J. M. Calvert: ‘Future of SAS Troops’ 1945
Subject: Future of SAS Troops
HQ SAS Tps/80/17/G
Lt Col W. Stirling
Lt Col D. Stirling, DSO
Lt Col R. B. Mayne, DSO
Lt Col B. M. F. Franks, DSO MC
Lt Col I. G. Collins
Lt Col E. C. Baring
Lt Col The Earl Jellicoe
Lt Col D. Sutherland
Lt Col D. Lloyd Owen, MC
Major J. Verney, MC
Major R. Farran, DSO, MC
The Director of Tactical Investigation, Maj Gen Rowell, has been ordered by the Chief of Imperial General Staff that his directorate should investigate all the operations of the Special Air Service with a view to giving recommendations for the future of the SAS in the next war and its composition in the peacetime army. The actual terms of reference were:
‘An investigation of SAS technique tactics and organization without prejudice to a later examination of all organizations of a similar nature which were formed and operated in various theatres of this last war’.
Brigadier Churchill is Deputy Director of Tactical Investigation and lives at Flat 110, 4 Whitehall Court, London, SW1 (Whitehall 9400 Ext 1632), just behind the War Office. The officer immediately concerned is Lt Col C. A. Wigham. Lt Col Wigham has in his possession all the reports on SAS operations in western Europe. The reports on SAS operations in Italy and in the Mediterranean theatre are also being obtained and forwarded. I have given Lt Col Wigham your names so that he may either have a talk with you to obtain your views and to find out about incidents which are not clear in the reports, or to ask you to write your views to him.
We all have the future of the SAS at heart, not merely because we wish to see its particular survival as a unit, but because we have believed in the principles of its method of operations. Many of the above-named officers have had command of forces which have had a similar role to that of the SAS, as well as being in the SAS at one time.
The object of this investigation is to decide whether the principles of operating in the SAS manner are correct. If they are correct, what types of units should undertake operations of this nature, and how best to train and maintain such units in peace, ready for war. I will not start now by writing about the principles of SAS, which have been an intrinsic part of your life for the past few years, but I will mention what I think are some of the most important points which need bringing out. The best way to do this is to consider the usual criticisms of the SAS type of force.
1. ‘The Private Army’
From what I have seen in different parts of the world, forces of this nature tend to be so-called ‘Private Armies’ because there have been no normal formations in existence to fulfil this function – a role which has been found by all commanders to be a most vital adjunct to their plans. It has only been due to the drive and initiative of certain individuals backed up by senior commanders that these forces have been formed and have carried out their role.
2. ‘The taking up of Commanders’ valuable time’
This has often been necessary because it has very often only been the Comds of armies who have realized the importance of operations of this nature, and to what an extent they can help their plans. The difficulty has been that more junior staff officers have not understood the object or principles of such forces. They have either given us every help as they have thought us something rather wonderful, or they have thought we were ‘a bloody nuisance’. I feel that the best way to overcome this is, that once the principle of the importance of Special Raiding Forces operating behind the vital points of the enemy’s lines is agreed to, it should become an integral part of the training of the army at the Staff College, military colleges, and during maneuvers, etc. Students should be asked not only what orders or directors or requests they have to give to the artillery, engineers, air, etc., but also what directives they would give to their raiding forces. There should be a recognized staff officer on the staffs of senior formations whose job it is to deal with these forces, i.e. the equivalent of a CRE or CRA. This should also be included in the text books FRS, etc.
3. ‘These forces, like airborne forces, are only required when we pass to the offensive, which – judging by all previous wars – is when the regular army has been nearly wiped out in rearguard actions whilst the citizen army forms, i.e. about 3 years after the beginning of the war.’
The answer here, I feel, is that it is just when we are weak everywhere that forces of this nature are the most useful, and can play a most vital part in keeping the enemy all over the world occupied. Also there is little difference between the roles of SAS and ‘Auxiliary Forces’ who duck when the enemy’s offensive rolls over them and then operate against the enemy’s L or C from previously constructed bases. An SAS formation, by its organization and training, is ideally suited to operate in this defensive role.
4. ‘Overlapping with SOE and other clandestine organizations’
My experience is that SOE and SAS are complementary to each other. SAS cannot successfully operate without good intelligence, guides, etc. SOE can only do a certain amount before requiring, when their operations become overt, highly trained, armed bodies in uniform to operate and set an example to the local resistance. SOE are the ‘white hunters’ and produce the ground organization on which SAS operates. All senior officers of SOE with whom I have discussed this point agree to this principle.
5. ‘SAS is not adaptable to all countries.’
This has already been proved wrong. SAS is probably more adaptable to changes of theatres than any regular formation. Also, as I have said in 4 above, SAS work on the ground organization of SOE. It is for SOE to be a world-wide organization with an organization in every likely country. Then when necessary, SAS can operate on this organization using their guides and intelligence knowledge, etc.
6. ‘Volunteer units skim the regular units of their best officers and men.’
Volunteer units such as SAS attract officers and men who have initiative, resourcefulness, independence of spirit, and confidence in themselves. In a regular unit there are far less opportunities of making use of these assets and, in fact, in many formations they are a liability, as this individualistic attitude upsets the smooth working of a team. This is especially true in European warfare where the individual must subordinate his natural initiative so that he fits into a part of the machine. Volunteer units such as the Commandos and Chindits (only a small proportion of the Chindits were volunteers although the spirit was there) have shown the rest of the army how to fight at a time when it was in low morale due to constant defeat. A few ‘gladiators’ raises the standard of all. Analogies are racing (car, aeroplane, horse, etc.), and test teams.
7. ‘Expense per man is greater than any other formation and is not worthwhile.’
Men in units of this nature probably fight 3 or 4 times more often than regular units. They are always eager for a fight and therefore usually get it. If expense per man days actually in contact with the enemy was taken into account, there would be no doubt which was the more expensive type of formation. I have found, as you will have done, the ‘old familiar faces’ on every front where we have seen trouble. I consider the expense is definitely worth it without even taking into account the extra results. One SAS raid in North Africa destroyed more aeroplanes in one day than the balloon barrage did during 6 years of war.
8. ‘Any normal battalion could do the same job.’
My experience shows that they definitely cannot. In Norway in 1940, a platoon of marines under a sergeant ran away when left on its own, although they had orders to stay, when a few German lorries appeared. Mainly owing to the bad leadership of this parade-ground sergeant, they were all jittery and useless because they were ‘out of touch’. A force consisting of two Gurkha Coys and a few British troops, of which I was one, was left behind in 1942 in Burma to attack the enemy in the rear if they appeared. The Commander, a good Gurkha officer with a good record, when confronted with a perfect opportunity (Japs landing in boats onto a wide sandy beach completely unaware of our presence), avoided action in order to get back to his Brigade because he was ‘out of touch’ and could not receive orders. By avoiding action, the unit went into a waterless area and more perished this way and later by drowning than if he had attacked.
My experience with regular battalions under my command in Burma was that there were only 3 or 4 officers in any battalion who could be relied on to take positive action if they were on their own, and had no detailed orders. This ‘I’ll ‘ave to ask me Dad’ attitude of the British Army is its worst feature in my opinion. I found the RAF and dominion officers far better in this respect. I have not had experience with the cavalry. They should also be better. Perhaps cavalry could take on the SAS role successfully? I admit that with training both in Burma and North Africa there were definite improvements amongst the infantry, but in my opinion, no normal battalion I have seen, could carry out an SAS role without 80 per cent reorganization. I have written frankly and have laid myself open to obvious criticism, but I consider this such a vital point I do not mind how strongly I express myself. I have repeated this for 5 years and I have nowhere seen anything to change my views, least of all in Europe.
I have mentioned some points above. You may not agree with my ideas but I write them down as these criticisms are the most normal ones I know. Other points in which the DTI wants to obtain information are:
You may expect a communication from Lt Col Wigham. Please give your views quite candidly. They certainly need not agree with those I have written down. I am sending Lt Col Wigham a copy of this letter so that it may give you something to refer to if necessary. I hope, from the army point of view, and for all that you have worked for and believed in during the last few years, that you will do everything you can to help Lt Col Wigham to obtain all the information that he requires. We can no longer say that people do not understand if we do not take this chance to get our views put before an impartial tribunal whose task it is to review them in the light of general policy, and then make recommendations to the CIGS. Send along any reports or documents you have got. Lt Col Wigham is thirsting for information.
[Mike Calvert]
Brigadier,
Commander,
SAS Troops
Sloe House,
Halstead, Essex.
12 Oct 45.
JMC/LGM.