The Mexican Revolution began in 1910 with an uprising led by Francisco I. Madero against longtime autocrat Porfirio Díaz. Several socialist, liberal, anarchist, populist, and agrarianist movements characterized the revolution, which changed over time from a revolt against the established order to a multi-sided civil war, The revolution created both heroes and villains throughout that bloody decade, among them a veritable caudillo of the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua.
José Doroteo Arango Arámbula, better known as Francisco “Pancho” Villa, came from the northern state of Durango. Villa with his army of Villistas joined the ranks of the Madero supporters. He led the Villistas in many battles, such as the attack of Ciudad Juárez in 1911 (which overthrew Porfirio Díaz and gave Madero a little power).
In 1911 Victoriano Huerta appointed Villa his chief military commander, but over the course of this appointment, Huerta and Villa became rivals. In 1912, when Villa’s men seized a horse and Villa decided to keep it for himself, Huerta ordered Villa’s execution for insubordination. Raúl Madero, brother of President Madero, intervened to save Villa’s life. Jailed in Mexico City, Villa escaped to the United States. Soon after the assassination of President Madero, Villa returned with a group of companions to fight Huerta, whose plotting had seen him ascend to the presidency. By 1913 the group had become Villa’s División del Norte (Northern Division), and included numerous American members. Villa and his army, along with fellow revolutionaries Venustiano Carranza and Álvaro Obregón, joined in resistance to the Huerta dictatorship.
Villa became provisional governor of the state of Chihuahua in 1914, and continued to receive international recognition: his tactics were studied by the United States Army and a contract with Hollywood was signed. By the terms of this agreement, Hollywood would be allowed to film Villa’s movements and fifty percent of the profit would be paid to Villa to support the revolution. As governor of Chihuahua, Villa raised more money for a drive to the south by printing his own currency. He decreed his paper money be traded and accepted at par with gold Mexican pesos, then forced the wealthy to give loans that would allow him to pay salaries to the army as well as supply them with food and clothes. He also took some of the land owned by the hacendados (owners of the haciendas) to give to the widows and family of dead revolutionaries. The forced loans would also support the war machinery of the Mexican Revolution. He confiscated gold from specific banks – in the case of the Banco Minero by holding hostage a member of the bank’s owning family, the extremely wealthy Terrazas clan, until the location of the bank’s hidden gold was revealed.
Villa’s political stature at that time was so high that banks in El Paso, Texas, accepted his paper pesos at face value. His generalship drew enough admiration from the US military that he and Obregón were invited to Fort Bliss to meet Brigadier General John J. Pershing (1860–1948). The new wealth was used to purchase draft animals, cavalry horses, arms, ammunition, mobile hospital facilities (railroad cars and horse ambulances staffed with Mexican and foreign volunteer doctors, known as servicio sanitario), and food, as well as to rebuild the railroad south of Chihuahua City. This railroad transported Villa’s troops and artillery south, where he defeated federal forces at Gómez Palacio, Torreón, and Zacatecas.
After Torreón, Carranza issued a puzzling order for Villa to break off action to the south and instead ordered him to divert to attack Saltillo, threatening to cut off Villa’s coal supply if he did not comply. Coal was needed for railroad locomotives to pull trains transporting soldiers and supplies, so this was widely seen as an attempt by Carranza to divert Villa from a direct assault on Mexico City, allowing Carranza’s forces under Álvaro Obregón, driving in from the west via Guadalajara, to take the capital first – and Obregón and Carranza did enter Mexico City ahead of Villa. This was an expensive and disruptive diversion for the División del Norte, since Villa’s enlisted men were paid the then enormous sum of a peso per day, and each day of delay cost thousands of pesos. Villa did attack Saltillo as ordered, winning that battle.
Villa, disgusted by what he saw as egoism, tendered his resignation. Felipe Ángeles, one of Villa’s chief advisors, and other members of his staff argued for Villa to withdraw his resignation, defy Carranza’s orders, and proceed to attack Zacatecas, a strategic mountainous city considered nearly impregnable. Zacatecas was the source of much of Mexico’s silver, and thus a supply of funds for whoever held it. Victory in Zacatecas would mean that Huerta’s chances of holding the remainder of the country would be slim. Villa accepted Ángeles’ advice, cancelled his resignation, and the División del Norte defeated the Federales in the Toma de Zacatecas (Taking of Zacatecas), the single bloodiest battle of the revolution, with the military forces counting approximately 7,000 dead and 5,000 wounded, and unknown numbers of civilian casualties. The loss of Zacatecas in June 1914 broke the back of the Huerta regime, and Huerta left for exile on July 15, 1914.
Huerta soon immediately plotted his return, however, traveling to Britain, then Spain, before returning to the States, landing in New York in 1915. He made contact with supporters in exile in the US as well as with German agents and plotted to cross back into Mexico to retake power. Arrested in Newman, New Mexico, on June 27, 1915, he was charged with conspiracy to violate US neutrality laws and held in the US Army prison at Fort Bliss under house arrest due to risk of flight to Mexico. Huerta was an alcoholic and while in captivity he drank himself to death, dying in early 1916 in El Paso, Texas.
Villa and Carranza had different goals. Because Villa wanted to continue the revolution, he became an enemy of Carranza. After Carranza took control in 1914, the revolutionary caudillos held a National Convention, which set rules for Mexico’s path toward democracy, and conducted a series of meetings in Aguascalientes. An interim president, Eulalio Gutierrez, was chosen; none of the armed revolutionaries were allowed to be nominated for government positions. Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa met at the convention, where Zapata told Villa he feared Carranza’s intentions were those of a dictator and not of a democratic president. True to Zapata’s prediction, Carranza decided to oppose the agreements of the National Convention, setting off a civil war. In the winter of 1914 Villa and Zapata’s troops entered and occupied Mexico City. Villa’s treatment of Gutiérrez and the citizenry outraged the more moderate elements of the population, who forced Villa from the city in early 1915.
The Conventionist forces under Pancho Villa were badly defeated by forces under the command of Álvaro Obregón, who supported the presidency of Venustiano Carranza, at the battle of Celaya Guanajuato on April 13, 1915. Villa lost around 4,000 men killed in frontal attacks and had also lost an additional 1,000 horses, 5,000 rifles, and 32 cannons. Approximately 6,000 of his men were taken prisoner. Of those captured, 120 of Villa’s officers were executed.
The Villistas were adept in fighting through rough conditions whether on foot or on horseback. They are armed with 7mm Mexican Model 1910 Mausers. (AdeQ Historical Archives)
Major battles and border raids during the Mexican Revolution
In this battle, Obregón developed a defense “in depth” that proved very effective against the offense-heavy cavalry charges and artillery techniques used at that time, and was based on his study of the trench conflict then raging in Europe. Although Obregón’s lines weakened at times, he had sufficient reserves to bolster it at any point. Villa had committed all his men to the attack and was unable to exploit any area of weakness or to protect his flanks, which were enveloped by Obregón’s cavalry.
The defending troops at Agua Prieta were led by Plutarco Calles and many of them were veterans who had already defeated Pancho Villa at the battle of Celaya earlier in the year. Calles, building on Álvaro Obregón’s experience at Celaya, had erected extensive fortifications around the city, with deep trenches, barbed wire, and numerous machine-gun nests. Additionally, President Wilson gave permission for Carranzista troops to cross through US territory in order for them to be able to quickly strengthen the garrison at Agua Prieta. About 3,500 fresh veteran troops traveled through Arizona and New Mexico and arrived in the town in early October, bringing the total number of defenders to 6500. Villa was completely unaware of this development; according to the American correspondent and friend of Villa, John W. Roberts, Villa believed the town was defended by only 1200 soldiers.
Villa arrived at Agua Prieta on October 30, 1915, where, while giving his men a day of rest, he finally learned that the US had recognized Carranza, but not that they had also permitted his forces to cross American territory to strengthen the defenses of the town. As a result, Villa still believed that a swift cavalry charge, carried under the cover of darkness, was capable of capturing the city in one stroke. His staff officers believed that the town would be captured within five hours.
The next day Villa began his attack with an artillery barrage in the early afternoon, which only managed to detonate some of the land mines around the town that had been placed there by the Carranzistas. Once darkness had fallen he made some feints at various locations in order to hide the direction of his main attack. Shortly after midnight on November 2, he launched his frontal assaults from the east and south of Agua Prieta.
As the Villista cavalry was charging toward the trenches, however, two searchlights illuminated the battlefield, making the horsemen an easy target for Calles’ machine guns. The front trenches were manned by units led by another future president of Mexico, Colonel Lázaro Cárdenas. Villa’s horsemen were decimated by machine-gun fire and land mines, the few that managed to make it near the trenches encountering electrified barbed wire. The charge collapsed and the attack was a failure.
Pancho Villa wanted to continue with the cavalry charges on the following day; his troops, however, were ready to mutiny. He was also running low on supplies and ammunition. As a result, Villa withdrew and arrived at Naco, Sonora, on November 4. Even though there his men were given rest, and supplies were acquired, more than 1,500 deserted from his army.
After resting his troops at Naco, Villa gathered up the remainder of his forces and attacked the town of Hermosillo, Sonora, on November 21, 1915. In order to try to restore the morale of his troops, Pancho promised them that after they took the city they could do whatever they wanted with the town and its inhabitants. This actually ended up causing the attack to fail, as his men almost immediately turned to looting and rape rather than fighting, which allowed the defending forces to reorganize and drive the Villistas out. Thereby, Villa’s dominance in northern Mexico was broken in 1915 with the series of defeats he suffered at Celaya and Agua Prieta at the hands of Álvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles.
Pancho Villa’s División del Norte initially began as 375 vaqueros, farmers, servants, orderlies, and rural peons who took up arms against the Mexican government. The men were originally organized into “columns” by Villa but as he gained combat field experience and as his army increased, more conventional units evolved. A total strength of 1,800 infantry, 2,800 cavalry, and 500 artillerymen with 36 guns existed in 1911. The following year the division was reorganized into three cavalry and four infantry brigades. By 1914 Villa’s force included 40,000 men in 11 brigades with 60 guns in two regiments – effectively a corps-sized formation.
The División del Norte even had trains and an air arm. In March 1915 Villa’s brother Hipolito arranged with Jack Berger, an entrepreneur who operated a traveling flying show, to supply Villa with planes and pilots. Berger purchased two airplanes from the Wright Factory – a Model B and a Model HS. They assembled the smaller Model B in Juarez, but before it could get off the ground a strong gust of wind blew it to pieces, injuring its pilot. The larger Model HS was hauled by train to Villa’s headquarters in Monterrey. The train was painted a vivid green, and the name on the side of the cars read “Aviation Division of the North.” Several test flights were made for Villa, who always came to watch but never went up. He did send an officer along though, in case the pilot decided to defect to Carranza. The plane’s first mission, piloted by Howard Rinehart, was to carry orders to a regiment 50 miles to the south. On landing, he came under fire from Villa’s own troops. The final mission for Rinehart was a message to troops in Matamoros. Rinehart later deserted from Villa’s army and returned to Ohio. Americans mostly manned Villa’s primitive air force. These pilots were ex-barnstormers and just as colorful as their comrades on the ground. They had names like Micky McQuire, Wild Bill Heath, and Farnum T. Fish.
Villa’s defeats at the hands of his former allies destroyed his army in 1915 and by the following year only about 2,000 Villistas remained within the ranks. Villa briefly tried to rebuild his army using anti-American sentiments and Pershing’s expedition as a rallying point but he was never able to gain the numbers he once had and his army melted away into the northern Mexican desert plains.
Villistas fighting in the streets of a northern Mexican town during the Mexican Revolution. A similar scene would have occurred in the streets of Columbus during that fateful morning of March 9, 1916. (AdeQ Historical Archives)
During this period Villa created an elite unit within the División del Norte. The Dorados, or the “Golden Ones,” began life as a cavalry unit in late 1913 or early 1914. The unit provided him with an elite bodyguard throughout his military career and fought as shock troops in his battles. The Dorados were organized into three squadrons of 100 men, each man being provided with a rifle, two pistols, and two good horses. Many of the soldiers added gold trim to their hats as recognition of their elite status and in 1915 rode to their deaths against machine guns and artillery. By 1916 only about 50 were still in the saddle, including Julio Cárdenas, and those surviving Dorados remained loyal to Villa when he “retired.”
The revolution continued as in the United States a new American president, Woodrow Wilson, took office. Like its predecessor, the Wilson administration now faced the task of choosing a side in the ongoing Mexican Revolution. Wilson and his administration refused to recognize Huerta, because of the corrupt manner in which he had seized power, and it instituted an arms embargo on both sides of the civil war.
When Huerta’s forces appeared to be winning the civil war in early 1914, Wilson lifted the embargo by offering to help Carranza. This action had volatile consequences. For several months, US Navy warships had been stationed at the ports of Tampico (under the command of Rear Adm. Henry T. Mayo) and Veracruz (under Rear Adm. Frank R. Fletcher’s command) to protect American and other foreign interests associated with the rich oil fields in the area. On April 9, a group of sailors detached from the USS Dolphin went ashore at Tampico to retrieve supplies; Huerta’s troops arrested and detained two of them. The sailors were released a short time later, and President Huerta offered an apology to the United States for the incident. Ultimately, Admiral Mayo demanded a 21-gun salute to the US flag in addition to the apology. Huerta agreed only if the Americans would return the honor. When learning of the incident, an infuriated President Wilson refused Huerta’s request Instead, he ordered the US Navy’s Atlantic Fleet to Mexico’s Gulf Coast to strengthen the forces under Mayo and Fletcher and occupy Tampico. Another crisis festering down the coast in Veracruz, however, prevented American troops from occupying the city, and the Tampico incident came to an end with no real conclusion.
Pancho Villa and his “Army of the North” on the move during the Mexican Revolution. (AdeQ Historical Archives)
The US consul’s office in Veracruz had been warned that a German ship, the Ypiranga, delivering arms and military equipment for Huerta, was expected in the port on April 21, 1914. On the afternoon of 21 April, following orders from President Wilson, a contingent of 787 marines and sailors quickly went ashore and seized the customs house. By noon the following day, the US troops had occupied the town. Although they had hoped to avoid bloodshed, American forces were fired upon by Mexican soldiers and naval cadets, and a violent street battle ensued. The American losses were four killed and 20 wounded on 21 April, and 13 killed and 41 wounded on April 22. There is no accurate casualty number for the Mexican troops but it was reported by several sources that between 152 and 172 were killed and between 195 and 250 wounded. The German ship in question was diverted to another port and Huerta received the arms shipment after all.
On April 30, 1914, the US Army’s Fifth Infantry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Frederick Funston, arrived at Veracruz. The brigade assumed occupation duty from the marines and also organized a military government to restore order to the city. President Huerta never officially recognized the US occupiers but he made no serious attempts to resist their power. On July 15, 1914 Huerta resigned from the office of President and moved to Spain; American troops stayed on after his departure. That summer US military officers worked with the constitutionalist faction among the Mexican revolutionary forces in Veracruz, establishing a joint administration of the customs house and warehouse area. Between November 19 and 23, as the first American troops were leaving, US officers supervised the unloading from five ships of military materials, which filled the warehouses and piers. The Fifth Infantry Brigade left Veracruz on November 23, and the US government agreed that Carranza and his de facto government could use the city as their capital. Two months later, in their last act, the US officers turned over the warehouse keys to the constitutionalist leaders. When the forces of Venustiano Carranza marched out of Veracruz to defeat the other revolutionary factions, they carried a wide array of US-supplied arms.
When US agents discovered that the German merchant ship Ypiranga was illegally carrying arms to the dictator Huerta, President Wilson ordered troops to the port of Veracruz to stop the ship from docking. The US did not declare war on Mexico but troops carried out a skirmish against Huerta’s forces in Veracruz. The Ypiranga managed to dock at another port, which infuriated Wilson. On April 9, 1914, Mexican officials in the port of Tampico, Tamaulipas arrested a group of US sailors, including at least one taken from on board his ship and thus from US territory. After Mexico failed to apologize in the terms that the America had demanded, the US Navy bombarded the port of Veracruz and occupied the state for seven months. (AdeQ Historical Archives)
The German drive to exert military influence in Mexico appears to have begun in 1900 with the arrival of Minister Edmund Freiherr von Heyking. Under Porfirio Díaz, the government was anxious to build a powerful Mexican army and to restrain the United States’ influence, while the Germans were obviously only too glad to play one nation off against another and to gain what advantage they could in the process.
Carranza maintained Mexican neutrality throughout World War I. He briefly considered allying with the German Empire after German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann sent Mexico the famous Zimmermann Telegram in January 1917, inviting Mexico to enter the war on the German side. Zimmermann promised Mexico German aid in recapturing territory lost to the United States during the Mexican–American War, specifically the states of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. Carranza assigned a general to study the possibility of recapturing this territory from the US, but ultimately concluded that it was not feasible.
Carranzistas, with a mixture of Mexican and American uniforms, equipment, and arms. The United States lent indirect support to the Carranzistas during the Mexican Revolution but relations between the two countries soured with Villista border excursions and the subsequent Punitive Expedition. (AdeQ Historical Archives)
This did not prevent Carranza accepting money and arms, or permitting German officers and soldiers serving as advisers of a German military mission to Mexico. An article in the New York Times, dated March 10, 1917, speculated on the number of German soldiers in Mexico:
As to the number of German army men in Mexico, it was said yesterday that there are at least 6,000 Germans in various parts of Mexico who are “available for service if needed.” Among them is Robert Fay, an officer of the German Army and a one-time plotter in New York, who escaped from the Atlanta Penitentiary last August. Fay was serving a sentence for plotting the destruction of munitions ships at sea. One of the men associated with him in that plot, also a German army officer, is also in Mexico, according to the Federal Authorities.
From New York City alone it is estimated that at least 2,000 Germans have gone to Mexico since the dismissal of Count von Bernstorff, and practically all of these men are said to be reserves “available for service if needed.” The Germans in Mexico City are said to have formed a military organization, the frame work of which was prepared by Captain von Papen in the last days of the Huerta regime in June 1914.
Known German agents and officials had been known to be working in other parts of Mexico during the Revolution, such as Torreon, Juarez, Chihuahua, and Parral. One of these officials was believed to have instigated one of the Orozco uprisings. The role of these Germans in Mexico would eventually lead to conflicts with American troops across the border.
There were rumors that Villa may have been partially financed by the German imperial government, and some of his military actions were explicitly designed to aid the Kaiser’s cause. Felix A. Sommerfeld, described by German historian Friedrich Katz as “one of the most interesting members of the shadowy army of agents, double agents, and lobbyists who swarmed like locusts over Mexico once the revolution had begun,” was a con man. Though he’d fought against the revolutionary Boxers in China, he came to Mexico and convinced Madero that he was a revolutionary democrat. Meanwhile he was establishing close relations with the German government and certain US business interests. These interests were represented by a crooked lobbyist named Sherbourne Hopkins, who was closely allied with Carranza. Sherbourne befriended Sommerfeld, gave him money, and told him to go to Mexico to work with Carranza. The silver-tongued Sommerfeld completely won Carranza’s trust, and was given the assignment to spy on Villa at Chihuahua. This he did, but not for Carranza; all information on Villa went to the German government. In addition, he ingratiated himself with Villa, who gave him an exclusive concession to import dynamite for his forces. For this, Sommerfeld received a commission of $5,000 a month. In late 1915 (a few months before the attack on Columbus) the US Justice Department ascertained that $340,000 had been paid into Sommerfeld’s bank account in St. Louis. The money came from a German government account in New York. When these transactions came to light, Sommerfeld closed the account. Following the money trail, treasury agents learned it had been paid to the Western Cartridge Company, the arms suppliers for Villa. When confronted by agents of the Justice Department, Sommerfeld insisted that he had severed all relations with Villa after the US recognized Carranza, and sent Villa a telegram protesting the massacre of the 16 mining engineers. Yet he was unable to explain why $340,000 deposited in his account by the German government had ended up in the hands of Villa’s arms supplier. Also, according to Carranza’s agents in the US, Sommerfeld continued to buy arms for Villa even after his interrogation by the Justice Department. As is often the case, who was using whom?
German intrigues in Mexico escalated throughout the years of the revolution as a means of distracting the United States and preventing the Americans from entering World War I. (AdeQ Historical Archives)
Pancho Villa was a revolutionary, and the fact that he may have received arms and financial aid from the Germans doesn’t mean he embraced Kaiserism. The dominant Carranza–Obregón forces, and the now hostile United States, placed Pancho Villa between a rock and a hard place, so this time he didn’t turn down help. Earlier, the German consul in Torreon, which Villa had captured, gave a lavish banquet for him and urged him to march on the Tampico oil fields. With the capture of Tampico, German ships would land in the port and bring him money and arms. Villa appeared to consider the offer, but then changed his mind and marched on Chihuahua. His eventual acceptance of their help was not that Pancho was a German agent, but rather a man engaged in the old game of playing both ends against the middle.
After years of public and documented support for Villa’s fight, the United States, following the diplomatic policies of Woodrow Wilson, who believed that supporting Carranza was the best way to expedite the establishment of a stable Mexican government, refused to allow more arms to be supplied to Villa’s army, and allowed Carranza’s troops to be relocated over US railroads. Villa felt betrayed by the Americans. He was further enraged by Obregón’s use of searchlights, powered by American electricity, to help repel a Villista night attack on the border town of Agua Prieta.
While most sources state that the searchlights that illuminated the battlefield for Calles’ machine guns were on the Mexican side of the border, Villa strongly believed that they were on the American side. Additionally, concerned about bullets and artillery shells falling over the border and the possibility of the fighting spilling to the American side, General Frederick Funston stationed three infantry regiments, some cavalry and one regiment of artillery in the cross-border town of Douglas, Arizona. While the American troops in the end did not take part in the fighting, their nearby presence would later lead Villa to believe that the Americans provided Carranza’s forces with crucial logistical support, which contributed to his growing anti-Americanism. Villa’s belief led him to change his attitude toward the United States. Previously, while engaging in an occasional border raid for supplies, Villa considered himself a friend of the Americans; now he wanted revenge for what he regarded as their treachery.
In January 1916 a group of Villistas attacked a train on the Mexico North Western Railway, near Santa Isabel, Chihuahua, and killed several American employees of ASARCO (American Smelting and Refining Company). The passengers included 18 Americans, 15 of whom worked for ASARCO. There was only one survivor, who gave the details to the press. Villa admitted to ordering the attack, but denied that he had authorized the shedding of American blood.
At Los Tanques on January 18, 1916, Villa and his 200 men, many of whom were comrades from his Dorado elite guard, congregated to discuss upcoming campaigns. Because Villa’s army had regained some of its strength and Carranza’s stronghold over Mexico appeared to be increasing, Villa informed his men that the moment to attack the Americans had come. However, Villa’s initial expedition plans were not geared toward attacking Columbus, New Mexico, but rather the small American town of Presidio across the Rio Grande from Ojinaga in Texas. This is peculiar because Presidio was one of the most destitute and impoverished towns in the United States. The Villistas clearly could not expect to acquire a large quantity of goods or supplies in such a town, but this was true for the majority of the small border towns in Texas. Nonetheless, the anticipated expedition to the Ojinaga region failed due to an unprecedented and highly unexpected degree of desertion. Consequently, Villa’s strategies and approach changed drastically in the following weeks.1
Mounted watchmen of the US Immigration Service patrolled the border in an effort to prevent illegal crossings as early as 1904, but their efforts were irregular and undertaken only when resources permitted. The inspectors, usually called Mounted Guards, operated out of El Paso, Texas. Though they never totaled more than 75, they patrolled as far west as California, trying to restrict the flow of illegal Chinese immigration.
In March 1915 Congress authorized a separate group of Mounted Guards, often referred to as Mounted Inspectors. Most rode on horseback but a few operated cars and even boats. Although these inspectors had broader arrest authority, they still largely pursued Chinese immigrants trying to avoid the Chinese exclusion laws. These patrolmen were Immigrant Inspectors, assigned to inspection stations, and could not watch the border at all times. Military troops along the southwest border performed intermittent border patrolling, but this was secondary to “the more serious work of military training.” Illegal aliens encountered in the US by the military were directed to the immigration inspection stations. Texas Rangers were also sporadically assigned to patrol duties by the state, and their efforts were noted as “singularly effective.”
Throughout 1915 Mexican insurgents raided the Texas border region as part of the Plan de San Diego. Supported by the Mexican Carranza government, a group of raiders known as the Seditionists attacked American military and commercial interests along the US–Mexican border in an effort to provoke a race war in the Southwestern United States with aims of returning the area to Mexican control. Charged with guarding the border, American General Frederick Funston had 20,000 troops to pit against the few hundred Seditionist insurgents. Nonetheless, the Mexicans never raided in force and the long border was difficult for Funston to fully protect. The Seditionist raids became such a threat to the Americans in the Big Bend area that local vigilante groups were formed in order to repel the Mexican raiders, as Funston did not have enough troops to ensure the safety of the American citizens living in the area.
A cavalryman displaying his kit prior to riding out on patrol somewhere along the US–Mexican Border. Barely visible is the scabbard tip for the Model 1913 Cavalry Saber. The saber was designed by 2nd Lieutenant (later General) George S. Patton in 1913, when he was Master of the Sword at the Mounted Service School, and is commonly referred to as the Patton Saber. (AdeQ Historical Archives)
In order to protect the Big Bend region, the United States deployed a number of US Cavalry and Signal Corps personnel in various posts along the Texas border. One of these posts was at the village of Ojo de Agua, which had been raided on September 3, 1915 and was the planned target of a Seditionist raid in October 1916. The American base at Ojo de Agua under the command of Sergeant Ernest Schaeffer consisted of a radio station manned by approximately ten men from Troop G, 3rd Cavalry and eight men of the United States Army Signal Corps. The post at Ojo de Agua was lightly defended and seemed to be little match for the 25–100 raiders that planned to raid the village.
After crossing the Rio Grande and arriving at Ojo de Agua at approximately 1a.m., the Mexican raiders attacked the village’s garrison. The American soldiers who had been sleeping in a wooden building stubbornly resisted. The Americans were heavily outgunned though, as the Signal Corps personnel were armed only with pistols. In the fighting Sergeant Schaeffer was killed, and as a result command devolved to Sergeant First Class Herbert Reeves Smith who by that time had also been wounded three times. In addition to attacking the garrison, the raiders robbed the post office and attacked the home of the Dillard family, setting their house on fire and stealing their livestock.
Although the Americans at Ojo de Agua were unable to call for reinforcements due to the fact that their wireless station had been knocked out of action earlier in the attack, other American detachments in the vicinity heard gunfire and two groups of American cavalry set out to investigate. A company from the 3rd Cavalry under Captain Frank Ross McCoy at Mission, Texas, some 8 miles from Ojo de Agua was dispatched, as was a small group of 12 recruits under Captain W. J. Scott. As Scott’s outfit was only 2 miles from the fighting, they arrived at the scene well before McCoy did and immediately attacked from the west of the raiders’ positions, driving them off from their assault on the mission. McCoy’s force arrived just as the Mexicans withdrew and saw little or no fighting.
By the end of the raid one civilian and three American soldiers had been killed, including the Ojo de Agua post’s commanding officer, Sergeant Schaffer, and eight wounded. The Seditionists also took several casualties, with five men dead and at least nine others wounded, of whom two later died. A Japanese man was found among the dead, as were two Carranzistas soldiers, a fact which was seen as evidence that the Carranzistas had been supporting the Plan de San Diego. The American soldiers were commended for their bravery during the raid, and Sergeant First Class Reeves was awarded a Distinguished Service Cross for his actions during the engagement.
The Seditionist raid on Ojo de Agua had a vast impact on American military strategy in the area. The severity of the raid led the commanding American general in the region, General Frederick Funston, to reinforce the Texas–Mexico border region with troops and to contact Washington with demands that he be allowed to give no quarter to any Mexican raiders who attacked the United States in the future. Although Washington denied General Funston his request, the raids did come to an end when Washington finally gave diplomatic recognition to the Mexican government under Carranza. Wishing to maintain good relations with the American government, Carranza ordered the Seditionist commanders to cease their raiding activities. Without support from the Mexican federal government the Plan de San Diego movement fell apart and there were no further Mexican invasions of the United States until the Villista raids began in 1916.
1 Frederick Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho Villa, p.560