Preface
campaigns against high-value installations, and they relentlessly assail their
quarry until they've established a solid operational foothold. Players in the
defense industry, high-tcch vendors, and financial institutions have all been
on the receiving end of APT operations.
Depending on the defensive ineasures in place, APT incidents can involve
more sophisticated tools, like custom zero-day exploits and forged certifi¬
cates. In extreme cases, an intrusion set might go so far as to physically
infiltrate a target (e.g., respond to job postings, bribe an insider, pose as a
telecom repairman, conduct breaking and entry (B&E), etc.) to get access to
equipment. In short, these groups have the mandate and resources to bypass
whatever barriers are in place.
Because APTs often seek to establish a long-term outpost in unfriendly ter¬
ritory, stealth technology plays a fundamental role. This isn't your average
Internet smash-and-grab that leaves a noisy trail of binaries and network
packets. It's much closer to a termite infestation; a low-and-slow underground
invasion that invisibly spreads from one box to the next, skulking under the
radar and denying outsiders any indication that something is amiss until it's
too late. This is the venue of rootkits.
1 What's New in the Second Edition?
Rather than just institute minor adjustments, perhaps adding a section or two
in each chapter to reflect recent developments, I opted for a major overhaul
of the book. This reflects observations that I received from professional
researchers, feedback from readers, peer comments, and things that I dug up
on my own.
Out with the Old, In with the New
In a nutshell, 1 added new material and took out outdated material. Specifi¬
cally, 1 excluded techniques that have been proved less effective due to
technological advances. For example, I decided to spend less time on bootkits
(which are pretty easy to detect) and more time on topics like shellcode and
memory-resident software. There were also samples from the first edition that
work only on Windows XP, and I removed these as well. By popular demand,
I've also included information on rootkits that reside in the lower rings (e.g.,
Ring — 1, Ring —2, and Ring —3).
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