Zhuangzi: Basic Writings

All we know about the identity of Zhuangzi, or Master Zhuang, are the few facts recorded in the brief notice given him in the Shiji or Records of the Historian (ch. 63) by Sima Qian (145?–89? B.C.). According to this account, his personal name was Zhou, he was a native of a place called Meng, and he once served as “an official in the lacquer garden” in Meng. Sima Qian adds that he lived at the same time as King Hui (370–319 B.C.) of Liang and King Xuan (319–301 B.C.) of Qi, which would make him a contemporary of Mencius, and that he wrote a work in 100,000 words or more which was “mostly in the nature of fable.” A certain number of anecdotes concerning Zhuangzi appear in the book that bears his name, though it is difficult, in view of the deliberate fantasy that characterizes the book as a whole, to regard these as reliable biography.

Scholars disagree as to whether “lacquer garden” is the name of a specific location, or simply means lacquer groves in general, and the location of Meng is uncertain, though it was probably in present-day Henan, south of the Yellow River. If this last supposition is correct, it means that Zhuang Zhou was a native of the state of Song, a fact which may have important implications.

When the Zhou people of western China conquered and replaced the Shang or Yin dynasty around the eleventh century B.C., they enfeoffed the descendants of the Shang kings as rulers of the region of Song in eastern Henan, in order that they might carry on the sacrifices to their illustrious ancestors. Though Song was never an important state, it managed to maintain its existence throughout the long centuries of the Zhou dynasty until 286 B.C., when it was overthrown by three of its neighbors and its territory divided up among them. It is natural to suppose that not only the ruling house, but many of the citizens of Song as well, were descended from the Shang people, and that they preserved to some extent the rites, customs, and ways of thought that had been characteristic of Shang culture. The Book of Odes, it may be noted, contains five “Hymns of Shang” which deal with the legends of the Shang royal family and which scholars agree were either composed or handed down by the rulers of the state of Song. Song led a precarious existence, constantly invaded or threatened by more powerful neighbors, and in later centuries its weakness was greatly aggravated by incessant internal strife, the ruling house of Song possessing a history unrivaled for its bloodiness even in an age of disorder. Its inhabitants, as descendants of the conquered Shang people, were undoubtedly despised and oppressed by the more powerful states which belonged to the lineage of the Zhou conquerors, and the “man of Song” appears in the literature of late Zhou times as a stock figure of the ignorant simpleton.

All these facts of Song life—the preservation of the legends and religious beliefs of the Shang people, the political and social oppression, the despair born of weakness and strife—may go far to elucidate the background from which Zhuangzi’s thought sprang, and to explain why, in its skepticism and mystical detachment, it differs so radically from Confucianism, the basically optimistic and strongly political-minded philosophy which developed in the Zhou lineage states of Lu and Qi. But since we know so little about the life and identity of Zhuang Zhou or his connection with the book that bears his name, it is perhaps best not to seek too assiduously to establish a direct causal connection between the background and the philosophy.

Whoever Zhuang Zhou was, the writings attributed to him bear the stamp of a brilliant and original mind. Instead of speculating upon the possible sources from which this mind drew its ideas, let us turn to an examination of the ideas themselves. I shall simply state that from here on, when I speak of Zhuangzi, I am referring not to a specific individual known to us through history, but to the mind, or group of minds, revealed in the text called Zhuangzi, particularly the first seven sections of that text.

The central theme of the Zhuangzi may be summed up in a single word: freedom. Essentially, all the philosophers of ancient China addressed themselves to the same problem: how is man to live in a world dominated by chaos, suffering, and absurdity? Nearly all of them answered with some concrete plan of action designed to reform the individual, to reform society, and eventually to free the world from its ills. The proposals put forward by the Confucians, the Mohists, and the Legalists, to name some of the principal schools of philosophy, are all different, but all are based upon the same kind of common-sense approach to the problem, and all seek for concrete social, political, and ethical reforms to solve it. Zhuangzi’s answer, however, the answer of one branch of the Daoist school, is radically different from these, and is grounded upon a wholly different type of thinking. It is the answer of a mystic, and in attempting to describe it here in clear and concrete language, I shall undoubtedly be doing violence to its essentially mystic and indescribable nature. Zhuangzi’s answer to the question is: free yourself from the world.

What does he mean by this? In a section not translated here (sec. 23), he tells the story of a man named Nanrong Zhu who went to visit the Daoist sage Laozi in hopes of finding some solution to his worries. When he appeared, Laozi promptly inquired, “Why did you come with all this crowd of people?” The man whirled around in astonishment to see if there was someone standing behind him. Needless to say, there was not; the “crowd of people” that he came with was the baggage of old ideas, the conventional concepts of right and wrong, good and bad, life and death, that he lugged about with him wherever he went.

It is this baggage of conventional values that man must first of all discard before he can be free. Zhuangzi saw the same human sufferings that Confucius, Mozi, and Mencius saw. He saw the man-made ills of war, poverty, and injustice. He saw the natural ills of disease and death. But he believed that they were ills only because man recognized them as such. If man would once forsake his habit of labeling things good or bad, desirable or undesirable, then the man-made ills, which are the product of man’s purposeful and value-ridden actions, would disappear and the natural ills that remain would no longer be seen as ills, but as an inevitable part of the course of life. Thus, in Zhuangzi’s eyes, man is the author of his own suffering and bondage, and all his fears spring from the web of values created by himself alone. Zhuangzi sums up this whole diseased, fear-struck condition of mankind in the macabre metaphor of the leper woman who, “when she gives birth to a child in the deep of the night, rushes to fetch a torch and examine it, trembling with terror lest it look like herself” (sec. 12).

But how is one to persuade the leper woman that disease and ugliness are mere labels that have no real validity? It is no easy task, and for this reason the philosophy of Zhuangzi, like most mystical philosophies, has seldom been fully understood and embraced in its pure form by more than a small minority. Most of the philosophies of ancient China are addressed to the political or intellectual elite; Zhuangzi’s is addressed to the spiritual elite.

Difficult though the task may be, however, Zhuangzi employs every resource of rhetoric in his efforts to awaken the reader to the essential meaninglessness of conventional values and to free him from their bondage. One device he uses to great effect is the pointed or paradoxical anecdote, the non sequitur or apparently nonsensical remark that jolts the mind into awareness of a truth outside the pale of ordinary logic—a device familiar to Western readers of Chinese and Japanese Zen literature. The other device most common in his writings is the pseudological discussion or debate that starts out sounding completely rational and sober, and ends by reducing language to a gibbering inanity. These two devices will be found in their purest form in the first two sections of the Zhuangzi, which together constitute one of the fiercest and most dazzling assaults ever made not only upon man’s conventional system of values, but upon his conventional concepts of time, space, reality, and causation as well.

Finally, Zhuangzi uses throughout his writings that deadliest of weapons against all that is pompous, staid, and holy: humor. Most Chinese philosophers employ humor sparingly—a wise decision, no doubt, in view of the serious tone they seek to maintain—and some of them seem never to have heard of it at all. Zhuangzi, on the contrary, makes it the very core of his style, for he appears to have known that one good laugh would do more than ten pages of harangue to shake the reader’s confidence in the validity of his pat assumptions.

In Zhuangzi’s view, the man who has freed himself from conventional standards of judgment can no longer be made to suffer, for he refuses to recognize poverty as any less desirable than affluence, to recognize death as any less desirable than life. He does not in any literal sense withdraw and hide from the world—to do so would show that he still passed judgment upon the world. He remains within society but refrains from acting out of the motives that lead ordinary men to struggle for wealth, fame, success, or safety. He maintains a state that Zhuangzi refers to as wuwei, or inaction, meaning by this term not a forced quietude, but a course of action that is not founded upon any purposeful motives of gain or striving. In such a state, all human actions become as spontaneous and mindless as those of the natural world. Man becomes one with Nature, or Heaven, as Zhuangzi calls it, and merges himself with Dao, or the Way, the underlying unity that embraces man, Nature, and all that is in the universe.

To describe this mindless, purposeless mode of life, Zhuangzi turns most often to the analogy of the artist or craftsman. The skilled woodcarver, the skilled butcher, the skilled swimmer does not ponder or ratiocinate on the course of action he should take; his skill has become so much a part of him that he merely acts instinctively and spontaneously and, without knowing why, achieves success. Again, Zhuangzi employs the metaphor of a totally free and purposeless journey, using the word you (to wander, or a wandering) to designate the way in which the enlightened man wanders through all of creation, enjoying its delights without ever becoming attached to any one part of it.

But, like all mystics, Zhuangzi insists that language is in the end grievously inadequate to describe the true Way, or the wonderful freedom of the man who has realized his identity with it. Again and again, he cautions that he is giving only a “rough” or “reckless” description of these things, and what follows is usually a passage of highly poetic and paradoxical language that in fact conveys little more than the essential ineffability of such a state of being.

These mystical passages, with their wild and whirling words, need not puzzle the reader if he recognizes them for what they are, but there is one aspect of them that calls for comment. Often Zhuangzi describes the Daoist sage or enlightened man in terms which suggest that he possesses magical powers, that he moves in a trancelike state, that he is impervious to all harm and perhaps even immortal. In these descriptions, Zhuangzi is probably drawing upon the language of ancient Chinese religion and magic, and there were undoubtedly men in his day, as there were in later centuries, who believed that such magical powers, including the power to become immortal, were attainable. I am inclined to believe that Zhuangzi—that is, the author of the most profound and penetrating portions of the book which bears his name—intended these descriptions to be taken metaphorically. But there is evidence elsewhere in the Zhuangzi that they were taken literally, and countless followers of the Daoist school in later ages certainly interpreted them that way. Perhaps, as Arthur Waley says, the best approach is not to attempt to draw any sharp line between rationalism and superstition, between philosophy and magic, but to be prepared to find them mingled and overlapping. After all, it is the drawing of forced and unnatural distinctions that Zhuangzi most vehemently condemns. In the end, the best way to approach Zhuangzi, I believe, is not to attempt to subject his thought to rational and systematic analysis, but to read and reread his words until one has ceased to think of what he is saying and instead has developed an intuitive sense of the mind moving behind the words, and of the world in which it moves.

Zhuangzi, along with Laozi, or Lao Dan, has long been revered as one of the founders of the Daoist school. Because it was believed that Laozi was a contemporary of Confucius and that he was the author of the book known as the Laozi, or Daodejing, he has been honored as the prime patriarch of the school, and Zhuangzi as a later disciple and continuer of his doctrines. Most scholars now agree that it is impossible to say whether Laozi ever lived or, if he did, to determine exactly when. He appears in the pages of the Zhuangzi as one of a number of Daoist sages, but this signifies very little, since so many of the figures in Zhuangzi’s writings are clearly fictitious. Zhuangzi at no point makes any reference to the Daodejing; there are a few places where he uses language that is similar to or identical with that of the Daodejing, but these do not prove that one text is earlier than the other, or that there is any direct connection between them. Moreover, Zhuangzi’s brand of Daoism, as often pointed out, is in many respects quite different from that expounded in the Daodejing. Therefore, though the two may have drawn upon common sources, and certainly became fused in later times, it seems best to consider them separately—which is why I have not discussed the philosophy of the Daodejing here. There is much disagreement among scholars as to when the Daodejing attained its present form, though it is safe to assume, I believe, that both the Zhuangzi and the Daodejing circulated in something like their present form from the second century B.C. on, that is, from the beginning of the Han dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 220).

In the early years of the Han dynasty, the Daodejing, probably because of its brevity and relative simplicity of language, seems to have enjoyed greater popularity than the Zhuangzi. It is repeatedly quoted or alluded to in the literature of the period, and several influential statesmen of the time, including a strong-willed empress dowager, advocated its doctrines. The court official Sima Tan (d. 110 B.C.), father of the historian Sima Qian, wrote a brief essay, “A Discussion of the Essentials of the Six Schools,” in which he reviewed the doctrines of the most important philosophical schools of the time and came out strongly in favor of Daoism. The Huainanzi, an eclectic work compiled by scholars of the court of Liu An (d. 122 B.C.), the king of Huainan, dates from the same period; it includes many excerpts from the Zhuangzi and Laozi and, like Sima Tan, reserves the highest praise for the teachings of the Daoist school.

In spite of this relative popularity, however, Daoism was gradually overshadowed by Confucianism, which won official recognition from the Han emperor toward the end of the second century B.C. and was declared the orthodox philosophy of the state, with a government university set up in the capital to teach its doctrines to prospective officials. This did not mean that Daoist writings were in any way suppressed. People were still free to read and study them, and we may be sure that educated men of the Han continued to savor the literary genius of Zhuangzi and Laozi as they had in the past. It simply meant that Daoist writings were not accorded any official recognition as the basis for decisions on state and public affairs.

In the intellectual world of late Zhou times, a number of rival doctrines had contended for supremacy, and the thinkers of the age had frequently attacked each other with vigor and asperity. Mozi had denounced Confucianism, Mencius and Xunzi had denounced Mohism, and the Legalist philosopher Han Feizi had denounced both doctrines. Zhuangzi had spent a certain amount of time attacking the philosophers of other schools—the pompously moralistic Confucians and Mohists, the Logicians Hui Shi and Gongsun Long with their hairsplitting semantics—though his customary weapon was parody and ridicule rather than polemic.

But by the first century B.C., many of the old sharp differences of opinion had been forgotten or softened by time. Mohism and the School of Logic had all but disappeared from the intellectual scene, and the principal battle was between the two rival philosophies of government: Confucianism, nominally the official doctrine of the state, with its emphasis upon moral guidance of the people, and Legalism, which stressed regimentation through stern and detailed laws and held a strong attraction for the totalitarian-minded rulers and statesmen of the time. Daoism, being basically apolitical, remained in the background, to be drawn upon by either side, though in Han times it was more often the Confucian scholars who utilized the Daoist concept of inaction to oppose the state monopolies and other large-scale government enterprises advocated by the Legalist-minded officials.¹

One should therefore think of Confucianism and Daoism in Han times not as rival systems demanding a choice for one side or the other, but rather as two complementary doctrines, an ethical and political system for the conduct of public and family life, and a mystical philosophy for the spiritual nourishment of the individual, with the metaphysical teachings of the Book of Changes acting as a bridge between the two.

This approach is well exemplified in the lives of two scholars, Shu Guang and his nephew Shu Shou, students of the Confucian Classics who served as tutors to the heir apparent of Emperor Xuan (r. 74–49 B.C.), instructing him in the Analects and the Classic of Filial Piety. When Shu Guang felt he had reached the pinnacle of success and honor, he announced, in the words of Laozi, that “he who knows what is enough will not be shamed; he who knows where to stop will not be in danger.” He and his nephew then petitioned the emperor for release from their official duties and, when it had been granted, retired to the country (Hanshu 71).

Or, to turn from officialdom to the world of private citizens, we may note the case of a scholar named Yan Junping of the region of Sichuan, who made his living as a diviner in the marketplace of Chengdu. He admitted that this was a rather lowly occupation, but explained that he pursued it “because I can thereby benefit the common people. When men come to me with questions about something that is evil or improper, I use the oracle as an excuse to advise them on what is right. I advise sons to be filial, younger brothers to be obedient, subjects to be loyal, utilizing whatever the circumstances may be to lead the people to what is right—and over half of them follow my advice!” So Yan Junping spent his days instructing the people, in this ingenious fashion, in the dictates of conventional morality. But when he had made enough money for one day, “he shut up his stall, lowered the blinds, and gave instruction in the Laozi” (Hanshu 72). He was the author of a work, which was based on the doctrines of Laozi and Zhuangzi, and was a teacher of the most eminent Confucian philosopher of the time, Yang Xiong (53 B.C.–A.D. 18).

Thus, like so many Chinese of later centuries, these men of the Han were both Confucians and Daoists by turns, depending upon which doctrine was appropriate to their particular activities or phase of life, and in this way they contrived, with considerable success, to enjoy the best of two superb philosophies.

Confucianism continued to receive official support and to dominate the intellectual life of China during the remaining centuries of the Han dynasty. With the decay and final collapse of the dynasty in A.D. 220, the empire split into three rival kingdoms and entered upon an era of strife and disunion, aggravated by repeated foreign invasion, that was to last until the Sui once more unified China in A.D. 581. Though Daoism had by no means been forgotten during the long years of the Han, the shock occasioned by the downfall of the dynasty and the political disorder which ensued led men to reexamine the texts of Daoism and the other ancient schools of philosophy with fresh interest to see if their teachings could be used in some way to supplement or correct the tenets of Confucianism, which had to some extent been discredited or called into doubt by the fall of the dynasty that had espoused them. The gradual spread of Buddhism during these same centuries helped to foster this revival of interest in Daoism, often referred to as Neo-Daoism, because so many of the doctrines of the Indian religion appeared, on the surface at least, to be strikingly similar to those of Laozi and Zhuangzi.

At this time the philosophy of Zhuangzi came to be studied and appreciated to a degree unknown before. Its unconventionality and skepticism appealed to an age of disorder in which conventional moral standards seemed to have lost all validity; its implications of a spiritual elite who could transcend the bonds of the world and wander in a realm beyond life and death—whether such release was interpreted metaphorically or literally—appealed to a society dominated by aristocratic tastes. It was an age of ferment, of widening intellectual horizons, in many ways like that of Zhuangzi himself, and one in which Zhuangzi’s mystic vision of freedom seemed to make better sense than it ever had during the staid and stable years of the Han empire.

Our present version of the Zhuangzi dates from this period and was edited by Guo Xiang (d. A.D. 312), one of the leaders of the Neo-Daoist movement. Guo Xiang appended a commentary to the text, the oldest commentary now in existence, which may in part be the work of a predecessor, Xiang Xiu, who lived in the first half of the third century A.D. In any event, it is the text and commentary of Guo Xiang’s edition of the Zhuangzi that form the basis for all our present versions of the work.

The bibliography compiled at the end of the first century B.C. and preserved in the “Treatise on Literature” of the Hanshu lists a Zhuangzi in 52 sections. When Guo Xiang compiled his edition some three centuries later, he discarded a number of sections which he considered to be inferior and of patently spurious nature, and settled upon a text consisting of 33 sections. These he divided into three groups in the following order: seven sections called neipian or “inner chapters,” 15 sections called waipian or “outer chapters,” and 11 sections called zapian or “miscellaneous chapters.” The titles of the “inner chapters” are descriptive of the theme of the chapter as a whole, and were probably affixed by the writer himself. Those of the “outer” and “miscellaneous” chapters, on the other hand, are taken from the opening words of the chapter and often have little to do with the chapter as a whole, suggesting that they were added later and that these chapters are in some cases more in the nature of collections of fragments.

It is generally agreed that the seven “inner chapters,” all of which are translated here, constitute the heart of the Zhuangzi. They contain all the important ideas, are written in a brilliant and distinctive—though difficult—style, and are probably the earliest in date, though so far no way has been found to prove this last assumption. Whether they are the work of the man called Zhuang Zhou we do not know, but they are certainly in the main the product of a superbly keen and original mind, though they may contain brief interpolations by other hands. The remainder of the Zhuangzi is a mixture, sections of which may be as old—they are at times almost as brilliant—as the “inner chapters,” sections of which may date from as late as the third or fourth centuries A.D. Though they contain many interesting anecdotes and passages of discussion which serve to expand and illustrate the ideas of the “inner chapters,” they add little to the philosophy of the Zhuangzi as a whole, and what they do add is often suspiciously foreign to the spirit of the “inner chapters.”

Waley, in his discussion of the authorship of the Zhuangzi, states that “some parts are by a splendid poet, others are by a feeble scribbler” (Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China, p. 256). Anyone who reads the original with any sensitivity to style will, I believe, readily agree with this observation; parts of the book are as humdrum and repetitious as others are inspired. In making my own selection, I have naturally tried to avoid the feeble scribbler at all cost. This is not always easy to do in the latter sections of the Zhuangzi, however, because the scribbler and the poet are occasionally to be found side by side within a single chapter. I have translated three sections from the “outer chapters” that seem to me to be of particular interest, and one section from the “miscellaneous chapters,” making a total of 11 sections. A few other sections that I would like to have included are so marred by textual corruption that I did not feel confident enough to undertake a translation (and textual uncertainties present a serious problem even in the sections I have translated, as is pointed out in my notes).

Though a considerable amount of critical work has been done on the text of the Zhuangzi, and there is an almost endless number of commentaries, the meaning of many passages remains a matter of doubt. There are two reasons for this: the intrinsic difficulty of Zhuangzi’s language and thought, and the textual corruption that has arisen, almost inevitably, we may suppose, in the course of the transmission of such a difficult text.

Zhuangzi, as I have said, rejects all conventional values, and as a result, like so many mystical writers, he rejects the conventional values of words as well, deliberately employing them to mean the opposite of what they ordinarily mean in order to demonstrate their essential meaninglessness. When a writer does this, he of course invites misunderstanding, no matter how dazzling the literary effect he achieves. This is what has happened to Zhuangzi. His grammar is regular enough; his sentence patterns are for the most part like those of other writers of the period; but, because what he says is so often the direct opposite of what anyone else would say, commentators have again and again been led to wonder if he really does not mean something other than what he says, or if the text is perhaps corrupt.

To give an example, in order to pry men loose from their conventional concepts of goodness and beauty, Zhuangzi deliberately glorifies everything that to ordinary eyes appears sordid, base, or bizarre—ex-criminals who have suffered mutilating punishments, men who are horribly ugly or deformed, creatures of grotesque shape or size. To illustrate the point—and because the passage is so important in Daoist philosophy—let me quote one of Zhuangzi’s most famous descriptions of the Dao or the Way:

But if, in Zhuangzi’s language, ugly stands for beautiful, or something beyond both beauty and ugliness, and bad stands for good, or something beyond it, then what do beautiful and good stand for? In other words, since Zhuangzi deliberately turns the values of words upside down, how are we ever to know for certain when he is sincerely praising something? This is the most serious problem one encounters in the interpretation of Daoist writings, as it is in the interpretation of the writings of Zen Buddhism. In any given passage, is the writer, regardless of what words he uses, describing a state of affairs that is in his eyes commendable or uncommendable? Depending upon how one answers this question, the interpretation of the entire passage will differ radically. (An example of this problem is pointed out in note 4 to section 3.)

In translating the other philosophers in this series, I have allowed myself considerable freedom, because I was reasonably confident that I understood what they were saying, and because the exact wording of the original did not seem to be of such vital importance. I have proceeded differently in the case of Zhuangzi. Zhuangzi, as has often been pointed out, though he writes in prose, uses words in the manner of a poet, particularly in the lyrical descriptions of the Way or the Daoist sage. In the broader sense of the word, his work is in fact one of the greatest poems of ancient China. For this reason it seems to me particularly important to stick just as closely as possible to the precise wording and imagery of the Chinese. For example, in section 5 there is a passage in which Confucius is pictured discussing the need to harmonize with and delight in all the manifold ups and downs of human existence, to “master them and never be at a loss for joy,” adding that one should “make it be spring with everything.” This last phrase, literally, “with things make spring,” is an example of the highly poetic language which Zhuangzi employs in such passages, and for which he is justly admired. To render the phrase as “live in peace with mankind” (Giles), or “be kind with things” (Yu-lan Fung), not only blurs the image of the original beyond recognition, but suggests that Zhuangzi is mouthing clichés when in fact he is using the Chinese language as it has never been used before. No other text of early times, with the possible exception of the Zuozhuan, so fully exploits the beauties of ancient Chinese—its vigor, its economy, its richness and symmetry—and it is for this reason that I have chosen to render the wording of the original as closely as possible, even though the English which results may at times sound somewhat strange. Zhuangzi uses words in unconventional ways and he deserves a translation that at least attempts to do justice to his imaginativeness. I have not hesitated to make free use of colloquialisms—a great part of the Zhuangzi is in the form of informal dialogues—or of slang; I do so, however, not in order to create a “jazzy” effect, but because such words or constructions seem to me to get closer to the original than more formal English could. Wherever I have substantially added to the wording of the original in translation, I have enclosed the added words in brackets.

Needless to say, I could not render the literal meaning of the original until I had first decided what it was, and in this sense my translation is as much an interpretation, and as tentative in many places, as any other. In the note on bibliography at the end of this introduction, I have mentioned briefly the commentaries and translations that I have drawn upon. But the result inevitably represents my own interpretation of the text, and will not be quite like that of anyone else. With a work of such difficulty, there can never be anything like a definitive translation, because there is no such thing as a definitive interpretation. Every translator who takes up the text will produce his own Zhuangzi, and the more that are available for the reader to enjoy and compare, the better.

Much of the Zhuangzi consists of anecdotes, often two or three anecdotes in a row that illustrate the same general theme and appear to be hardly more than different versions of a single story. In these anecdotes a variety of historical and semihistorical personages appear, as well as a delightful assortment of gods, mythical heroes, and talking trees, birds, insects, and other creatures. One such historical figure, the logical philosopher Hui Shi or Huizi, who seems to have been a friend of Zhuangzi, always represents the same viewpoint: that of “intellectuality as opposed to imagination,” as Waley puts it (Three Ways of Thought, p. 12). But there is no consistency in the variety of viewpoints which the other figures are made to expound. Thus Confucius sometimes preaches conventional Confucian morality, while at other times he speaks in the words of a true Daoist sage, and even Zhuangzi himself appears on occasion in the role of the convention-ridden fool. The reader must learn to expect any opinion whatsoever from any source, to savor the outrageous incongruities, and to judge for himself which of the opinions offered represents the highest level of enlightenment.

In closing, I may add a word on the translation of certain key philosophical terms in the Zhuangzi. The term Dao I have translated throughout as “the Way,” in order to remain consistent with the practice adopted in the other translations in this series. It is perfectly true that Zhuangzi means by this word something quite different from what Mozi, Xunzi, or Han Feizi meant. But all of them used the same Chinese word, and the reader may easily judge for himself how they interpreted it by observing the ways in which they used it. For the same reason, I have rendered Tian as “Heaven” or “heavenly” in nearly all cases. Zhuangzi uses the word to mean Nature, what pertains to the natural as opposed to the artificial, or as a synonym for the Way. This too is very different from what Mozi or Xunzi meant by the word Tian, but again the reader may judge the differences for himself. In nearly all cases I have rendered de as “virtue,” except where it has the special meaning of a favor or good deed done for someone. This word presents certain difficulties in Zhuangzi. Sometimes he employs it to mean conventional virtue—that is, virtue in the Confucian or Mohist sense—in which case it has bad connotations; at other times he employs it in a good sense to mean the true virtue or vital power that belongs to the man of Dao. (Compare Waley’s rendering of the title Daodejing as The Way and Its Power.) I prefer not to try to distinguish these two usages in the translation because I do not wish to impose upon the English a distinction that is not explicit in the original. As already mentioned, I render wuwei as “inaction” and you as “to wander” or “wandering.” In addition to inventing legendary figures with amusing and often significant names, Zhuangzi invents a variety of mysterious and high-sounding pseudo-technical terms to refer to the Way or the man who has made himself one with it. I have given a literal translation of such terms, and capitalized them in order to indicate their special character—e.g., Great Clod, Supreme Swindle, True Man. The reader need not puzzle over their precise meaning, since in the end they all refer to essentially the same thing—the inexpressible Absolute.

I have used as the basis of my translation the Zhuangzi buzheng of Liu Wendian (Shanghai, 1947), principally because of its magnificent legibility, though I have not always followed its punctuation. It would be impractical to list all the commentaries I have drawn upon, directly or indirectly; I have mentioned by name in my notes the commentator I am following in questionable passages, and the reader may identify the works by consulting the exhaustive bibliography of Zhuangzi commentaries in Guan Feng’s translation and study, Zhuangzi neipian yijie he pipan (Beijing, 1961), pp. 370–403. Two works have been of particular assistance to me: one is the modern language Chinese translation by Guan Feng cited above; the other is the Japanese translation by Fukunaga Mitsuji, Sōshi (Tokyo, 1956), in the Chūgoku kotensen series. Both translations are confined to the “inner chapters,” the first seven sections of the text; but they draw upon all the important recent studies and contain invaluable notes and explanations. No such exhaustive study has as yet been given to the remainder of the Zhuangzi text, and the latter sections of the work contain many unsolved problems. Three important works on the philosophy of Zhuangzi may be noted here: the Zhuangzi xuean by Lang Qingxiao (Shanghai, 1934; reprinted, Hong Kong, 1963); the Zhuangzi zhexue taolunji (Beijing, 1962), a collection of essays by Feng Youlan, Guan Feng, and other Zhuangzi experts; and Sōshi (Tokyo, 1964) by Fukunaga Mitsuji, a study of Zhuangzi’s thought. Also of aid to the student and translator of Zhuangzi is the Concordance to Chuang Tzu, Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 20 (1947).

I have consulted several earlier English translations: that by Herbert A. Giles, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist, and Social Reformer (London, 1889); that by James Legge in The Sacred Books of the East, vols. XXXIX–XL; that by Yu-lan Fung (Feng Youlan), Chuang Tzu (Shanghai, 1933); and the excerpts translated by Arthur Waley in Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (London, 1939), and by Lin Yutang in The Wisdom of Laotse (Modern Library, 1948). The first two are complete translations of the Zhuangzi; the third is a translation of the “inner chapters”; while the last two contain excerpts from many different sections. Another complete English translation, by James R. Ware, The Sayings of Chuang Chou (New York, New American Library [Mentor], 1963), did not come into my hands until after I had completed my version.

Giles, who produced the first complete English translation, is very free in his rendering, and again and again substitutes what strike me as tiresome Victorian clichés for the complex and beautiful language of the original. In spite of his offensively “literary” tone, however, he generally gets at what appears to me to be the real meaning of the text. Legge is far more painstaking in reproducing the literal meaning, and for the most part uses a simple, unaffected English that can still be read with pleasure today. But, perhaps because of his long years of work on the Confucian texts, he seems to miss Zhuangzi’s point rather often, and to labor to make common sense out of paradox and fantasy. Yu-lan Fung’s work is valuable today mainly because it contains translations from the important Guo Xiang commentary. Lin Yutang’s The Wisdom of Laotse contains a great many well-translated anecdotes and isolated passages from the Zhuangzi, but they have been chopped up and completely rearranged to serve as a commentary on the Daodejing, making it very difficult to appreciate the form and relationship which they have in the original. To my mind, by far the most readable and reliable of all Zhuangzi translations to date are those by Arthur Waley, though unfortunately they represent only a fraction of the text as a whole. I have not had time to examine Professor Ware’s translation carefully, though I note that, in his introduction, he describes Zhuangzi as a member of the “progressive, dynamic wing of Confucianism,” which is rather like describing Lucretius as a member of the progressive wing of Stoicism. This strikes me as a flight of fancy that would have astounded even Zhuangzi, and it is to be hoped that Professor Ware will sometime in the future explain to the world the reasoning upon which it is based.