The Somme Chronicles: South Africans on the Western Front

THE ATTACK ON Longueval, on the morning of 14 July 1916, was entrusted to the 26th Brigade of the 9th Division. The 8th Black Watch and the 10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders would lead, the 7th Seaforth Highlanders would be in support, and the 5th Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders would be in reserve. Behind them, the 27th Brigade would ‘clean up’. It was General Congreve’s aim to secure Longueval, as well as Delville Wood.

Shortly after dawn, General Lukin received orders to put a regiment at the disposal of the 27th Brigade to assist in clearing the streets of Longueval. For this purpose, he sent out the 1st South African Infantry Regiment. The 3rd South Africans in the meantime had been allotted to the 26th Brigade, but this instruction order was later cancelled. Buchan recorded the attack as follows:

The assault of the Highlanders was a most gallant performance. They rushed the trenches outside the village, and entered the streets, where desperate hand-to-hand fighting took place among the houses, for the enemy made a resolute defence. Before noon all the west and south-west part of Longueval was in our hands; but it had become clear that the place in its entirety could not be held, even if won, until Delville Wood was cleared.¹

At 13:00 the 9th Division’s commander reported: ‘12/R Scots [12th Royal Scots] pushed through Northern half of Longueval Village but were forced back by a machine gun about N.W. corner of Delville Wood. Artillery is being turned on to machine gun. FOO [Forward Observation Office] reports “German artillery shelling Waterlot Farm. No troops of 9th Div believed to have reached this point”.’²

News very good this morning. Our troops driving the Huns back, and the cavalry have just passed, they look so fine. The Bengal Lancers were among them, so I was told. We’re under orders to shift at a moment notice. It rained heavily this morning. I hope it does not hamper the movements of the cavalry. If this move ends as successfully as it has begun, it will mean such a lot to the bringing of the war to an end. Our chaps are getting so tired of the mud and damp. There’s such a change in the sunburnt faces of Egypt, and this inactivity makes one as weak as a rat. The cavalry have done excellent work, now it remains to us infantry to consolidate the positions. We’re just ready to move forward.³

Several Scottish Regiments of the 9th Division attacked the village of Longueval, captured it and a small portion of Delville Wood alongside the village. The S.A. Brigade was in support. As we advanced I saw many dead kilties, one of the Cameronians had rammed his bayonet into the chest of a German when both were killed by the blast of a German shell. This was a gruesome sight among many others in the vicinity of Longueval village.

That afternoon we moved up to the fringe of Longueval, digging shallow trenches when time allowed. The Germans had started a frightening barrage on our exposed positions and sent over a gas attack. Captain Farrell was gassed and wounded and Lieutenant Taylor was among others taken by stretcher to the field hospital erected at the side of Bernafay Wood. This hospital was within range of the German heavy guns and carried on attending to the thousands of wounded under shell fire … our advance had caused a huge salient, resulting in Longueval and Delville Wood coming under fire from three directions, a most unpleasant and dangerous situation. Delville Wood was on high ground, commanding a view of the Germans in a shallow valley. It was imperative that this important wood should be held at all costs. The safety of our other divisions depended on it.⁴

Private Sidney Martin Carey, a 21-year-old serving in D Company of the 1st South African Infantry Regiment, vividly recalled his experience of the fighting that day:

We all knew that we were going against a pretty tough enemy – but we didn’t expect anything like what actually happened. While going up to Longueval my friend next to me [Private G.F. Greenwood] said, ‘Man, but there’re a damn lot of bees around here!’ I said, ‘Bees be blowed! Those are bullets flying around.’

Unfortunately about four minutes afterwards a bullet caught him and killed him right out. Then I began to see that things were getting bad. Then another went over. Then another. Then I thought, ‘It’s my turn next.’ There were machine gun posts at the flour mill at Longueval and we got it very heavy from there. I got hit at the beginning of the wood. The lower part of my jaw was shot away, they reckon by a ricochet. It felt like a mule-kick.⁵

Second-Lieutenant Clive Featherstone of Aberdeen in the Eastern Cape served in the 1st Regiment, B Company, when the advance took place.

We were in first-line support all day, so we came in for plenty of punishment and tear shells. These are decidedly unpleasant; they make the eyes burn so that you weep freely. The smell is somewhat similar to chloroform.

By about 2.00 p.m. we became front-line, and we lay down for a time under steady whizz-bang and machine gun fire. But cover was good, with large shell holes and, as the trajectory of the shells was very low, there were few casualties.

After a time we began the advance in earnest and met heavy machine gun fire. Losing men steadily from that and sniping, we pressed steadily forward and made good our advance.

The enemy was putting up strong resistance, and we had to fight for every yard. The fighting lasted for days [Delville Wood included]. There was no rest, night or day, and we were subjected to gunfire incessantly.⁶

General Furse, who had command of the 9th Division, informed Lukin that, as soon as the other two brigades had taken Longueval, the South Africans should capture and consolidate the outer edge of Delville Wood. The entire South African brigade, minus the 1st South African Infantry Regiment, was available to achieve this. Lukin scheduled the attack for 17:00, but the time was later pushed back to 19:00 and then to 19:30. Eventually, because the village was not entirely captured, Lukin’s orders were suspended. After a mission to ascertain the position in Longueval, a South African brigade staff officer, Lieutenant P.R. Roseby, had reported that the northern part of the village was not in British possession, and that therefore it would be impossible to form up on a line west of Longueval and advance to the attack from there.

Following a conference with Furse at Montauban, it was decided that the attack would take place at 05:00 the next morning. Furse said the wood had to be taken at all costs, and that the advance was to proceed even if the 26th and 27th brigades had still not captured the northern part of the village.⁷

Lukin instructed his regiment commanders that if on arrival at Longueval they found the northern part still in German hands, they should attack Delville Wood from the south-west corner, moving forward on a one-regiment front. The assault was entrusted to the 2nd and 3rd South Africans, with the latter leading. The 4ths would be in support.

In the meantime, the 1st South Africans, under Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Dawson, had been heavily engaged in Longueval, having deployed along the line held by the two Scottish brigades. The regiment had been instructed to attack the remainder of the village, and its leading companies, A and B, reached their first objectives at about 16:00 on 14 July. Due to machine-gun fire from the front and flank, however, they were unable to advance. During the night three parties were sent out to capture the enemy posts that were checking their advance, and they found that the whole northern part of the village was a nest of German machine guns. In the morning, once the other three South African regiments had started their advance on Delville Wood, the 1st South Africans returned to Lukin’s command.⁸

It was overcast on the morning of 15 July when the South Africans moved forward from Montauban two hours before dawn. Buchan describes the scene:

As the sun rose the sky lightened above the Bapaume Ridge, and men noticed amid the punctual shelling how small birds still sang in the ruined coverts, and larks rose from the battered ridges. Before them on their right front lay the shadow which was Delville Wood, and the jumbled masonry, now spouting like a volcano, which had been the hamlet of Longueval.⁹

During the march, orders arrived from the division headquarters for the South African brigade to put two companies at the disposal of the 26th Brigade in Longueval. The B and C companies of the 4th Regiment were ordered to report to the officer commanding the 5th Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders. The rest of the brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel William Tanner, moved over the broken ground under heavy fire until they were close to the southern edge of Longueval.

Tanner’s patrols reported that the Germans still held the northern part of the village and part of the wood adjacent to the streets. The situation in the rest of the wood, however, was uncertain. Some of the 5th Camerons were holding a trench running into Delville Wood from the south-west corner, and in the rear of this trench the 2nd and 3rd South African regiments assembled at about 06:00.

Typical of the common practice of using familiar names to identify battlefield locations on British Army maps, the existing roads in Delville Wood at the time of the Battle of the Somme were given names of streets known to the soldiers. Tanner decided to occupy the wood by first clearing the area south of Princes Street and then pushing north from there to occupy the Strand and the perimeter of the wood from its northern end round to the south-west corner. This would gain him the whole of Delville Wood, except the north-west corner.¹⁰

The attack went swiftly at first, and by 07:00 the 3rd South African Infantry Regiment and one company of the 2nd held all ground south of Princes Street. The remaining three companies of the 2nd were sent to occupy the Strand and the northern perimeter, but this proved a difficult task. The three weakened companies reached their target area, but were forced to hold a front of some 1.2 kilometres, along which it was almost impossible to maintain connection. The men did their best to dig themselves in and wire the ground they had gained, but as soon as they reached the edge, the whole wood was heavily shelled by the Germans. At the same time, they were subjected to heavy machine-gun and rifle fire from the strongly entrenched German lines around the perimeter.

While this was going on, two patrols of the 3rd South Africans under the command of Captains Medlicott and Tomlinson managed to sneak up on the Germans in the southern and eastern parts of the German trench and capture three officers, 135 other ranks and a machine gun.

At 14:40, Tanner reported to Lukin that he had taken the whole of Delville Wood, except for some strong positions in the north-west abutting Longueval and the northern orchards. The first part of the general’s task had been completed admirably, but, as later events would show, the problem with Delville Wood was that it proved far less a task to occupy it than to hold it. It had been Lukin’s plan to thin out the troops in the wood as soon as the perimeter was reached, and leave it to be held by small detachments of infantry backed by machine guns. This plan was rendered impossible, however, by the Germans’ counterattack, as every available man was needed to hold them off.¹¹

At around 15:00, sections of the German 6th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 10th Bavarian Infantry Division launched an attack from the east, but solid rifle fire from the South Africans drove them back. Almost two hours later, Tanner reported that the Germans were also preparing for an attack at the northern end. At around 18:30, he again reported a German concentration to the north and north-east. Tanner had suffered heavy casualties, one company of the 2nd South Africans having been virtually destroyed, and therefore requested some reinforcements. Having already received a company of the 4th South Africans, another company of the 4ths was now sent forward to strengthen the 3rds. And with the 1st South Africans now having returned to Lukin’s command, one of its companies was despatched to reinforce the 2nds.

As the sun went down, the intensity of the German bombardment increased. As Buchan dramatically described it, ‘the darkness of night was turned by shells and liquid fire into a feverish and blazing noon. The German rate of fire was often as high as 400 shells a minute.’¹²

That evening, Lukin sent a staff officer to determine the full situation of the regiments’ positions in the wood. The officers commanding the 2nd and 3rd regiments were urged to dig in properly in view of the heavy shell fire that was expected in the morning, and Dawson, commanding the 1sts, was instructed to detail special carrying platoons to keep up the supply of ammunition. To command the southern edge, a Vickers machine gun and a Lewis gun were set up at the south-west corner of the wood.

By nightfall, the north-west corner of the wood was in German hands, while the north-east corner was held from left to right by one and a half companies of the 2nd South African Infantry Regiment, with one company of the 1st in support, and by one company of the 3rd, with a company of the 4th in support. The south-east corner was held by two companies of the 3rd, and the southern edge from left to right by one company of the 2nd, one company of the 3rd and a company of the 4th. A half company of the 2nd held the western third of Princes Street, while two companies of the 1st formed a defensive flank on the side of the village. The headquarters of the 2nds and 3rds was at the junction of Buchanan and Princes streets. Ten machine guns were in position around the perimeter at the northern apex, the eastern end of the north-eastern edge and in the eastern half of the southern edge. Therefore, 12 weakened infantry companies were holding a wood with an area of slightly less than two square kilometres, on which every German battery was accurately ranged. As the Germans held the north-west corner, they had a covered approach into the wood.

At this stage, the only South African reserves were one company of the 1st and two companies of the 4th, which were due to return the following morning. The latter had been involved in the British attack on Waterlot Farm. After the 18th Division had cleared Trônes Wood on 14 July, they had established their line up to Maltzhorn Farm, joining up with the 9th Division near Waterlot Farm, where the Germans had fortified their position with heavy Maxim machine guns. On the morning of 15 July, when the 5th Camerons had attacked this point, the two companies were used as troops to follow and consolidate. Major Hunt, who was in charge of the companies, sent a platoon from each company to occupy the trenches close to the farm. This they did under heavy fire from concealed German posts to the south and east. Waterlot Farm was not taken until the following day. At about 18:00 that evening, an enemy force was seen coming from Guillemont, but it was countered by the artillery barrage. An hour later, the two companies were ordered to fall back and construct a strong point. At 2:30 on the morning of 16 July they were relieved by the Camerons and withdrawn to the sunken road behind Longueval.¹³

During all of this, the 1st South African Field Ambulance and its stretcher-bearers had struggled to remove casualties. Staff Sergeant Tom Welsh recalled:

The road from Longueval to Bernafay Wood was in an indescribable condition. It was impossible to carry from the front of the Regimental Aid Posts in Longueval, owing to the sniping, which was at times very severe and accurate. The rear was a mass of ruins, wire entanglements, garden fences, fallen and falling trees, together with every description of debris and shattered building material. It is one thing to clear a path along which reinforcements may be brought, but quite another to make a track on which four men may carry a stretcher with a modicum of comfort to the patient … Besides this road there was a narrow sunken lane, which at first afforded some safety, but later became so pitted with shell-holes that the bearers were compelled to take to the open. In addition to these difficulties, it must be remembered that these roads were shelled heavily day and night. At times the enemy would put up a barrage with heavy stuff, which meant that no stretcher-bearing could be done until the fire was over. Parties who were unfortunate enough to be caught in one of these barrages spent moments of nerve-racking suspense, crouching in shell-holes or under banks, or wherever cover was available. One of the worst experiences of this kind was when it was decided to shell Longueval once more. Very short notice was given to clear all the Regimental Aid Posts, and only two men per stretcher could be spared. Padres, doctors, and odd men were pressed into service to enable all patients to be removed. As the party left, the bombardment began on both sides. Scrambling, pushing, and slipping amid a tornado of shell-fire, they headed for Bernafay Wood. It was impossible to keep together, and in the darkness squads easily became detached and lost touch. The noise of bursting shells was incessant and deafening, while the continuous sing of the rifle and machine-gun bullets overhead tried the nerves of the hardiest. To crown all, it was raining, and the roads were almost impassable for stretcher work. In fact, had it not been for the light of the German star shells, the thing could not have been worked at all. As the night wore on squad after squad of tired, soaked, and mud-covered men stumbled into Bernafay Wood. Here came a medical officer covered with grime and mud from top to toe, carrying a stretcher with a kilted Scot. Then a tall parson, unrecognizable under a coating of mud, with a stretcher-bearer as partner, whose orders he obeyed implicitly. When word was passed round in the morning that all had returned alive, some were so incredulous that they started an inquiry of their own.¹⁴