CW, 6:374–375
In the summer of 1863 General Ulysses S. Grant commanded all Union forces in the District of Western Tennessee and Northern Mississippi. After a prolonged and costly siege, Vicksburg had fallen to Grant, and his army had gained control of the Mississippi River, splitting the Confederacy in two. Displaying his deep involvement in planning military strategy and the next move for his favorite general, Lincoln expressed his concern over the French in Mexico and continued blockade running out of Mobile, Alabama. He also sought to gauge Grant’s opinion on the use of black troops. While the general shared the president’s prejudiced views on African Americans, he needed no further convincing over their fighting ability. During the siege of Vicksburg, Grant learned of the untested unit of black soldiers that had repulsed a vicious Confederate attack at Milliken’s Bend on June 7 and of the heroism of the men of the Corps d’ Afrique that had served so gallantly, if unsuccessfully, at Port Hudson on July 9. In his reply to Lincoln on August 23, Grant—whose army was exhausted—told the president that “I have given the subject of arming the negro my hearty support. This, with the emancipation . . . is the heaviest blow yet given the Confederacy.” Lincoln, who only the year before thought blacks incapable of serving as soldiers, now saw them as indispensable to victory. “It works doubly, weakening the enemy and strengthening us.” The newly appointed Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, head of recruitment for the United States Colored Troops (USCT), arrived in Grant’s district in the spring to assess the willingness of Union officers to accept black soldiers and to help raise men for the USCT. Recruitment in the Mississippi Valley, however, proved difficult at first as Confederates removed as many of their slaves as possible to Texas and Georgia. For a discussion of Lincoln’s and Grant’s views on the recruitment of black troops in the Mississippi Valley, see: James M. McPherson, Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008), 201–202.
Executive Mansion, |
I see by a despatch of yours that you incline quite strongly towards an expedition against Mobile. This would appear tempting to me also, were it not that in view of recent events in Mexico, I am greatly impressed with the importance of re-establishing the national authority in Western Texas as soon as possible. I am not making an order, however. That I leave, for the present at least, to the General-in-Chief.
A word upon another subject. Gen. Thomas has gone again to the Mississippi Valley, with the view of raising colored troops. I have no reason to doubt that you are doing what you reasonably can upon the same subject. I believe it is a resource which, if vigorously applied now, will soon close the contest. It works doubly, weakening the enemy and strengthening us. We were not fully ripe for it until the river was opened. Now, I think at least a hundred thousand can, and ought to be rapidly organized along it’s shores, relieving all the white troops to serve elsewhere.
Mr. [Charles A.] Dana understands you as believing that the emancipation proclamation has helped some in your military operations. I am very glad if this is so. Did you receive a short letter from me, dated the 13th. of July?
Yours very truly
A. Lincoln.