FROM
Emory Upton was bom in New York in 1839 and graduated from West Point. He distinguished himself in combat with the Federal army in the Civil War, serving with the infantry, cavalry, and artillery and finishing as a brevet major general.
He devised a new system of infantry tactics which was adopted in 1867. From 1870 to 1875 he was commandant of cadets and instructor in artillery, cavalry, and infantry at West Point. He then undertook a world tour, at Sherman's request, to study foreign military systems and produced his Armies of Asia and Europe on his return in 1875.
Shortly after his appointment to general command in San Francisco in 1881 he shot himself at the age of forty-one. He was a lonely man, intensely religious and fmstrated by the state of the American army and America.
Upton's study was unfinished when he shot himself and it remained on file for many years. "His recommendations had all the prestige of his brilliant career," said Elihu Root, the Secretary of War, in 1903. "They had the advocacy and support of the great soldier who commanded the American armies, General Sherman. . . . Yet his voice was as the voice of one crying in the wilderness."
The Lessons to be drawn from the Revolution are:
First that nearly all of the dangers which threatened the cause of independence may be traced to the total inexperience of our statesmen in regard to military affairs, which led to vital mistakes in army legislation. . . .
Ninth. That the draft, connected or not connected, with voluntary enlistments and bounties, is the only sure reliance of a government in time of war.
Emory Upton
Tenth. That short enlistments are destructive to discipline, constantly expose an army to disaster, and inevitably prolong war with all its attendant dangers and expenses.
Eleventh. That short enlistments at the beginning of a war tend to disgust men with the service, and force the Government to resort either to bounties or to the draft.
Twelfth. That regular troops, engaged for war, are the only safe reliance of a government, and are in every point of view the best and most economical.
Thirteenth. That when a nation at war relies upon a system of regulars and volunteers, or regulars and militia, the men, in the absence of compulsion, or very strong inducements, will invariably enlist in the organizations most lax in discipline.
Fourteenth. That troops become reliable only in proportion as they are disciplined; that discipline is the fruit of long training, and cannot be attained without the existence of a good corps of officers.
Fifteenth. That the insufficiency of numbers to counterbalance a lack of discipline should convince us that our true policy, both in peace and war, as Washington puts it "ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one."
In seeking to trace all the great mistakes and blunders committed during the Civil War to defects of our military system, it is important to bear in mind the respective duties and responsibilities of soldiers and statesmen. The latter are responsible for the creation and organization of our resources, and, as in the case of the President, may further be responsible for their management or mismanagement. Soldiers, while they should suggest and be consulted on all details of organization under our system, can alone be held responsible for the control and direction of our armies in the field.
So long as historians insist upon making our commanders alone responsible for disasters in time of war, so long will the people and their representatives fail to recognize the importance of improving our system.