As a reader I therefore pay my tribute in what follows . . . in the form of several extended marginalia which otherwise make no particular claim. (Logis in einem Landhaus 7G)
A title, no doubt, should take the long view, describe, and circumscribe the textual matter to follow.1 Sebald himself, however, often chose titles that no reader can mistake for simple deictic markers. Does After Nature (Nach der Natur, 1988) tell of a mode of writing and art made according to, and perhaps in imitation of, nature?2 Or shall we understand the title to suggest a time after nature, a pronouncement of an eco-apocalyptic foreboding suggesting that, from the outset, Nature might no longer be a viable assumption? Or is it with certainty neither of these after all? Schwindel. Gefühle. (1990) in the German original punctuates dizziness/swindle/lie (Schwindel), and then feelings (Gefühle) with the interruptive halt of periods—all lost in translation, of course, with the title Vertigo. Is the German title then a dizzying suggestion that any immediacy of feeling might needs be read in tandem with deception? Austerlitz, which seems unproblematically to name Jacques Austerlitz, the central character of the narrative, is nevertheless questioned by the boy of fifteen when he first learns his name: “what does it mean?” (Austerlitz 68E, 100G). It means as well, according to Austerlitz’s teacher, a famous battle, the study of which makes evident that conventional, factual history simply will not do, that there is no way to make the telling of the past adequate to the object of its description. It names, moreover, one of the many train stations in Austerlitz, and specifically that from which the protagonist, Austerlitz, like his father before him, disappears. Something of this ambiguity, something of this deception, something of this evasion of factual narrative and of the inability of language to simply name, haunts Sebald’s Vision as well.3
Three aspects of Sebald’s writing must inevitably strike every reader.4 To begin with, it is a question of a postwar German author addressing the Holocaust (and other historico-political and ecological disasters) in a manner the reading public had never before witnessed. In Sebald one encounters an ethics of melancholy outrage, but he also sets forth his moral position with an astonishing sense of self-certitude. Second: every reader is struck by the visual oddity of literary and essayistic works peppered with images: photographs, documents, diagrams, sketches, and reproductions of artworks. The temptation, of course, is to assume that, given the ethical stance, the visual materials are there as illustrations. In Sebald’s writings one soon notices that this assumption is particularly vexed, since he openly plays with the purposeful uncertainty of what he places before our eyes. The visual materials, as Sebald admits in an interview, often serve the purpose of readerly disorientation. And then one encounters in each of his writings an astonishingly innovative writing style. Given his performances of meandering detours, his shattering of frames, crossing borders, writing tangentially, disintegrating the name, surreptitiously citing, and announcing blindness,5 what is called for is a careful analysis of the highly unusual literary practices of his texts. How to reconcile such a radical stylistics with moral certitude? This is the question. How to understand, as Sebald will assert in interviews, that he can only speak indirectly? The task in reading Sebald, then, is to account for a whole range of concepts: what Sebald called our moral capacity alongside the vagaries of perception and, more generally, how representation in art and literature relates to the epistemological crises that he shows us arising out of the juxtaposition of all these.
That his writings are about vision as the ability to see can escape no reader. Alongside the unusual, interspersed visual materials that rightfully engage so many Sebald scholars a theme of sight is often woven into the text. In “Air War and Literature” Sebald reproves those writers who directly witnessed the Allied bombings. What was called for was a steady gaze at what was before them (“Air War” 51E, 57G) rendered in a concrete prose that might make the reader see.6 Still in The Rings of Saturn the narrator will celebrate not only Rembrandt’s verisimilitude (Wirklichkeitsnähe; Rings of Saturn 16E, 26G) but also his rebellion against mimesis. That refusal to copy nature emerges as Rembrandt’s social commentary. Sebald also writes of the remarkable realism of the art of Jan Peter Tripp, while nevertheless insisting that it is less its identity with reality that is worth considering than the “far less apparent points of divergence and difference” (“As Day and Night” 84E, 178G).7 In a late interview, Sebald will go on to insist that the Holocaust, which so concerned him, can only be spoken of indirectly: “So the only way in which one can approach these things, in my view, is obliquely, tangentially, by reference rather than by direct confrontation.”8 These are atrocities, he often takes the opportunity to remind us, that he himself, in any case, born in 1944, could not possibly have experienced head-on.9
The degree to which written texts are called upon to see and report a factual or historical world of the artist’s experience fluctuates wildly in Sebald’s works and, more crucially, also within each individual work. In the texts we are about to read, neat conclusions about vision-of-the-eye are impossible. And then we encounter the prolific acts of citation, both visual and verbal, that are bound to seem twenty-twenty from a certain point of view. As we all know, however—and no one better than Sebald—the play of montage alters the incorporated material and puts it into new relations that cause us to see and read otherwise.
Vision, of course, also implies not only acts of the eye but also those of the mind, or, as we like to imagine it, spirit, as when we say that someone has vision, a vision, or is a visionary.10 Sebald’s work is celebrated for its moral stand, for its turn not only to the Shoah (The Emigrants, Austerlitz, Rings of Saturn) but also to other historical and natural scenes of violence: the 1525 massacre at Frankenhausen during the German Peasants’ War (After Nature), the 1800 Battle of Marengo (Vertigo), the bombing of German cities in the Second World War (Air War and Literature), slave laborers worked to death in the Belgian Congo, the nineteenth-century Taiping rebellion that took tens of millions of lives in China, the devastation of the herring population and then of trees in the hurricane of 1987 (Rings of Saturn).
Still, one takes away the rules of Sebald’s engagement with difficulty and uncertainty. The puzzle in all this is due not only to Sebald’s inconsistencies and contradictions. What if such entanglements are Sebald’s game plan, which may be no plan at all? Sebald’s writings are a continuously changing meditation on these issues and a dizzying practice of thinking and representing them: Schwindel. Gefühle., one is tempted to say. What if to read Sebald (and perhaps this does not distinguish him all that much from other writers) lies in the specificities of individual texts? Despite Sebald’s frequent invocation of the bird’s-eye view (a vantage point shared by God and the dreamer), any naïive attempt to assume that perspective as reader, to arrive at an overarching thesis in relation to these particular issues in Sebald’s writings, is bound to fail. Even “Air War and Literature,” which claims for itself an extraliterary status while initially calling for documentary concreteness, eventually gives way to the suspicion that we may not be able to learn anything at all, even when we step back or look from above.
It is true: one ruins one’s eyes with too much close reading. Still, what I offer in the pages to come includes the practice of a stubborn attention to detail. Sebald talks less openly of this than of “the eye / of the crane” that allows one to overlook a wide terrain,11 but even a troubled nearsightedness nevertheless offers us flashes, now and again, of a bigger picture. I take as my model an image from The Emigrants in which, as the artist Aurach/Ferber narrates,12 he is represented as a young boy “deeply bent over his writing” (The Emigrants 171–72E, 255–56G). The photograph brings us right up to the face of the child—also to his hands, his pencil, its point shining at the edge of the frame. Only, just what he is writing is cut from our view. I take as my model Austerlitz, who describes himself as a child—muttering and spelling out the stories in his Welsh children’s Bible yet certain something else lies there, completely different from the sense of the words produced as he runs his index fingers over the lines of writing (Austerlitz 55E, 80G), and Austerlitz repeatedly in that same Bible examining every inch of a bewildering, hatch-marked illustration of the camp of the children of Israel (Austerlitz 55–58E, 81–84G).
These are puzzling models, I know, for literary criticism, and they presage only modest accomplishments in the chapters to follow. Still, if there are any insights to come, it will have something to do with a self-imposed myopia as I trace Sebald’s running, elusive, understated, meditations on the intersection of vision, our capacity to know, and of what Sebald called “our moral capacity”: all these and his own narrative performances.13
Thus in After Nature (1988, chapter 1), the earliest published of Sebald’s major literary works, it is at the title of the first of its three poems that one must pause: “Like the snow on the Alps.” That title calls for particular attention, borrowed, as it is, from the poem’s concluding line and not according to the usual convention of citing the first phrase. “Like the snow on the Alps” is devoted to the German painter Matthaeus Grünewald. In the opening lines of the poem the figures from the altar at Lindenhardt cross the border from the sixteenth-century artwork into our twentieth-century world. By the end of the poem it is we as readers who are openly called upon to cross the border into the linguistic demands of the text.
Along the way Sebald experiments with what it might be to take in what is outside the text. We think as we begin to read that we understand its obvious project. “Like the snow on the Alps” sets about describing the painter’s work while sketching out a biography of the man: each of these tasks is embroiled in a sociopolitical critique. Such a project implies major presumptions about literary language and its practice of representation. Yet, as the poem progresses, ekphra sis gives way to a failure to capture the visual in language; and the biography describes the uncertainty of Grünewald’s identity in the multiplicity of names attached to his works. Section 4 questions the identity of Grünewald because a jumble of different initials sign and claim authorship of his canvases. But, before and after this in Sebald’s poem, that name appears in stranger form yet. Grünewald’s wife-to-be falls in love neither with the man nor with the painter but with his “green-colored name” and is subsequently, we read, doomed to madness. Later, in the tale of the Aschaffenburg artist’s death, broken fragments of the name grün and Wald are scattered through the lines.14 They are the linguistic accompaniment to the coming blindness with which the poem closes, violent and ultimate blindness, it seems. We, the readers, who have been commanded to look sharply ahead, come upon those now famous phrases of Sebald, which announce: “So it becomes, when the optic nerve / tears . . . / white like the snow / on the Alps” (After Nature 37E, 33G). Following the details of these lines elsewhere in the book, one discovers that significance is generated in Sebald not by the gaze directed straight on but by a net of interconnections, or what Sebald elsewhere will call coincidences. A new mode of seeing and an odd mode of signification define his literary work. Thus culmination in loss of vision becomes the linguistic matrix of the possibility of signification throughout After Nature. One might wish to think it emblematic of Sebald’s work as a whole, though Sebald himself warns us that no symbol, as he puts it, has a single, fixed meaning. Here, as elsewhere in Sebald’s work, blindness and sight do not simply shut one another out. Signification in Sebald’s poem often moves not by way of deictic pointing or simple nomination but rather by passages and phrases that gain their potential to signify through acts of repetition and echoing.
Four years after the appearance of After Nature, Sebald publishes The Emigrants (1992, chapter 2). The earlier work was announced in its German subtitle as a single poem (Ein Elementargedicht, “An Elemental Poem”) divided into three long poems that tell of Grünewald, Steller, and Sebald. The new volume is divided into four, here too with each section devoted to a different figure. What binds The Emigrants together is not only what the title suggests, a loss of homeland in the form of four life stories, but also a literary landscape in which, in the spirit of its themes of dust and butterflies, a cross-pollination of recurring images proliferates across the texts. These are the coincidences of which Sebald spoke with light irony in his interviews. They are also, as in After Nature, what forces us to read, differently, even if that reading doesn’t necessarily produce a certainty of delineated form. Once again, then, Sebald draws his characters together through the uncanny repetition of apparently arbitrary details, a new mode of drawing, one wants to say, that counters conventional figurative art. The art of Max Aurach in the last story is also of a piece with this. Wracked by losses of memory, what he treasures in his charcoal drawings is not the figure that remains for all to see, but the coal dust that falls away from the picture like lost traces of the past. As he paints a portrait, he does so by gouging out the paint he had previously laid on the canvas, not by producing but by undoing the representation.
The challenge to the conventions of the framed artwork and the cross-pollination of images are the experience if not the subject matter of a slide show early on in The Emigrants. The narrator, his wife, Henry Selwyn, and friend watch as images of Crete take flight in the narrator’s thoughts, which carry us from place to place: Nabokov in the Swiss Alps (outfitted in butterfly-catching array) gives way to the Caucasus, to the Lasithi Plateau in Crete, until, like the specificity of place, the physical frame of the slide, it, too, cannot hold. It is a shattering of frame that shatters as well the capacity for circumscribed acts of narrative description. The story will take us from there to a film in which a caravan seems to pass out from the screen into the audience (passing the borders of art like Grünewald’s figures), from this to a tale of madness in the story of Ambros Adelwarth’s friend, another tale of another film that transgresses its borders—all in a manner, of course, that sweeps its reader audience along with it.
Still, it is not this wild play of form of which the narrator is wary, but rather another concept of representation. At the close of The Emigrants he imagines himself standing before a photograph taken in the Litzmannstadt Ghetto by the bookkeeper Genewein, who prided himself on his celebratory documentation in color slides of Nazi organization. Three young women look across to the narrator from behind the threads of a loom: he stands on the very spot where Genewein had stood to capture his image. The one at our left fixes him with a steady and relentless gaze. They are there, it seems, as the three fates, ready to take his measure. It is the close of the volume. They stand in judgment. Has Sebald achieved anything more, anything different from Genewein, the would-be documentarian? What is a photograph? What is an image? How to assess the way in which he collects documents and makes a gesture toward preserving memory? How to think these gestures of fidelity to reality in relation to the frame-rupturing leaps of connection to which we have also been witness and to the concept of citation?
The Rings of Saturn (1995, chapter 3) offers something of an answer or, at least, a series of answers. Over and over, in any case, it poses the question of the frame in relation to a dream of fixing reality. Early on in that volume we encounter the image, reproduced in black and white and taking up a full two-page expanse, of Rembrandt’s Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaas Tulp. At stake from a certain point of view are Cartesian claims that reduce the body to a machine or scientific diagram. Yet, in stark contrast to the rest of the vast canvas, recognized for its fidelity to reality, and in order to signal his act of compassion for the victim of state cruelty whose body is being violated, Rembrandt gives to the flayed hand a false construction. Rembrandt’s purposeful, crass misrepresentation of the object of the artist’s gaze, we are told, critiques the faulty vision and values of the scientific gathering. That the unfeeling onlookers portrayed there look past the body to an anatomical atlas is evidence of their moral failures. But when Sebald in turn does some cutting of his own, when he excises a piece of that full canvas and reproduces it on the following page, he flouts his act of reframing as further distortion and thereby unsettles the analysis of representation he has offered in relation to ethical conscience. While professing the thoughtful gaze, what the narrator practices is distraction.
And distraction, detour, is, of course, the path of Sebald’s prose. Here in The Rings of Saturn one thing leads to another and we find ourselves suddenly reading Thomas Browne who finds a fixed pattern that runs through the entire natural world. His quest brings us back to the frame, this time in the form of Browne’s Quincunx. The quincunx is valid everywhere: in The Garden of Cyrus (1658) a fifty-five-page list of things that partake of its form proves the point. The four-cornered field framing a fifth point at its center, comes to us as the ever encountered and inescapable order of things, a promise of iterable certitude. And yet, like Rembrandt’s anatomy lesson, the quincunx too is charged with distraction. For Browne’s thoughts, as Sebald reminds us, could not hold steady on the ever repeating pattern that seemed to account for everything. If one turns from reading Sebald to reading Browne’s The Garden of Cyrus one finds the narrative wandering from the reassuring repetition of the enclosing quadrilateral form, to the letter X drawn by lines that run between the rhombus’s opposing angles, wandering then again to the Roman numeral V. Thus Browne shifts back and forth between the frame and its undoing in the open forms of X and V. What appears to take place spatially at the core of Browne’s essay, this shuttling back and forth between closed and open forms, the lozenge-shaped frame of the quincunx and the Xs and Vs also derived therefrom, reappears in the dedicatory letter of Browne’s Garden of Cyrus. That is to say, the X, which is later so crucial in the succeeding chapters as a spatial figure, first assumes a linguistic form in a cluster of words beginning in ex-. As Browne chatters about the errant path of his text, he strews it with an ex- of a verbal order—Excursion, Exception, Extremity, and Extraneous—invoked to mark once again the break from the rhombus form that later claims to account for and enclose.
The oscillation between stable form and dispersion, which in Browne’s preface is something of a mirthful dance, appears in a more somber form in Sebald’s Austerlitz (2001, chapter 5).15 The opening pages raise the question of the letter A—and not only because the narrator meets Austerlitz in Antwerp, just two of the many proper A-names that swarm through the pages to follow. At the dead center of the long prose text (Sebald refused to call his books novels), through a long and redemptive passage of eighty pages, A has a place of honor. Austerlitz, who had been brought to Wales as a small child on the Kindertransport, returns to his native city of Prague to seek out his past. He goes to the state archives where the archivist, Ambrosová, finds his family name in the perfectly preserved alphabetical files and directs him at once to his family apartment. There he finds his nanny, her name promising truth (Vera), who brings back his past as well as his ability to both understand and speak his childhood Czech language. This is the core of the story, solid enough to convince some readers that it is a volume about recovered memory. It reminds us that the alphabet is our means for understanding, organizing knowledge, recording the spoken word, reading, and recovering the past—above all, for making good on loss.
And yet, our first encounter in Austerlitz with the letter A has none of that promise of recuperation after trauma; it is at best an inarticulate reliving of a never to be articulated pain. In the early pages of the fiction, the narrator tells of Gastone Novelli, tortured by the Nazis, who, after his liberation, immediately headed for South America to live among the native people and escape what we tend to think of as civilization. While there he compiled a dictionary of their language consisting mostly of vowels and especially of A-sounds. Novelli’s return to his European home was far from Austerlitz’s linguistic rediscovery of the mother tongue. Instead, with a technique akin to that of Aurach in The Emigrants, he filled canvases with the letter A by scratching the paint out to form a tableau of letters, spelling out a horrific scream that rose and fell in waves.
The double register of language-in-As (as the path to articulated knowledge and memory as well as their disintegration) is also that of sight—the sight of the narrator to be precise. At the chronological close of the tale, though still in its opening pages, as something of a preface to the tale of Austerlitz we are about to read, the narrator discovers that the sight in his right eye, threatened by black crosshatching, is almost gone. The hatch marks that define the narrator’s incapacity to see also haunt Austerlitz throughout the entire book. They echo as well the artwork of Novelli, it too a series of scratched markings. The left eye, at least for now, maintains a sense of clear sight and the narrator maintains clarity in the right eye at the edge of his field of vision. But, with the impaired eye, he can see nothing head on. The entire work evolves out of this mode of seeing and writing, shot through with intertwined strands of thoughts and images, with networks, with branchings of various sorts. We lose our sense of space and also our sense of time. The vision of recuperating a lost childhood is something of a hollow dream set at the center of a vast text that seems to know better, though we cannot be certain what.
Still, in his 1997 lectures in Switzerland, entitled “Air War and Literature,” Sebald indeed seemed to know better (chapter 4). At first, at least, he held out for more than a hollow promise. If not for the recuperation of times past, Sebald called, retroactively, for the clear sight there should have been of what is presently before one, a presentation of the real circumstances in the name of truth. He expressed his moral outrage that the writers who witnessed the bombings of the German cities in World War II had failed to come to terms with, to bring into memory and onto paper what they had seen. It was their obligation as well to make the reader see. A documentary approach (“Air War” 58E, 65G), an ideal of objective truth (“Air War” 53E, 59G), in contrast to traditional aesthetics, would have been the only correct response. And yet, Sebald admits, that kind of experience cannot be grasped under such conditions and cannot be reported with precision. It is from a pseudodocumentary text of Alexander Kluge that he learns this, which, of course, gives pause. Sebald famously calls for a “synoptic artificial view” (“Air War” 26E, 33G), but the examples he gives offer no simple prism by way of which we might grasp the scene. Still, there is another artificial view begging for consideration. Sebald speaks at length of Kluge’s “The Air Attack on Halberstadt on April 8, 1945” (“Der Luftangriff auf Halberstadt am 8. April 1945”). Issues of ironic amazement, intellectual steadfastness, and the challenge to learn from our past mistakes suddenly rise into view. Is epistemology still possible, can we as human beings maintain our autonomous history, or are we at a point beyond self-knowledge, which is to say more or less blind to our own experience? No answers to these questions: Sebald leaves us between possibilities, though the lectures have a dramatic ending. “Air War and Literature” closes with the famous passage from Walter Benjamin on the Angel of History. It is not that the angel, who stares as the ruins pile up before him, is the redemptive resolution to all that has gone before. The passage resembles other culminating moments of Sebald’s texts: they are all citations. Moreover, just a few pages earlier we read a grudging approval of the Halberstadt photographer whose pictures, though he could not have known they would find their place there, Kluge added to his text. Is citation, then, both verbal and visual, a path to learning—is it a possible way of seeing?
Sebald turns to citation again at the close of his 1993 essay “Like Day and Night: On the Pictures of Jan Peter Tripp” (chapter 6) where citation is a medium of meditation and a path to answering questions. It was with the painter and long-time friend that Sebald had prepared, as it turned out, his final work of literature, Unrecounted (Unerzählt). That posthumous volume alternates Tripp’s extraordinary images of (just) the eyes of various, often famous, people, with Sebald’s haiku-like lines, which, as they had previously agreed, do not necessarily have an apparent relationship to the opposing image. At the end of the essay on Tripp as well, Sebald poses the question of image and text. He reproduces Tripp’s Déclaration de guerre, a large painting of two shoes on a patterned tile, and he declares it of a visual complexity not to be described in words, an exemplum, then, of the incommensurability between language and objects of sight. He poses a series of questions about the elegant footwear, as though it were a matter of actual shoes with a real-life history we are challenged to seek out. The joke is, in an essay (uncharacteristically for Sebald) riddled with jokes as it is with puzzles, that the answers materialize only when the large canvas, Déclaration de guerre, is cited. It is cited first by Tripp, who incorporates it into another painting. A woman now sits, her back to us, contemplating Declaration of War hung on the wall of what appears to be a museum space. Only when the painting is cited, when it is formally recognized as an image within an image rather than as image of real shoes, does the essay begin to narrate with ease the possible stories that explain the conundrum of the origin of the elegant pumps. That footwear, it seems, has its real-life counterpart on the feet of the woman dressed in white in the second painting. On her feet, or, rather, on one of them, is a shoe that the narrator declares “the same” as those in the picture she regards. We have found, then, the original shoes, though one is missing. Sebald has cited Tripp’s citation of the declaration of war in the second, smaller painting, which he leaves untitled. But the montage of a text or image, he had reminded us earlier, compels us to look through our knowledge of texts and pictures: doing so, we find the name of the smaller canvas—Déjà vu oder der Zwischenfall (Déjà vu or the Incident). That is the question. Is the relation between the two scenes, the image of the shoes in the first painting and the image of the lady (with a dog) contemplating the image of the shoes, a repetition of what has been seen, or does it suggest an incident whose explanation requires a narrative?
Sebald obliges. First he tells the story of the woman, weary at the end of the day, who had removed the second shoe, held it in her hand, whereon it then totally vanished. In place of it (in Déjà vu oder der Zwischenfall) we see another, hardly identical, object at the foot of a dog who gazes out of the painting. For this incident, too, Sebald has a tale to tell: of the dog who played fetch, who, in leaps to which we have become accustomed, jumped the frame of Tripp’s work, crossing the centuries, crossing the English Channel, bringing the sandal back from a masterpiece of Van Eyck hung in another museum.
Thus the last pages of the essay on Jan Peter Tripp gather together in something of a jumble, a dizzying series of questions on the work of art: as preserving life, as recording history, as a reminder of its own materiality, and yet again as a bit of a prank, or rather an elaborate joke, under the guise of commentary. This is one of the most profoundly literary performances in Sebald’s works, despite its pretentions to be something else, and one of the most subtle theoretically. The essay closes with yet another set of eyes brought to the fore as Sebald, once again (as in Rings of Saturn), excises a piece of the canvas. The dog from the second painting (Déjà vu . . .), which cites and comments on the first, is ready for his close-up. He is, though we hardly take notice of him at first, the star of the show. The dog from Déjà vu . . . who has cavorted about, leaping in and out of artworks, takes an object from another work, another era, another country, treats it as a thing, and plops the footwear down, leaving it to us to figure out the puzzle of his sleight of the eye. With one eye, Sebald writes, the domesticated one, he looks right at us. With the other, however, he looks right through us, the spectator. So it is with Sebald’s writing that we are as readers at once the spectators and also the object of scrutiny and judgment.
In short, what Sebald’s Vision attempts to make clear is that the literary texts and the essays (in their practice) as well as the interviews (in their straightforward assertions [chapter 7]) show Sebald thinking through his writing strategies and poetics with enormous care. What follows concerns Sebald’s implicit theorizations about language, literature, epistemology, and the ethical. These meditations arise out of careful attention not only to the larger gestures of the texts but also to what I have called a myopic reading. It is my hope that thereby something new jumps to the eye.
. . .
Sebald’s works are referred to with short versions of their English titles. These are followed by the page numbers in the published English translations, marked with an E, and by the page numbers in the German originals, marked with a G. The extended titles of Sebald’s works, as well as that of other authors, can be found in Works Cited. Throughout this book English translations appear in the body of the text. The original German of the longer citations can be found in the endnotes. Modifications to the translations were made where they seemed necessary for understanding the argument.