FROM
FROM
Mao Tse-tung was born in central China in 1893, of a peasant family, and after educating himself became a librarian at Peking University. He helped to found the Chinese Communist party in 1921 and promoted several rebellions against the central government. In 1931, with Russian support, he established a soviet republic in the remote interior. Overrun by government forces, he led his followers on the "Long March" to a new base in the northwest and then entered into an alliance against the Japanese invader. After the Japanese surrender he turned against Chiang Kai- shek and by 1949 had gained complete control of the mainland. He proclaimed a People's Republic and remained in power.
from On Guerrilla Warfare, 1936
The collections of military rules and orders promulgated in many countries point out the necessity of "applying principles elastically according to the situation," as well as the measures to be taken in a defeat. The former requires a commander not to commit mistakes subjectively through too flexible an application of principles, while the latter tells him how to cope with a situation when he has already committed mistakes or when unexpected and irresistible changes occur in the circumstances.
Why are mistakes committed? Because the disposition of forces in the war or battle or the directing of them does not fit in with the conditions of a certain time and a certain place, because the directing does not correspond with or dovetail into realities, in other words, because the contradiction between the subjective and the objective is not solved. People can hardly avoid coming up against such a situation in performing any task, only some are more and others are less competent in performing it. We demand greater
Mao Tse-tung
competence in performing tasks, and in war we demand more victories or, conversely, fewer defeats. The crux here lies precisely in making the subjective and the objective correspond well with each other. . . .
The process of knowing the situation goes on not only before but also after the formulation of a military plan. The carrying out of a plan, from its very beginning to the conclusion of an operation, is another process of knowing the situation, i.e. the process of putting it into practice. In this process, there is need to examine anew whether the plan mapped out in the earlier process corresponds with the actualities. If the plan does not correspond or does not fully correspond with them, then we must, according to fresh knowledge, form new judgments and make new decisions to modify the original plan in order to meet the new situation. There are partial modifications in almost every operation, and sometimes even a complete change. A hothead who does not know how to change his plan, or is unwilling to change it but acts blindly, will inevitably run his head against a brick wall.
The above applies to a strategical action, a campaign, or a battle. If an experienced military man is modest and willing to learn, and has familiarised himself with the conditions of his own forces (officers and men, arms, supplies, etc., and their totality) as well as those of the enemy (similarly, officers and men, arms, supplies, etc., and their totality), and with all other conditions relating to war, such as politics, economy, geography and weather conditions, he will be more confident in directing a war or an operation and will be more likely to win it. This is because over a long period of time he has learnt the situation on both the enemy side and his own, discovered the laws of action, and solved the contradiction between the subjective and the objective. This process of knowing is very important; without such a long period of experience it is difficult to understand and grasp the laws of an entire war. No truly able commander of a high rank can be made out of one who is a mere beginner in warfare or one who knows warfare only on paper; and to become such a commander one must learn through warfare.
All military laws and theories partaking of the character of principle represent past military experiences summed up by people in both ancient and modern times. We should carefully study the lessons which were learnt in past wars at the cost of blood and which have been bequeathed to us. This is one point. But there is another point, namely, we must also put conclusions thus reached to the test of our own experience and absorb what is useful, reject what is useless, and add what is specifically our own. The latter is a very important point, for otherwise we cannot direct a war.
Reading books is learning, but application is also learning and the more important form of learning. To learn warfare through warfare—this is our chief method. A person who has had no opportunity to go to school can also learn warfare, which means learning it through warfare. As a revo-
The Twentieth Century
lutionary war is the concern of the masses of the people, it is often undertaken without previous learning but is learnt through undertaking it —undertaking is itself learning. There is a distance between a civilian and a soldier, but that distance is not as long as the Great Wall and can be quickly eliminated; to take part in revolution and war is the method of eliminating it. To say that learning and application are difficult means that it is difficult to learn thoroughly and apply skilfully. To say that civilians can very quickly become soldiers means that it is not difficult to get them initiated. In summarising these two aspects we may apply an old Chinese adage: "Nothing is difficult in the world for anyone who sets his mind on it." Initiation is not difficult and mastery is also possible so long as one sets one's mind on them and is good at learning.
Military laws, like the laws governing all other things, are a reflection in our mind of objective realities; everything is objective reality except our mind. Consequently what we want to learn and know includes things both on the enemy side and our own, and both sides should be regarded as the object of our study and only our mind (thinking capacity) is the subject that makes the study. Some people are intelligent in knowing themselves but stupid in knowing their opponents, and others are the other way round; neither kind can solve the problem of learning and applying the laws of war. We must not belittle the saying in the book of Sun Tzu, the great military expert of ancient China, "Know your enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster," a saying which refers both to the stage of learning and to the stage of application, both to knowing laws of the development of objective realities and to deciding on our own action according to them in order to overcome the enemy facing us.
War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes, or political groups, and all laws of war are applied by a nation, a state, a class, or a political group waging a war to win victory for itself. It is beyond question that success or failure in a war is mainly determined by the military, political, economic and natural conditions on both sides. But not entirely so; it is also determined by the subjective ability on each side in directing the war. A military expert cannot expect victory in war by going beyond the limits imposed by material conditions, but within these limits he can and must fight to win. The stage of action of a military expert is built upon objective material conditions, but with the stage set, he can direct the performance of many lively dramas, full of sound and colour, of power and grandeur.
Swimming in an immense ocean of war, a commander must not only keep himself from sinking but also make sure to reach the opposite shore with measured strokes. The laws of directing wars constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war. —Anne Freemantle
(translator)
Mao Tse-tung
from Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare, 1937
A guerrilla unit should carry out the task of extricating itself from a passive position, when it is forced into one through some incorrect estimation and disposition, or some overwhelming pressure. How to extricate itself from it depends on circumstances. The circumstances are often such as to make it necessary to "run away." The ability to run away is precisely one of the characteristics of the guerrillas. Running away is the chief means of getting out of passivity and regaining the initiative. But it is not the only means. The moment when the enemy exerts maximum pressure and we are in the worst predicament often happens to be the very point at which he begins to be at a disadvantage and we begin to enjoy advantages. Frequently the initiative and an advantageous position are gained through one's effort of "holding out a bit longer."
Now we shall deal with flexibility.
Flexibility is a concrete manifestation of initiative. Flexible employment of forces is more indispensable in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare.
The directors of guerrilla war must understand that the flexible employment of forces is the most important means of changing the situation between the enemy and ourselves and gaining the initiative. As determined by the special features of guerrilla warfare, guerrilla forces must be flexibly employed according to conditions, such as the task, the enemy disposition, the terrain and the inhabitants; and the chief ways of employing the forces consist in dispersing, concentrating and shifting them.
In employing the guerrilla units, the director of guerrilla war is like a fisherman casting a net which he should be able to spread out as well as to draw in. When a fisherman spreads out his net, he must first find out the depth of the water, the speed of the current and the presence or absence of obstructions, similarly when the guerrilla units are dispersed we must also be careful not to incur losses through an ignorance of the situation and mistakes in actions. A fisherman, in order to draw in his net, must hold fast the end of the cord; in employing the forces, it is also necessary to maintain liaison and communication and to keep an adequate portion of the main force to hand. As a fisherman must frequently change his place, so guerrillas should constantly shift their positions. Dispersion, concentration and shifting of the forces are the three ways of flexibly employing the forces of guerrilla warfare.
Generally speaking, the dispersion of guerrilla units, i.e. "breaking up the whole into parts," is employed mainly in the following circumstances: (1) when we threaten the enemy with a wide frontal attack because he is on the defensive and we are still unable to mass our forces to engage him; (2) when we widely harass and disrupt the enemy in an area where his forces are weak; (3) when, unable to break through the enemy's encirclement, we
The Twentieth Century
try to disperse his attention in order to get away from him; (4) when we are restricted by the condition of terrain or in matters of supply; or (5) when we carry on work among the population over a vast area. But in dispersed actions under any circumstances, attention should be paid to the following: (1) no absolutely even dispersion of forces should be made, but a larger part of the forces should be kept at a place conveniently situated for its flexible employment so that, on the one hand, any possible exigency can be readily met and, on the other, the dispersed units can be used to fulfil the main task; and (2) the dispersed units should be assigned clearly defined tasks, fields of operation, specific time limits and rendezvous, and ways and means of liaison.
Concentration of forces, i.e. the method of "gathering parts into a whole," is adopted largely for the annihilation of an enemy on the offensive; it is sometimes adopted for the annihilation of certain stationary forces of the enemy when he is on the defensive. Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the massing of the main forces in a certain important direction while retaining or dispatching a part of the forces in other directions for purposes of containing, harassing or disrupting the enemy, or for work among the population.
Although flexible dispersion or concentration of forces in accordance with circumstances is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must also know how to shift (of transfer) our forces flexibly. When the enemy feels seriously threatened by the guerrillas he will send troops to suppress or attack them. Hence guerrilla units should ponder over the circumstances they are in: if it is possible for them to fight, they should fight right on the spot; if not, they should not miss the opportunity to shift themselves swiftly to some other direction. Sometimes the guerrillas, for the purpose of smashing the enemy units separately, may, after annihilating an enemy force in one place, shift themselves immediately to another direction to wipe out another enemy force; sometimes the guerrillas, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, may have to disengage themselves immediately from the enemy there and engage him in another direction. If the enemy's forces at a place are particularly strong, the guerrilla units should not stay there long, but should shift their positions as speedily as a torrent or a whirlwind. In general, the shifting of forces should be done secretly and swiftly. Ingenious devices such as making a noise in the east while attacking in the west, appearing now in the south and now in the north, hit-and-run and night action should be constantly employed to mislead, entice and confuse the enemy. . . .
—Anne Freemantle (translator)