BASIL LIDDELL HART:

FROM

The Real War;

FROM

Strategy

Basil Liddell Hart was born in Paris in 1895, the son of an English clergyman. After attending Cambridge he joined the army as an infantry officer in 1914. After being gassed on the Western Front, he began to develop infantry training methods and to engage in tactical studies. Invalided out of the army, he became Military Correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph and then of the Times and a prolific writer of books on war. For a time he was adviser to the war minister, securing important military reforms, but his opposition to some of Churchill's war policies led to his eclipse in Britain—although his ideas remained influential in other countries, especially Germany. In later years he turned increasingly to military history, lectured at American universities and colleges, and was widely recognized as a pioneer of strategy. He died in 1970.

FROM The Real War

The third battle of Ypres, which came to be known as Pas- schendaele, was launched on the Western Front in 1917, by a reluctant decision of Lloyd George—under pressure from Haig and his supporters. It cost 250,000 casualties and many reputations.

For the ominous condition of the French army, the crisis at sea caused by the submarine campaign, and the need to second the still possible Russian offensive, combined to justify Haig's decision in May, the situation had radically changed before the main offensive was actually launched on

The Twentieth Century

July 31st. In war all turns on the time factor. By July the French army, under Petain's treatment, was recuperating, if still convalescent, the height of the submarine crisis was past, and the revolutionary paralysis of the Russian army was clear. Nevertheless, the plans of the British High Command were unchanged.

The historian may consider that insufficient attention was given to the lessons of history and of recent experience, and of material facts in deciding both upon the principle of a major offensive and upon its site. The axis of the attack diverged from instead of converging on, the German main communication, so that an advance could not vitally endanger the security of the enemy's position in France. Haig, curiously, was to adopt here the same eccentric direction of advance which a year later his advice prevented Foch and Pershing from taking on the other flank of the Western Front.

Thus an advance on the Belgian coast offered no wide strategic results, and for the same reason it was hardly the best direction, even as a means of pinning and wearing down the enemy's strength on a profitable basis. Moreover, the idea that Britain's salvation from starvation depended on the capture of the submarine bases on this coast had long since been exploded, for the main submarine campaign was being conducted from German ports. In fairness, however, one should add that this mistaken belief was impressed on Haig by the Admiralty.

Worse still, the Ypres offensive was doomed before it began—by its own destruction of the intricate drainage system in this part of Flanders. The legend has been fostered that these ill-famed “swamps of Passchen- daele" were a piece of ill-luck due to the heavy rain, a natural and therefore unavoidable hindrance that could not be foreseen. In reality, before the battle began, a memorandum was sent by Tank Corps Headquarters to General Headquarters pointing out that if the Ypres area and its drainage were destroyed by bombardment, the battlefield would become a swamp.

. . . Nearly two months passed before the preparations for the main advance were completed, and during that interval the Germans had ample warning to prepare counter-measures. These comprised a new method of defence, as suited to the waterlogged ground as the British offensive methods were unsuited. Instead of the old linear system of trenches they developed a system of disconnected strong points and concrete pill-boxes, distributed in great depth, whereby the ground was held as much as possible by machine-gun and as little as possible by men.

While the forward positions were lightly occupied, the reserves thus saved were concentrated in rear for prompt counter-attack, to eject the British troops from the positions they had arduously gained. And the further the British advanced the more highly developed, naturally, did they find the system. Moreover, by the introduction of mustard gas the Germans scored a further trick, interfering seriously with the British artillery and concentration areas. . . .

Basil Liddell Hart

On July 22nd, the bombardment began, by 2300 guns, to continue for ten days, until at 3:50 a.m. on July 31st the infantry advanced on a fifteen- mile front to the accompaniment of torrential rain.

Thus, when on November 4th, a sudden advance by the 1st Division and 2nd Canadian Division gained the empty satisfaction of occupying the site of Passchendaele village, the official curtain was at last rung down on the pitiful tragedy of "Third Ypres." It was the long overdue close of a campaign which had brought the British armies to the verge of exhaustion, one in which had been enacted the most dolorous scenes in British military history, and for which the only justification evoked the reply that, in order to absorb the enemy's attention and forces, Haig chose the spot most difficult for himself and least vital to the enemy. Intending to absorb the enemy's reserves, his own were absorbed.

Perhaps the most damning comment on the plan which plunged the British Army in this bath of mud and blood is contained in an incidental revelation of the remorse of one who was largely responsible for it. This highly-placed officer from General Headquarters was on his first visit to the battle front—at the end of the four months' battle. Growing increasingly uneasy as the car approached the swamp-like edges of the battle area, he eventually burst into tears, crying "Good God, did we really send men to fight in that?" To which his companion replied that the ground was far worse ahead. If the exclamation was a credit to his heart it revealed on what a foundation of delusion and inexcusable ignorance his indomitable "offensiveness" had been based.

from Strategy

The original outline of the strategy of indirect approach was published in the author's Decisive Wars in History in 1929 and elaborated in editions of The Strategy of Indirect Approach.

The perfection of strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting. History, as we have seen, provides examples where strategy, helped by favourable conditions, has virtually produced such a result—among the examples being Caesar's Ilerda campaign, Cromwell's Preston campaign, Napoleon's Ulm campaign, Moltke's encirclement of MacMahon's army at Sedan in 1870, and Allenby's 1918 encirclement of the Turks in the hills of Samaria. The most striking and catastrophic of recent examples was the way that, in 1940, the Germans cut off and trapped the Allies' left wing in Belgium, following Guderian's surprise break-

The Twentieth Century

through in the centre at Sedan, and thereby ensured the general collapse of the Allied armies on the Continent.

While these were cases where the destruction of the enemy's armed forces was economically achieved through their disarming by surrender, such "destruction" may not be essential for a decision, and for the fulfilment of the war-aim. In the case of a state that is seeking, not conquest, but the maintenance of its security, the aim is fulfilled if the threat be removed—if the enemy is led to abandon his purpose.

The defeat which Belisarius incurred at Sura through giving rein to his troops' desire for a "decisive victory"—after the Persians had already given up their attempted invasion of Syria—was a clear example of unnecessary effort and risk. By contrast, the way that he defeated their more dangerous later invasion and cleared them out of Syria, is perhaps the most striking example on record of achieving a decision—in the real sense, of fulfilling the national object—by pure strategy. For in this case, the psychological action was so effective that the enemy surrendered his purpose without any physical action at all being required.

While such bloodless victories have been exceptional, their rarity enhances rather than detracts from their value—as an indication of latent potentialities, in strategy and grand strategy. Despite many centuries' experience of war, we have hardly begun to explore the field of psychological warfare.

It rests normally with the government, responsible for the grand strategy of a war, to decide whether strategy should make its contribution by achieving a military decision or otherwise. Just as the military means is only one of the means to the end of grand strategy—one of the instruments in the surgeon's case—so battle is only one of the means to the end of strategy. If the conditions are suitable, it is usually the quickest in effect, but if the conditions are unfavourable it is folly to use it.

Let us assume that a strategist is empowered to seek a military decision. His responsibility is to seek it under the most advantageous circumstances in order to produce the most profitable result. Hence his true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision , its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this. In other words, dislocation is the aim of strategy; its sequel may be either the enemy's dissolution or his easier disruption in battle. Dissolution may involve some partial measure of fighting, but this has not the character of a battle.

* * *

How is the strategic dislocation produced? In the physical, or "logistical," sphere it is the result of a move which {a) upsets the enemy's dispositions and, by compelling a sudden "change of front," dislocates the distribution and organization of his forces; {b) separates his forces; (c)

endangers his supplies; {d) menaces the route or routes by which he could retreat in case of need and reestablish himself in his base or homeland.

A dislocation may be produced by one of these effects, but is more often the consequence of several. Differentiation, indeed, is difficult because a move directed towards the enemy's rear tends to combine these effects. Their respective influence, however, varies and has varied throughout history according to the size of armies and the complexity of their organization.

In the psychological sphere, dislocation is the result of the impression on the commander's mind of the physical effects which we have listed. The impression is strongly accentuated if his realization of his being at a disadvantage is sudden, and if he feels that he is unable to counter the enemy's move. Psychological dislocation fundamentally springs from this sense of being trapped.

This is the reason why it has most frequently followed a physical move on the enemy's rear. An army, like a man, cannot properly defend its back from a blow without turning round to use its arms in the new direction. "Turning" temporarily unbalances an army as it does a man, and with the former the period of instability is inevitably much longer. In consequence, the brain is much more sensitive to any menace to its back.

In contrast, to move directly on an opponent consolidates his balance, physical and psychological, and by consolidating it increases his resisting power. For in the case of an army it rolls the enemy back towards their reserves, supplies, and reinforcements, so that as the original front is driven back and worn thin, new layers are added to the back. At the most, it imposes a strain rather than producing a shock.

Thus a move round the enemy's front against his rear has the aim not only of avoiding resistance on its way but in its issue. In the profoundest sense, it takes the line of least resistance. The equivalent in the psychological sphere is the line of least expectation. They are the two faces of the same coin, and to appreciate this is to widen our understanding of strategy. For if we merely take what obviously appears the line of least resistance, its obviousness will appeal to the opponent also; and this line may no longer be that of least resistance.

In studying the physical aspect we must never lose sight of the psychological, and only when both are combined is the strategy truly an indirect approach, calculated to dislocate the opponent's balance.

The mere action of marching indirectly towards the enemy and on to the rear of his dispositions does not constitute a strategic indirect approach. Strategic art is not so simple. Such an approach may start by being indirect in relation to the enemy's front, but by the very directness of its progress towards his rear may allow him to change his dispositions, so that it soon becomes a direct approach to his new front.

The Twentieth Century

Because of the risk that the enemy may achieve such a change of front, it is usually necessary for the dislocating move to be preceded by a move, or moves, which can best be defined by the term "distract" in its literal sense of "to draw asunder." The purpose of this "distraction" is to deprive the enemy of his freedom of action , and it should operate in both the physical and psychological spheres. In the physical, it should cause a distension of his forces or their diversion to unprofitable ends, so that they are too widely distributed, and too committed elsewhere, to have the power of interfering with one's own decisively intended move. In the psychological sphere, the same effect is sought by playing upon the fears of, and by deceiving, the opposing command.

Superior weight at the intended decisive point does not suffice unless that point cannot be reinforced in time by the opponent. It rarely suffices unless that point is not merely weaker numerically but has been weakened morally. Napoleon suffered some of his worst checks because he neglected this guarantee—and the need for distraction has grown with the delaying power of weapons.

A deeper truth to which Foch and other disciples of Clausewitz did not penetrate fully is that in war every problem, and every principle, is a duality. Like a coin, it has two faces. Hence the need for a well-calculated compromise as a means to reconciliation. This is the inevitable consequence of the fact that war is a two-party affair, so imposing the need that while hitting one must guard. Its corollary is that, in order to hit with effect, the enemy must be taken off his guard. Effective concentration can only be obtained when the opposing forces are dispersed; and, usually, in order to ensure this, one's own forces must be widely distributed. Thus, by an outward paradox, true concentration is the product of dispersion.

A further consequence of the two-party condition is that to ensure reaching an objective one should have alternative objectives. Herein lies a vital contrast to the single-minded nineteenth century doctrine of Foch and his fellows—a contrast of the practical to the theoretical. For if the enemy is certain as to your point of aim he has the best possible chance of guarding himself—and blunting your weapon. If, on the other hand, you take a line that threatens alternative objectives, you distract his mind and forces. This, moreover, is the most economic method of distraction , for it allows you to keep the largest proportion of your force available on your real line of operation—thus reconciling the greatest possible concentration with the necessity of dispersion.

The absence of an alternative is contrary to the very nature of war. It sins against the light which Bourcet shed in the eighteenth century by his most penetrating dictum that "every plan of campaign ought to have several branches and to have been so well thought out that one or other of the said

branches cannot fail of success." This was the light that his military heir, the young Napoleon Bonaparte, followed in seeking always, as he said, to “faire son theme en deux facons." Seventy years later Sherman was to relearn the lesson from experience, by reflection, and to coin his famous maxim about "putting the enemy on the horns of a dilemma." In any problem where an opposing force exists, and cannot be regulated, one must foresee and provide for alternative courses. Adaptability is the law which governs survival in war as in life—war being but a concentrated form of the human struggle against environment.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SELECTIONS

A few of the source works for this collection are available only in other countries. Direct quotations are from specific translations and editions. For the convenience of the American reader, where possible, a list follows of editions of these works obtainable in the United States, although not necessarily chosen by the editors of this volume. Those which are no longer in print are available in many circulation and reference libraries.

In several cases, more than one edition of a work exists. No special criteria were used in selecting among them, and the reader may locate another more easily.

I. THE ANCIENT WORLD

From the Book of Judges: The King James Bible

Thucydides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Richard Crawley. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1963.

Xenophon. Hellenica and Anabasis. 3 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Aristotle. Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. New York: Modern Library, 1943.

Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963.

Polybius. The Histories of Polybius. Translated from the text of F. Hultsch by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962.

Julius Caesar. Caesar's Commentaries. Translated by Jane Mitchell. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972.

Vergil. Aeneid. Translated by C. Day Lewis. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1952.

Onasander. Military Essays (Bound with Military Essays, Aeneas Tacticus; and Military Essays, Asclepiodotus). Loeb Classical Library: Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1923.

Tacitus. The Annals of Tacitus. Edited by F. R. Goodyear. 4 vols. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Arrian. The Anabasis of Alexander, and Indica. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Bibliography of Selections

Vegetius. The Military Institutions of the Romans. Translated by John Clark. Edited by Thomas R. Phillips. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1944.

Procopius. History of the Wars. 7 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Leo. Tactica. Extract from general history. Also published in United States in 1935 by Colonel Spaulding. (Rare).

Juvaini. The History of the World Conqueror. Translated from the text of Mirza Muhammad Qazvini by John Andrew Boyle. 2 vols. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958.

II. RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION

Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince. Translated by W. K. Marriott. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1908.

_ The Art of War. Revised ed. Translated by Ellis Farneworth. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.

Richard Hakluyt. The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, Made by Sea or Over-Land to the Remote and Farthest Distant Quarters of the Earth at Any Time Within the Compasses of These 1600 Yeeres. 12 vols. New York: AMS Press, 1965.

Walter Raleigh. The History of the World. Edited by C. A. Patrides.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1971.

Hugo Grotius. The Law of War and Peace. Translated by Francis W. Kelsey with the collaboration of Arthur E. R. Boak et. al. Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1962.

Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. Edited by C. B. Macpherson. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968.

Oliver Cromwell. Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell. Edited by William Cortez Abbott. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947.

George Savile Halifax. Complete Works. Edited by J. P. Kenyon. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969.

Daniel Defoe. Memoirs of a Cavalier. Edited by James J. Boulton. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

III. THE AGE OF REASON

Jonathan Swift. The Conduct of the Allies. Edited by C. B. Wheeler. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1916.

Bibliography of Selections

Maurice de Saxe. Reveries, or Memoirs Upon the Art of War. Reprint of 1757 edition. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Jean de Bourcet. The Defence of Piedmont by Spenser Wilkinson. London: Oxford University Press, 1927.

Frederick the Great. Frederick the Great. Translated by Jay Luvaas. New York: Free Press (MacMillan & Co.), 1966.

Henry Lloyd. A Political and Military Rhapsody on the Invasion and Defence of Great Britain and Ireland. London, 1779.

_ The History of the Late War in Germany. London, 1776 and 1782.

2 vols. (Rare copy in War Office Library in London).

James Wolfe. Letter to Major Rickson, 5 November 1757, from Life and Letters of James Wolfe. Edited by Beckles Wilson. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1909.

Alexander Suvurov. The Art of Victory. New York, 1966.

Edward Gibbon. Autobiography. Edited by Lord Sheffield. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Jacques Antoine Guibert. General Essay on Tactics. 2 vols. Reprint of 1781 edition. Westport, Conn.: The Greenwood Press.

John Paul Jones. Letter to Admiral Kersaint, 1791, in Selected Naval Records. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Also, Memoirs of Rear- Admiral Paul Jones. Reprint of 1830 edition. New York, Da Capo Press, Inc., 1972.

Robert Jackson. A View of the Formation, Discipline, and Economy of Armies. London: Parker, Furnivall, and Parker, 1845.

IV. THE REVOLUTION

Horatio Nelson. The Trafalgar Memorandum. On display at the British Museum. The Life of Nelson: The Embodiement of the Sea Power of Great Britain by A. T. Mahan. 2 vols. New York: Haskell House Publishers, Inc., 1969. Reprint of 1897 edition.

_ Nelson's Last Diary, September 13—October 21, 1805. Edited by

Gilbert Hudson. London: E. Mathews, 1917.

Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon's Maxims of War. Translated by Lieutenant-General Sir G. C. D'Aguilar. Kansas City, Mo.: Hudson- Kimberly Publishing Company, 1902.

_ Napoleon's Memoirs. Edited by Somerset de Chair. London: The

Golden Cockerel Press, 1945.

Arthur W. Wellington. Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda. 8 vols. Reprint of 1880 edition. Millwood, N.Y.: Kraus Reprint Company.

Private Wheeler. Letters of Private Wheeler. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. London: Michael Joseph, 1952.

Armand de Caulaincourt. With Napoleon in Russia; the Memoirs of

Bibliography of Selections

General de Coulaincourt. From the original memoirs as edited by Jean Hansteau. Abridged and edited by George Libaire. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1935.

Henri Jomini. The Art of War. Translated by G. H. Mendell and W. P.

Craighill. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971.

Karl von Clausewitz. On War. Translated by Anatol Rapoport. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969.

Stendhal (Marie-Henri Beyle). The Charterhouse of Parma. Translated by M. R. Shaw. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968.

V. THE LATER NINETEENTH CENTURY

Helmuth von Moltke. The Military Works (Militarische Werke). Edited by the Prussian General Staff, 1891—1894.

Abraham Lincoln. Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. Edited by Roy P. Basler. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953.

Herman Melville. Works. New York: Russell and Russell, 1963. Volume 6, White-]dcket.

William Tecumseh Sherman. Letter to Major R. M. Sawyer, 31 January 1864 in The Sherman Letters. Edited by Rachel S. Thorndike (reprint of the 1894 edition). New York: AMS Press, 1972.

William Howard Russell. Despatches from the Crimea 1854 — 1856. Edited by Nicolas Bentley. New York: Hill and Wang, 1966.

Charles Ardant du Picq. Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle. Translated by Colonel John N. Greely and Major Robert C. Cotton. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1921.

Leo Tolstoy. War and Peace. Translated by Constance Garnett. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976.

Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch. Modern Weapons and Modern War (abridgment of War of the Future). London: Grant Richards, 1900.

Alfred von Schlieffen. The Great Memorandum. Translated by Andrew and Eva Wilson; edited by Gerhard Ritter. London: Oswald Wolff, 1958.

Emory Upton. The Military Policy of the United States. Reprint of 1904 edition. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Alfred Thayer Mahan. The Influence of Sea-Power upon the French Revolution and Empire , 1793-1812. 2 vols. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1968.

Colmar Von der Goltz. The Nation in Arms. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1887.

Hans Delbruck. The Art of War. Translated by Dr. Peter Paret in Military Affairs Magazine, 1966. (Originally published in Berlin under the title

Bibliography of Selections

Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, 1800).

Ferdinand Foch. The Principles of War. Translated by J. De Morinni.

Reprint of 1918 edition. New York: AMS Press, 1970.

George Francis Henderson. Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War.

Abridged ed. Gloucester, Mass.: P. Smith, 1968.

Julian S. Corbett. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. New York: AMS Press, 1972.

VI. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Halford MacKinder. The Geographical Pivot of History . London: 1904. Reprinted by the Royal Geographical Society, London, 1969.

Jean Colin. Transformations of War. Translated by L. Pope-Hennessy.

Reprint of 1912 edition. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Erich Ludendorff. The Nation at War. Translated by A. S. Rappoport.

London: Hutchinson and Company, 1936.

Herbert George Wells. The War of the Air. Reprinted by Penguin Books, 1941.

Giulio Douhet. The Command of the Air. Translated by Dino Ferrari.

Reprint of 1942 edition. New York: Arno Press, 1972.

Lenin. War and Socialism in Works ofV. I. Lenin. New York: International Publishers, 1929.

_ Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder. New York:

International Publishers, 1940.

Stephen Crane. The Red Badge of Courage. New York: Modern Library, 1951.

Marcel Proust. Remembrance of Things Past. 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1934.

Winston Churchill. The River War. New York: Universal Publishing and Distributing Corporation, 1964.

John Frederick Charles Fuller. Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier.

London: I. Nicholson and Watson, 1936.

William Mitchell. Winged Defense. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1971.

Leon Trotsky. The History of the Russian Revolution. Translated by Max Eastman. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1932.

Douglas MacArthur. Report of the Chief of Staff in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965.

T. E. Lawrence. Evolution of a Revolt: Early Postwar Writings of T. E.

Bibliography of Selections

Lawrence. Edited by Stanley and Rodelle Weintraub. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968.

_ Seven Pillars of Wisdom , a Triumph. Garden City, N.Y.:

Doubleday, 1966.

Adolf Hitler. Mein Kampf. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943.

Albert Speer. Inside the Third Reich. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Macmillan, 1970.

Charles de Gaulle. The Edge of the Sword. Translated by Gerard Hopkins. New York: Criterion Books, 1960.

Mao Tse-tung. On Guerrilla Warfare . Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, New York: Praeger, 1961.

Andre Malraux. Anti-Memoirs. Translated by Terence Kilmartin. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.

Basil Liddell Hart. The Real War, 1914-1918. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930. _ Strategy. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1967.

Acknowledgments

The editors of The Sword and the Pen and the Thomas Y. Crowell Company wish to thank the following publishers, agents, and translators for granting permission to reprint selections from the following copyrighted material. All possible care has been taken to trace ownership of material included and to make full acknowledgment for its use.

the army quarterly for The Evolution of a Revolt by T. E. Lawrence.

Jonathan cape ltd. and the seven pillars trust for The Seven Pillars of Wisdom by T. E. Lawrence.

chatto and windus ltd. and the estate of c. k. scott-moncrieff for Remembrance of Things Past by Marcel Proust, translated by C. K. Scott-Moncrieff.

faber and faber limited for The Edge of the Sword by Charles de Gaulle, translated by Gerard Hopkins. Reprinted by permission.

hamish Hamilton for Anti-Memoirs by Andre Malraux.

the hamlyn group ltd. for The River War by Winston Churchill. Reprinted by permission.

hodder & stoughton ltd. for The Transformation of War by J. Colin.

holt, rinehart and winston for Anti-Memoirs by Andre Malraux. Translated by Terence Kilmarten. Copyright © 1968 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston and Hamish Hamilton Ltd. Reprinted by permission of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Publishers.

Hutchinson publishing group ltd. for The Nation at War by Erich Ludendorff.

the new American library, inc. and anne freemantle, translator, for On Guerrilla Warfare and Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse-tung.

random house inc. for The Guermantes Way by Marcel Proust. Copyright 1925 and renewed 1953 by Random House, Inc. Reprinted from Remembrance of Things Past, Volume I, by Marcel Proust, translated by C. K. Scott-Moncrieff, by permission of Random House, Inc.

margarita alison starr for Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier by J. F. C. Fuller.

the university of Michigan for The Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky, translated by Max Eastman. Copyright by the University of Michigan 1932, 1933,1960. Renewed 1961.

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