FROM
Alfred von Schlieffen was born in 1833, and after briefly studying law joined the Prussian army in 1854. He became a member of the General Staff in 1865, and thereafter he devoted himself almost entirely to it. He became its chief in 1891, retired in 1905—though he continued to advise it—and died in 1913. His last words were said to be, "The struggle is inevitable. Keep my right flank strong!"
It is also recorded that on one occasion, while traveling by train, his aide attempted to make conversation by commenting on the beauty of the mountain valley. "An insignificant obstacle" was the only rejoinder. He spent most of his life working at his "Plan" which was eventually put into operation by his successor in 1914.
The Schlieffen Plan went through a number of revisions before its final acceptance by the German General Staff in 1905. The conception was said to have derived from Cannae.
The actual distribution of forces and the details of maneuver were left uncertain. When it was carried into effect by the younger Moltke in 1914, it achieved only a limited success.
In a war against Germany, France will probably at first restrict herself to defence, particularly as long as she cannot count on effective Russian support. With this in view she has long prepared a position which is for the greater part permanent, of which the great fortresses of Belfort, Epinal, Toul and Verdun are the main strongpoints. This position can be adequately occupied by the large French army and presents great difficulties to the attacker.
The attack will not be directed on the great fortresses, whose conquest requires a great siege apparatus, much time and large forces, especially as encirclement is impossible and the siege can only be conducted from one side. The attacker will prefer to advance on the intervening gaps. . . .
Therefore a frontal attack on the position Belfort-Verdun offers little promise of success. An envelopment from the south would have to be
The Later Nineteenth Century
proceeded by a victorious campaign against Switzerland and by the capture of the Jura forts—time-consuming enterprises during which the French would not remain idle.
Against a northern envelopment the French intend to occupy the Meuse between Verdun and Mezieres, but the real resistance, it is said, is not to be offered here but behind the Aisne, roughly between St. Menehould and Rethel. An intermediate position beyond the Aire seems also to be under consideration. If the German envelopment reaches even further, it will run into a strong mountainous position whose strongpoints are the fortresses of Rheims, Laon and La Fere.. . .
One cannot have great confidence in an attack on all these strong positions. More promising than the frontal attack with an envelopment by the left wing seems to be an attack from the north-west directed on the flanks, at Mezieres, Rethel, La F£re, and across the Oise on the rear of the position.
To make this possible, the Franco-Belgian frontier left of the Meuse must be taken, together with the fortified towns of Mezieres, Hirson, and Maubeuge, three small barrier forts, Lille and Dunkirk; and to reach thus far the neutrality of Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands must be violated.
The violation of Luxembourg neutrality will have no important consequence other than protests. The Netherlands regard England, allied to France, no less as an enemy than does Germany. It will be possible to come to an agreement with them.
Belgium will probably offer resistance. In face of the German advance north of the Meuse, her army, according to plan, will retreat to Antwerp and must be contained there; this might be effected in the north by means of a blockade of the Scheldt which would cut communications with England and the sea. For Liege and Namur, which are intended to have only a weak garrison, observation will suffice. It will be possible to take the citadel of Huy or to neutralise it.
—Andrew and Eva Wilson
(translators)
It is important, of course, that for an advance through Belgium the right wing should be made as strong as possible. But I cannot agree that the envelopment demands the violation of Dutch neutrality in addition to Belgian. A hostile Holland at our back could have disastrous consequences for the advance of the German army to the west, particularly if England should use the violation of Belgian neutrality as a pretext for entering the
Alfred von Schlieffen
war against us. A neutral Holland secures our rear, because if England declares war on us for violating Belgian neutrality, she cannot herself violate Dutch neutrality. She cannot break the very law for whose sake she goes to war.
Furthermore it will be very important to have in Holland a country whose neutrality allows us to have imports and supplies. She must be the windpipe that enables us to breathe.