9
Categorial Intuition
Husserl’s distinction between simple and categorial intuition in chapter 6 of the Sixth Logical Investigation (LI) is the basis for the phenomenological theory of knowledge. But the theory of categorial intuition is regarded as difficult. Some critics also think it is opaque or even completely wrong.1 Sometimes it is even suspected that Husserl later completely rejected his theory of categorial intuition.2 With the help of this last theory, Husserl tries to answer the question how intentions directed to “states of affairs” (Sachverhalte), such as “The book is green,” are fulfilled. In these expressions elements occur which can be easily fulfilled in sense perception, for example, the book and the color green. But what gives fulfillment to the “being green” of the book? We might extend this question to all all elements of categorial form in propositions, like “one,” “and,” “all,” “if,” “then,” “or,” “no,” “not,” and so on. Intentions of real things are fulfillable by sense perception, whether inner or outer perception. Thus we might call ideal objects those objects which are only fulfilled in categorial intuition, as Husserl suggests (Husserl 1984: 674).
The contrast of simple and categorial acts is explained by means of act analysis. A simple intuition in the form of sense perception presents its object “directly,” “immediately,” in a “single step” (Husserl 1984: 674), “in one blow” (Husserl 1984: 676), and its presenting function does not rest on founding acts.
Categorial intuition is founded. In this case we do not use the concept of mutual founding but the concept of one-sided foundation.3 In the less complex cases, categorial intuition is founded on simple perceptions. The condition for the intuitivity of the categorial act is its having passed through each of the founding particular intentions in a fulfilled way. As in the case of simple objects, in categorial acts there are also degrees of intuitivity, and thus of evidence. Categorial intuition does not refer to its object in simple, one-rayed acts but always in jointed, higher-order acts which rest on founding acts. The objects of founding acts are synthetically placed into a categorial relation within the founded categorial act. Thus in categorial acts new objects are intended, i.e., categorial objects which can only be intended (and given) in such founded acts. The intuitivity of categorial intuition is only thanks to acts which consist of stages of founding and founded.
If we consider the realm of language, we might pose the problem of categorial intuition in the following way: What fulfills the categorial elements of propositions which cannot be fulfilled by simple perception alone like “one,” “some,” “many,” “is,” “is not,” “and,” “or,” etc. (Husserl 1984: 658)? These elements must also be somehow fulfilled, otherwise the intention as a whole cannot be fulfilled.
In the most simple cases the fulfillment of the categorical elements of propositions is somehow connected with simple perception, but for categorical intuition it asks more than perception. Perception is not founded in other acts. Categorial intuition is founded in acts in which we intend the objects (or the aspects of objects) which we relate to one another in categorial intuition. Thus in categorial intuition we intend objects which cannot be intended in the simple founding acts, like “being red,” “being a book” (Husserl 1984: 674 ff.).
There are different forms of categorial intuition, and each has its particular type of synthetic fulfillment.4 In the Sixth Logical Investigation Husserl analyzes only some basic forms of categorial intuition (identification, relations, collections, eidetic abstraction) to show that the concept of categorial intuition is justified, and that these forms can serve as a pattern for analyzing the other forms of categorial intuition (see Husserl 1984: 678 f., 681 f., 683 f., 688 f., 690 ff.).
In §48 of the Sixth Logical Investigation Husserl analyzes the stages of acts found in synthetic categorial intuition. Three clearly distinct steps or phases are to be distinguished. We will take the proposition “The door is blue” as an example.5 The simple, founding perceptions must be those of the door and of the dependent moment of the color “blue.” In the first step (1) we intend the object in one, unstructured glance. This is a simple act which is directed to the object as a whole; Husserl calls it a simple “Gesamtwahrnehmung” (Husserl 1984: 682). The parts of the object are, however, also intended, but in this first unstructured intention of the whole of the object, not yet explicitly so (Husserl 1984: 681 ff.). Nevertheless these partial intentions are elements of the unstructured intention of the whole object, and they are thus already conscious as potential objects of an explicit intention.6
In the second step (2) the object is intended in an explicit manner by highlighting our interest with respect to the parts which, up to now, had only been implicitly intended. Husserl calls this kind of objectification a “subdividing act” (“gliedernde Akte”; Husserl 1984: 681). Parts of the object which had been implicitly intended now become the intentions of explicit acts. But this does not mean that in this new kind of objectification of the object there is an intention of a new object: It is still the door we are perceiving. The subdividing acts are special intentions within the simple act which is directed at the door. We might say that in the “subdividing act” the door is intended through (or by way of) the medium of the blue color. There is no new object intended; rather we intend the same object in a subdividing manner.
In the first unstructured perception of the object the parts of it were also intended, but only implicitly. In a subdividing, specifying intention (Sonderwahrnehmung) they are intended explicitly – they (so to speak) stand in the foreground. Our interest is directed to the sense contents in which the object is presented: I am attentive to the color and the smell of the rose, the rustle of the leaves. In each continuous perception my attention wanders through the elements which present the object one after the other.
The shift from the unstructured perception of an object to the subdivided perception of an object might be interpreted as a “double apperception,” i.e., as two different perceptions based on the same sense contents. But in this case it is not a change of apperception which results in another object, but in a different mode of the same object. Both are simple acts, but in the particular partial intentions we intend the door by way of an intention of its color, while in the initial unstructured perception of the same object we are only implicitly directed at the color. In the first case the sense contents serve as representatives of an implicit partial intention, in the second the same sense contents are representatives of an explicit partial intention.
As we have already pointed out in the example of continuous synthesis, there is a so-called “synthesis of coincidence” in the transition from the unstructured intention of the whole to the explicit partial intentions. In this “synthesis of coincidence” we are aware both that we are intending the same object, and that this object, the door, not only has a color in general but that this color is blue. One important remark: Both of these founding intentions are intuitively fulfilled and thus justify the thesis that the perceived object is a “real” object. This is one of the decisive functions of sensuality in the framework of categorical intuition.7 Thus the synthetic transition from the one to the other is also suitable for justifying the claim of “reality” with respect to categorial intuition. This constitutes the difference between knowledge and mere hearsay.
This transition of founding acts and the “synthesis of coincidence” which happens in this transition somehow offer everything we need for knowledge. But for actual knowledge there must also be a synthetic act which performs a categorial apperception of the “synthesis of coincidence” itself. In everyday life we often experience such “syntheses of coincidence” and thus “have everything needed for the performance of knowledge,” but we nevertheless only actually carry out such a performance if it is relevant for our practice.8
In the third (3) decisive step of the process of categorial intuition we intend the objects of the particular subdividing perceptions synthetically in the new categorial intention. We can establish a relation between the objects of the founding acts, or between the object of the unstructured act as a whole and one of its dependent moments (“The door is blue”). In this founded act the elements which are synthetically connected in a categorial relation take on a new character: they are syntactically formed by the categorial act. In all synthetic categorial intuitions we will find these three steps: (1) the initial, simple perception of the whole; (2) the particular, explicit subdividing perceptions; and (3) the actual categorially synthetic intention.
In the example of the door and its color, it is the “door” which takes on the categorial form of a “substrate” which bears qualities, while the “blue” becomes a “quality” of the substrate (substrate/accident). This categorial formation is not merely the performance of another type of simple apperception of the perceived object. The categorial act intends “that the door is blue” and is perhaps even the fulfillment of this matter of fact. Within categorial intention the “substrate capable to bearing qualities” and the “quality of the substrate” are dependent moments. Thus the fulfillment of a categorial intention is always dependent on founding perceptions and their intuitive fulfillment. But the dependence goes further: the fulfillment of perceptual intentions is in turn dependent on hyletic (reelle) contents.
But the fulfillment of categorial intentions is not only dependent on the intuitive character (evidence) of the founding acts.9 Such a generalization, i.e., the thesis that the intuitive character of categorial intention is completely dependent on that of the founding perceptions, would lead to paradoxical results. For example, one of the consequences would be that axiomatic mathematics is not evident knowledge because its results are established completely within signitive intentions (i.e., only intentions with the means of a system of signs but without sensual fulfillment).
Thus, sense perception can contribute to the fulfillment of categorial intentions at least in the most simple cases. But there are many objects of categorial intuition which have only a very loose connection with sense perception, for example, the propositions of pure mathematics and algebra, where there is hardly any contribution of sensibility. But on the other hand, there are surely elements in categorial intuition which can be fulfilled with the help of sensible intuition – something like the “blue” of the door – and in each case there are elements which cannot be fulfilled in sensibility alone, like “being blue.”
One of the decisive issues for this conception of knowledge concerns the function of the former stages of the categorial process in the intuitivity of the categorial act: to what extent is their performance in the third stage still “alive” or, respectively, “present”? On the one hand, this question concerns the intuitivity and the quality (i.e., its thetic character, “Setzungsqualität”) of the founding acts. But it also concerns the “synthesis of coincidence”: we need to make clear what the founding acts are, and whether we can somehow keep their performance in play in the complex process of knowledge.
Let us turn once again to the details of our example of the “blue door.” After the simple perception of the whole is performed, the moment of the blue color of the door becomes the object of an explicit subdividing perception (Husserl 1984: 682). But in the explicit perception of the “blue” we do not intend and perceive the “blue” for the first time. For an implicit intention the “blue” already occurs in the initial, simple perception of the whole. This implicit, partial intention corresponds to a possibility of an explicit intention. In the transition from the first simple perception of the whole to the explicit subdividing intention there occurs a “synthesis of coincidence” between these two intentions (see Husserl 1984: 650 ff., 569 ff.). The coincidence occurs between the explicit intention of the moment “blue color” on the one hand, and the partial intention implicit in the intention of the whole on the other.
It is decisive for the understanding of the concept of “synthesis of coincidence” that what is brought into coincidence are the intentional moments of the respective acts. The fulfilling coincidence is not based on equal or similar hyletic data (“reelle Bestände”). Such a coincidence may occur, but it does not support the intuitivity of categorial intuition. The basis of intuitivity in the case of categorial intuition are the coincidences of the intentional moments of acts, i.e., synthesis of coincidence between partial intentions.10
These syntheses of coincidence which occur between partial intentions now have a new function: they are apperceived as representing or fulfilling contents of the new synthetic categorial intention “The door is blue.” The synthesis of coincidence which arises in the active process of running through the subdividing acts – making, so to speak, all the partial intentions of the object explicit – are now representing the “being blue” of the door.
At this decisive point in the phenomenological theory of knowledge we find the schema: apprehension/apprehended content (“Auffassung – aufgefaßter Inhalt”) which is meant to understand the intuitivity of perceptions as based on sensually given contents. Thus we need to recognize that Husserl accepts this model of how to understand intuitivity for the categorial intuition as well as for sense perception. In the LI, as well as in many later writings, we find this model introduced many times at decisive points of the argument (see Husserl 1964: 94–103, 109 ff., 132 f., 138 ff.). For our limited purposes we do not need to take up Husserl’s self-criticism with respect to the model of apprehension/contents of apprehension, which in the first place only points out the limits of the schema but does not reject it (see Husserl 1969: 7, Anm.1). Husserl criticizes the use of this model for the deepest level of constitution in inner time-consciousness and for acts of fantasy (Husserl 1980: 265 f., Husserl 1984: 884). For acts constituting intentional objects and categorial objects it is not defective, but unavoidable.
But the model of apprehension and apprehended contents leaves some questions unanswered. For it is obvious that the very special character of the way “given” contents fulfill categorial intuition, i.e., the syntheses of coincidence, requires a critical analysis. Therefore we have to analyze more closely what kind of contents syntheses of coincidence are. In relation to the special character of the synthesis of coincidence as a given content I will first present three negative insights. The discussion of these three negative insights will in turn reveal some positive insights into the character of the syntheses of coincidence which give intuitivity to categorial objects: we cannot identify that which is the representing content of categoriality (i.e., the synthesis of coincidence) with the representing content of sense perception (neither with respect to the simple perception of the whole nor the explicit perception of the subdividing acts). And syntheses of coincidence cannot be sense contents of outer perception at all.
One might think that a representing content of a perceived object could serve as a fulfilling content of a categorial intuition if it were apprehended in a new manner, i.e., in a “categorial apprehension,” where formerly it had only been used in an “perceptual apprehension.” But I do not think that this is the case in categorial intuition. Consider the representing contents of the objects of explicit and subdividing acts in sense perception. If it were the case (that they could also serve as contents of categorial acts), then we would not be able to argue for three essential and necessary stages in the active performance of a categorial intuition. In principle we would already have (or would be able to have) categorial intuition on the basis of sense perception alone. The same argument shows that categorial intuition cannot be fulfilled with a perceptual content of outer perception.11
We can now point to some positive aspects of the synthesis of coincidence. As we have seen in the example of the blue door, the representing contents of the door function in a double way: first in the simple perception of the whole object, then also in the explicit perception in which the color of the door is specifically intended. In the transition between these two acts there arises the synthesis of coincidence between the implicit intention and the explicit intention of the blue within the subdividing act that is aimed thematically at the color. This synthesis of coincidence now turns out to be able to function as a representing content for the categorial intuition of the “being blue” of the door (Husserl 1984: 682).
In this case the content which is apprehended is not a sense content at all – even if it rests on the coincidence of partial intentions fulfilled by sense contents, it is a synthesis between intentional moments of two or more acts which is imposed on us in the transition between the acts.12 Experiencing the coincidence of the intentional moments of “blue” in the two acts at first only means that we “experience” the equality of these intentions; it does not mean that we have the fact of equality or equivalence as a theme, nor that we have the matter of fact “being blue” as a theme. The synthesis of coincidence is somehow imposed on us in a passive manner, even if it occurs in the framework of an actively performed activity. The content (the datum) is given to us – we must accept this seemingly paradoxical formulation – in a “sense” which has nothing to do with sensibility, but which is an irreducible relation between the intentional moments of acts. It is the apprehension of such contents which fulfills the intention “The door is blue.” Syntheses of coincidence are non-sensible representing contents.
Obviously the concept of non-sensible contents is problematic within the framework of a phenomenology which begins its theory of knowledge with the analysis of sense perceptions. Yet we should not only dwell on the difficulties with this way of understanding categorial intuition, but also point to its advantages: the fact that non-sensible contents somehow fulfill categorial intuitions clearly justifies Husserl’s extension of the concept of intuition beyond the realm of sensibility. Simple (founding) acts and founded, complex categorial acts do not only differ essentially in their structure, but also in the characteristics of the contents which make them intuitive. Beside this we have a clear hint how to understand knowledge in mathematics with the same model (i.e., synthesis of coincidence) as we use in all other forms of knowledge. Moreover, we have a clear argument for the necessity of running through the complete three-staged process of categorial activity in order to reach intuitive fulfillment. Without the performance of the first two stages of categorial activity (i.e., the simple perception of the whole and the subdividing explication of the partial intentions), the necessary fulfilling syntheses of coincidence cannot occur. We may even suppose that in every case of categorial intuition there is a necessary contribution of non-sensible contents. I will now examine more closely this last thesis.
Another important form of categorial intuition is the eidetic intuition (“ideierende Abstraktion” or “Wesensschau”).13 Husserl’s theory of eidetic intuition begins with the fact that the human mind has the ability to become aware of common features in different objects. In §52 of the Sixth Logical Investigation Husserl analyzes this form of knowledge as a particular form of categorial intuition. The phenomenological method of eidetic intuition is the attempt first to understand and then to enforce this original ability of the human mind so that it becomes a method for a priori knowledge that is based upon common features of acts of consciousness as well as objects of thinking and perceiving.
The eidetic method is of crucial importance for the claim of phenomenology to be a philosophical science. In the Investigations Husserl still interprets his phenomenology as a version of “descriptive Psychology” – at least he uses this denotation – but on the other hand phenomenology is not meant to be an empirical discipline that only collects together arbitrary facts. Thus phenomenology has to find and establish methods which make it possible to arrive at a priori insights independent of the given particular factual case, i.e., to arrive at universal knowledge concerning the general features of consciousness.
Thus the claim of phenomenology to be a science depends on whether eidetic intuition can be established as a justified form of categorial intuition. We may also look at this from the point of view of the idea of self-justification that Husserl pursues for phenomenology: to establish eidetic intuition as a justified form of categorial intuition is a decisive aim of the LI.
Eidetic intuition is founded in simple intuition in a way similar to other forms of categorial intuition we have seen. We are only able to have an intuition of general features like “blueness” or “human” by running through a whole series of blue objects in perception or fantasy (see Husserl 1984: 111–15, 176 ff., 225 f., 690–3). The aim of the theory of eidetic intuition is not only (but also) to make clear how it is that we can gain general concepts of objects, but also how the intuition of general features works, i.e., how it is that we can have an intuition of the characteristics held in common by different objects. We may also speak in this respect of “common objects,” and insofar as we usually identify such common objects with “concepts,” it is also an investigation into the legitimating source of our intuition of concepts. Thus in performing the eidetic intuition of “blueness,” we must run through a series of perceived or imagined blue objects in order to have the intuition of the common “blueness.” This process is not circular, because in the founding acts the theme is single blue objects while in the founded eidetic intuition we apprehend the common feature of blue on the basis of the synthesis of coincidence which, as we already know, is a non-sensible content.
A detailed analysis of eidetic intuition as a form of categorial intuition in §52 of the Sixth Logical Investigation runs along the lines of the three stages found in every form of categorial intuition: first the simple perception of the object as a whole; then the explicit, subdividing acts; then finally the categorial synthesis. In the second stage, that is, in running through the subdividing acts explicitly pointing to the moment of color with respect to different perceptive or imaginative objects, there occurs a synthesis of coincidence with a particular style.
In order to arrive at an intuition of general objects it is of decisive importance that we have intuitive or imaginative acts for the subdividing acts during the second phase. Eidetic intuition cannot be founded on signitive acts alone (Husserl 1984: 607 ff.). But on the other hand, eidetic intuition is also possible if only one intuitively present object is given, for we can vary this example in imagination. In the Investigations Husserl states that it is indifferent for the intuitivity of eidetic intuition whether the subdividing acts of the second phase are intuitive acts or imaginative acts, that is, imaginative acts are admissible (Husserl 1984: 691 ff., 670). In the further development of his theory Husserl arrives at the insight that the imaginative acts are not only to be tolerated but that they are to be preferred – even that imaginative or “free” variation is necessary for eidetic intuition.14 It is free eidetic variation that assures us that in eidetic variation we do not adhere to a limited realm of cases which may carry only contingently common features (see Husserl 1964: 419–25 and Husserl 1968: §9). The factual reality of the single cases in the eidetic variation is irrelevant in this concern (see Husserl 1968: 74).
In the third stage of the process of eidetic intuition we apprehend the synthesis of coincidence which occurs in running through the different acts of the second stage. We apprehend this synthesis as a representation of the common feature, i.e., the general object that we intend. As in the act in which a real thing is thematically identified, the synthesis of coincidence which occurs on the second stage between the subdividing acts is the apprehension of the coincidence as the identity of the general feature. The general feature, the (same) color, is intuitively given through the series of blue objects and the synthesis of coincidence between the acts directed at the moment of color.
We can understand higher order eidetic intuitions in the same way. We can perform eidetic intuitions founded in categorial acts. For example, we can have an intuition of the general aspect “color” based on the intuition of different colors, and we can have an intuition of the concept “act of consciousness” by running through eidetic intuitions of different forms of consciousness.
There are also problematic aspects of eidetic intuition, which is above all an experimental form of reflection. With the help of eidetic intuition we can supposedly have a clear idea about the limits of our concepts: by imaginative variation of particular cases of a general concept we might discover the point where the variation exceeds the limits of the concept, and at which we are imagining something else.15 We can thus learn to recognize the limits of our concepts and experience them as non-arbitrary. But even in recognizing them as something fixable, it is not clear how their limits are determined.
The full extent of this problem is only realized in the attempt to intuit the essence of objects which carry some cultural meaning. Whereas in one culture we may intuit the essence of the divine as plural, in another we might intuit the essence of the divine as singular. The same turns out to be the case with the essence of woman, honor, justice, etc. There is no way of finding a common answer.
As a partial solution to this problem, we might try to draw a distinction between “simple” objects which carry no cultural meaning and those which do. Acts of consciousness – the preferred theme of Husserl’s phenomenology – may turn out to be objects of the first class. On the other hand: complex objects which can only have their full sense in the intersubjective constitution of the community, objects such as cultural world, myth, religion, etc., all exceed this limit. Most everyday concepts are learned by each of us in a long process of formation within the intersubjective consensus of our community. In this way our everyday concepts have a genesis and a “history” closely connected to the convictions of our respective community.
The next important form of categorial intuition is collection. The fullfillment of “a and b” is dependent on the performance of founding acts directed at a and b making the members of a collection an explicit theme. But this is not enough as long as the synthetic intention on both together, the “and” is not performed. In this case the fulfilling factor is not to be found in synthesis of coincidence, because we can combine objects in a collection which have no partial intentions in common.
Thus we cannot understand how fulfillment works in collections without taking into account the contribution of the synthetic categorial intention “and” itself. Collections owe their intuitivity only to the fact that we synthetically combine objects, that we collect them. Only while synthetically combining the a and the b do we have the collection intuitively. But this leads to the strange result that the categorical act itself contributes to its own intuitivity. At least this makes us understand why we are completely free in collections to combine objects even of different realms of being, for we are not dependent on common partial intentions: “7 and justice and Napoleon.”
An intention contributing to its own fulfillment might induce the impression of circularity. But it is the synthetic activity of combining the objects of the founding acts into a new object, the collection, which gives the fulfillment. This strange case raises questions about the kind of fulfilling, “representing” contents in collection. We might suppose that what serves as representant (“Repräsentant”) is the experience of the performance of the act of collection (in inner perception). But it seems more reasonable to accept the fact that the categorical intention “and” itself can be viewed as a non-sensible content (in this respect it is similar to the synthesis of coincidence) and that it can serve as a fulfilling content of the intention of the collection.
It is obviously a special case, in fact an important exception, in the realm of intentions and categorical intentions that the will to perform a synthetic intention is enough to fulfill this intention. But it remains an exception for the fulfillment of intentions which count for knowledge in the narrow sense is dependent on synthesis of coincidence which occurs passively in the passing over from one founding act to the other. A collection itself therefore, is not already a contribution to knowledge but it can become an important element of further knowledge if we make further judgments about this collection (or set). Husserl writes in respect to the lack of independence of collectiva that they are no “states of affairs” (Husserl 1984: 688, 1964: 254), because there are no syntheses of coincidence fulfilling the categorical intention (see Husserl 1964: 135, 254, 297, 223).
Notes
1 The most important sources on the theme of categorical intuition in Husserl are: Tugendhat 1970: 111–36; Sokolowski 1970: 65–71; Sokolowski 1974: §§10–17; Ströker 1978: 3– 30; Sokolowski 1981: 127–41; Willard 1984: 232–41; Lohmar 1989: 44–69; Lohmar 1990: 179–97; Seebohm 1990: 9–47, Cobb-Stevens 1990: 43–66; Bort 1990: 303–19; Lohmar 1998: 178–273 and Lohmar 2002: 125–45.
2 Husserl wrote that he no longer accepts the theory of the categorial representation (1984: 534 f.). An appropriate interpretation of Husserl’s intentions, therefore, must free itself from the misleading elements of his initial interpretation of categorial representation in Ch. 7 of the 6th LI; see Lohmar 1990: 179–97.
3 In the 3rd LI the concept of mutual foundation is predominant but the 6th LI prefers the concept of one-sided foundation. See Husserl 1984: 270 f., 283–6, 369 and, for the 6th LI, Husserl 1984: 678. On Husserl’s different concepts of foundation, see Nenon 1997: 97– 114.
4 But there are differences in the kind of intention. Husserl makes a distinction between synthetic and abstractive forms of categorical intuition. Synthetic categorical intentions are co-directed to the objects of their founding acts, such as “A is bigger than B.” The intention of abstracting intentions is not directed in the same way on the objects of the founding acts. In abstractive intentions the objects of the founding acts can only be a medium through which the intention is directed to something common, the eidos. The objects of the founding acts are only examples of this eidos (see Husserl 1984: 690, 676, 688).
5 In the 6th LI Husserl makes a difference between the relation of whole and independent parts (Stücke) and the relation of whole and dependent parts (Momente); see Husserl 1984: 680 f., 231; Husserl 1964: §§50–2. In Husserl 1964 he interprets the two forms “S has the part P” and “S has the quality m” as equivalent in relation to the structure of their constitution; see Husserl 1964: 262.
6 In Ideas I (1950) Husserl will regard this possibility of making an intention explicit as characteristic of horizon-intentionality. See Husserl 1950: 1, 57, 71 ff., 212 f.
7 See Husserl 1950: 239. For detailed discussion of the function of sensuality in categorial intuition see Lohmar 2002: 125–45.
8 Nevertheless, these opportunities for gaining knowledge do not disappear without trace. In the genetic phenomenology one of the prominent themes is the way in which this “trace” (of knowledge which is experienced but not conceptualized) is kept or stored in the human subject in different forms of prepredicative experience. See the first section of Husserl 1964 and Lohmar 1998: Ch. III, 6–8.
9 Husserl himself wrote once – in the problematic Ch. 7 of the 6th LI – about the possibility of a functional dependence of the evidence of the categorial act from the evidence of the founding acts (see Husserl 1984: 704). See Lohmar 1990: 179–97.
10 Husserl writes: “Zugleich ‘deckt’ sich aber das fortwirkende Gesamtwahrnehmen gemäß jener implizierten Partialintention mit dem Sonderwahrnehmen” (Husserl 1984: 682). It is important that this “synthesis of coincidence” can occur also between symbolic (and thus “empty”) intentions, which is of crucial importance for the foundation of mathematical knowledge; see also Husserl 1985: 282.
11 We might think that syntheses of coincidence are a content of inner perception. At a time Husserl himself thought that such a solution may be promising. In Ch. 7 of the 6th LI (1st edn.), the “Studie über kategoriale Repräsentation,” Husserl proposes the thesis that categorial intuitions can be fulfilled by the apprehension of so-called “contents of reflection.” In this case, the content apprehended is the same content which represents the actual performance of the categorial act in inner perception. See Husserl 1984: 708, Lohmar 1990. E. Tugendhat takes up this misleading view of Husserl; see Tugendhat 1979: 118–27. Later on Husserl criticizes this attempt of the first edition of LI as defective; see Husserl 1984: 535.
12 The concept of coincidence has a problematic double sense in Husserl. In the LI Husserl uses the concept of coincidence often to name the coincidence of fulfilled intentions with empty intentions which fulfills the latter. But this is a trivial concept of fulfillment for it does not answer the question how fulfilled intentions become fulfilled at all. The other context of using the concept of coincidence is in analyzing categorial intuition as fulfilled by synthesis of coincidence between the partial intentions of the founding acts; this non-trivial use of the concept makes clear how the categorical intentions become fulfilled.
13 See Bernet, R., Kern, I., Marbach, E. 1989: 74–84; Mohanty 1959: 222–30; Tugendhat 1979: 137–68; Hopkins 1997: 151–78. The designation “Wesensschau” for the eidetic intuition seems to be a wrong choice in terminology because it suggests a nearness to platonic thinking which is not intended by Husserl.
14 See Husserl 1950: 146 ff., where he speaks of a priority of imagination; see also Husserl 1974: 206, 254 f. and 1964: 410 ff., 422 f. Th. Seebohm points out that imaginative variation is already to be found in the LI (Seebohm 1990: 14 f.).
15 Husserl has analyzed the accquisition and the determinations of the limits of concepts in his theory of types in his genetic phenomenology. See Lohmar 1998: Kap. III, 6, d. To this problematic see also Held 1985: S. 29 and Claesges 1964: 29 ff.
References and Further Reading
Bernet, R., Kern, I., & Marbach, E. (1989) Edmund Husserl. Darstellung seines Denkens [Edmund Husserl: portrayal of his thought]. Hamburg: Meiner.
Bort, K. (1990) Kategoriale Anschauung. In D. Koch and K. Bort (eds.), Kategorie und Kategorialität (pp. 303–19). Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
Claesges, U. (1964) Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution [Edmund Husserl’s theory of the constitution of space]. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Cobb-Stevens, R. (1990) Being and categorical intuition. Review of Metaphysics, 44, 43–66.
Held, K. (1985) Einleitung. In: E. Husserl, Die phänomenologische Methode. Ausgewählte Texte I. Stuttgart: Reclam.
Hopkins, B. (1997) Phenomenological cognition of the a priori. Husserl’s method of “seeing essences.” In B. Hopkins (ed.), Husserl in Contemporary Context (pp. 151–78). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Husserl, E. (1950) Husserliana III–1: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, erstes Buch [Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy] (ed. K. Schuhmann). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (original work published in 1913).
—— (1964) Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik [Experience and judgment: Investigations in the genealogy of logic] (ed. L. Ludwig). Hamburg: Claassen.
—— (1968) Husserliana IX: Phänomenologische Psychologie [Phenomenological psychology] (ed. W. Biemel). The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
—— (1969) Husserliana X: Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewussteseins (1893–1917)[The phenomenology of internal time-consciousness (1893–1917)] (ed. R. Boehm). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (original works published 1893–1917).
—— (1974) Husserliana XVII: Formale und transzendentale Logik [Formal and transcendental logic] (ed. P. Janssen). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (original work published 1929).
—— (1980) Husserliana XXIII: Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung [Imagination, image consciousness, and memory] (ed. E. Marbach). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (original works from the Husserl estate).
—— (1984) Husserliana XIX: Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Teil [Logical investigations, second part] (ed. U. Panzer). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (original work published in 1901, rev. edn. 1922).
—— (1985) Husserliana XXIV: Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie [Introduction to logic and theory of knowledge] (ed. U. Melle). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (original work presented 1906/7).
Lohmar, D. (1989) Phänomenologie der Mathematik. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
—— (1990) Wo lag der Fehler der kategorialen Repräsentanten?, Husserl-Studies, 7, 179–97.
—— (1998) Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
—— (2002) Husserl’s concept of categorial intuition. In D. Zahavi and F. Stjernfelt (eds.), One Hundred Years of Phenomenology (pp. 125–45). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Mohanty, J. N. (1959) Individual fact and essence in Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 29, 222–30.
Nenon, T. (1997) Two models of foundation in the “Logical Investigations”. In B.C. Hopkins (ed.), Husserl in Contemporary Context (pp. 97–114). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Seebohm, Th. M. (1990) Kategoriale Anschauung. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 23, 9–47. Sokolowski, R. (1970) The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
—— (1974) Husserlian Meditations. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
—— (1981) Husserl’s concept of categorial intuition. Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, supplement to Philosophical Topics, 12, 127–41.
Ströker, E. (1978) Husserls Evidenzprinzip [Husserl’s principle of Evidenz]. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 32, 3–30.
Tugendhat, E. (1970) Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger [The concept of truth in Husserl and Heidegger]. Berlin: De Gruyter.
—— (1979) Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung: Sprachanalytische Interpretationen[Self-consciousness and self-determination]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Willard, D. (1984) Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge. Athens: Ohio University Press.