St. Jean de Luz, 21stNov., 1813 I enclose you an original address which has been presented to me by the constituted authorities and notables here (which I hope your Lordship will do me the favor not to make public), which will show the strong sentiment here respecting the war; the same prevailed at St. Pe, and I hear of the same opinions in all parts of the country.
I have not myself heard any opinion in favor of the House of Bourbon. The opinion stated to me upon that point is, that 20 years have elapsed since the Princes of that House have quitted France; that they are equally, if not more, unknown to France than the Princes of any other Royal House in
The Revolution
Europe; but that the allies ought to agree to propose a Sovereign to France instead of Napoleon, who must be got rid of, if it is hoped or intended that Europe should ever enjoy peace; and that it was not material whether it was of the House of Bourbon or of any other Royal Family.
I have taken measures to open correspondence with the interior, by which I hope to know what passes, and the sentiments of the people, and I will take care to keep your Lordship acquainted with all that I may learn. In the mean time, I am convinced more than ever that Napoleon's power stands upon corruption, that he has no adherents in France but the principal officers of his army, and the employes civils of the government, and possibly some of the new proprietors; but even these last I consider doubtful.
Notwithstanding this state of things, I recommend to your Lordship to make peace with him if you can acquire all the objects which you have a right to expect. All the powers of Europe require peace possibly more than France, and it would not do to found a new system of war upon the speculations of any individual on what he sees and learns in one corner of France. If Buonaparte becomes moderate, he is probably as good a Sovereign as we can desire in France; if he does not, we shall have another war in a few years; but if my speculations are well founded, we shall have all France against him; time will have been given for the supposed disaffection to his government to produce its effect; his diminished resources will have decreased his means of corruption, and it may be hoped that he will be engaged singlehanded against insurgent France and all Europe.
There is another view of this subject, however, and that is, the continuance of the existing war, and the line to be adopted in that case. At the present moment it is quite impossible for me to move at all: although the army was never in such health, heart, and condition as at present, and it is probably the most complete machine for its numbers now existing in Europe, the rain has so completely destroyed the roads that I cannot move; and, at all events, it is desirable, before I go farther forward, that I should know what the allies propose to do in the winter, which I conclude I shall learn from your Lordship as soon as the King's government shall be made acquainted with their intentions by the King's diplomatic servants abroad. As I shall move forward, whether in the winter or the spring, I can acquire and ascertain more fully the sentiments of the people, and the government can either empower me to decide to raise the Bourbon standard, or can decide the question hereafter themselves, after they shall have all the information before them which I can send them of the sentiments and wishes of the people.
I can only tell you that, if I were a Prince of the House of Bourbon, nothing should prevent me from now coming forward, not in a good house in London, but in the field in France; and if Great Britain would stand by
Duke of Wellington
him, I am certain he would succeed. This success would be much more certain in a month or more hence, when Napoleon commences to carry into execution the oppressive measures which he must adopt in order to try to retrieve his fortunes.
I must tell your Lordship, however, that our success, and every thing, depends upon our moderation and justice, and upon the good conduct and discipline of our troops. Hitherto these have behaved well, and there appears a new spirit among the officers, which I hope will continue, to keep the troops in order. But I despair of the Spaniards. They are in so miserable a state, that it is really hardly fair to expect that they will refrain from plundering a beautiful country, into which they enter as conquerors; particularly, adverting to the miseries which their own country has suffered from its invaders. I cannot, therefore, venture to bring them back into France, unless I can feed and pay them; and the official letter which will go to your Lordship by this post will show you the state of our finances, and our prospects. If I could now bring forward 20,000 good Spaniards, paid and fed, I should have Bayonne. If I could bring forward 40,000, I don't know where I should stop. Now I have both the 20,000 and the 40,000 at my command, upon this frontier, but I cannot venture to bring forward any for want of means of paying and supporting them. Without pay and food, they must plunder; and if they plunder, they will ruin us all.
I think I can make an arrangement of the subsidy to cover the expense of 20,000 Spaniards; but all these arrangements are easily settled, if we could get the money. Where we are to get the money, excepting from England, it is impossible for me to devise; as the patriotic gentlemen at Lisbon, now that they can buy no commissariat debts, will give us no money, or very little, for the drafts on the Treasury, and the yellow fever has put a stop to the communication with Cadiz and Gibraltar; and if we had millions at all three, we could not get a shilling for want of ships to bring it.