schedule and, I believe, beaten. If this is true, the whole army may surrender. On the other hand, in 1940 they attacked as at present, and then came over at Saarbrucken and Thionville to Metz. They may repeat – but with what?
On a wallet-size card distributed to every officer and man in the Third Army was Patton’s Christmas message:
To each officer and soldier . . . I wish a Merry Christmas. I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill in battle. We march in our might to complete victory. May God’s blessing rest upon each of you on this Christmas Day.
On the reverse side was Patton’s prayer, actually written by Chaplain James O’Neill:
Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech Thee, of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have to contend. Grant us fair weather for Battle. Graciously hearken to us as soldiers who call upon Thee that armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory, and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, December 25, 1944
I have been unable to open any boxes except one from you with sox etc. – thanks . . .
The Lord has given us the 3 consecutive days of good weather and things are looking up but so far I am the only one attacking.
I am going out now to push it. I love you and hope for the best.
The worst of the danger was over by Christmas. Patton’s prompt shift of units, the recovery of the American troops, and improvement in the weather, which allowed massive Allied air strikes, were about to turn the tide. But this was more apparent in retrospect.
Diary, December 25
A clear cold Christmas, lovely weather for killing Germans, which seems a bit queer, seeing Whose birthday it is. Last night Codman and I went to the Candlelight Communion at the Episcopal Church here in Luxembourg. It was very nice and we sat in the former Kaiser Wilhelm I’s box.
I left early this morning to try to visit all the divisions in contact with the enemy . . . All were very cheerful. I am not, because we are not going fast enough . . . All the men . . . in most cases got hot turkey sandwiches for dinner . . . I feel that all are doing their best . . .
The 101st Airborne Division [in Bastogne] was not re-supplied by air today because the ships could not take off from the UK due to icy conditions, and nobody had the forethought to have ships take off from France . . .
After supper Brad and I had a talk. Monty says that the First Army cannot attack for three months and that the only attack that can be made is by me, but that I am too weak; hence we should fall back to the Saar-Vosges line or even to the Moselle . . .
I feel that this is disgusting and might remove the valor of our army and the confidence of our people. It will have tremendous political implications and probably condemn to death or slavery all the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine if we abandon them to the Germans. If ordered to fall back, I think I will ask to be relieved.
Diary, December 26
Today has been rather trying as in spite of our efforts, we have failed to make contact with the defenders of Bastogne . . .
At 1400 Gaffey phoned to say that if I authorized the risk, he thought that . . . Colonel Wendell Blanchard could break through to Bastogne by a rapid advance. I told him to try it. At 1845 they made contact, and Bastogne was liberated. It was a daring thing and well done. Of course they may be cut off, but I doubt it . . . The speed of our movements is amazing, even to me, and must be a constant source of surprise to the Germans.
Blanchard, a member of the 2d Armored Division during the early days of Patton’s command, broke through the German line surrounding Bastogne, surged into town, and eliminated the danger of losing not only the substantial number of encircled Americans but also the excellent road net that would have facilitated the German offensive.
Why in hell the SHAEF thinkers hold the nth Armored, 17th Airborne, and 87th Infantry Divisions at Reims is beyond me. They should be attacking.
The German has shot his wad. Prisoners have had no food for from three to five days. We should attack.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, December 26, 1944
Ever since the 22, we have been trying to relieve Bastogne. Just now at 1845 Gaffey called to say we had made contact. Of course we did not do it with much, but we did it. I hope that the troops making the advance don’t get bottled up too.
My Prayer seems to be working still as we have had three days of good weather’ and our air has been very active. Of course they overstate [their results] at least 50% but they do scare the Huns.
For the first time since Gela the Bosch bombed and straffed me . . . I don’t like it a bit better than I used to.
I have some [Christmas] boxes from you that I will open after supper.
The corridor between the 4th Armored Division and the 101st Airborne Division in Bastogne was considerably widened on December 27, and the traffic of supplies and the evacuation of wounded began.
Yet the Germans continued to menace Bastogne as they fought fiercely to hold the shoulder of the bulge and prevent their troops inside from being trapped.
Diary, December 27
Bradley left at 1000 to see Ike, Montgomery, and Smith. If Ike will put Bradley back in command of the First and Ninth Armies, we can bag the whole German army.
I wish Ike were more of a gambler, but he is certainly a lion compared to Montgomery, and Bradley is better than Ike as far as nerve is concerned. Of course he did make a bad mistake in being passive on the front of the VIII Corps. Monty is a tired little fart. War requires the taking of risks and he won’t take them . . .
If I could get three more divisions, I could win this war now.
Hardly into Bastogne, Patton was already planning to attack from that town to Houffalize. He wanted to move the 6th Armored Division into the Bastogne area during darkness and surprise the Germans.
Bradley managed on December 28 to get two divisions released from SHAEF reserve and made available to Patton in order to strengthen the VIII Corps effort to reach Houffalize.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, December 29,
The relief of Bastogne is the most brilliant operation we have thus far performed and is in my opinion the outstanding achievement of this war. Now the enemy must dance to our tune, not we to his.
In the morning we are starting on a new series of attacks which may well be decisive if I can only get Destiny to use reserves to attack and not to defend . . .
This is my biggest battle . . .
I now have 16 divisions but four have strings tied to them [meaning that he had to obtain permission before he could use them in battle].
That afternoon he dictated a letter to Beatrice “to give you a little insight into what is actually going on.” Five divisions had been in action between Saarlautern and Sarreguemines and by telephone he sent three to Luxembourg to stop the Germans. The staff responsible for these complicated moves, he said in some exaggeration, “consisted of my self and [his driver] Sergeant Mims.” He could have had his units jump off toward Bastogne a day earlier, “but the attack would have been a little ragged.” With some legitimate boasting, he added, “if you put in such a solution at Leavenworth, you would go to the doghouse or St. Elizabeth’s [mental institution in Washington].” He enclosed several copies of this “sort of thumbnail sketch of what is going on” and suggested that Beatrice might want to send them to his sister Nita, Harbord, Summerall, and Guy Henry.
The plans evolved on December 29 and approved in principle by Bradley had the VIII Corps attacking to seize high ground near Houf-falize, then being ready to continue to St. Vith; the III Corps attacking directly from Bastogne to St. Vith; the XII Corps to attack to Echternach and then to Bitburg.
Middleton phoned on the afternoon of December 29, and Patton told him “he didn’t care how Middleton made the attack, but he must make it, and he must take the objective.”
Diary, December 30
The 11th Armored and 87th Infantry Divisions jumped off west of Bastogne as planned and ran right into the flank of a large German counterattack headed [toward Bastogne] . . . This lucky meeting stopped the Germans and probably corrected a bad situation.
Everyone of the generals involved urged me to postpone the attack . . . but I held to my plan, although I did not know the German attack was coming. Some people call it luck, some genius. I call it determination.
The 35th and 26th Divisions also got attacked at dawn . . . We had an inkling that it was coming and were set for it . . .
Drove to Bastogne and had to pass about a thousand yards from the Germans, but they did not fire . . . I decorated Brig. Gen. A. C. McAuliffe . . . and Lt. Col. S. A. Chappuis with the DSC . . . They were delighted and wanted me to drive slowly so the soldiers could see me.
Editorial, “Patton Of Course,” Washington Post, December 30, 1944 It has become a sort of unwritten rule in this war that when there is a fire to be put out, it is Patton who jumps into his boots, slides down the pole, and starts rolling . . . This is the same Patton who has a number of indiscretions on his record, but who has again and again demonstrated that when a jam develops, he is the one who is called upon to break it.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, December 31, 1944
Darling B. Happy New Year! I hope I am home for the next one.
He would be dead before the end of the next year.
Yesterday my luck held in a big way. I was launching two new divisions, but they were late getting to the assembly area, and every one urged that the attack be suspended. I insisted that they attack, if it was only with their advance guards. They did attack and ran right into the flank of a German attack. Had this not happened, things could have been critical. As it was, we stopped the attack in its tracks.
Historians will clame that such perfect timing was a stroke of jenius. It was just mulishness on my part. I had no idea the Germans were attacking.
On the other side of Bastogne, they also hit us hard. But we stopped them with the loss of one village to us and 55 tanks to them.
To day has been a slugging match, but I got Bob Grow[’s 6th Armored Division] in and things are better. Tomorrow will be the crutial test. I think, in fact know, we will stop them and attack at once.
Diary, December 31
This has been a very long day for me. The Germans launched a heavy counterattack on the 26th Division . . .
It has snowed and frozen over all day, and the tractors which pull our medium and heavy artillery are perfectly useless. We either have to replace them by truck or send a truck ahead with a cable to haul them over the road . . .
Total number of [German] counterattacks for today aggregates 17 – all repulsed. On the other hand, we have not made much ground.
Bradley submitted an efficiency report on Patton’s performance and characterized him as “Superior,” recommended him for command of an Army or Army Group, and, among all others he knew of Patton’s grade, listed him Number 1 as an Army commander in combat.
Third Army General Orders 1, January 1, 1945
To the officers and men of the Third Army and to our comrades oftheXIXTAC:
From the bloody corridor at Avranches, to Brest, thence across France to the Saar, over the Saar into Germany, and now on to Bastogne, your record has been one of continuous victory. Not only have you invariably defeated a cunning and ruthless enemy, tout also you have overcome by your indomitable fortitude every aspect of terrain and weather. Neither heat nor dust nor floods nor snow have stayed your progress. The speed and brilliancy of your achievements is unsurpassed in military history__
My New Year wish and sure conviction for you is that under the protection of Almighty God and the inspired leadership of our President and the High Command, you will continue your victorious course to the end that tyranny and vice shall be eliminated, our dead comrades avenged, and peace restored to a war-weary world.
In closing, I can find no fitter expression for my feelings than to apply to you the immortal words spoken by General Scott at Chapultepec when he said, “Brave soldiers, veterans, you have been baptized in fire and blood and have come out steel”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Middleton, January 1, 1945
As I see the situation now, you will eventually use the 17th Airborne to augment your attack on Houffalize. When this starts, I believe that the further use of the 87th will terminate, and we can trade that for the 94th.
Looking into the future, I propose to have you . . . attack on the axis Bastogne-St. Vith. In conjunction with an attack by the XII Corps from Diekirch north on St. Vith, the VII Corps [of the First Army] will attack the day after tomorrow morning on the road Houffalize-Vaux-Chavanne. It is therefore my belief that, if the 101st feels it can do it, and the situation otherwise is satisfactory, you should move on Noville the day after tomorrow.
For the big picture, with you and Eddy moving on St. Vith, the III Corps will hold defensively on any line obtained and successively break off divisions from the west to augment the attack of the XII Corps.
This plan is subject to change without notice as all plans are. However, we must still bear in mind that the 4th Armored Division should eventually get to the XII Corps, so that the XII Corps can have one armored division and two infantry divisions. You will then have one armored division and two or three infantry divisions, which should make a very powerful pair of scissor blades.
Diary, January 1
The 6th Armored did well in spite of snow and icy roads. The 11 th Armored yesterday fought well but stupidly and lost too many tanks. Apparently they are very green and particularly inept at fighting in the woods . . .
All my troops are just where they should be, so if we lost, it will be due to better fighting on the part of the enemy . . . not to any mistakes which I may have made.
GSP, Jr., Press Conference, Luxembourg City, January 1, 1945
Patton: The purpose of this operation as far as the Third Army is concerned is to hit this son-of-a-bitch – pardon me – in the flank, and we did it, with the result that he is damn well stopped and going back. If you got a monkey in a jungle hanging by his tail, it is easier to get him by cutting his tail than kicking him in the face. The same thing is true here.
I am very well pleased with the situation . . . To me it is a never ending marvel what our soldiers can do.
He outlined and discussed the movements between December 19 and 22.
Now that sounds like what a great man George Patton is, but I did not have anything to do with it. I told General Gay and the staff, and they got the movement orders out. The people who actually did it were the younger officers and soldiers. When you think of those men marching all night in the cold, over roads they had never seen, and nobody getting lost, and everybody getting to the place in time, it is a very marvelous feat; I know of no equal to it in military history . . . I take off my hat to them.
The 35th Division did a marvelous thing . . .
The day before yesterday, the 11th Armored and the 87th Infantry Divisions came up from Reims. They were supposed to close in the afternoon. The 11th got in at 2200 and attacked at 0800 the next morning, and the 87th got in at 6 A.M. and attacked at 6:30. That was a very fortunate piece of timing . . . If I were a liar, I would have said that I planned it, but actually I was lucky as hell . . .
I think yesterday was the crucial time in the operation. He [the enemy] could have done something yesterday; he can’t do it now.
All this is of course off-the-record ...
Question: Will the First Army jump soon?
Patton: I’m not my brother’s keeper.
Question: . . . future plans?
Patton: . . . We want to catch as many Germans as possible, but he is pulling out.
Question: If you pinch off a lot of Germans, is there any chance of the front collapsing?
Patton: What do you think I went to church for yesterday . . .
Question: What about the [enemy] concentration of armor?
Patton: They got damn little armor left – unless they have reproductive tanks.
Question: . . . enemy capabilities in eastern Holland?
Patton: That is out of my line. I am only interested in the son-of-a-bitch where he is right now in front of me . . . We can lick the Germans any place . . . I don’t care where he fights. We’ll find him and kick his teeth in.
Question: Just how important was Bastogne?
Patton: It was just as important as the Battle of Gettysburg was to the Civil War. The credit for seeing that goes to General Bradley . . . You know that when you catch a carp and put him in the boat, he flips his tail just before he dies, and I think this is the German’s last flip . . .
Question: [getting through the Siegfried Line?]
Patton: Never in the history of the world has there been a line that could be successfully defended. The Trojans built a big wall but the Greeks took it; Hadrian built a wall; the Chinese built a wall; the French – with due respect – built a wall upside down. We built walls in the first World War – trenches are nothing but upside down walls. The only way you can win a war is to attack and keep on attacking, and after you have done that, keep attacking some more . . .
Question: General, what do you think the over-all purpose [of the Ardennes counterattack] was?
Patton: I will be damned if I know. My private theory, which has no backing except in my vivid imagination, is that the German General Staff knew the war was lost if they remained on the defensive, and they thought there was a possibility that they could retain the initiative by attacking. I also think that they are getting ready for the third World War, and they think the prestige of the German army going down in attack is better than its going down while on the defensive. Now that is my private opinion.
Diary, January 2
I had in all four corps commanders before lunch to discuss the plan, so that now each one knows what all the others are doing . . .
At last the VII Corps of the First Army is attacking in the direction of Houffalize . . . I still see no reason to change my disposition. God show the right.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, January 2, 1945
The Bosch is fighting all out and so are we and doing it better . . .
Dear Courtney comes in at long last in the morning, and that will relieve the pressure. Any how I am not worried. I took a nap after lunch.
By then, even the syndicated columnists who had been hostile to Patton were giving him what one called “belated orchids.” Patton, they said, might be irascible and acid, profane and hard, but no one could question his professional soundness and his ability as a fighter.
Diary, January 3
The new SHAEF Directive returns the First Army [from Montgomery’s control] to the 12th Army Group [and Bradley] as soon as contact between the First and Third Armies is made near Houffalize. When this has occurred, the Armies drive northeast via St. Vith.
The 6th Army Group is trying to steal the XX Corps.
Montgomery got some fool Englishman in America to suggest that as Eisenhower had too much work, he (Montgomery) should be made Deputy Ground Forces Commander of all troops in Europe. If this occurs, I will ask to be relieved. I will not serve under Montgomery and neither, I think, will Bradley.
At 5 P.M., Middleton telephoned Patton and recommended that the VIII Corps attack, scheduled for the following morning, be postponed because of the enemy buildup near Bastogne. Patton refused, holding that once an attack was set to be launched, it should go. His - main mission was to destroy the enemy, and this could be done better by attacking the Germans than by waiting for them to attack.
Diary, January 4
I want to attack to the north from Diekirch but Bradley is all for putting new divisions in the Bastogne fight. In my opinion, this is throwing good money after bad. In this weather, on the defensive, the Germans can hold us well enough so that we can never trap them there, whereas if we attack close to the base [of the Bulge], they will have to pull out and we will regain ground and probably catch just as many Germans as the other way . . .
The 11th Armored is very green and took unnecessary losses to no effect. There were also some unfortunate incidents in the shooting of prisoners (I hope we can conceal this).
The 17th Airborne, which attacked this morning, got a very bloody nose and reported the loss of 40% in some of its battalions. This is, of course, hysterical. A loss for any one day of over 8 to 10% can be put down to a damn lie, unless the people run or surrender. General Miley did not impress me when I met him at Bastogne . . . He told me he did not know where his right regiment was, yet he was not out looking for it ...
Bastogne was being shelled when I drove in. The flashes of the shells of our guns on the snow was pretty, but I could have foregone the beauty.
It took two hours to drive home from Bastogne in the dark, and it was very cold.
We can still lose this war. However, the Germans are colder and hungrier than we are, but they fight better. I can never get over the stupidity of our green troops.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, January 5, 1945
These new units are not worth a thing in their first fight. This is the second that has gone sour in the last week.
The whole country is covered with snow and ice. How men live, much less fight, is a marvel to me. – A 280 shell just hit near here —
Those Germans are vicious fighters . . .
Some times even I get skeptical about the end of this show.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Frederick Ayer, January 5, 1945
I really believe that. . . was the most brilliant operation ever performed, and was due wholly to my staff and to the tremendous efficiency of the veteran American soldiers who now compose our armies.
At the present time the fighting is very hot, but we are retaining the initiative and killing more Germans than I have ever previously accounted for . . .
I really feel that, although the German breakthrough was regrettable, it may terminate the war sooner . . . because, when they fail, as they will – or as they have – there will be nothing to look forward to. Of course they have an uncanny method of pulling new troops out of the hat, but at the moment it seems to me that they have everything in they can possibly put in, while we still have a few cards up our sleeves.
Diary, January 5
After talking to Bradley, we concurred that the German pocket southeast of Bastogne must be eliminated before we can attack Houf-falize . . .
Walker is a very fine soldier. He has never yet complained about any order he has received. The fact that he is not complaining when I take the 90th Division [from his corps] is particularly noteworthy.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Summerall, January 6, 1945
At the present moment I am attacking with an Army of 17 divisions and slowly but surely smashing a hole in the German’s left flank. It has been a very violent battle under appalling weather conditions, but we are going to win.
Diary, January 6
Had Millikin, Van Fleet, and my general staff in the office this morning to get the plan for the attack by the 90th Division settled in all details . . .
The 90th is doing a very clever piece of work in registering its guns. As the guns come in, they register, and similar guns from the 26th Division cease firing. In this way, I believe, we can wholly deceive the enemy as to the arrival of a new unit . . .
I had to use the whip on both Middleton and Millikin today. They are too cautious. I know that their men are tired, but so are the Germans. We have to push people beyond endurance in order to bring this war to its end, because we are forced to fight it with inadequate means.
Only three small counterattacks today —all repulsed. I fear this indicates the enemy is getting away.
The weather, caution on the part of commanders, fatigue on the part of the men, lack of sufficient troops, terrain favorable to the German defense – all this was frustrating, particularly after his brilliant maneuver to bring pressure on the Germans around Bastogne. Prevented from smashing into the flank of the German bulge, trapping substantial numbers of enemy, and winning a great victory, Patton was somewhat discouraged. But only for the moment.