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The birth of the South African brigade

WHEN THE GREAT WAR broke out, South Africa found itself doing battle within its borders as well as without. The South African prime minister, General Louis Botha, and his government not only had to contend with the German enemy just across the border in South-West Africa and further north in German East Africa, but with an internal rebellion as well.

When Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, former Boer War commanders of prominent rank in the Union Defence Force revolted and refused to follow orders to invade South-West Africa. Around 10 000 soldiers, mostly from the Orange Free State and Transvaal, joined the rebellion, which was led by Generals Christiaan de Wet and Christiaan Beyers, among others. Lieutenant-Colonel Manie Maritz was put in charge of the invasion forces, based in the north-eastern part of the Cape Province. But when he resigned his commission and crossed the border to join the German forces, taking with him many of his men, Botha’s troops curtailed the rebellion before the end of 1914. Botha treated the rebels leniently, all except Jopie Fourie, who refused to resign his commission and was executed by firing squad following a court martial.¹

During the rebellion, in an attempt to stem the flow of former Union Defence Force soldiers to the German side, Botha had announced that only volunteers would be used for the campaign. Among the first ten Cape Town recruits to sign up for service was Harold Lewis Silberbauer of Kenilworth, who would serve as a private in the Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer Rifles during the German South-West Africa campaign and later as an officer with the Leicestershire Regiment on the Somme. He would later recall:

It is quite impossible to describe the excitement in Cape Town when war was declared … General Botha called for volunteers in September 1914, as the Union of South Africa had been invaded near the Orange River. A very motley crowd turned up at the Drill Hall … a sprinkling of [veterans] from the Boer War days … clerks, students, advocates, judges. We were all marched out from Cape Town to Oude Molen at Mowbray and spent some uncomfortable days under canvas, without equipment, army clothing or blankets. Our ardour cooled off somewhat!

We were to be called ‘Botha’s Army’, but the response was poor and they marched us off to Wynberg Camp one morning, where, to our indignation, we were told that we were to form ‘B’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ companies of the Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer Rifles, as that regiment was under strength. That was how we became part and parcel of the Duke’s and very soon were proud of that fact. Wynberg training was peculiar by modern standards. Parade ground drill, marching and PT [physical training] were the only things that mattered. Discipline was not bad, but on New Year’s Day 1915, only fifty men turned out on parade and some had to support others. Amongst our riflemen were the ex-Chief Justice Centlivres, Sir Murray Bisset and ex-Judge President Jackie de Villiers.

I was really pleased with myself when I became an unpaid lance-corporal, then corporal, and then a sergeant. None of the non-commissioned officers knew anything at all about Drill, Arms, Field Work or, in fact, anything at all about anything they should have known. The same applied to most of the officers.²

Early in 1915, General Botha, with General Jan Smuts as his second in command, started his drive against the Germans in South-West Africa. Men who had fought side by side during the Anglo-Boer War a decade earlier were now on opposing sides and former enemies on the same side. The Union Defence Force rolled on, reaching the capital, Windhoek, on 12 May 1915 and forcing the surrender of the German troops on 9 July.

Of their arrival in Swakopmund before the final push for Windhoek, Silberbauer wrote:

Heat, dust, flies and general confusion were our enemies. The Germans seemed to have disappeared into the sand dunes four miles away and there were light skirmishes in that direction. Now that we were on active service, we did our best to train and become efficient, but it was fortunate for us that the enemy did not attack.³

Later, Silberbauer and seven others were sent to guard a blockhouse in Walvis Bay along the railway line to Swakopmund. They could buy food in Walvis Bay and were close enough to the sea to bathe and spear fish.

Life, for the eight of us, was not thrilling. The sandbags, out of which the blockhouse was made, were old sugar bags and attracted flies and we all suffered from diarrhoea … We practised Morse and semaphore, but it was difficult to pass the time and no-one was sorry when we moved on to Swakopmund after ‘keeping the enemy at bay’ for six weeks.⁴

The company’s commander, Captain P.J. Jowett, later went missing at Delville Wood in France.

More engagements followed at Swakopmund, and then Karibib, before the Germans finally surrendered. ‘The regiment could not say that it had been in action, but the chaps had toughened up well, were very fit, and the discipline and morale were fine,’ Silberbauer concluded.⁵

During the campaign, the Germans had been taken by surprise by the South Africans’ ability to deal with the harsh conditions. ‘Discipline the burghers have no idea of,’ wrote Captain Trevitt of the South African Engineers, ‘but the capacity for getting through desperate places, seems for them almost limitless.’⁶

With the immediate threat dealt with, Botha now looked abroad. As the ultimate patriot, he believed that the fortunes of his country were tied up with those of the British Commonwealth and therefore he supported South Africa’s participation in the war effort over in Europe. And so, in April 1915, the South African government proposed sending over a South African contingent. In July the Imperial government accepted their offer.

It was agreed that the contingent would be equipped from the Union’s stores in hand and paid by the Union up to the date of their embarkation for Europe. Thereafter, they would be paid at the rate of British regular troops and carry the status of the new service battalions of the British Army.

Compared to the powers of Europe, South Africa’s (white) population was small and it was accepted that the most the country would be able to raise was a brigade of infantry. The political situation was still unsettled following the 1914 Afrikaner rebellion, and so when it became obvious that South Africa would be required to support the East African campaign, the government realised that it would not be wise to send permanent-force members. Therefore, it was decided that the infantry brigade would consist only of volunteers.

In Europe, considering the rate of casualties, the estimated rate of reinforcements required per month stood at 15 per cent. In Britain, the recruitment drive was gathering momentum. Private F.B. Vaughan, later with the 12th Battalion, Yorks and Lancashires, recalled:

It was not just a sudden decision that I made to join the Army. My pals were going, chaps I had kicked about with in the street, kicking tin cans or a football, and chaps I knew very well in the city. And then if you looked in the newspapers we saw that Canadians were coming, Australians were coming, South Africans were coming – they were catching the first available boat to England to get there before the war was over … The whole thing was exciting … I don’t know whether patriotism entered into it or not, possibly so. We were stirred, I know, by the atrocities, or the alleged atrocities, when the Germans invaded Belgium and France. The other great factor was that the womenfolk, fifty percent of the population, were very keen on the war … the whole effect was cumulative, but we were not pressed, we made our own decisions.⁷

But not all women were keen on the war, especially those who were married and feared the prospect of their husbands going off to the front. Kitty Eckersley, a mill worker from Clayton, West Yorkshire, was very happily married. But, one evening, at an unexpected recruitment exercise at a concert, her husband decided to join the British Army. ‘When we got home that night I was terribly upset,’ she said. ‘I told him I didn’t want him to go and be a soldier – I didn’t want to lose him. I didn’t want him to go at all. But he said. “We have to go. There has to be men to go.”’⁸ His sentiments were echoed by many South African men: there had to be men to go.

It was eventually decided that a South African brigade of four regiments (also sometimes referred to as battalions by the men) would be sent to Europe, as well as five batteries of heavy artillery, a general hospital, a field ambulance and a signal company to be attached to the Royal Engineers. Sir Charles Preston Crewe, a man of considerable experience, was appointed director of recruitment for this South African Overseas Expeditionary Force.⁹ Volunteers were encouraged to join the regiment of their choice, and, in the end, the four regiments were made up as follows: the 1st South African Infantry Regiment (Cape of Good Hope Regiment), consisting of men predominantly from the old Cape Colony; the 2nd South African Infantry Regiment (Natal and Orange Free State Regiment); the 3rd South African Infantry Regiment (Transvaal and Rhodesia Regiment); and the 4th South African Infantry Regiment (South African Scottish Regiment), recruited from the Scottish regiments existing in the Union, the 1st and 2nd Transvaal Scottish and the Cape Town Highlanders, and from the various Caledonian societies.

The brigade was based at Potchefstroom, where the facilities for mobilisation were already in place, and numbered 1 282 of all ranks. Of these, 595 were South African, 337 Scottish, 258 English, 30 Irish, 13 Welsh and 49 of other origin. There were 292 men younger than 20, and 196 between the ages of 35 and 40. They came from various occupations, including business, government service, agriculture and mining. Most notable, though, were the Afrikaans-speaking personnel in the brigade. As John Buchan, author of The South African Forces in France, commented: ‘The large Boer contingent, many of whom had fought against us in the South African War, gave it a special romance.’¹⁰

Each regiment had an honorary colonel. Crewe was appointed honorary colonel of the 1st Regiment, General Louis Botha of the 2nd, General Jan Smuts of the 3rd and Colonel W. Dalrymple of the 4th.

Brigadier-General Henry Timson Lukin, the inspector-general of the Union forces, was appointed commander of the brigade. Lukin was the ideal man for the job, considering his long and distinguished record in South African military campaigns. He had fought in the Zulu War (1879), Basutoland (1881), the Langeberg Campaign (1896–97) and the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), when he commanded the artillery during the siege of Wepener and after that the 1st Colonial Division in the Cape Colony. In 1914 he had been appointed commander of the Union forces in German South-West Africa. Lukin was the quintessential soldier and turned out to be the perfect man for the campaign in Europe.

The regiments’ commanding officers were all permanent members of the Union Defence Force. For the 1st regiment, there was Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Stuart Dawson, commander of the 4th South African Mounted Rifles; for the 2nd, Lieutenant-Colonel William Ernest Collins Tanner, district staff officer, Pietermaritzburg; for the 3rd, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Talbot Thackeray, district staff officer, Kimberley; and for the 4th, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Aubrey Jones, district staff officer, Johannesburg.¹¹

Then there was a signal company and five batteries of heavy artillery. A heavy artillery brigade had served in the German South-West Africa campaign, with personnel drawn from non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of the Royal Marine Artillery and from the various South African artillery regiments, but was disbanded in June 1915. The following month a regiment of heavy artillery was recruited for Europe largely from this former brigade. The five batteries represented the Western Cape, the Eastern Cape, the Transvaal, Kimberley and the Diamond Fields, and Natal, and were affiliated to the Royal Garrison Artillery.

A most important section of the South African Overseas Expeditionary Force was the medical staff. Lieutenant-Colonel P.G. Stock, the appointed senior medical officer, arranged for the mobilisation of a field ambulance and a general hospital. The 1st South African Field Ambulance was to provide staff for the South African Military Hospital at Richmond, near London, and for the No. 1 South African General Hospital in France.

In addition, a medical unit with South African personnel was formed in the autumn of 1914 by the Société Française du Cap. In early 1915 this unit was established at the Hotel Beau-Rivage in Cannes as a hospital for treating sick and wounded French soldiers.

There was another component to the South African force overseas – the crucial railways and trades companies. In 1916 all the railways, roads, canals and docks in the British zone in France were placed under the control of the transportation department commanded by Sir Eric Geddes, a British businessman who later served as First Lord of the Admiralty between 1917 and 1919 and then as the first minister of transport between 1919 and 1921.

At Potchefstroom, where the South African brigade was based before its departure, the August winds were blowing, raising clouds of dust. The scene was one of stark contrast to what awaited the men in the beautiful green fields and woods of Belgium and France.

Training was tough, but the men were enthusiastic. Dudley Meredith, a new recruit, wrote:

The transformation of the motley crowd of civilians into soldiers now began to move apace: uniforms and rifles were issued, and exercises and drills assisted in the organisation of what was without doubt a fine body of men. All types were represented: miners, farmers, tradesmen, old soldiers who had seen service in South-West Africa, and raw recruits such as ourselves.

At first the rough life was strange and we did not take kindly to army cooking, to sleeping on the floors without mattresses, and to the mixing with men from all strata of society, but the very evident spirit of comradeship and good humour and the prospect of an almost immediate trip to England, followed by a period of training there, soon resulted in our feeling at ease and very much interested in our new life.¹²

Between 28 August and 17 October 1915, the whole South African contingent gathered in Cape Town ready to sail for England. The infantry brigade numbered 160 officers and 5 648 men of other ranks; the heavy artillery, 34 officers and 636 men of other ranks; and the signal company, 6 officers and 198 men of other ranks. Meredith recalled that when they left Cape Town, ‘the mountains were clothed in mist … but the delicious freshness of the green grass and cool atmosphere, were most refreshing after the journey through the Karroo, and it was with light hearts that we filed on board the Dunvegan Castle’.¹³

By the beginning of November 1915 all units were established in England, with the infantry based at Bordon, the field ambulance at Fleet and the heavy artillery at Bexhill. For the next two months they were kept busy training. They were honoured with inspections by General Sir Archibald Hunter, the general officer commanding of the Aldershot Command, and the Duke of Atholl, as well as Queen Mary. On 21 November the senior officers went to France for three days’ duty with the British Army.

The South Africans’ arrival coincided with a critical moment in the Great War. The Russian retreat had come to an end, but German field marshal August von Mackensen¹⁴ had overrun Serbia and driven the Allies back to Salonika, and Gallipoli was about to be evacuated. Everyone now realised that the war was going to take longer and would be more grim than had been foreseen.

The South African 1st Infantry Brigade was initially attached to the 16th (Irish) Division, and it was expected that by mid-December it would be operating in France. Plans, however, were altered on 7 December when it was decided that the brigade would retrace its course and return to the African continent. And so, on 30 December 1915, the four South African regiments embarked at Devonport for Alexandria, Egypt.

The campaign in western Egypt

By the end of 1914, the main British force in North Africa was concerned with the defence of the vital Suez Canal, which was under threat from the Turks based in Syria. But in April 1915, a new inland threat emerged when Gaafer Pasha, a former Turkish Army officer in charge of a force of Arab regulars stirred up by agents from Germany and Turkey, arrived from Constantinople with large supplies of money and arms to mobilise the Arab and Berber tribes of the Libyan plateau for an attack on Egypt from the west.

In that region Turkey relied on the support of the Senussi brotherhood, a Muslim political-religious Sufi order and tribe with its headquarters in the oases of the northern Libyan Desert. At the outbreak of war, the Senussi leader, Ahmed Sharif as-Senussi, had given assurance of friendship to the Anglo-Egyptian authorities, but the scheming of Gaafer proved too much for the tribesmen of the Senussi and the Grand Senussi himself.

Although the possibility of trouble had initially been detected in May 1915, it was not until August that the first hostilities took place, when Arabs fired on two British submarines that were sheltering from bad weather off Tripoli. Then, in the first week of November, HMS Tara and HMT Moorina were torpedoed by German submarines, and their crews were taken captive and delivered to the Senussi in Cyrenaica, Libya. In that same week, the Egyptian port of Sollum was shelled by U-boats and an Egyptian coastguard cruiser was sunk. To the British, it was clearly war.¹⁵

On 9 December Major-General A. Wallace, in command of the Western Frontier Force, advanced from Mersa Matruh and drove the enemy from Wadi Senaab. On 13 December his force defeated some 1 200 Arabs near Beit Hussein and on Christmas Day marched against an enemy force of 5 000 under Gaafer Pasha, 12.8 kilometres southwest of Mersa Matruh. Gaafer suffered heavy losses, but in early January 1916 he reappeared some 40 kilometres south-west of Mersa Matruh with another force. To safeguard the frontier, Gaafer had to be driven westward out of Egypt and into the desert, but Wallace lacked the troops for such an operation.

It was around this time that the South African 1st Infantry Brigade arrived in Alexandria aboard the RMS Saxonia (arrived 10 January) and the SS Corsican (arrived 13 January). The brigade settled at Mex Camp, ten kilometres west of Alexandria, where they spent a few days in training and enhancing local defences.

Orders came on 19 January for part of the brigade to reinforce Wallace’s attack on the Senussi near Mersa Matruh. The 2nd South African Infantry Regiment was chosen for this operation, with two companies departing that day and the remainder of the regiment the day after. By the evening of 21 January, the 2nd South Africans under Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner were gathered at Mersa Matruh. The whole force moved out the next day to Bir Shola, 29 kilometres away. On the morning of 23 January, Wallace deployed his troops in two columns, with the South Africans, the 1st Battalion New Zealand Rifle Brigade and a squadron of the Duke of Lancaster’s Yeomanry marching under Lieutenant-Colonel J.L.R. Gordon and his 15th Sikhs.¹⁶

The 15th Sikhs led the attack, and together the column forced the Senussi back from their forward positions, finally breaking into the main position at Halazin and putting the enemy to flight. Heavy rain and muddy conditions compelled the Allied troops to move to Bir Shola before returning to Mersa Matruh on 25 January.

In their baptism by fire, the South Africans lost one officer (Captain J.D. Walsh) and seven other ranks in action, while one officer (Lieutenant W.G. Strannock) and two other ranks later died of wounds. Four officers and 102 other ranks were wounded.

Due to health problems, Wallace was now replaced by Major-General W.E. Peyton,¹⁷ while the Sikhs and the New Zealanders were replaced by more of the South African brigade (by this time the entire brigade had arrived at Mersa Matruh). In early February the main Senussi forces were near the port town of Sidi Barrani, with a smaller body at Sollum. On 20 February a column under Brigadier-General Lukin, which included the 3rd South African Infantry Regiment, moved out from Mersa Matruh with orders to occupy Sidi Barrani on their way to Sollum. Their route lay north of the Khedival Highway, practically along the line of an old Roman road dotted with Roman wells. The scorching sun and strong winds made it a gruelling march, but at least the men could take dips in the ocean, as the route ran along the coast. At Unjeila, 51 kilometres from Mersa Matruh, the 1st South Africans joined the column.

By now the Senussi forces were at Agagia, 22.5 kilometres southeast of Sidi Barrani. On the morning of 26 February, Lukin moved out his whole force with the 3rd South Africans, under Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, in the centre, and Yeomanry and armoured cars on either flank. The 1st South Africans formed the general reserve. It didn’t take long to conquer the Senussi and capture Gaafer, a move that deprived the rebels of their principal general. Two days later Lukin’s men occupied Sidi Barrani without a blow. They were now able to bring in supplies by sea and establish a new advanced base there.

The Battle of Agagia resulted in some losses to Lukin’s force, chiefly among the mounted troops. Infantry casualties, almost all incurred by the 3rd South Africans, included one officer (Lieutenant Bliss) and 13 other ranks killed, and five officers and 98 other ranks wounded.¹⁸

A 19-year-old private, Henry Sherman from Port Elizabeth (1st Regiment, B Company), wrote to his father that the fight had lasted all day and that they had covered between 16 and 20 kilometres of enemy territory. The next day search parties were sent to look for the fallen and clear the field:

The only man in our platoon to get hit was an old Walmer [Port Elizabeth] postman, in fact he used to live at 9th Avenue for a while. He was with our General Staff, and a stray bullet got him in the stomach. He has gone to hospital marked ‘Severe Case’.

One of the 3rds who was wounded in the lungs, was gasping for breath when I came across him. I could see he was far gone, I gave him my water and called for an ambulance cart. I came across several men dead and wounded on both sides, but it is not much of a subject to write on.

The general [Lukin] was well pleased with our work and thanked us all. Compliments came in from all over the country. I was surprised to see how calmly and fearlessly our boys went into the fire. We just duck our heads when we hear the bullets and shells whizz by.¹⁹

Dudley Fynn of the 3rd Regiment, C Company, who was wounded in the fight, recorded: ‘The enemy gave us a very hot time of it and it was wonderful that so many of us came out alive.’²⁰

Following their action at Halazin, the 2nd South Africans had been employed in providing escorts for convoys between Mersa Matruh and Unjeila. With this task now completed, the 2nd and 4th regiments joined Lukin at Sidi Barrani, together with the rest of the 2nd South Western Mounted Brigade.

After their defeat at Agagia, the Senussi had retreated west towards Sollum, headquarters of the Grand Senussi before the campaign had begun. Peyton decided to strike again without delay and clear Egypt up to the frontier. On 9 March a column under Lukin left Sidi Barrani for Sollum, some 80 kilometres off, to secure the plateau by way of the Nagb Medean Pass. His troops consisted of the whole South African brigade, a squadron of the Dorset Yeomanry, the Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery, and a camel supply column and train. They were to be joined later by the Armoured Car Battery and a company of the Australian Camel Corps.

One of the biggest challenges for Lukin and his men was securing an adequate supply of water. By the time the 1st and 4th South Africans had secured the Nagb Medean Pass on 12 March, and were joined by the armoured cars, there was not enough water for the entire column to continue on its original line.

Lukin was therefore ordered to push along the top of the escarpment with the 1st and 4th South Africans, the armoured cars, the Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery, and a company of the Australian Camel Corps, while the rest of the infantry and the mounted troops were directed to proceed from Suàni el-Augerín along the coast to the foot of the Halfaya Pass. They set off on 13 March and by midnight Lukin was six kilometres from the Halfaya Pass. The rest of the infantry was at Alim Tejdid, and the cavalry at Ragbag. On 14 March the armoured cars occupied the Halfaya Pass without opposition, as the enemy had evacuated Sollum the previous evening and retreated south-west. On 15 March, Peyton entered Sollum, thus ending the threat from the Senussi.²¹

At the end of the campaign it was accepted that the men would be going to France, to the Western Front. But it transpired that negotiations had been taking place for the South African brigade to be sent to East Africa as part of the Union Defence Force campaign to counter the German threat in that part of the world. After Lukin had discussed the matter with Army Headquarters in Cairo, however, it was decided that they would be joining the 9th (Scottish) Division at Armentières instead.²²

The South African 1st Infantry Brigade began their return journey by sea from Sollum to Alexandria on 28 March. On their arrival in Alexandria, they were joined by a draft of eight officers and 400 other ranks under the command of Captain L.W. Tomlinson. The next day the brigade received orders to embark for Marseille.²³

The men had spent three months in North Africa, where they had experienced their first taste of war. They had endured severe hardships – scorching heat, freezing cold, dry desert winds, hunger, thirst, and long and tiring marches – and emerged stronger, both physically and mentally. They couldn’t have asked for better preparation for what lay ahead on the fields of Flanders.