At the present day war is carried on by regular armies: the people, the peasantry, the townsfolk take no part in it and as a rule have nothing to fear from the sword of the enemy.
—Vattel, 1714-1767 Law of Nations
FROM
Jonathan Swift was born in Dublin in 1667. From 1713 until his death he was Dean of St. Patrick's Cathedral but it was as a prose satirist that he established his enduring reputation. Despite his Whig principles, he agreed in 1710 to become the chief political writer of the new Tory ministry of Queen Anne, headed by Robert Harley and Henry St. John.
Gullivers Travels, Swift's best-known work, appeared in 1726. He died in Dublin after long physical and mental illness, in 1745.
Swift's pamphlet, commissioned by the new Tory Government in 1711, was published on November 27. Thirty thousand copies were soon sold. Parliament reassembled on December 7 and Marlborough was dismissed on December 30.
The motives that may engage a wise prince or state in a war, I take to be one or more of these: either to check the overgrown power of some ambitious neighbour; to recover what has been unjustly taken from them; to revenge some injury they have received, which all political casuists allow; to assist some ally in a just quarrel, or, lastly, to defend themselves when they are invaded. In all these cases, the writers upon politics admit a war to be justly undertaken.
The last is, what has been usually called pro aris et focis; where no expense or endeavour can be too great, because all we have is at stake, and consequently our utmost force to be exerted; and the dispute is soon determined, either in safety or in utter destruction. But in the other four, I believe, it will be found that no monarch or commonwealth did ever engage beyond a certain degree; never proceeding so far as to exhaust the strength and substance of their country by anticipations and loans, which, in a few years, must put them in a worse condition than any they could reasonably apprehend from those evils, for the preventing of which they first entered into the war; because this would be to run into real infallible ruin only in
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hope to remove what might, perhaps, appear so, by a probable speculation. . . .
Suppose the war to have commenced upon a just motive, the next thing to be considered is, when a prince ought in prudence to receive the overtures of a peace; which I take to be, either when the enemy is ready to yield the point originally contended for, or when that point is found impossible to be ever obtained; or when contending any longer, although with probability of gaining that point at last, would put such a prince and his people in a worse condition than the present loss of it. All which considerations are of much greater force where a war is managed by an alliance of many confederates, which, in a variety of interests among the several parties, is liable to so many unforseen accidents.
In a confederate war, it ought to be considered which party has the deepest share of the quarrel; for, although each may have their particular reasons, yet one or two among them will probably be more concerned than the rest, and therefore ought to bear the greatest part of the burden, in proportion to their strength. . . .
We have now for ten years together turned the whole force and expense of the war, where the enemy was best able to hold us at bay; where we could propose no manner of advantage to ourselves; where it was highly impolitic to enlarge our conquests; utterly neglecting that part which would have saved and gained us many millions; which the perpetual maxims of our government teach us to pursue; which would have soonest weakened the enemy and must either have promoted a speedy peace or enabled us to continue the war.
Those who are fond of continuing the war, cry up our constant success at a most prodigious rate, and reckon it infinitely greater than in all human probability we had reason to hope. Ten glorious campaigns are passed; and now at last, like a sick man, we are just expiring with all sorts of good symptoms.
I say not this by any means to detract from the army and its leaders. Getting into the enemy's lines, passing rivers and taking towns, may be actions attended with so many glorious circumstances; but when all this brings no real solid advantage to us; when it has no other end than to enlarge the territories of the Dutch and to increase the fame and wealth of our general; I conclude, however, this comes about, that things are not as they should be; and that surely our forces and money might be better employed, both towards reducing our enemy and working out some benefit to ourselves. But the case is still much harder; we are destroying many thousand lives, exhausting our substance, not for our own interest, which would be but common prudence, not for a thing indifferent, which would be sufficient folly, but perhaps to our own destruction, which is perfect madness. . . .
Jonathan Swift
But great events often turn upon very small circumstances. It was the kingdom's misfortune that the sea was not the Duke of Marlborough's element; otherwise the whole force of the war would infallibly have been bestowed there, infinitely to the advantage of his country, which would then have gone hand in hand with his own. . . .
By agreement subsequent to the grand alliance we were to assist the Dutch with forty thousand men, all to be commanded by the Duke of Marlborough. So that whether this was prudently begun or not, it is plain that the true spring or motive of it was the aggrandizing of a particular family; and in short, a war of the general and the ministry, and not of the prince or people; since those very persons were against it when they knew the power, and consequently the profit would be in other hands.
With these measures fell in all that set of people who are called the monied men; such as had raised vast sums by trading with stocks and funds, and lending upon great interest and premiums; whose perpetual harvest is war, and whose beneficial way of traffic must very much decline in peace.
In the whole chain of encroachments made upon us by the Dutch, which I have above deduced; and under those several gross impositions from other princes; if anyone should ask, why our general continued so easy to the last? I know of no other way so probable or indeed so charitable to account for it, as by that unmeasurable love of wealth which his best friends allow to be his dominant passion. However, I shall waive anything that is personal upon the subject. I shall say nothing of those great presents made by several princes, which the soldiers used to call winter foraging, and said it was better than that of summer; and of two and a half per cent subtracted out of all the subsidies we pay on those parts, which amounts to no inconsiderable sum; and lastly, of the grand perquisites in a long and successful war, which are so amicably adjusted between him and the States.
The first overtures from France are made to England on safe and honourable terms; we who bore the brunt of the war ought in reason to have the greatest share in making the peace. If we do not hearken to a peace, others certainly will, and get the advantage of us there, as they have done in the war. We know that the Dutch have perpetually threatened us, that they will enter into separate measures of peace; and by the strength of that argument as well as by other powerful motives, prevailed on those who were then at the helm, to comply with them on any terms, rather than put an end to a war, which every year brought them such great accessions to their wealth and power.
MAURICE DE SAXE:
FROM
Hermann Maurice Comte de Saxe was born in Germany in 1696 , one of the 374 acknowledged bastards of the Elector Frederick August of Saxony, later King of Poland. He was commissioned at the age of twelve, fought under Prince Eugene at the battle of Malplaquet, and was given command of a German regiment, which had been bought for him, at the age of seventeen. He began to experiment with new methods of infantry training. In 1717 he took part in the capture of Belgrade from the Turks and in 1726 was elected Duke of Courland. He was expelled by the Russians the following year and returned to France.
He took part in the War of the Polish Succession, becoming a lieutenant-general in 1734 and in the War of the Austrian Succession, capturing Prague in 1741. In 1744 he planned an invasion of Britain in support of the Young Pretender, but a storm shattered the project. The same year he became a marshal of France and the following year he won the battle of Fontenoy against the British and their allies. He captured Brussels, and in 1747 was appointed marshal-general of France, with almost complete power over the Netherlands. After the successful conclusion of his campaigns and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, he retired in ill health to the Chateau of Chambord, where he maintained a private regiment and a Negro bodyguard. He died there in 1750.
"Life is but a dream," he said to his doctor at the end, "but mine has been a fine one."
I have formed a picture of a general commanding which is not chimerical—I have seen such men.
The first of all qualities is COURAGE. Without this the others are of little value, since they cannot be used. The second is INTELLIGENCE, which must be strong and fertile in expedients. The third is HEALTH.
He should possess a talent for sudden and appropriate improvisation. He should be able to penetrate the minds of other men, while remaining
impenetrable himself. He should be endowed with the capacity of being prepared for everything, with activity accompanied by judgment, with skill to make a proper decision on all occasions, and with exactness of discernment.
The functions of a general are infinite. He must know how to subsist his army and how to husband it; how to place it so that he will not be forced to fight except when he chooses; how to form his troops in an infinity of different dispositions; how to profit from that favorable moment which occurs in all battles and which decides their success. All these things are of immense importance and are as varied as the situations and dispositions which produce them.
In order to see all these things the general should be occupied with nothing else on the day of battle. The inspection of the terrain and the disposition of his troops should be prompt, like the flight of an eagle. This done, his orders should be short and simple, as for instance: "The first line will attack and the second will be in support."
The generals under his command must be incompetent indeed if they do not know how to execute this order and to perform the proper maneuvers with their respective divisions. Thus the commander in chief will not be forced to occupy himself with it nor be embarrassed with details. For if he attempts to be a battle sergeant and be everywhere himself, he will resemble the fly in the fable that thought he was driving the coach.
Thus, on the day of battle, I should want the general to do nothing. His observations will be better for it, his judgment will be more sane, and he will be in better state to profit from the situations in which the enemy finds himself during the engagement. And when he sees an occasion, he should unleash his energies, hasten to the critical point at top speed, seize the first troops available, advance them rapidly, and lead them in person. These are the strokes that decide battles and gain victories. The important thing is to see the opportunity and to know how to use it.
Prince Eugene possessed this quality, which is the greatest in the art of war and which is the test of the most elevated genius. I have applied myself to the study of this great man and on this point can venture to say that I understand him.
Many commanding generals only spend their time on the day of battle in making their troops march in a straight line, in seeing that they keep their proper distances, in answering questions which their aides de camp come to ask, in sending them hither and thither, and in running about incessantly themselves. In short, they try to do everything and, as a result, do nothing. They appear to me like men with their heads turned, who no longer see anything and who only are able to do what they have done all their lives, which is to conduct troops methodically under the orders of a commander. How does this happen? It is because very few men occupy themselves with
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the higher problems of war. They pass their lives drilling troops and believe that this is the only branch of the military act. When they arrive at the command of armies they are totally ignorant, and, in default of knowing what should be done, they do what they know.
One of the branches of the art of war, that is to say drill and the method of fighting, is methodical; the other is intellectual. For the conduct of the latter it is essential that ordinary men should not be chosen.
Unless a man is born with talent for war, he will never be other than a mediocre general. It is the same with all talents; in painting, or in music, or in poetry, talent must be inherent for excellence. All sublime arts are alike in this respect. That is why we see so few outstanding men in a science. Centuries pass without producing one. Application rectifies ideas but does not furnish a soul, for that is the work of nature.
I have seen very good colonels become very bad generals. I have known others who were great takers of villages, excellent for maneuvers within an army, but who, outside of that, were not even able to lead a thousand men in war, who lost their heads completely and were unable to make any decision.
If such a man arrives at the command of an army, he will seek to save himself by his dispositions, because he has no other resources. In attempting to make them understood better he will confuse the spirit of his whole army with multitudinous messages. Since the least circumstances changes everything in war, he will want to change his arrangements, will throw everything in horrible confusion, and infallibly will be defeated.
I do not favour pitched battles, especially at the beginning of a war, and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all his life without being forced into one.
Nothing so reduces the enemy to absurdity as this method; nothing advances affairs better. Frequent small engagements will dissipate the enemy until he is forced to hide from you.
I do not mean to say by this that when an opportunity occurs to crush the enemy that he should not be attacked, nor that advantage should not be taken of his mistakes. But I do mean that war can be made without leaving anything to chance. And this is the highest point of perfection and skill in a general. But when a battle is joined under favourable circumstances, one should know how to profit from victory and, above all, should not be contented to have won the field of battle in accordance with the present commendable custom.
—Thomas R. Phillips (translator)
FROM
lean de Bourcet was bom in 1700 and joined the French army in 1719 as an engineer officer. Like his famous predecessor, Vauban, Bourcet devoted most of his long military career to the principles and active conduct of siege warfare. At the same time he exercised a profound influence on general organization and strategical ideas of the French army—to which Napoleon was to be indebted. In 1742, at the start of the Piedmont campaign, he was chief engineer of the fortress of Mont Dauphin. He was responsible for the successful plans for the defense of southern France, culmmating in the victory of Bassignano. He died in 1780.
In a mountain region, the all-important points for military purposes are the defiles, and when these, as is frequently the case, are impregnable against frontal attacks, the general taking the offensive must seek every possible means of turning them, and must so arrange his troops as to fix the enemy's attention on some point other than that of which it is intended to gain possession.
For this purpose, a general will do well to divide his army into a number of comparatively small bodies, a proceeding which in another kind of country would be dangerous, but which in the mountains is indispensable and safe provided the general who adopts it makes such arrangements that he can reunite his forces the moment that becomes necessary. He must therefore make his dispositions so that the enemy cannot interpose between the fractions into which his army is divided. . . .
A general who intends to take the offensive should assemble his army in three positions, distant not more than a march from one another, for in this way, while he will threaten all points accessible from any portion of the 25 or 30 miles thus held, he will be able suddenly to collect his whole army either in the centre or on either wing. The enemy will then be tempted to post troops to defend each of the threatened avenues of approach, and the attempt to be strong at all points will make him weak at each separate portion.
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However carefully the enemy may have prepared his communications between several parts of his army, and have drafted the orders for its reunion in case of an attack at any point he will not be able to concentrate his troops there in time, if only the attacking general has concealed his plan and his first movements. The attacking general will usually be able to steal a march, if need be by moving at night, while the defender requires time to receive warning, time to issue his orders, and time for the march of the troops to the point attacked.
—Spencer Wilkinson (translator)
FROM
FROM
Frederick was bom in Berlin in 1712, the heir to Frederick William I of Prussia. After disagreements with his father and an unsuccessful attempt to escape to England, he was court-martialed and imprisoned. After gradual restoration to favor, he was attached to the army of Prince Eugene and developed a close friendship with Voltaire and other leading intellectuals. Upon his accession in 1740 he seized Silesia. After a series of brilliant victories he was left in possession of Silesia by the Peace of Dresden in 1745. Fie devoted the next ten years to the consolidation of his state, including his army. After the outbreak of the Seven Years'
War in 1756 he found himself at overwhelming odds with France, Russia, and Austria. Despite some initial victories, only the unexpected accession of the admiring Peter III in Russia saved him from total disaster and enabled him to retain Silesia in 1763. Thereafter he concentrated principally on domestic reform and died, virtually alone, in his palace of Sans Souci in 1786.
from Memoirs
What is the use of life if one merely vegetates? What is the point of seeing if one only crams facts into his memory? In brief, what good is experience if it is not directed by reflection? Vegetius stated that war must be a study and peace an exercise, and he is right.
Experience deserves to be investigated, for it is only after repeated examinations of what one has done that the artists succeed in understanding principles and in moments of leisure, in times of rest, that new material is prepared for experiment. Such investigations are the product of an applied mind, but this diligence is rare and, on the contrary, it is common to see men who have used all their limbs without once in their lives having utilized their minds. Thought, the faculty of combining ideas, is what distinguishes
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man from a beast of burden. A mule who has carried a pack for ten campaigns under Prince Eugene will be no better a tactician for it, and it must be confessed, to the disgrace of humanity, that many men grow old in an otherwise respectable profession without making any greater progress than this mule.
To follow the routine of the service, to become occupied with the care of its fodder and lodging, to march when the army marches, camp when it camps, fight when it fights—for the great majority of officers this is what is meant by having served, campaigned, grown gray in the harness. For this reason one sees so many soldiers occupied with trifling matters and rusted by gross ignorance. Instead of soaring audaciously among the clouds, such men know only how to crawl methodically in the mire. They are never perplexed and will never know the causes of their triumphs or defeats.
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Scepticism is the mother of security. Even though only fools trust their enemies, prudent persons never do. The general is the principal sentinel of the army. He should always be careful of its preservation and that it is never exposed to misfortune. One falls into a feeling of security after battles, when one is drunk with success, and when one believes the enemy completely disheartened. One falls into a feeling of security when a skillful enemy amuses you with pretended peace proposals. One falls into a feeling of security by mental laziness and through lack of calculation concerning the intentions of the enemy.
To proceed properly it is necessary to put oneself in his place and say: what would I do if I were the enemy? What project could I form? Make as many as possible of these projects, examine them all, and above all reflect on the means to avert them. . . . But do not let these calculations make you timid. Circumspection is good only up to a certain point.
from Military Instructions
Here are the particulars for offensive warfare.
1. Your strategy must pursue an important objective. Undertake only what is possible and reject whatever is chimerical. If you are not fortunate enough to follow a great plan through to its perfection, you will nevertheless go much farther than the generals who, acting without plan, make war from day to day. Give battle only when you have reason to hope that your success will be decisive, and fight not only to defeat the enemy but to execute the course of your strategy that would fail but for this decision.
Frederick the Great
2. Never deceive yourself, but picture skillfully all the measures that the enemy will take to oppose your plans, in order never to be caught by surprise. Then, having foreseen everything in advance, you will already have remedies prepared for any eventuality.
3. Know the mind of the opposing generals in order better to divine their actions, to know how to force your actions upon them, and to know what traps to use against them.
4. The opening of your campaign must be an enigma for the enemy, preventing him from guessing the side on which your forces will move and the strategy you contemplate.
5. Always attempt the unexpected: this is the surest way to achieve success.
In a war between equals:
1. The more you employ strategems and ruses, the more advantages you will enjoy over the enemy. You must deceive him and induce him to make mistakes in order to take advantage of his faults.
2. Always have as a goal to transform the war into an offensive on your part as soon as the occasion presents itself. All your maneuvers must lead toward this end.
3. Consider all the mischief that the enemy can do to you and prevent it by your prudence.
4. Do not attack the enemy when he adheres to the rules of war, but profit from his slightest mistakes without delay. Whoever lets the occasion escape is not worthy of seizing it.
5. Profit from the battles you win, follow the enemy to the utmost, and push your advantages as far as you can extend them, because such happy events are not common.
6. Leave as little to fortune as possible by your foresight—chance will still have too much influence in military operations. It is enough that your prudence shares the stage with chance.
7. To win advantages over the enemy you must procure them, both by a war of partisans and by defeating his escorts, seizing his provisions, surprising his magazines, often defeating his detachments . . . [and] his rear guard, attacking him on the march, and finally, by engaging in battle with him, if he is badly posted, and even by surprising his winter quarters and falling on his posts if he has not provided for the security of his cantonments during the winter.
Here are the general maxims you must observe for defensive warfare.
1. Intend to put all your resources to work to change the nature of this
war.
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2. Anticipate everything detrimental the enemy can plan against you, and study expedients to elude his designs.
3. Choose impregnable camps that can contain the enemy by threatening his rear in the event that he changes posts, and be sure to cover your own magazines.
4. Accumulate many small advantages which, taken together, are the equivalent of great advantages. Try to make the enemy respect you in order to contain him by the fear of your arms.
5. Calculate all your movements carefully and observe the maxims and rules of tactics and castrametation strictly.
6. If you have advantages, make the most of them, and punish the enemy for his slightest errors, as though you were a pedagogue.
If you are on the defensive after losing a battle:
1. Your retreat must be short. You must get your troops accustomed again to looking the enemy in the face. Encourage them little by little, and wait for the proper moment to avenge your defeat.
2. Make use of ruses, stratagems, false information imparted to the enemy to lead to the happy moment when you can pay him back in his own coin—with interest—for the damage he did to you.
If you are less than half as strong as the enemy:
1. Wage partisan warfare: change the post whenever necessary.
2. Do not detach any unit from your troops because you will be beaten in detail. Act only with your entire army.
3. If you can throw your army against the enemy's communications without risking your own magazines, do so.
4. Activity and vigilance must be on the watch day and night at the door of your tent.
5. Give more thought to your rear than to your front, in order to avoid being enveloped.
6. Reflect incessantly on devising new ways and means of supporting yourself. Change your method to deceive the enemy. You will often be forced to wage a war of appearances.
7. Defeat and destroy the enemy in detail if it is at all possible, but do not commit yourself to a pitched battle, because your weakness will make you succumb. Win time —that is all that can be expected of the most skillful general.
8. Do not retreat toward places where you can be surrounded: remember [Charles XII at] Poltava without forgetting [the Duke of Cumberland at] Stade.
Frederick the Great
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Of an army on the defensive awaiting reinforcements:
You risk everything by becoming involved in some undertaking before the juncture of your forces which, when united, would render you sure of whatever you would want to attempt. Thus you must confine yourself to the sphere of the strictest defensive during the period of concentration.
You can see by this presentation the extent to which the knowledge of a real general must be varied. He must have an accurate idea of politics in order to be informed of the intention of princes and the forces of states and of their communications; to know the number of troops that the princes and their allies can put into the field; and to judge the condition of their finances. Knowledge of the country where he must wage war serves as the base for all strategy. He must be able to imagine himself in the enemy's shoes in order to anticipate all the obstacles that are likely to be placed in his way. Above all, he must train his mind to furnish him with a multitude of expedients, ways and means in case of need. All this requires study and exercise. For those who are destined for the military profession, peace must be a time of meditation, and war the period where one puts his ideas into practice.
—Jay Luvaas (translator)
FROM
FROM
"Land forces are nothing. Marines are the only species of troops proper for this nation; they alone can defend and protect it effectively."
Henry Lloyd (sometimes referred to as Henry Humphrey Evans)is believed to have been born in Merioneth in 1720, the son of a clergyman. The circumstances of his life are uncertain. He became a lay brother in a religious house in France after unsuccessfully trying to obtain a commission in the French army. Then he became military instructor to John Drummond of the Irish Brigade in the French army and obtained Marshal Saxe's permission to accompany the army as a mounted draftsman. As such he took part in the battle of Fontenoy.
He was appointed a third engineer and captain by the Young Pretender and took part in the 1745 Rising. He was wounded on board the Elizabeth in its engagement with the Lion but reappeared in Carlisle with the Young Pretender. He went on a mission to Wales, trying to enlist support for the Jacobites and, secretly dressed as a priest, to travel to various western England ports- —possibly with a view to a French landing. At the port of London he was arrested but released and returned to France. There he became a lieutenant colonel, and was sent back to England in 1754 to investigate further invasion possibilities.
He served with the Prussian army, became a major general in the Austrian army and commanded a Russian division at the siege of Silistria. On at least one occasion he changed sides in the course of a war. He finally settled in Brussels where he died in 1783.
First published in 1779, the Rhapsody appears to be derived from the author's experience with the invading forces during the
Henry Lloyd
Jacobite Rising of 1745—and thereafter as a secret agent. His point of view changed. And, apart from detailed defense considerations, he included some of his wider views of war.
from The Military Rhapsody
The order of battle now adoptee in Europe is, in many respects, defective and absurd. The infantry and cavalry, formed three deep, make the line so extensive that it loses all activity which is the soul of military manoeuvres and alone can insure success: insomuch that it may be established as an axiom that the army which moves and marches with the greatest velocity must, from that circumstance alone, finally prevail.
Our military institutions exclude every idea of celerity; hence it is that our victories are never complete and decisive, and that our attacks are reduced to some particular point which, gained or lost, the battle is over; the enemy retires, generally in good order, because from the extent and slowness of our motions we cannot pursue him with any vigour; he occupies some neighbouring hill and we have to begin again.
Moreover the position of the cavalry in a line on the flanks of the infantry is such that it retards the motions of the whole, because no one can advance unless the whole line does; besides, it cannot from that situation there support the infantry or be supported by it: the moment is lost before you can bring the cavalry where it is wanted. The reason assigned for placing the cavalry on the flanks is absurd viz. it covers the flanks of the infantry—Pray, is not the flank of the cavalry much weaker than that of the infantry? Since it cannot in any manner form a flank to protect itself, much less will it protect the flank of the infantry.
To remedy these defects I would humbly propose that all infantry be formed in such a manner that between each battalion or regiment, an interval of one hundred and fifty yards be left; behind these intervals I would have the cavalry placed in two lines at a proper distance, each squadron separately, with intervals to manoeuvre upon.
Whether you advance to the enemy or the enemy comes to you, the light troops disperse to the right and left, and you hear no more of them till the next day. Why on such occasions they do not form on the right and left of the army, at a convenient distance, and attack the enemy on the flanks, is to me inconceivable and the use now made of them appears ridiculous and absurd. Four or five hundred men; including one hundred hussars, distributed into small parties in the woods, behind the hedges, near the high roads would observe the enemy much better than ten thousand men. . . .
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Land forces are nothing. Marines are the only species of troops proper for this nation; they alone can defend and protect it effectively.
from History of the Late War in Germany
Published in successive volumes in 1766 and 1782, this detailed study of campaigns in the Seven Years' War, in which the author had commanded on both sides, included the author's conclusions on eighteenth-century war.
It is universally agreed upon, that no art or science is more difficult than that of war; yet by an unaccountable contradiction of the human kind, those who embrace this profession take little or no pains to study it. They seem to think that the knowledge of a few insignificant trifles constitute a great officer. This opinion is so general that little or nothing else is taught at present in any army whatever. The continual changes and variety of motions, evolutions, etc. which soldiers are taught prove evidently they are founded on mere caprice.
This art, like all others, is founded on certain fixed principles, which are by their nature invariable, the application of them only can be varied: but they are in themselves constant.
This most difficult science may, I think, be divided into two; one mechanical, and may be taught by precepts; the other has no name, nor can it be defined or taught. It consists in a just application of the principles and precepts of war, in all the numberless circumstances and situations which may occur; no rule, no study, or application, however assiduous, no experience, however long, can teach this part; it is the effect of genius alone.
As to the first, it may be reduced to mathematical principles. Its object is to prepare the materials which form an army for all the different operations which may occur: genius must apply them according to the ground, number, species and quality of the troops, which admit of infinite combinations.
In this art as in poetry and eloquence, there are many who can trace the rules by which a poem or an oration should be composed, and even compose, according to the exactest rules; but for want of that enthusiastic and divine fire, their productions are languid and insipid: so in our profession, many are to be found who know every precept of it by heart; but alas! when called upon to apply them, are immediately at a stand. They then recall their rules and want to make everything, the rivers, the woods,
Henry Lloyd
ravines, mountains, etc. subservient to them; whereas their precepts should, on the contrary, be subject to these, who are the only rules, the only guide we ought to follow; whatever manoeuvre is not formed on them is absurd and ridiculous.
These form the great book of war; and he who cannot read it, must be forever content with the title of a brave soldier and never aspire to that of a great general.
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The king's conduct was founded on the most sublime principles of war. Though his army was much inferior to that of the enemy, yet, by dint of superior manoeuvres, he brought more men into action, at the point attacked, than they; which must be decisive when the troops are nearly equal in goodness.
Wherefore generals must make it their study to establish in time of peace, such evolutions as facilitate the manoeuvre of armies, and, in time of war, choose such a field of battle, if possible, as enables them to hide part of their motions, and so bring more men into action than the enemy; and if the ground, either by its nature or by the vigilance of the enemy, does not permit them to cover their motions, then a greater facility of manoeuvring will answer the same end and enable them to bring more men to the PRINCIPAL POINT ATTACKED THAN THE ENEMY. The only advantage of a superior army in a day of action consists in this only, that the general can bring more men into action than the enemy; but if they do not move with facility and quickness and are not all brought to action at the same time, that superiority of numbers will serve only to increase the confusion.
From when we will deduce a general rule—"That general, who, by the facility of his motions, or by his artifice, can bring most men into action, at the same time, and at the same point, must, if the troops are equally good, necessarily prevail and therefore, all evolutions, which do not lend to this object, must be exploded."
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People talk very much of the shock of cavalry. If they mean that the horses push each other and strike with their breasts, which the French who abound in unmeaning words, call Coup de Pontrail, it is an absurdity. . . .
Indeed, our battles, as we have seen, are commonly nothing more than great skirmishes, and therefore, as I have said before, wars are not now as formerly, concluded by battles, but for want of means to protract them.
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Such [the American War of Independence] has been, and generally must be, the issue of wars prosecuted at a great distance, unless the first campaign gives you a decisive superiority: it follows, of course, that the success of such enterprises depends entirely on the vigour of your
The Age of Reason
operations: if in the beginning they are not decisive, they never will be so hereafter.
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Velocity is everything in war, particularly if the country be open and fruitful like Poland. Such an army, as we suppose, with two hundred carpenters, and ropes to make rafts, would ruin any European Army in a month. The Tartars have overcome and conquered a great part of the world by their velocity alone, whereas European Armies have not in two centuries conquered any one province of considerable extent, because they are too heavy.
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There is nothing performed by contractors which may not be much better executed by intelligent officers. They make immense fortunes at the expense of the state which ought to be saved. They destroy the army, horse and foot and even the hospitals, by furnishing the worst of everything.
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The French are gay, light and lively, governed rather by immediate and transitory impulse than by any principle or sentiment: their sensations, from the nature of their climate are very delicate, and therefore objects make a very strong impression, but momentary, because a new object, producing a new impression, effaces the former: from whence follows they are impetuous and dangerous in their attacks, all the animal spirits seem united, and produce a sort of furious convulsion, and gives them a more than ordinary degree of vigour for that instant, but it exhausts the whole frame: the instant following they appear languid and weak, and changed into other men.
Wherefore it should be a maxim, in making war against the French, to keep them continually in motion, especially in bad weather, always attack them, never permit them to follow their own dispositions, force them to observe yours; their impatience will soon reduce them to commit some capital error. If their leader is wise and prudent, and refuses to comply with their unreasonable requests, they will treat him with contempt, grow turbulent, and desert. The present ministry endeavours to introduce German discipline among them, without considering the difference there is between national characters, and I doubt whether it will produce the effects they expect from it. Nature must be improved, not annihilated.
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But experience has proved that the Russian infantry is by far superior to any in Europe, insomuch that I question whether it can be defeated by any infantry whatsoever, and as their cavalry is not so good as that of other nations, reason dictates that a mixed order of battle alone can conquer
Henry Lloyd
them. They cannot be defeated, they must be killed, and infantry, mixed with great corps of cavalry, only can do this.
They made war, and always will, in all probability, like the Tartars. They will over-run a country, ravage and destroy it, and so leave it; because they can never, according to the method they now follow, make a solid and lasting conquest. They put themselves an insurmountable barrier to it. Their own light troops, and the want of a solid plan of operations, will one day ruin their army.
FROM
James Wolfe was born in Kent in 1726. He was commissioned in the marines in 1741, but transferred to an infantry regiment and took part in the War of the Austrian Succession, fighting against the French at Dettingen in 1743. He then took part in the suppression of the Jacobite uprising, fighting at Culloden where he was commended by the Duke of Cumberland. He was promoted to command a regiment in 1750 at the age of twenty-four. After the outbreak of the Seven Years' War he was sent to North America and captured Louisburg in a daring amphibious operation. On his return to England in 1758, he was promoted to major general and put in command of the expedition to capture Quebec. The following year, after an initial setback and while seriously ill with tuberculosis, he took the city by surprise, storming the Heights of Abraham and insuring British supremacy in North America. He was killed in the assault.
During his short career Wolfe had undertaken intensive military studies and acquired a reputation for oddity. 'Mad, is he?" the King is said to have commented. "I wish he would bite some of my other generals."
I thank you heartily for your welcome back. I am not sorry that I went, notwithstanding what has happened; one may always pick up something useful from amongst the most fatal errors. I have found out that an Admiral should endeavour to run into an enemy's port immediately after he appears before it; that he should anchor the transport ships and frigates as close as he can to the land; that he should reconnoitre and observe it as quick as possible, and lose no time in getting the troops on shore; that previous directions should be given in respect to landing the troops, and a proper
James Wolfe
disposition made for the boats of all sorts, appointing leaders and fit persons for conducting the different divisions.
On the other hand, experience shows me that, in an affair depending upon vigour and despatch, the Generals should settle their plan of operations, so that no time may be lost in idle debate and consultations when the sword should be drawn; that pushing on smartly is the road to success, and more particularly so in an affair of this nature; that nothing is to be reckoned an obstacle to your undertaking which is not found really so upon trial; that in war something must be allowed to chance and fortune, seeing it is in its nature hazardous, and an option of difficulties; that the greatness of an object should come under consideration, opposed to the impediments that lie in the way; that the honour of one's country is to have some weight; and that, in particular circumstances and times, the loss of a thousand men is rather an advantage to a nation than otherwise, seeing that gallant attempts raise its reputation and make it respectable; whereas the contrary appearances sink the credit of a country, ruin the troops, and create infinite uneasiness and discontent at home.
I know not what to say, my dear Rickson, or how to account for our proceedings, unless I own to you that there never was people collected together so unfit for the business they were sent upon—dilatory, ignorant, irresolute, and some grains of a very unmanly quality, and very unsoldierlike or unsailor-like. I have already been too imprudent; I have said too much, and people make me say ten times more than I ever uttered; therefore, repeat nothing out of my letter, nor name my name as author to any one thing.
The whole affair turned upon the impracticability of escalading Rochefort; and the two evidences brought to prove that the ditch was wet (in opposition to the assertions of the chief engineer, who had been in the place) are persons to whom, in my mind, very little credit should be given, without these evidences we should have landed, and must have marched to Rochefort, and it is my opinion that the place would have surrendered, or have been taken, in forty-eight hours. It is certain that there was nothing in all that country to oppose 9000 good foot—a million Protestants, upon whom it is necessary to keep a strict eye, so that the garrison could not venture to assemble against us, and no troops, except the militia, within any moderate distance of these parts.
Little practice in war, ease and convenience at home, great incomes, and no wants, with no ambition to stir to action are not the instruments to work a successful war withal; I see no prospect of better deeds. . . .