CHAPTER 7

Forts Henry and Donelson

ON MAY 7, 1861, the state of Tennessee withdrew from the Union and joined the Confederacy. Southern leaders hoped Kentucky would follow Tennessee’s example, which would provide the Confederates a formidable northern boundary on the Ohio River. Kentucky did not follow Tennessee’s lead, but remained as a border state. Thus, Southern leaders were forced to defend the Tennessee border. This was a challenge for the Confederacy since the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland Rivers crossed this state border, and each allowed an opportunity for Union invasion. The Southern strategy of defending its borders required controlling these major transportation routes and keeping them out of Union hands.

Governor Isham Harris of Tennessee took the challenge head-on, directing engineers to select the best locations for forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers that were north of railroad crossings and south of the Kentucky state line. This resulted in the construction of Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River atop a high bluff near Dover, Tennessee. A greater challenge was finding a location for a fort on the Tennessee River. The engineers settled on a site for Fort Henry, but it was subject to being flooded by the Tennessee River. Another defensive work, Fort Heiman, was also built to strengthen this area, but it was on the high ground across the Tennessee River from Fort Henry.

Grant recognized these forts as the key to the enemy heartland and he was anxious to attack them. Yet, the infantry could not operate against the forts without naval support. So Grant communicated with Fleet Officer Andrew H. Foote, commander of a fleet of new ironclad river gunboats called the Mississippi River Squadron. Together they sought permission from the Union commander of the Western Department, General Henry W. Halleck, to first attack Fort Henry. General Grant was initially rebuffed, but when the request was reiterated with Foote’s recommendation, Halleck agreed on January 30, 1862, and Grant began ferrying his troops to a spot just north of Fort Henry. By February 6, General Grant had his force of two divisions, about 15,000 men, and Foote’s gunboats in place and ready to attack.

Five days later Grant’s soldiers began their march across the twelve miles to Fort Donelson. Grant divided his army and sent Brigadier General C. F. Smith’s division on the west bank to attack Fort Heiman while Brigadier General John McClernand’s division moved along the east bank to Fort Henry. Foote’s fleet of seven gunboats made up the third prong of the Union attack. Foote took advantage of an elevated water level and used a chute around the west side of Panther Island, which was below Fort Henry in the Middle of the Tennessee River. This allowed the gunboats to get closer to the fort without being fired on by the Confederate artillery. The gunboats emerged from the chute and lined up in battle formation, keeping their bows turned toward the fort, and they opened a tremendous fire. Fort Henry respnded with its eleven heavy guns, but the bow guns of the Union gunboats had more firepower than the fort could match. This, along with the poor position of Fort Henry, gave Foote’s gunboats the advantage. Foote pressed in close to the fort, silencing seven of the eleven heavy Confederate guns, one of which exploded during the battle, killing most of the crew.

But the gunboats did not come away unscathed. The Essex took a round in her boiler, sending scalding steam through the boat. Many sailors jumped overboard to avoid being scalded to death. Several others did not have the chance to jump and were found dead at their posts. The damage sustained by the Cincinnati was extensive enough that repairs could not be made in time to participate in the later Fort Donelson battle.

Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman, commanding the Confederate forces at Fort Henry, decided further resistance was futile and ordered a white flag to be raised. The Union Navy had captured the fort while the army, delayed by swollen streams and muddy roads, was still trying to make its way to the battlefield. The Tennessee River was now open to the Union. Less than a hundred of the Confederates at Fort Henry surrendered, including the garrison commander Tilghman; the remainder, about 2500, escaped to Fort Donelson, twelve miles away on the Cumberland River. The Union ironclad gunboats returned from the battle to Cairo, Illinois, with instructions to hasten repairs before steaming down the Cumberland River to attack Donelson.

With the surrender of Fort Henry Grant now had his first clear victory, but in reality it was the navy who won the day. Foote was the clear hero thus far in the operation. Still it was Grant’s initiative that set the campaign in motion and this would be his trademark for the remainder of the war. He wanted to take this initiative and capture Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River in the same manner. So on February 6 Grant telegraphed Halleck with news of Henry’s surrender and optimistically told him “I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry.”¹

Grant’s quick plan to capture Donelson was not going to happen. First, Foote was not at hand. He had returned to Illinois for repairs to his gunboats and would not be back on the Cumberland for at least a few days. It was not until February 12 that Grant advanced toward Donelson. Despite this delay he still believed that an easy victory awaited him, even though Union intelligence indicated that the Confederate garrison was more heavily fortified than Henry.

Unlike the heavy rain they faced at Henry, Grant’s men marched toward Donelson in spring-like weather, causing many of the soldiers to discard their overcoats and blankets. That was a horrible mistake because on the night of February 12 a winter storm brought cold temperatures and snow. The following day Grant deployed his two divisions, placing Smith on the left and McClernand on the right. Another division, under Brigadier General Lew Wallace, who later became famous as the author of Ben Hur, was placed in the center.

February 14 began as a quiet, cold day for the Confederate troops guarding Donelson. That quickly changed in the afternoon when Foote’s gunboat fleet, now consisting of the ironclads St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Louisville, and Carondelet, along with the timberclads Conestoga and Tyler, reached the fort via the Tennessee and Ohio Rivers. Suddenly the earth shook as the Union vessels commenced a duel with twelve large Confederate guns that lined the river.

The ironclads moved into battle formation, four abreast with their bows pointed toward the fort, to open fire. They would have to run a gauntlet through a narrow one-and-a-half channel to reach Fort Donelson. The Confederates were ready and returned fire with their two largest cannons, a ten-inch Columbiad and a six-and-one-half-inch rifle. The gunboats continued to close the distance to the fort. Once the boats had pressed to eight hundred yards, they came under the fire of seven thirty-two-pounders. Fort Donelson was built on much higher ground than Fort Henry. So the closer the gunboats came to the fort, the more the Union gunners had to elevate their gun muzzles while, at the same time, it was easier for the defending Confederates to shoot down on them. As a result, the nearer the boats got, the more the Union aim deteriorated while the Confederate aim improved.

The Confederate command at Fort Donelson was surprised at events thus far. No one had expressed much confidence that an earthen fort could hold on against ironclad boats. Still, the question for the Confederates was, how much longer could they hold out? Halleck, concerned that Grant’s position on the Tennessee River was weak, began sending him reinforcements. Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston, believing Fort Donelson would fall to the gunboats as Fort Henry had done, felt that his army’s position at Bowling Green, Kentucky, was threatened. Johnston’s forces faced Union General Don C. Buell’s army north of Bowling Green. If Grant brought his army up the Cumberland River to Nashville, Tennessee, General Johnston would find himself trapped between the two Union armies.

Johnston decided to reinforce Fort Donelson to delay Grant and cover his own retreat from Bowling Green to Nashville. He summoned about twelve thousand men, including Generals John B. Floyd, Gideon Pillow, Simon B. Buckner, and Bushrod Johnson, from southern Kentucky and northern Tennessee. These men pressed forward to strengthen Fort Donelson. The Confederates mounted heavy guns in the water batteries, built and extended earthworks, and cut trees to open fields of fire. But they made no effort to hamper, harass, or delay Grant as he prepared to move against Fort Donelson.

Grant was hoping the ironclad gunboats would be as successful at Fort Donelson as they had been at Fort Henry. If the gunboats could silence the fort and steam past, Fort Donelson would be surrounded without hope of reinforcement or supplies. Time would then force the Confederates to surrender.

The gunboats continued to press to within four hundred yards of the fort. A solid shot entered the pilothouse of the flagship St. Louis, killing the pilot, damaging the wheel, and wounding Flag Officer Foote. The St. Louis became difficult to steer and began to fall back. The Louisville began to fall back after receiving several shots and having its tiller cables cut. The Pittsburgh had received two rounds in the bow “between wind and water,” meaning the rounds went under the armor and penetrated the wooden hull. It was taking on more water than the pumps could pump out. The bow guns were run back and repair parties went to work to slow the water leaking into the vessel. These measures saved the gunboat from sinking, but it, too, had to retire. This left the Carondelet alone to face the heavy batteries. Every cannon trained on the single boat and forced it to fall back with the remainder of the fleet. The gunboat attack had failed. The hills and hollows surrounding Fort Donelson echoed with Confederate shouts of victory.

This news sent shock waves through the Union army. Grant began to contemplate siege, but Confederate generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner would not give him the chance. After celebrating the victory against the gunboats, they took a long, hard look at their situation. The Confederate forces were spread out evenly around the two and a half miles of outer earthworks. Simon Buckner was in command of the Confederate right while Bushrod Johnson was in command of the Confederate left. Pillow had been in overall command of the fort until the arrival of Major General John B. Floyd on February 13. The Confederate generals realized that, while they had defeated the gunboats, they were still surrounded by a superior force whose numbers had been growing while their numbers had not.

They had all been sent to Fort Donelson by Johnston to delay Grant and to cover Johnston’s withdrawal from Bowling Green. Additional instructions were to remove the army from the fort and join General Johnston in Nashville. The Confederate generals agreed the time had come to act. They decided on a plan to break through the Union lines and take their army out to Nashville using two roads on the Confederate left wing. The plan called for Pillow to take command of Johnson’s division and to mass them on the extreme left of the Confederate lines. Confederate Colonel Adolphus Heiman’s brigade would hold its position in the Confederate center. Buckner’s division would move into the gap between Heiman’s brigade and Pillow’s division. This would place most of the Confederate army on the left wing and almost nobody on the right.

Pillow’s division was to launch the attack against the Union right, and once the Union right was turned and being forced back around the earthworks, Buckner’s division would join the attack. Once the roads were open, the retreat to Nashville could take place. At daybreak on February 15, Pillow’s division hit the Union right hard, under the command of McClernand. This massed and determined attack began to turn the Union right and forced them back along the roads used to surround Fort Donelson.

McClernand realized he was in trouble and sent word to the other division commanders and to Grant requesting help. Grant had not anticipated this action from the Confederates. He had left his headquarters before daylight and traveled several miles downstream to inspect the gunboats. The only instructions he left to his division commanders were to hold their positions and not to bring on a general engagement. Instead, the Confederate generals had brought the engagement to the Union army. During Grant’s absence, no one was there to make a decision. This confusion helped the Confederates, and the Union right continued to give way. Lew Wallace, commanding the Union center, eventually decided that if he were going to hold his position, he would have to help McClernand hold the right wing. C. F. Smith, commande-ing the Union left, also sent one brigade to help McClernand. By midafternoon, McClernand’s division had been pushed off the battlefield and was trying to reform while Wallace’s division and a brigade from Smith’s division had crossed Indian Creek and moved into position to block the Confederate attack. This Union position was well beyond the River and Forge Roads, which meant that those roads were open to the Confederates as escape routes to Nashville.

The Confederate attack seemed to stall, and there was a lull on the battlefield. Buckner ordered additional infantry regiments and artillery forward to strengthen his position. He intended to press the attack or hold his position so that the rest of the Confederate army could escape while his division served as a rear guard. Pillow sent a telegram to Johnston in Nashville announcing that “the day is ours” and sent orders directing Buckner and all Confederate forces to withdraw inside the earthworks, which was very confusing to Buckner. He questioned the order because he did not see the reason to give up all the area they had fought for and won that day. Pillow reiterated his original order, and Buckner reluctantly began to comply. Confederate General John Floyd arrived and asked why Buckner was moving back inside the earthworks. After Buckner expressed his disagreement with Pillow’s order, Floyd conferred with Pillow. Ultimately the Confederate command decided to pull back inside the earthworks.

While the Confederate generals were debating about what actions they should take, Grant arrived on the battlefield. He found confusion among some of the Union forces; men wandered around with empty cartridge boxes while wagons of ammunition stood nearby. Captured Confederate soldiers with knapsacks and bedrolls had caused fear that the Confederates were prepared to fight the Union army back to Fort Henry. Grant realized that the Confederates in Fort Donelson were trying to escape, and he issued orders to get the regiments back into line and properly equipped with ammunition. He told Wallace and McClernand to retake the area lost during the morning attack. He also believed that, for the Confederates to have hit him so hard in one place, they must have weakened their line somewhere else. He rode off to order Smith to attack the Confederate right wing. As he rode, he yelled to the men to rally and not to let the enemy escape, and the men responded well.

Upon receiving orders to attack the fortifications in front of his division, Smith moved his forces down the ridge and formed for battle at the bottom of the Confederate-occupied hill. He gave his men an “inspirational” talk, saying that they had volunteered to die and that now was their chance. He placed his hat on his saber and, while mounted on a white horse, led the advance up the hill. There were very few Confederate forces at the top of the hill to greet them, and Smith’s division easily captured the right wing of the earthworks. The Confederates fell back to the next ridge to regroup. Buckner’s division arrived in time to hold this ridge against the attacking Union soldiers. The Union forces fell back, and the lateness of the hour prevented further attacks. The long, bloody day closed with the Confederates back inside the works on their left and with the works on their right firmly held by the Union Army. Through indecision and debate, the Confederate generals had missed their opportunity to evacuate, while the decisiveness and leadership of Grant had preserved the Union position.

At sunup on February 16, 1862, Union and Confederate soldiers alike were surprised to see white flags flying over the Confederate works. Buckner sent a message to Grant proposing an armistice while terms of surrender could be discussed. Grant sent back the ultimatum that would make him famous: “No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.” Buckner accepted what he named “ungenerous and unchivalrous terms.”

The battle count for both sides was 4,332 casualties. The Confederacy abandoned southern Kentucky and most of Middle and West Tennessee. The Union army had control of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. The Union had a base with a river and rail network that allowed a huge influx of the men and materials necessary to conquer the South.

Grant and Buckner met at the Dover Hotel, site of Buckner’s headquarters, to formalize the surrender. It must have been awkward for both, since Grant had once turned to Buckner for financial help after leaving the army. During the next few days, approximately 13,500 Confederate prisoners began their trips to prison camps and an uncertain future. Northern newspapers reporting the events dubbed the Union commander U. S. “Unconditional Surrender” Grant. He wrote Julia after the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson. “These terrible battles are very good things to read about for a person who lost no friends, but I am decidedly in favor of having as little of them as possible. The way to avoid it is to push forward as vigorously as possible.”²

It was also during this time that Grant acquired a fondness for cigars. He would later say it was strictly by accident, stemming from Admiral Foote’s invitation aboard his flagship to meet where he offered the general a cigar. Grant smoked it on his way back to his headquarters when he was met by a staff officer who, as Grant wrote:

announced that the enemy were making a vigorous attack. I galloped forward at once, and while riding among the troops giving directions for repulsing the assault I carried the cigar in my hand. It had gone out, but it seems that I continued to hold the stump between my fingers throughout the battle. In the accounts published in the papers I was represented as smoking a cigar in the midst of the conflict; and many persons, thinking, no doubt, that tobacco was my chief solace, sent me boxes of the choicest brands from everywhere in the North. As many as ten thousand were soon received. I gave away all I could get rid of, but having such a quantity on hand, I naturally smoked more than I would have done under ordinary circumstances, and have continued the habit ever since.³

Despite the glorious victories at Forts Henry and Donelson, an incident occurred afterward that almost cost Grant his command. Grant wanted to remain on the offensive and wired Halleck that he intended to continue the Tennessee Campaign by taking Clarksville and Nashville unless he was told otherwise. Not receiving a response from Halleck by February 21, Grant assumed he was in the clear. Therefore, he sent Smith to Clarksville, which had been abandoned by the Confederates, and then sent reinforcements to Buell, who was moving against Nashville. Grant shortly learned that this city was also deserted and went there as well. Still, he had received no word from Halleck. In reality Halleck was trying to contact Grant. Neither of them knew that a Confederate telegrapher was creating havoc in Cairo with the communication lines.

It was not until the first week of March that Grant finally heard from Halleck. One telegram ordered him back to Fort Henry to prepare for a major expedition up the Tennessee River toward Mississippi. But then Grant received a startling telegram from Halleck: “You will place Maj. Gen. C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command.”⁴ Halleck’s anger focused on Grant’s failure to send reports to his superior, but Grant was not aware that he was required to send them. Halleck needed to hear from Grant so he could report troop strength to General in Chief George B. McClellan. Halleck was requesting reinforcements, and before McClellan would send them, he needed to know how many men were already in the field. Halleck could not provide such information.

When McClellan learned this, he ordered Halleck to arrest or relieve Grant. Halleck refused, but ordered Grant to remain at Fort Henry and relinquish his command of his field army to Smith just as they were preparing to advance up the Tennessee River. Smith and Grant knew each other at West Point when the former was commandant of cadets, as well as during the Mexican War, where he led a light battalion with distinction.

Grant, among other officers, felt that Smith was more than capable to take over command, but it seemed odd to him that the accusations were being thrown at him after his recent success. Halleck relented, and Grant was restored to command on March 11, 1862. By the time Grant returned to his field command, Smith was ill and died a month later.

Grant explained the situation to Julia in a very defensive tone:

All the slander you have seen against me originated from where I was. The only foundation was the fact that I was ordered to remain at Fort Henry and send the expedition up the Tennessee River under command of Major General C. F. Smith. This was ordered because General Halleck received no report from me for near two weeks after the fall of Fort Donelson. The same thing occurred with me. I was not receiving the orders, but knowing my duties was reporting daily, and when anything occurred to make it necessary, two or three times a day. Then was ordered to remain behind it was the cause of much astonishment among the troops of my command and also a disappointment. When I was again ordered to join them they showed, I believe, heartfelt joy.

I never allowed a word of contradiction to go out from my headquarters, thinking this the best course. I know though I do not like to speak of myself, that General Halleck would regard this army better off if I was relieved, but because it would leave inexperienced officers senior in rank. You need not fear but that I will come out triumphantly. I am pulling no wires as political generals do to advance myself. I have no future ambitions. My object is to carry on my part of this war successfully, and I am perfectly willing that others may make all the glory they can out of it.⁵

Grant’s victories at Fort Henry and Donelson were turning points in his career and for the Union. President Lincoln was thrilled to have a general who was ambitious, even though Halleck downplayed Grant’s role in the operation. Lincoln expected great things from him, but as the next operation proved, Grant was far from invincible.⁶