“We are going to attack until the war is over”
THE NIGHT OF JANUARY 6 was “almost too quiet” for Patton’s comfort, and he began to feel ever more strongly that the Germans were going to get away – pull out all the men they had in the Bulge without getting trapped. To prevent this, he told Middleton “to push out till he bumps” into the enemy.
Eddy was worried that the Germans might strike his XII Corps through Diekirch, and so was Bradley. Patton doubted it, yet gave Eddy more protection. He alerted two armored divisions to be ready to help if Eddy was attacked, and he made sure that the road blocks and mines in front of the corps were strong and effective. “If the enemy tries to get through, he will be well stopped.”
He had lunch at Bradley’s headquarters with Paul McNutt and the Manpower Board.
McNutt is a pompous fool not at all interested in manpower . . . He told me he knew all about war. I told him he knew nothing about it compared to the people fighting it, and that he and his Board were responsible for the deaths of all Americans who gave their lives due to the shortage of replacements. I doubt if he loves me; it’s mutual.
During lunch he sat next to a Harvard professor,
who remarked that apparently I did not give a damn as to what people thought of me. I told him that depended upon who the people were, but that in any case I did not give very much of a damn.
To Beatrice:
McNutt and the man power bord . . . I told them the truth about their failure to provide men and they did not like it. [They] talked about laws. I told them we were talking in blood and that it was on their heads . . .
We got 17 counter attacks from 16 German divisions yesterday and nocked them all back for losses.
To day they are too quiet, so I am convinced they are cooking something up, but [they] have not the force to hurt us except for a moment.
We are going to put on a hell of a show soon which should realy rock them. At the moment I have 17 divisions but 3 of them are pretty weak.
Diary, January 8
Bradley asked me if I could attack Houffalize today . . . I said I could, but felt it a mistake as all plans were made for a general attack tomorrow . . .
I met Gaffey on the road . . . When I told him that he was to attack in the morning, he made no remarks at all, but simply wanted to know when, and in what direction . . .
I passed through the last battalion of the 90th Division moving in by truck. They must have been riding in the cold, blizzard weather in open trucks for many hours, but were in splendid form and cheered and yelled as I drove past. It was a very inspiring sight.
We attack in the morning . . . [with] eight divisions. It should work . . .
The 87th and 17th Airborne got fairly well chopped up yesterday due at least in part to Middleton’s reluctance to use the 11 th Armored in backing them up. He is still over-worried about his left flank and rear. Too much so.
At supper Middleton called to say that the 87th and 17th Airborne could not attack tomorrow, and that the 101st Airborne and 4th Armored should, if possible, wait until the 10th. I told him everything would go on as ordered and that all units would attack on the 9th, tomorrow, with the understanding that the 87th and 17th Airborne would probably not be able to put on a very good show.
Next, Gaffey called up and made the same recommendation and got the same answer.
Then Eddy called and said he heard the 4th Armored was going into that fight, and [therefore] he couldn’t count on it to support him, and that it would take nine hours for the 10th Armored to reach him. I told him that in that event, he would certainly have to hold for nine hours.
Again I earned my pay.
We continue to get a rumor of a German concentration [of troops] at Saarbrucken. The chief reason I believe it is so, is that if I were the Germans, that is what I would do . . . It would be a great feather in their caps if they recaptured Metz. I told Walker . . . to prepare all roads for demolition [as a precaution against a German attack].
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, January 9, 1945
The ground and the snow and the brief period of daylight are a greater menace than the enemy . . .
We simply have to keep attacking or he [the enemy] will. I wish that great soldier Sir B. [Bernard L. Montgomery] would do a little more.
The rumors of a German counterattack through Saarbrucken continued, although Patton could hardly see how the Germans had enough troops to launch it – unless they were pulling all their armor out of the Bulge, “which they may have done.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Stimson, January 10, 1945
The success which the Third Army has attained, while apparently attributed to me, should certainly be given in equal measure to all the gallant men and officers composing this Army. They have continued in the past and are now doing more than it is humanly possible to do . . .
The two things which bother us . . . are replacements and ammunition. I am sure that everything is being done, but cannot help stressing the importance of maintaining the troops at full strength and giving us all the ammunition we can shoot.
In my opinion, this present battle is a replica of Grant’s “Wilderness Campaign” and we will have to fight it out on these lines if it takes all winter and all next summer.
Naturally, things would be facilitated if we had more divisions, but as far as I kriow> there are no more, so will have to get by with what we have.
This was as close to complaining as he dared go.
Because the Germans had launched a diversionary attack against the Seventh Army, Bradley phoned to tell Patton that Eisenhower wanted the Third Army effort in the Bastogne area and toward Houffalize to be stopped. He wanted at least an armored division freed from contact with the enemy and dispatched to the XX Corps in case the German effort against the Seventh Army spilled over into the Saarbrucken area.
Patton immediately agreed, but as he thought about it, the more he thought it would be a mistake. He asked Bradley to go with him to Arlon and look over the situation personally. Bradley consented.
At Arlon, after discussion with Middle ton and Millikin, they decided to pull the 4th Armored Division out of the front. Patton then phoned and halted the attacks of the 101st Airborne and 4th Armored Divisions. He ordered the latter to assemble southeast of Luxembourg, astride a road net that would enable it to go, if necessary, to the XX or XII Corps.
For these somewhat complicated movements, “no written orders were issued.” Patton, Middleton, and Millikin simply drove to Bastogne and talked with the division commanders, Taylor, Gaffey, and Grow, to arrange the details.
When Patton returned to Luxembourg, he
actually found elements of the 4th Armored moving to their new assembly positions. The remarkable ability which Gaffey has of doing what he is told fast was well exemplified here.
It appeared to Patton that the Germans were withdrawing from the Bulge. If this were so, he could take Houffalize with what he had left in the Bastogne area; and if no great danger developed at Saarbrucken, he could attack to the north at once with the XII Corps.
But there was another rumor, “invented” he thought by the 12 th Army Group, of an enemy troop concentration near Trier.
To me it is patently impossible that the Germans can have concentrations all over the face of nature – I do not believe it. However, the position in which we have placed the 4th Armored is such that it can operate against this threat too.
This is the second time I have been stopped in a successful attack due to the Germans having more nerve than we have – that is, not me, but some of the others. The ability of American troops to maneuver when properly led is wonderful. Their ability to fight is not so good ...
It was very cold driving, and I may have frozen my face a little.
Herbert Lehman, Director General of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, wrote from Washington to express his thanks for the “many courtesies” extended by Patton during Lehman’s trip to Europe. He thought it might interest Patton to know that he had returned home on a ship carrying American soldiers, many of whom were wounded. A large proportion volunteered the information that they wished they were serving under Patton.
Diary, January n
The III Corps . . . made good progress and are taking a lot of prisoners. The end of the Bastogne operation is in sight . . .
I would prefer to attack at once and take the German bridgehead at Saarbrucken. This could be done now. Bradley thinks we had best wait . . .
I believe that today ends the Bastogne operation. From now on it is simply a question of driving a defeated enemy.
Diary, January 12
The VIII and III Corps attack tomorrow to take Houffalize and should get it, as there is not much in the way. That will tidy up that job and next to the crossing of France, it is the biggest one we have done. I hope we get the credit.
When Houffalize is taken, we will have a junction between the First and Third Armies, which will put Bradley back in control of the First Army. This will be very advantageous, as Bradley is much less timid than Montgomery.
Besides, Bradley and Patton usually saw eye to eye on the issues. In addition, they felt that they were more concerned with upholding American interests than Eisenhower.
I believe that the Bastogne operation is the biggest and best the Third Army has accomplished, not excluding the battle of France, and I hope the troops get the credit for their great work . . .
Bradley came over late this afternoon to discuss long range plans . . . He wants to attack east with the First Army [directed] on Cologne, while the Third Army maintains pressure and really holds a defensive flank . . . This plan has the advantage of attacking where we have already breached the Siegfried Line and also of using the shortest road to Cologne. It is probably sound but slow . . .
Personally, I believe that an attack by the XX Corps . . . straight east through Saarlautern would bring better results and would certainly be more crippling to Germany, as it would get the whole [industrial] Saar valley.
Wherever we attack, one thing is certain, we should attack, because if we don’t, the Germans will.
GSP, Jr., Press Conference, Luxembourg, January 12, 1945
Patton: [As in 1918], unquestionably this [German] attack was also to end this war, and they failed. There will be another one, and it too will fail. In fact, I hope to God they do attack down south, for we’ll wipe their ass right off!
The operation at Bastogne is finished. The 6th Armored, 35th, and 90th all made contact yesterday. Without deprecating the great heroism of the 101st, I think you should know that one combat command of the 9th Armored, one combat command of the 10th Armored, and two tank destroyer outfits were also in Bastogne . . .
I am very much satisfied with this operation so far, and I am hopeful that these sons-of-bitches attack somewhere soon. If they do, I won’t be able to hold myself, for I will attack then. We can lick them anywhere . . .
There are two things that the enemy can do. He can hit from around Metz or further down, and in either case he is shit out of luck!
Question: [will the Germans pull out and defend or attack again?]
Patton: You cannot win a war without retaining the initiative. If he pulls out and sits on his ass, he is through. You’ve got to keep pushing . . .
Question: . . . new role of the 4th Armored?
Patton: Just waiting to bite this fellow in the ass when he comes through.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, January 12, 1945
Personally I would attack them right now . . . but others don’t like to take the chances I do. I feel that if we attack him, he cant attack us . . .
Just saw the tent maker on long range plans. I think they are too long range.
Hughes remarked in a letter to Beatrice that some people wondered in Sicily whether soldiers would serve under Patton. Now everyone wanted to be in his Army.
Diary, January 13
There is a distinct difference in the mental attitude of the officers and men today . . . They all feel that they are on the winning side, pursuing a beaten enemy; while yesterday . . . they were dubious as to whether we could stop the German attack. It is an interesting psychological situation. Now that all feel the enemy is licked, they are sure of themselves. Until today I was the only one sure of victory.
The fighting today has been bitter, but it is just what one would expect, as it is to the north and northeast of Bastogne where the enemy must hold in order to extricate what he has left east of the town. We will get them . . .
Wrote the Editor of the Stars and Stripes protesting against his paper as subversive of discipline. I sent a copy of my letter to general Lee . . . I stated that unless there is an improvement, I will not permit the paper to be issued in this Army, nor permit his reporters or photographers in the Army area. It is a scurrilous sheet.
What he particularly disliked were Bill Mauldin’s cartoons, showing Willie and Joe, typical infantrymen, as unshaved and dirty.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, January 15, 1945
The Germans are definitely on the run . . .
I rather fear that our super planners have been scared more than the soldiers have . . .
I still have about 20 Xmas boxes to open. I gave a lot of cakes to some orphans . . .
We have had three nice clear days and hope that our air has done half as much as it says. However, they do try, especially Weyland and his fighter bombers.
Diary, January 16
The 11th Armored made contact with the . . . 2d Armored Division [of the First Army] at Houffalize. This restores Bradley to the command of the First Army . . . and terminates the German offensive. Now we will drive them back . . .
Devers is to liquidate the Colmar pocket . . . We have to loan him the 10th Armored Division and three battalions of artillery, which he will probably try to steal. Personally I would rather fight Germans than resist the inroads of Devers and Monty.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to son George, January 16, 1945
Leadership . . . is the thing that wins battles. I have it – but I’ll be damned if I can define it. Probably it consists in knowing what you want to do and then doing it and getting mad if any one stepps in the way. Self confidence and leadership are twin brothers . . .
I think we accounted for some 80,000 Germans. The woods are full of corpses, and it is going to stink some in the spring.
One of these damned jet planes that goes 470 miles an hour just dropped a bomb. It shook this house . . . and scared Willie. They also shoot rockets at us, but one gets used to such things. It is like a thunder storm. You are not apt to be in the way. And if you are, what the Hell, no more buttoning and unbuttoning.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, January 16, 1945
As we are having a tidying up battle to day, there is not much to do . . .
I fear we have not got the mental equipment for one big push. From a material and personnell view point, it could be and should be done . . .
Even the tent maker admits that Courtney is dumb. He is also very jealous of me.
Diary, January 17
Visited Millikin and Middleton at Arlon. I had already congratulated both over the telephone and repeated it in person. They have done exceptionally well. Of course, Millikin, being a greenhorn, required considerable shoving, but I think he has done a good job . . .
I told the division and corps commanders that it will be necessary to continue the attack, and that I know they are tired; therefore, they should try to arrange to get one third of their forces out to rest up and warm up, because we are going to attack until the war is over.
Diary, January 18
SHAEF called and directed us to send a division to the 6th Army Group . . . We selected the 101st Airborne because we will probably lose that anyhow . . .
Walker . . . called up late and asked if he could continue a serious attack . . . I told him to go ahead. Now is the time to attack and keep it up ...
When Hughes came yesterday, he told me with great glee that in his last interview with Eisenhower, the latter said to him, “Do you know, Everett, George is really a very great soldier, and I must get Marshall to do something for him before the war is over.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, January 19, 1945
Things are a little slow just now mostly due to utterly vile weather. Yesterday Eddy jumped off in a London fog which turned to rain and sleet. We are going forward but are mostly delayed by the ice.
Milly and Troy are starting again Sunday and Walker keeps pitching all the time ...
I always hate not to have a desperate job on my hands. I guess I am getting too used to it.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Lt. Col. John A. Degen, Brookline, Mass., January 19, 1945
Fortunately for my sanity, and possibly for my self-esteem, I do not see all the bullshit which is written in the home town papers about me.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, January 20, 1945
The 101 Air Borne call themselves the tripple B’s – “Battered Bastards of Bastogne.” They did well but like the Marines of the last war, they get more credit than they deserve.
The weather could not be worse. It is snowing like hell again now. But we are still going forward about a mile a day . . .
I doubt if Willie needs a sweater . . .
When I am reading in bed, he gets in with me. But as soon as I start to open the windoe he hurries into the bath room where it is warm.
Troy and Milly renew the attack in the morning. I will go up and have a look. It will not be a great sensation but will kill Germans. Really I don’t see how they can stand the continued attacks on both flanks – I hope we get to Berlin first. But if we do we will have to get a move on [to beat the Russians],
Diary, January 21
Drove . . . to give each officer a pat on the back. They have finally found themselves and have done well. A few days ago I was on the point of relieving both Miley and Kilburn; one should not act too fast . . . At one time I was at the point of relieving [Brig. Gen. W. A.] Holbrook, but now he seems to be doing a good job.
I noticed another instance of the complete incapacity of inexperienced officers. Several ordnance trailers, each loaded with between 40 and 50 replacements . . . were stuck on a slippery hill and not moving. There were a number of officers present, but none of them had enough sense to make the men dismount and push the vehicles until Stiller and I did so. Then the trucks got moving fast.
In the Canal Zone in 1948, Mrs. Patton was halted by a sentry who inspected her pass. He was wearing the Third Army patch, and she asked whether he had ever seen General Patton. “Oh, yes,” the soldier said, “I knew him, though I only saw him once. We were stuck in the snow and he came by in a jeep. His face was awful red, and he must have been about froze, riding in that open jeep. He yelled to us to get out and push, and first I knew there was General Patton pushing right alongside of me.”
Devers is howling for more troops, although when he started to obliterate the Colmar Pocket, ho said he could do it with one division. I fear we may lose the 8th Armored [to him]. We have already sent him the 101st Airborne and the 10th Armored.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, January 22, 1945
Saw a lot of dead Germans yesterday frozen in funny attitudes. I got some good pictures but did not have my color camera, which was a pity, as they were a pale claret color.
They are definitely on the run and have suffered more than we hoped.
Diary, January 22
I told Eddy not to halt on his final objective but to continue . . . There is a rumor that the enemy is withdrawing, which I doubt.
Called Bradley on the phone . . . and urged all Armies to attack in spite of fatigue or losses, as I am sure that in view of the Russian offensive, now is the time to strike.
Diary, January 23
In spite of strong remonstrances by Bradley and myself, SHAEF ordered the 35th Division . . . to the 6th Army Group. It is too bad that the highest levels of command have no personal knowledge of war...
The elimination of the Colmar pocket seems to have developed into a fiasco. I hope I don’t get sent down to strike it out . . .
Called on Bradley [about] . . . future plans . . . If this plan fails, Bradley will have to give Monty a number of divisions, possibly twelve, and all the remainder of the First and Third Armies will sit on the defensive while Monty proceeds to do nothing as usual. We must succeed in our attack to avoid this, and also to maintain the prestige of the American Army.
Bradley’s plan for the attack is good, and I think it will succeed. He is also trying to get Monty to temporarily take over the Ninth Army front so we can send four more divisions to Devers to clean up the Colmar pocket, and then put the 6th Army Group on the defensive.
Diary, January 24
Hodges . . . arrived at lunch time, and after lunch we had a meeting attended by Bradley . . . The boundaries between the Armies were worked out, very satisfactorily to us and I also believe to Hodges.
Just when everything had been satisfactorily arranged and Hodges said he could attack Sunday, the telephone rang and General White-ley [a British officer and deputy G–3 of SHAEF] called up Bradley and wanted to withdraw additional divisions . . . to help Devers. Bradley told him that . . . we would be giving up a sure thing for a side show.
For the only time to my knowledge he lost his good humor and told Whiteley that if he wanted to destroy the whole operation, he could do so and be damned, or words to that effect, and to take all the corps and divisions.
It occurs to me that this patent attempt to prevent the attack of the First and Third Armies is a British effort to give Monty the leading role. If our attacks fail after a good try, we will have to give Monty troops, and the Americans simply sit on the defensive while U.S. blood aids British prestige. At the moment four British divisions are out of contact [with the enemy] and Monty says the earliest he can attack is February 8.
Bradley was very firm and even angry.
Bull [the SHAEF G–3, Whiteley’s superior] got on the phone and Bradley repeated his statements, adding that much more than a tactical operation was involved, in that the prestige of the American army was at stake.
We were all very pleased with Bradley’s attitude and told him so.
Gay recorded what happened this way. After everyone at the meeting had satisfactorily worked out the details of the attack by both Armies to break through the Siegfried Line, someone from SHAEF phoned Bradley. Gay remembered what Bradley said on the phone as follows:
“I want you to understand that there is more at stake than the mere moving of divisions and corps and of a certain tactical plan. The reputation and the good will of the American soldiers and the American army and its commanders are at stake. If you feel that way about it, then as far as I am concerned, you can take any goddam division and/or corps in the 12th Army Group, do with them as you see fit, and those of us that you leave back will set on our ass until hell freezes. I trust you do not think I am angry, but I want to impress upon you that I am goddam well incensed.”
At that time, Gay noted,
practically every officer in the room stood up and applauded, and General Patton said in a voice that could be heard over the telephone, “Tell them to go to hell and all three of us will resign. I will lead the procession.”
Diary, January 24
Hodges expects to jump on Sunday. I trust that I can beat him by one day.
If SHAEF insists on the Colmar pocket venture, it is playing into the enemy’s hands by moving our troops from a vital area to one of very little secondary importance. Furthermore, this will be the third time such a mistake has been made, and I do not believe that people guilty of such errors in judgment can eventually avoid the censure of history.
Bradley, Hodges, and myself are determined to carry on our attack no matter how much they deplete us. Personally, I am convinced that the Germans are pulling out, probably as far as the Rhine, and if we go ahead, we will get to the Rhine, and very soon. To do otherwise at this moment would, in my opinion, be criminal.
Diary, January 26
Heavy local snows and intense cold . . .
Bradley leaves for his new command post at Namur today . . . I called on him . . . to say goodbye. He is a good officer but utterly lacks “it.” Too bad.
Diary, January 27
Middle ton . . . is in very good spirits and eager to attack . . . Eddy . . . is full of offensive ardor and wants to get going.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, January 28, 1945
I have written nearly daily for inspite of what people think, an Army commander is not very very busy lots of the time . . .
Driving in a peep is not so hot, not in zero weather. However I have plenty of clothes. I have a woolen scarf that I find makes a lot of difference – if you keep your neck warm. I also have a lap robe made of a shelter half lined with a blanket and I have plastic glass doors on the side of the peep . . .
We are starting a new attack to day and it is snowing like Hell. However, I think that the Germans are in a bad way and that we will be able to get through. Unfortunately we have to storm the Siegfried line as a starter.
By that date the bulge had been eliminated. The Germans had been expelled from the salient. The front had been restored. Now everyone could get on with the old business of cracking the Siegfried Line and driving to the Rhine.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, January 31, 1945
Yesterday I drove in a peep in zero weather for about eight hours. When I came in I was so cold I got in a hot tub and to give a tropical aspect, turned on the sun lamp. And left it on for about 20 minutes. It was some 12 feet away, but is pretty potent. My eyes were already bad from the snow.
I woke up at 1145 in great pane with my eyes running like a spigot.
I got up and woke Col. Odom, the Dr. who lives with us – my personal physician? – He put cold barasic compresses on for two hours, gave me a shot of morphine and a sleeping powder.
I stayed in bed till noon in a dark room, and now the eyes are well. I am like a puppy, always sticking my nose into trouble.
The night of the 28 at 0130 our time, which is 5:30 your time, I dreamed I was in a boat in a muddy creek and had just started to back down stream when you came running over the mud and called “Georgie” the way you do. Were you in any trouble?
Eddy wanted to attack on the 6th, but Patton told him he would have to jump off on the 4th.
He said I never gave him time to get ready and did not appreciate time and space factors.
I told him that had I ever given a corps commander the time he asked for, we would still be on the Seine.
Shortly afterward a telephone call from 12 th Army Group instructed Patton to commit nothing for the moment. He would get orders later.
As the result of this, I told Eddy to stop his preparations. Hell and damn. This is another case of giving up a going attack in order to start one that has no promise of success except to exalt Monty, who has never won a battle since he left Africa and only El Alamein there. I won Mareth for him.
Somewhat angry, he told Harry Maloney that his 94th Division was the worst in the Army insofar as the ratio of non-battle casualties to battle casualties was concerned. If conditions did not improve, he said, Maloney himself would become a non-battle casualty. “I was intentionally rough.”
Patton then talked to the field officers and representatives from each company in the division and gave them the usual talk. I also praised the men for what they had done, but told them very frankly that the 94th had lost more men as prisoners of war than all the other troops I had commanded during my entire military service and that they must wipe out the disgrace. I then patted General Maloney on the back, and believe that this technique will have the desired effect.
In a phone call Bradley justified Patton’s “worst fears.” Patton would lose the 95th Division to the Ninth Army and perhaps also five or six artillery battalions. As usual, Patton was
quite outspoken in my objections, but Bradley said that it was not even Eisenhower’s plan, but was forced on him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Eisenhower had gone to Marseilles to see Marshall who was on his way to the Yalta Conference, and Marshall had passed along the instruction.
Damn this political war. However, the mistakes of the high command have thus far turned to my personal advantage and glory. Here’s hoping.
Driving to Spa, Belgium, Patton was appalled by the destruction of Houffalize, which was “completely removed. I have never seen anything like it in this war. In my opinion, it is worse than St. Vith.”
O little town of Houffalize, How still we see thee lie; Above they steep and battered streets The aeroplanes sail by.
Yet in thy dark streets shineth Not any Goddamned light; The hopes and fears of all thy years Were blown to hell last night.
At Spa on February 2, Patton discovered that Hodges had his office in the room where Hindenburg decided in the fall of 1918 that the war was lost. From the windows, Patton could see the lake around which the Kaiser walked while awaiting word from Hindenburg.
Bradley, Hodges, Simpson, and I, with a few staff offiers, met after lunch in what may be another momentous mistake. Bradley stated that after General Eisenhower had seen General Marshall . . . he had been directed on the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to attack with the British 21st Army Group and the Ninth Army, all under General Montgomery.
Bradley thought that part of this decision was the desire to see that the 14 British divisions, which have been sitting in northern Belgium for the last two months without fighting, were used.
The purpose of the attack is to secure as rapidly as possible a wide stretch of the Rhine River so that in the event that Germany collapses, we will have a quick entry.
I feel, and I believe Hodges also agrees, that our present attack, which is moving, has a better chance of getting to the Rhine first than has a new attack which will not start until February 10th, if then. Furthermore, neither of us has a very high opinion of the offensive value of British troops.
In other words, the 21 Army Group would make the main effort, and the Ninth Army, in direct support of the British, was to be built up at the expense of the First and Third Armies. The First Army was to secure the Roer River dams and protect the right flank of the Ninth.
Or, as Eisenhower later explained, the general attack in the Ardennes was to be abandoned, and the entire weight of the Allied forces was to be thrown into an attempt to reach the Rhine River below Diisseldorf.
The First and Third Armies will be allowed to continue their present attack until the 10th, and thereafter, provided the casualties and the ammunition expenditures are not excessive . . . We have not got sufficient ammunition or replacements to maintain the attack of three [American] Armies.
The 6th Army Group is to go on the defensive . . .
Personally, I think that this is a foolish and ignoble way for the Americans to end the war. In my opinion, every division should be attacking, and if such an attack were made, the Germans do not have the resources to stop it.
We were all very gloomy . . . It was further revealed to us that SHAEF is taking several divisions for a theater reserve – reserve against what? – which seems to me painting the lily, or locking the stable door after the horse is stolen.
To cheer himself up, he ordered two shotguns, one for himself, the other for his brother-in-law, Frederick Ayer.
Patton had his four corps commanders in on February 3, and explained that the Third Army had to continue its attack to prevent the Germans from moving troops against Montgomery.
Diary, February 3
My plan of attack is only tenable on the assumption that the Germans have not got the power to hit back. I believe this to be the case. I tried to get an extra armored division to give to the XX Corps in order to clear up the Moselle-Saar triangle, but as usual my request was turned down.
He thought it “the height of folly, both from a political and military angle” to end the war with the 6th Army Group and the Third Army on the defensive. He expected little from the 21 Army Group attack because “Monty is so slow and timid that he will find a German build-up in front of him and will stall.”
Since he felt that Bradley would stop him if he knew that Patton was starting a new attack with the XII Corps, “I shall not tell him.”
Van Fleet, whose division was with the First Army, and Leclerc, whose division was with the Seventh, asked Patton to try to get them reassigned to the Third Army. “Is it bootlick or admiration?”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, February 4, 1945
You may hear that I am on the defensive but it was not the enemy who put me there.
I don’t see much future for me in this war. There are too many “safety first” people running it. However, I have felt this way before and something has always turned up. I will go to church and see what can be done . . .
I feel pretty low to be ending the war on the defensive.
But not even he could cope with his resilience. He expanded his notion of his attack and soon believed that “We may still . . . have an opportunity of getting to the Rhine first.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, February 5, 1945
Am going to Bastogne to meet Destiny and the tent maker . . . I hope it wont be a stop order as we are doing very nicely . . .
If I become defense, I think I will visit the Leicester-Warrens and the Stockdales for a few days. I am not tired but get bored when there is no fighting.
Diary, February 5
I am trying to keep the impending Bitburg offensive secret so that the powers that be will not order it stopped. Therefore I was quite worried when Bradley telephoned and asked if I could meet him and Ike at Bastogne. I trust that it is simply a desire to be photographed in that historic city, but it may be further orders. In any event, Eddy will jump off at 0100 on the 7th.
The meeting at Bastogne
was purely a social one, but I was more amused than surprised when Eisenhower failed to make any remark about my Bastogne operation; in fact, he made no reference whatever to the great successes of the Third Army.
How Patton wanted a tribute!
So far in my dealings with him, he has never mentioned in a complimentary way any action that myself or any other officer has performed. I do not believe that it is intentional, but just carelessness; however, it is poor leadership. He had on his new five stars – a very pretty insignia.
They were photographed in front of a carefully selected “junk heap,” then drove to First Army headquarters. Patton carefully avoided mentioning the forthcoming XII Corps attack.
He told Eisenhower that if he had to lose a corps, he hoped it would not be Middleton’s. Eisenhower said that he could see no reason why a man could not keep those whom he trusted. He added that he felt handicapped “by having to keep Devers under him, whom he distrusted. I told him I felt the same way about Devers.”
Middleton was pleased when he learned of Patton’s request. “While he had nothing against Hodges, he had nothing for him.”
Patton awakened for no reason at 3 A.M., February 6, and it suddenly occurred to him that if he got a breakthrough in either the VIII or XII Corps area – or in both – he might be able to launch two, possibly three, armored divisions in a swift exploitation, thereby
re-enacting the Brest Peninsula show. Whether ideas like this are the result of inspiration or insomnia, I don’t know, but nearly every tactical idea I have had popped into my head like Minerva and not as historians attempt to describe generals who work things out on paper in a laborious manner.
If we do launch three divisions, we will have practically nothing to hold the line defense; however, it is my considered opinion that if we launch three divisions, there will be no line left to hold. In any case, I will take a chance. The Lord will provide.
“This,” he said later, “was the origin of the Palatinate Campaign.”
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Frederick Ayer, February 6, 1945
We are having a very funny battle right now. I am taking one of the longest chances of my chancy career; in fact, almost disobeying orders in order to attack, my theory being that if I win, nobody will say anything, and I am sure I will win.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, February 6, 1944
At 0100 tomorrow I am starting my biggest gamble. You remember that when Nelson was attacking Calvi in Corsica, he learned that there were twice as many French there as he had reported to his chief, so he kept the secret and won the battle.
Yesterday, when I saw Omar and Destiny, I was in the same fix. If the thing works, I may be able to cut Hugh and Bob loose and repeat the Driant show. If I loose, I will be where I am now.
As usual I am short of men owing to the need of supporting Big Simp.
As usual Destiny never mentioned the Bastogne operation. Nor has anyone else.
Neither Patton nor Eddy was satisfied with XII Corps progress on February 7, and things continued to be gloomy on the 8th, “mostly due to weather.” Patton phoned Bradley to ask whether he could postpone giving up the 17 th Airborne,
but he was no help. His success is due to his lack of backbone and subservience to those above him. I will manage without him. In fact, I always have; even in Sicily he had to be carried. Personally I fight every order that I do not like, which makes me unpopular but successful.
James F. Byrnes, who had visited Patton several weeks earlier, wrote to say that at a luncheon with about a dozen of his former colleagues in the Senate he had repeated Patton’s “very generous tribute” to Bradley for his part in planning Patton’s summer campaign. Everyone was pleased to know of the “affectionate regard” that the two generals had for each other.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Byrnes, February 7,
The chief thing I deprecate about the unfortunate publicity I have received is the misguided remarks which have occurred in a few Southern papers connecting me with politics. I have no more gift for politics than a cow has for fox hunting, and am not interested in it. Also, I am sure it is very bad for a man’s military reputation to be confounded with it. Personally I have never voted and do not intend to.
At a press conference on February 9, he said, “I think we are going to play this part of the war by ear. If we can get a breakthrough, we will be all right.”
But the weather was abominable. When the Germans destroyed the Roer River dams, they flooded the ground in front of the Ninth Army and stalled Simpson before he started. Bradley then hoped that the First and Third Armies could attack to seize Cologne and Coblenz. He told Patton to give a corps headquarters to the First Army. Patton sent the III because, even though Millikin did
a good job at Bastogne, he is very amateurish compared to the other corps commanders. I don’t like him and never have [since West Point days]. Furthermore, I would rather have three big corps than four little ones. I hope we have to go back to the old plan and keep attacking.
Diary, February 11
The situation in the VIII Corps is very critical due to the fact that the roads are literally disintegrating . . . I told Middleton to dismount tank crews and use them as infantry if necessary, but not to give up the bridgehead the 6th Armored Division has secured over the Sauer River. I hate to get men hurt to take a place and then give it up.
Diary, February 12
All troops not actually fighting are working on the roads.
I have given the XII Corps permission to stop the attack if they want to, but any such permission always acts in reverse on Eddy, so he continued the attack. They are making fine progress.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, February 13, 1945
The only army group I would like to have would be one in China without Allies. Here things are pulled in so many directions by every passing breeze of expediency that we get on slowly.
Also the thaw and our terrific traffic has almost obliterated the roads in Belgium.
Diary, February 13
Crossed the Sauer River into Germany and drove along the east bank . . . The men were quite surprised to see me. However, the chance of getting hit was small and worth the risk due to the effect it had on the troops . . .
I will be the first on the Rhine yet.
Letter, GSP, Jr., to Beatrice, February 14, 1945
Some times I get so mad with the troops for not fighting better and then they do something superb. The forcing of the crossing of the Sauer and Our Rivers . . . was an Homeric feat.
The Siegfried line runs right along the river with hundreds of pill boxes and submerged barbed wire. The river was in flood, running at ten to twelve miles an hour, and yet they crossed.
One day we lost 136 boats but not all the men. We built bridges under [enemy] fire, and even when I crossed they still had to keep them covered with smoke.
I got up closer than I intended to but nothing happened, and the soldiers were all glad to see me. If I only had one more division, I could break through, but the brains are all set on another fool move which never has and never will succeed, particularly under Sir B. L. [Montgomery].
Diary, February 14
I decided to visit Hughes in Paris as neither the VIII nor XII Corps will be able to resume their attack until the 17th, the day I plan to return . . .
Codman and I departed on our first leave since the 24th of October, 1942. We got on the railway car, and Hughes has secured rooms for us at the George V Hotel.
The drama and the desperation of the Battle of the Bulge were over, and the fighting once again was slow and slogging. But now at least the Rhine River was definitely in view.