DURING THE EVENING of April 6, 1862, General Sherman sought out Grant to express his opinion about that day’s battle and what the army should do. If there had been any doubt about the strength of their companionship, it was answered then. Sherman and Grant commenced what would become a long relationship of service and friendship. They had met before at West Point when Sherman was a senior classman and Grant a fresh cadet. Because of the age difference they did not associate then, but encountered each other once more in St. Louis in the 1850s. They were complete opposites: Sherman has been described as nervous, volatile, and emotional, which countered Grant’s calm demeanor. That day at Shiloh they would need each other more than ever
Shiloh was an unexpected encounter. After victory at Fort Donelson, Grant’s next task was to move southward along the Mississippi Central Railroad against Jackson, Mississippi, then head westward against Vicksburg in the same state. His command was now designated the Department of the Tennessee, but was later named the Thirteenth Corps. The Confederate theater commander, Major General Albert Sidney Johnston, had abandoned Kentucky and West and Middle Tennessee and concentrated most of his forces at the rail junction of Corinth, Mississippi, just south of the Tennessee border. Grant commanded the forward movement of forty thousand Union troops to Pittsburg Landing on the west bank of the Tennessee River, where he was to be joined by another Union force under General Don Carlos Buell for a campaign against Corinth, Mississippi, Johnston did not await Union attack. Backed by General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, who had come from Virginia to be his second in command, Johnston intended to attack Grant before Buell’s troops arrived.
By the end of March the Union forces in Tennessee had grown from three divisions at Fort Donelson to six. Five of the divisions were camped at Pittsburg Landing. Nearby was the Methodist Shiloh Church. From there Grant prepared them to attack the vital Confederate rail junction at Corinth. One division remained farther north; Grant maintained his headquarters downriver. Sherman commanded the forces at Pittsburg Landing. At this stage in the war Pittsburg Landing was not fortified by either Grant or Sherman. Instead, the two were thinking of attacking Corinth once Buell’s Army of the Ohio had arrived from Nashville. This delay almost proved fatal since Johnston planned to attack first. He gathered troops from Kentucky, as well as the Gulf Coast and Arkansas.
On April 6, Johnston attacked at Pittsburg Landing and drove the Union forces from their camps back toward the Tennessee River. Grant arrived later that day and rallied his men before they completely collapsed. Also arriving to save the day was the vanguard of Buell’s army. The next day, Grant went on the offensive, attacking with both armies and eventually forcing the Confederates to Corinth.
Grant’s men remained on the battlefield, it was far from a thorough victory. Shiloh, at this point in the war, was the largest, bloodiest battle in American history. It was painfully obvious that both sides were seriously committed to fighting the war. Criticism was levied at both Sherman and Grant, who had apparently been caught off guard by Johnston, which was certainly true. Grant was too focused on Corinth to prepare for a possible Confederate attack. A number of factors saved the day for the Union, including Confederate miscalculations and Johnston’s death. But the bravery of the men under Grant’s command cannot be misun-derstated. Grant himself wisely remained calm and organized a counterattack instead of withdrawing. Grant rode all over the field, shoring up his breaking lines, encouraging division commanders, and forming a last-ditch line of artillery and infantry stragglers on the heights above the landing. Many years later Grant gave his opponent a backhanded compliment: “The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh. . . . It is possible that the Southern man started in with a little more dash than his Northern brother, but he was correspondingly less enduring.”1
Having won decisive victories at Forts Henry and Donelson, Grant was overconfident. He did not entrench or prepare his army for defense. When Johnston and General P. G. T. Beauregard attacked on the morning of April 6, he was caught by surprise. Nevertheless, he remained cool through the long, bloody day as his troops were steadily driven back from the initial point of contact near Shiloh Church. Much of the fighting centered on a part of the battlefield called the Hornets’ Nest, so named by the Confederates because the enemy’s bullets sounded like swarms of angry bees.
As dusk closed in on April 6, Union forces held. General Johnston had been killed during the afternoon. The first reinforcements from Buell’s army were arriving, but Grant’s men had suffered such heavy casualties that some officers advised retreat. Grant replied, “Retreat? No. I propose to attack at daylight and whip them.” And this is just what Grant did, ably aided by three of Buell’s divisions. Beauregard, in command since Johnston’s death, broke off and retreated to Corinth.
However, victory at Shiloh was achieved at a terrible cost for Grant. The thirteen thousand Union casualties shocked the North. Grant wrote after the war that Shiloh “has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood, than any other engagement . . . during the entire rebellion.” Grant incurred censure for having been caught by surprise, and baseless rumors of drunkenness rekindled. Lincoln parried pressures to remove Grant with the words, “I can’t spare this man; he fights.”2
Halleck had lost confidence in Grant. He went personally to Pittsburg Landing to take command of the combined and reinforced armies and gave Grant the meaningless designation as second in command. Stories that Grant may have turned to alcohol during the battle was suggested, but there was no truth to this accusation. Later on in 1862 Grant addressed the allegation when everyone was offered a drink during a conference convened near Memphis, Tennessee. In the presence of Sherman, Logan, and Howard, Grant said “Gentleman, the newspapers have been printing stories about my being drunk. I want to tell you I haven’t had a drink in months.”3
Meanwhile, in a cautious campaign, Halleck captured Corinth on May 30, 1862, but allowed Beauregard’s army to escape. Depressed by his empty role, Grant considered resigning, but Sherman talked him out of it. After having seen Grant in action Sherman couldn’t help but admire his coolness, self-poise, and confidence in himself; in the quiet routine of headquarters work or the rush and danger of battle, Grant always looked after the welfare of all under his command, from private to general. “His affection to his family, which showed itself in so many ways, won for him the respect and admiration of all with whom he came in contact. . . . The one great character that marked General Grant’s character to others was that in proportion to his increased responsibility and care came increased ability to act, increased power to meet the emergency.”4
Grant had some relief during the summer as Halleck and General John Pope went to Washington and he resumed direct command of the District of West Tennessee. Grant went on the defensive by guarding the territories obtained by the Federals the past twelve months. This area stretched from Paducah and Columbus, Kentucky, to Corinth, Mississippi, and Memphis, Tennessee. His next engagement was at Iuka, Mississippi, where he sent Major General Rosecrans against Majoe General Sterling Price. The Confederates repulsed Rosecrans and escaped. Two weeks later the Confederates attacked Rosecrans at Corinth. This time the Union saved the city, but Grant could not catch the fleeing Confederate forces. He would go on to fight another day as Union forces under his command continued on the offensive to dislodge the Confederates along the Mississippi River.