Military operations began on the night of October 6, 2001 with the coalition’s Operation Crescent Wind. US ground forces, in the form of operatives from the CIA’s SAD – Ground Branch, had arrived in Afghanistan 15 days after the events of September 11 and were busy striking deals with Afghan warlords. Carrying millions of dollars of US currency, the SAD operatives bought the support of the Afghan militias opposed to the Taliban. By October 19, the first US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams were on the ground linking up with the CIA “pilot teams” and their newly recruited Afghan allies.
The Special Forces ODAs, assisted by small numbers of JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command) and UK Special Forces operators, began an unconventional warfare campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Deploying their SOFLAMs (Special Operations Forces Laser Markers) the ODAs guided in precision close air support from US Air Force, US Navy, and Royal Air Force strike aircraft and bombers. This “magic” created awe amongst their Afghan recruits and resulted in an increase in battlefield confidence, if not competence. In at least one notable case, this 21st-century technology was matched with an 18th-century cavalry charge, as B-52s supported Afghan horsemen (the battle of Bai Beche, November 2001). Soon, the Taliban-held cities began falling.
The campaign, a classic Special Forces mission, lasted 49 days and resulted in the toppling of the Taliban Government and the capture of all major population centers. Conventional forces from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit and the 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne divisions soon arrived to support the SOF vanguard. The Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies were in shock and disarray and many retreated to the south and east of the country. With NATO support, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was deployed to begin the task of reconstruction.
Members of the 2nd Battalion, 187th Infantry conduct a dismounted sweep and clear during Operation Mountain Lion, a follow-up operation to Anaconda in April 2002. This clearly shows the type of terrain Coalition forces were forced to navigate during Anaconda. (US Army)
SOF were organized into five individual task forces with specific roles and responsibilities: Joint Special Operations Task Force – North (JSOTF–N), known as Task Force Dagger; Joint Special Operations Task Force – South (JSOTF–S), known as Task Force K-Bar; Task Force Sword; The Joint Inter Agency Task Force – Counter Terrorism (JIATF–CT), known as Task Force Bowie; and Task Force 64.
Task Force Dagger was based around the US Army’s 5th Special Forces Group and provided the principal force who overthrew the Taliban and were instrumental in developing early counterinsurgency efforts throughout the war-devastated nation. Task Force K-Bar was initially manned by US Navy SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) Teams and elements of the 3rd Special Forces Group. Task Force K-Bar was also in command of the majority of Coalition SOF such as the Canadian Joint Task Force 2, the New Zealand Special Air Service Group, and the Danish Army Jaegerkorpset (Hunter Corps). K-Bar was primarily tasked with both long-range Special Reconnaissance (SR) and Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE).
Task Force Sword, later renamed Task Force 11, was an independent command of JSOC, with the sole purpose of hunting Taliban and al-Qaeda High Value Targets (HVTs). Sword was manned by rotating squadrons from the Army and Navy JSOC Special Mission Units (SMUs). Task Force Bowie was established as an intelligence fusion cell, gathering and disseminating actionable intelligence product to both the conventional forces and SOF task forces. Finally, Task Force 64 was the title given to the Australian Special Forces Task Group from the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR). The Australians were tasked with specialist long-range reconnaissance missions, enabled by the fact that SASR were the only Coalition SOF to bring their own vehicles into theater.
Advanced Force Operations (AFO) was a small element that operated under the control of Task Force Sword, the JSOC task force, which was renamed Task Force 11 in late 2001, commanding all “black” SOF in the Afghanistan theater of war. Initially when AFO was deployed, it numbered no more than 45 operators, primarily drawn from the ranks of the Army’s Tier One SMUs, the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta but including reconnaissance/sniper specialists from JSOC’s Navy SEAL Tier One SMU, the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), and attached Combat Controllers and Pararescue Jumpers from the USAF’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron (STS).
Delta had already had their B Squadron operational in Afghanistan in October 2001 conducting wide-ranging mobility operations in their Pinzgauer Special Operations Vehicles. They had also carried out one of the first offensive combat operations of the war in October 2001 when they air assaulted by MH-47E Chinooks into a walled compound outside of Kandahar, known as Objective Gecko, in search of Mullah Omar, the one-eyed cleric who led the Taliban militia. Rangers from the 1st Battalion, 75th Rangers, provided a force-protection outer cordon whilst Delta conducted the clearance and search. They didn’t find Mullah Omar, but they did run into a large number of Taliban who responded quickly to the arrival of helicopters.
A vicious firefight erupted until an on-station AC-130 Spectre gunship provided precision fire support to allow the operators and Rangers to break contact and exfiltrate. The landing gear of one MH-47E was damaged in the hasty extraction, leading to predictable Taliban claims that they had downed a helicopter. A plan to leave a stay-behind party of Delta operators in a covert observation post (OP) after the raid was not surprisingly scrapped. Media coverage focused on the publicized Ranger combat drop on Objective Rhino whilst the JSOC operation at Gecko remained virtually unknown.
A US military briefing slide showing the Operation Anaconda Area of Operations. Note projected enemy locations in the Lower Shahikot and the expected “rat line” escape routes covered by observation posts from Task Force K-Bar and Task Force 64. (US Army)
An Australian SASR reconnaissance patrol from Task Force 64 in the brutal weather that afflicted all of the recon teams from AFO, Task Force K-Bar, and Task Force 64. The Australians are readying a Perentie Long Range Patrol Vehicle, a 6×6 Land Rover based design unique to the SASR. (Australian DOD)
Small numbers of operators had also been working with the “pilot teams” of CIA SAD and 5th Special Forces Group personnel coordinating the war effort with the Northern and Eastern Alliance (and developing a plan for a Delta hostage rescue of several kidnapped non-governmental organization workers, which was eventually not required as they were released under a deal with Northern Alliance forces). These elements were joined in early December 2001 by a second Delta squadron (A Squadron) that hunted “HVT-1” himself – Usama bin Laden – in the mountains of Tora Bora.
AFO‘s operators were split between AFO South and AFO North, with a headquarters element based at Bagram within Task Force Bowie but reporting directly to Task Force 11. Task Force Bowie was led by Brigadier General Gary Harrell, a highly respected and experienced former commander of Delta, who worked for General Tommy Franks, the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander in charge of Operation Enduring Freedom. Bowie was designated as the in-theater intelligence “shop” with representatives from many government agencies (known to the military as OGA, for Other Government Agency) and from both conventional and SOF units.
Task Force 11 also had other DEVGRU SEALs (known as Task Force Blue) and Rangers from the 1st Battalion of the 75th Rangers (known as Task Force Red), supported by the aviators of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (160th SOAR, otherwise known as the Nightstalkers or Task Force Brown), deployed to Bagram as an assault element should actionable intelligence be received on the location of any of the high value targets on the Task Force “kill/capture” list.
Task Force 11 was commanded by the USAF’s Brigadier General Gregory Trebon, based on Masirah Island, some 1,600km away from the battlespace. Trebon was vastly experienced in special-operations aviation, but had little operational experience commanding SOF ground elements. Some officers in JSOC felt that Colonel Jim Schwitters, Delta’s commander, or Captain Joe Kernan, the DEVGRU commander, should instead have been commanding the Task Force – both these men had operational experience and understood the units and tactics intimately. Trebon, and his superior Major General Dell Dailey, head of JSOC, were keen to rotate Delta out and replace them with DEVGRU teams as they felt that JSOC would be the most important command in the newly announced “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) and thus didn’t want any one unit “burning out.”
A pre-mission briefing to senior officers, explaining the concept of operations for Operation Anaconda. (US Army)
Delta’s A Squadron had already been sent back to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, earlier than expected and Dailey and Trebon instead ordered DEVGRU squadrons into the Afghan theater, leaving Delta’s undeployed C Squadron frustrated and back at Bragg. These decisions had already caused friction between Trebon, Dailey, and the on-the-ground Delta contingent, frictions which would ultimately but indirectly lead to the battle of Takur Ghar.
AFO was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber, a former Ranger and veteran Delta officer, and were tasked to be the “eyes and ears” of the Coalition forces in Afghanistan. They were instructed by General Tommy Franks to “get some men out into the frontier to figure out what’s going on” (Blaber 2008: 204). Blaber and his AFO teams needed no further prompting.
All of the Delta and DEVGRU operators assigned to AFO had been handpicked and were the elite within an elite – the sniper, surveillance, and reconnaissance specialists within their respective units. Their task was to blend in with the locals, develop intelligence leads in the field, and conduct special reconnaissance on the targets they developed.
In early 2002, AFO analysts working hand in glove with their CIA and Special Forces compatriots and Harrell’s Task Force Bowie began seeing intelligence indications that a large number of foreign fighters – “Afghan Arabs” from al-Qaeda, plus Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) – and Afghan Taliban were hunkered down in the relative security of the Lower Shahikot Valley in eastern Afghanistan.
A 5th Special Forces reconnaissance patrol conducted by ODA 594 in late January 2002 provided the first indications. As they carried out a reconnaissance in the region of Zurmat District and Tergul Ghar in the Shahikot, their AMF (Afghan Militia Force) warned them against advancing any farther. ODA 594’s reporting reached Bowie and AFO and they began looking carefully at the Lower Shahikot Valley.
A map of the immediate battlespace of Operation Anaconda based on contemporary US military maps. The air assault route of Task Force Rakkasan and the proposed ground assault route of Task Force Hammer can be seen along with the observation posts maintained by the special operators of Task Force 64 to the south and K-Bar to the north. The outer-lying blocking positions to the east were designed to engage any mujahideen elements that managed to escape the initial encirclement of the valley and head toward Pakistan.
The intelligence indicated that enemy fighters were living in the villages of Serkhankheyl and Marzak, both located on the eastern approach. Overlooking these villages were Tergul Ghar to the west (soon nicknamed “The Whale” by US planners due to its similarity to a terrain feature at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California) and Takur Ghar to the south of the villages.
Many enemy fighters appeared to have fled to the valley after the defeat at Tora Bora. At Tora Bora, the CIA and Delta squadron commander requested a battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment to be deployed to block the passes into Pakistan. The request was denied amid political fears of increasing the US military “footprint” in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters managed to escape the aerial bombardment through bribing local AMF commanders and declaring a false truce allegedly to discuss surrender conditions. They instead used this ruse to slip away.
Some al-Qaeda, IMU, and Taliban crossed the border into Pakistan whilst the Americans’ main target, bin Laden, appears to have hidden in Jalalabad for a short time before, according to respected al-Qaeda authority Peter Bergen, retreating into the mountains of Kunar province. Bin Laden eventually crossed into Pakistan and settled in a custom-built compound in Abbottabad where he was famously located and killed by DEVGRU in May 2011 on Operation Neptune Spear.
As the intelligence mounted on the suspected enemy concentration in the Lower Shahikot Valley, AFO began developing options for inserting personnel into observation posts to conduct both environmental reconnaissance and pattern-of-life surveillance. An environmental reconnaissance is carried out to understand the terrain that forces may encounter – for example, the difficulty in traversing certain mountain trails, the amount and depth of snow in a given area, the availability of water sources, or the general weather and climate. It is defined as “operations conducted to collect and report critical hydrographic, geological, and meteorological information” (US DOD 2003: 5) by the US military. Broadly speaking, it is gaining an understanding of the environmental factors in the target area that may impact upon military operations.
Pattern-of-life surveillance entails maintaining covert surveillance over an area of interest to develop an understanding of that area and its inhabitants. This is generally a longer-term special reconnaissance mission as time is required to monitor and understand the atmospherics of the target location. Pattern-of-life surveillance allows operators and analysts to spot when something changes in the area of interest – for example, on a certain day the villagers take food into the hills, is it to feed insurgents (as it was on Anaconda) or are they simply having a community picnic?
For the AFO teams, it meant a lot of cold, backbreaking work infiltrating the Shahikot covertly. Blaber made the call early in the planning phase that “there will be no direct helicopter infiltrations of AFO teams anywhere near the valley” (Blaber 2008: 227) to ensure AFO didn’t spook their quarry. He felt that heliborne insertions made it impossible to surprise the enemy, giving forewarning of the operation and that the tactic limited opportunities for the teams to develop superior methods of infiltrating a target area.
A Polaris ATV ridden by a Special Forces soldier prepares to drive up the ramp of a CH-47D Chinook. This was how the JULIET AFO team extracted the valley on their specially adapted Polaris ATVs. (US Air Force)
Instead, AFO chose to conduct vehicle recons of the routes into and around the valley in local 4WD Toyota vehicles and at night on specially adapted Polaris all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). These ATVs were modified by unit mechanics with infrared headlights, GPS receivers, and suppressed exhausts. They also sent two teams of highly experienced Delta operators from their squadron’s Reconnaissance and Surveillance Troop into the area surrounding the Shahikot to conduct the environmental recons.
These two teams, codenamed JULIET and INDIA, with five and three operators respectively assigned, climbed high into the mountains and gorges of the Shahikot, often in the most extreme weather conditions, to gain an appreciation of the area of operations. Their vital intelligence was fed back to the AFO teams and would prove invaluable once Operation Anaconda was launched.
General Franks was reading the AFO daily situation reports and CIA intelligence and became convinced that an operation needed to be mounted to destroy what appeared to be a sizable enemy presence in the Lower Shahikot. Franks believed the time was right to deploy conventional forces into what could well become a large-scale, and decisive, battle with the Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants.
An initial planning meeting was held at a 5th Special Forces Group safe house with representatives of the Special Forces from Task Force Dagger, the CIA, the AFO, and staff officers from the conventional units assigned – the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 187th Infantry Regiment (1-187th and 2-187th) from the storied 101st Airborne, known as the “Rakkasans” (from a Japanese term loosely meaning “falling down umbrella man” used to describe their original role as parachute troops), and the 1st Battalion of the 87th Infantry Regiment (1-87th) of the 10th Mountain Division. Neither unit had thus far been committed to any significant combat operations and both were understandably keen to see action. As the Rakkasans were trained and equipped as air assault infantry, they also understandably began to develop an airmobile option for the attack into the Shahikot. Blaber made his point early at the meeting, backed by strong reluctance from AFO, Special Forces, and CIA, concerning the idea of landing troops in the valley by helicopter:
A US military briefing map showing the original plan featuring the main axis of attack of Task Force Hammer and the location of all proposed blocking positions to be manned by Task Force Rakkasan. (US Army)
Understand that because of the terrain and altitude, there are only two air corridors the helicopters can use to fly into the valley, and you should assume both will be covered by heavy weapons. Remember that every enemy on the planet expects the US military to attack using helicopters; this enemy will be no different. The time it will take the large, lumbering Chinooks to brake, flare, hover, and then land will make you highly vulnerable to the enemy’s antiaircraft weapons. (Blaber 2008: 241)
If any air assault was to be conducted, the SOF argued that Task Force Rakkasan should land at offset HLZs (Helicopter Landing Zones) in the heights of the Upper Shahikot and move in over the mountains to preserve at least some surprise and to hit the enemy from a direction they were not expecting.
Task Force Rakkasan held the view that inserting into the mountains would limit the amount of equipment and supplies the soldiers could carry due to the increased altitude, and slow their progress by forcing movement through snow-covered, difficult terrain. Additionally, an insertion into the mountains would potentially deprive the conventional forces of air cover from their AH-64As as the altitude would be too high for the attack helicopters to operate in.
Despite SOF’s reluctance with regard to the air assault the plan to use the helicopters to land in the valley solidified. In simple terms, the concept of operations was for Task Force Rakkasan to air assault into the valley in CH-47D Chinooks supported by six AH-64A Apache gunships and occupy blocking positions (BPs) along the eastern ridgeline of the Shahikot. Apart from organic 60mm mortars and a single 120mm mortar tube, Task Force Rakkasan would be fully reliant on the attached AH-64As and Air Force, Marine, and Navy fast air for fire support.
Task Force Rakkasan prepare to board their CH-47D Chinooks for a dry run of the air assault into the Lower Shahikot. (US Army)
The Chinooks were used rather than the small UH-60 Blackhawks as the lowest HLZ was at a height of 8,500ft, an altitude that a fully loaded Blackhawk would simply not be able to attain (one UH-60 was employed as a C2 platform for the 10th Mountain battalion staff but only carried a reduced complement of half-a-dozen individuals). The conventional troops would act as the “anvil,” manning seven BPs along the eastern ridges and destroying enemy forces fleeing from the “hammer.”
The “hammer” was based around a Special Forces force element built around some 450 Afghan militia fighters led by Commander Zia Lodin, and was considered the main effort. Lodin’s AMF, suitably code named Task Force Hammer, would enter the valley from the northern entrance in a mix of locally procured vehicles after a pre-planned aerial bombardment of key enemy positions identified by the AFO teams and other Coalition SR teams. They would then assault through the villages of Serkhankheyl and Marzak where the intelligence indicated the enemy was concentrated and force fleeing enemy forces into the BPs.
Lodin’s militia were somewhat amusingly termed “Tier One Pashtuns” by the Special Forces due to their ability to learn from training and advice provided by the SF and their eagerness to take the battle to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. His forces, with ODAs 372 and 594 and a small team of AFO, CIA, and SASR liaisons attached, would travel south from Gardez and turn west, attacking toward the village of Serkhankheyl and the towering Tergul Ghar known as “The Whale.”
Two other locally recruited Afghan forces – Kamel Khan’s AMF (supported by ODA 392 and 571) and Zakim Khan’s forces (supported by ODAs 381 and 542) – were designated Task Force Anvil and were tasked with establishing an outer cordon to stop any enemy “squirters” from escaping into Pakistan. Zakim Khan’s fighters would establish BPs at the southern end of the valley whilst Kamel Khan’s AMF would drive from Khowst and man an outer perimeter to the east.
The Special Forces leadership were concerned that Task Force Rakkasan would be landing just short of their objectives and in front of the Afghan forces of Zia Lodin and felt that a friendly fire incident was inevitable. The commanders of their attached ODAs even went to the extent of parading around an American combat engineer dressed in full “battle rattle” so that they could hopefully identify friendly forces in the confusion of battle. Nothing could be done to eliminate the possibility of Task Force Rakkasan soldiers firing on the Afghans who dressed and were equipped in a similar manner to their Taliban opponents.
Infantrymen of Task Force Rakkasan conduct dry runs, practising their building clearance drills using string on the ground to mark out the boundaries of the buildings. (US Army)
If a HVT was positively located during Anaconda, all offensive operations were to be stopped and conventional forces were tasked to place a cordon around the location of the HVT, ensuring that no enemy could escape or be reinforced. They would then await the arrival of Task Force 11’s direct action assault elements that would conduct the actual capture.
The Task Force Blue SEALs and the Task Force Red Ranger element would fly up from Bagram in their designated Nightstalker helicopters with flying times estimated at roughly an hour. The agreed procedure was a ridiculous requirement when considering the highly trained veteran operators from both black SOF and white SOF already in the immediate Area of Operations (AO). Additionally, the idea of halting all offensive operations in the middle what could be a major battle was likewise ill-considered at the least.
An Air Force Combat Controller attached to a Special Forces ODA guides in Coalition air strikes, using his SOFLAM laser designator to mark the target for the laser-guided bombs. (DOD)
Further intelligence developed by Task Force Bowie, the AFO, and the CIA reported that the Taliban and foreign fighters had forced the local Afghans from the villages on the valley floor with few civilians remaining. It was also ascertained that a wanted Taliban commander, Jalaluddin Haqani, a seasoned veteran of the Soviet–Afghan War and once supported by Western intelligence agencies, was in overall military command of the valley.
Additionally, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan deputy leader Tahir Yuldashev was present on the ground and in command of IMU forces in the area. Saifur Rahman Mansoor was allegedly in charge of the Taliban elements within the Valley. There were even indicators that other HVTs, including bin Laden, may have been resident in the valley.
The noted Afghanistan specialist, Lester Grau, believes there were initially some 600 estimated enemy fighters in the valley, which tallies with other credible sources. Coalition intelligence estimates pre-Anaconda of 150 enemy indicates that they had significantly underestimated opposition strength in the valley. Colonel Mulholland of the 5th Special Forces Group later commented, “I knew in my gut that there were more than a few hundred” (Briscoe et al. 2003: 281).
These mujahideen forces were deployed in what appeared to be a “caste” system of sorts with little direct coordination between the “castes” – Pete Blaber recounts that al-Qaeda and the “Afghan Arabs” were considered (by themselves) as the top tier, with the Uzbeks and Chechens of the IMU next down, and finally the Afghan Taliban on the lowest rung of the ladder. A disgruntled Taliban fighter told Blaber that al-Qaeda treated the Taliban fighters “like we are dogs” (quoted in Blaber 2008: 246) with the Afghan rank and file strictly forbidden even to speak to the al-Qaeda mujahideen.
The valley was protected by a multilayered defense in depth. At the entrances to the valley, the insurgents maintained checkpoints which allowed them early warning of any ground-based intrusion into the Shahikot. As the official history of US Army SOF in Afghanistan relates, the valley was “classic guerrilla terrain – easily defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of escape, and near a sympathetic border” (Briscoe et al. 2003: 280).
The mujahideen had emplaced multiple 82mm and 120mm mortars covering the entrances to the valley, with the base plates often cemented into position to allow preregistered fire missions – another sign that whoever had developed the defenses knew what they were doing. A number of elderly but still lethal 76mm field guns and 122mm howitzers had also been emplaced in the valley with their arcs covering the entrances.
The air-defense network was similarly well sited. Weapons systems had been deployed to provide interlocking firing arcs against all likely avenues of approach by a heliborne force. These ranged from S-60 57mm antiaircraft guns to ZPU-1 14.5mm antiaircraft cannon. The eastern peaks were additionally defended by multiple DShK 12.7mm heavy machine guns on antiaircraft mounts, often in sandbagged positions with overhead cover. There was also at least one SA-7 Grail/Strela MANPADS available.
Thankfully there appears to have been no known use of American Stinger MANPADS that were a leftover from the Soviet–Afghan War. The battery packs fortunately had a relatively short “shelf life” that may explain their nonappearance. Whatever the reason, the lack of Stingers in enemy hands in the Shahikot was a blessing. Even one of the more advanced American MANPADS would have spelt disaster for the Chinooks of Task Force Rakkasan.
A door-gunner aboard a 160th SOAR MH-47E engages a target with his 7.62×51mm M134 minigun. Electrically powered, these guns were knocked out when RAZOR 01 lost its electrics during the crash landing on Takur Ghar. (DOD)
The static air defenses were very well placed on the so-called military crest of the mountains with the weapons systems oriented toward the valley, rather than on the tops of mountains where they would be more exposed to lethal fires from the USAF bombardment. Whoever had designed the defenses, most likely the elder Mansoor, he knew what he was doing and understood the likely avenues of attack.
The ridges were also peppered with caves, both natural and manmade, with some dating back to the 1980s. Major General Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain explained in an interview with Field Artillery magazine in September/October 2002:
The eastern ridge had more than one hundred caves dug in throughout the ridgeline. The enemy went from what appeared to be small fighting positions to the complex caves; the largest cave we found was about thirty meters deep in an inverted ‘V’ and then went right and left another thirty meters each. That cave was filled with weapons and ammunition caches. (McElroy 2002: 5)
On February 28, 2002, three AFO teams were covertly infiltrated into the valley. JULIET was an Army Delta element comprised of five operators including one signals-intelligence specialist from Grey Fox, the intelligence unit that conducts signals and electronic intelligence gathering for JSOC. The team entered from the north using Delta’s specially modified ATVs and drove through snow, rain, and high winds using their night-vision devices to eventually reach an OP location on the east side of the valley. The second team was also an Army Delta element with an attached Grey Fox operator and was codenamed INDIA. This three-man team walked into the valley through the same incredibly fierce weather and climbed to establish their OP in the southwest of the valley in a location known as “The Fish Hook.” The final team, MAKO 31, was from DEVGRU and was comprised of three SEALs, an Air Force Combat Controller, and, curiously, a Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operator. It is unclear what support an EOD specialist could possibly provide to a covert surveillance team and his inclusion on the mission has never been explained. MAKO 31 also infiltrated on foot via the southern edge of the valley to set up their OP on a terrain feature known as “The Finger.”
All three elements were tasked with covertly confirming enemy strengths and dispositions including anti-aircraft emplacements, ensuring the designated Rakkasan HLZs were clear of obstructions and providing terminal guidance for air support both prior to and during the insertion of the Rakkasans. The OP teams took advantage of the poor weather that kept the mujahideen in their caves and tents. The AFO teams wore a mix of Afghan and US clothing including camouflage “ghillie”-type suits known as Leafywear, were armed with both M4A1 carbines and the heavier-caliber SR-25 sniper rifle, and carried Schmidt-Cassegrain spotting ’scopes to enable them to plot enemy locations. Each team was also equipped with portable PRC-117F SATCOM radios linked to their Toshiba laptops to allow them to transmit grid locations and messages to the AFO Tactical Operations Center (TOC).
JULIET was in place by 04:45 whilst INDIA reached their OP at 10,500ft at 05:22, just beating the dawn. MAKO 31 had a very difficult infiltration route and ran out of darkness before they could reach their OP, stopping around 1,000m from their desired location. They would close the distance on the following night with day movement considered too risky with the large number of enemy evidently in the valley.
Also on February 28, the CIA flew a Mi-17 ‘Hip’ helicopter in commercial markings down the valley to conduct an aerial reconnaissance. The ‘Hip’ carried a video camera that provided the Rakkasan leadership with some indication of the terrain they would be facing. AFO appears to have been opposed to the overflight on the basis that it may have spooked the enemy.
Whilst the AFO teams settled into their covert OPs, other special reconnaissance teams were also inserting into the valley. These teams were drawn principally from Task Force K-Bar and Task Force 64 and were tasked with establishing OPs which “had to be tenable, afford good reconnaissance, and cover the identified escape routes, or ‘rat lines’ into Pakistan” (quoted in Briscoe et al. 2003: 281) according to one of the planners. Some 25 teams from US and Coalition SOF including US Navy SEALs from Teams 2, 3, and 8, US Army Special Forces from the 3rd SF Group, and personnel from Canada’s JTF-2, Australia’s SASR, New Zealand’s SAS Group, the German KSK, Norway’s Jaegerkommando, the Dutch Korps Commandotroepen, and the Danish Army’s Jaegerkorpset, were to be inserted on the outer edges of the valley to the east to cut off these potential escape routes. These SR teams largely remained uncompromised throughout the duration of Anaconda and provided vital intelligence which allowed air support to intercept enemy “squirters” and inhibit the ability of the enemy to reinforce positions (as an example, three NZSAS patrols remained in place without resupply for some ten days as did numerous other Coalition SOF teams).
A slightly blurred image from the surveillance camera of MAKO 31, the SEAL team on “The Finger.” It shows a mujahideen fighter, possibly a Chechen, checking on a 12.7mm DShK heavy machine gun on an antiaircraft tripod. This mujahideen along with his comrades was later killed by MAKO 31 and a follow-up AC-130 strike at about 04:00, two hours before the Rakkasans landed in the valley. (US Army)
The third AFO team, MAKO 31, moved into position during the predawn darkness of March 1. The team sent forward three SEALs to scout their proposed OP location before moving all of their equipment up and promptly discovered that the mujahideen had already established a fighting position exactly where their OP was to be located. Several enemy fighters appeared to be on the peak living in a large multiperson tent and had deployed a 12.7mm DShK heavy machine gun on a dedicated antiaircraft tripod. The DShK had excellent firing arcs over the southern end of the valley and could inflict serious damage on the Rakkasans’ air assault if left in place.
The SEALs were surprised to see Caucasian-looking mujahideen moving around the location dressed in commercial cold-weather gear and what appeared to be Russian camouflage-pattern fatigues. MAKO 31 urgently informed AFO of their discovery and, not surprisingly, asked whether any British or Coalition Special Forces were operating at their location. Once they established there was no chance of fratricide and that the fighters were likely Chechens of the IMU, the SEALs developed a plan with AFO to attack and destroy the mujahideen position just before H-Hour, which was set for 06:30 on March 2.
JULIET also had a close call with a number of enemy fighters. On March 1, four or five mujahideen, braving the elements, trudged past JULIET’s positions and appeared to spot the tracks of their ATVs. The mujahideen appeared confused by the tracks but eventually moved off without conducting any serious sweep of the area, leaving JULIET uncompromised.
The OP teams reported these ominous developments to AFO who passed them on to the Task Force Rakkasan leadership. The OP teams were also reporting large numbers of mujahideen moving about the valley and plotted numerous enemy positions on the ridges to the east and west. They also noted no evidence of any civilian occupation of the villages on the valley floor. All of the indications were that the civilian population had been forcibly displaced by the mujahideen and that the real threat was not on the valley floor but on the heights surrounding the Shahikot.
Another image from the surveillance camera of MAKO 31, showing “The Finger.” Two foreign mujahideen are visible outside the tent the defenders of the peak slept in. These mujahideen were later killed by MAKO 31. (US Army)
Seen through passive night vision, infantrymen from Task Force Rakkasan board their helicopters for the early-morning assault into the valley. (US Army)
As planned, several hours before the launch of Operation Anaconda (H-Hour or 06:30), MAKO 31 cautiously moved a three-man team forward toward the mujahideen position on “The Finger.” The three DEVGRU snipers would engage the mujahideen at precisely 05:30 before withdrawing to allow an orbiting AC-130 Spectre to complete the job of destroying the DShK position with its heavier ordnance.
Luck was not on the team’s side that morning. At approximately 04:00, a mujahideen left the tent and walked up the ridgeline, apparently looking for a spot to relieve himself. The SEALs tensed as the enemy fighter moved directly toward their position. The mujahideen suddenly spotted the SEALs, shouted a warning to his comrades, and ran back toward the tent. The team leader gave the order to engage and the three SEALs opened fire on the running mujahideen and the tent, inadvertently firing the first shots of Operation Anaconda.
Two of the three SEALs suffered stoppages with their M4A1 carbines, perhaps due to the climatic conditions, allowing five enemy to escape from the tent. Moments later, their carbines were firing again and three mujahideen were engaged and killed with aimed fire. The operators fired the remainder of their magazines into the tent and swiftly broke contact to allow the AC-130 to do its job.
GRIM 31, circling overhead, could see two further mujahideen moving around the back of the tent, attempting to flank the SEALs. One fired a burst from a Russian PKM general-purpose machine gun at the operators that fortunately missed. GRIM 31 cleared a “danger close” (bombs or other ordnance delivered close to friendly forces with the potential for wounding those friendlies) fire mission with MAKO 31, and as the SEALs took cover, delivered the first of several 105mm howitzer rounds down onto the peak. The first shell killed both remaining mujahideen with the follow-up rounds destroying the tent and the DShK position itself.
MAKO 31 swept through the mujahideen position to conduct a bomb damage assessment (BDA) and to recover any intelligence materials. The mujahideen were apparently very well equipped, with the PKM general-purpose machine gun, an RPG-7, a Dragunov SVD sniper rifle, and numerous AKs. In addition, the SEALs learnt that the DShK was likewise well supplied – some 2,000 rounds of ammunition sat in linked belts beside the gun that would have proved deadly to the lumbering Chinooks of Task Force Rakkasan.
Zia Lodin’s Task Force Hammer left Gardez as planned on the early morning of March 2. Soon, however, the plan began to unravel. Although there was nearly a full moon and good visibility, the Afghans were unfamiliar with driving at night and soon any pretense at light discipline was lost as the Afghans turned on their headlights. Numerous vehicles became bogged or broke down and the convoy suffered a rollover, which injured a dozen AMF.
Three ODA 372 soldiers with a handful of AMF broke off from the main column to establish an OP at the northern entrance to the valley to support Lodin’s advance. The first tragedy of Operation Anaconda was about to occur. The pilot of GRIM 31, the orbiting AC-130 that had supported MAKO 31 minutes earlier, cleared fires against a small column of vehicles he could see on the ground and the weapons officer fired the AC-130’s 40mm Bofors cannon into the group. ODA 372’s Chief Warrant Officer Stanley Harriman was killed as were two AMF in the lead Ground Mobility Vehicle. Both of the other Special Forces soldiers were wounded as were seven AMF, some seriously. It was later established that GRIM 31’s navigational systems were malfunctioning and that the location plotted for Harriman’s convoy was not correct. Other SF soldiers quickly aborted any further fires from the AC-130 until they could establish what had occurred.
As the convoy finally moved off again, the first USAF bombs struck Tergul Ghar – seven Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) smart bombs striking targets previously identified by the AFO and SASR teams. The ODAs and Lodin were stunned when the air strikes did not continue. They had been promised virtually a full hour of aerial bombardment prior to the attack and this had been a key leverage in convincing the Afghans to actually join the fight.
There is still confusion over exactly why the preparatory air strikes were aborted – several accounts mention an unspecified SOF element calling for the strikes to be halted as the ordnance was landing too close to their position, whilst others lay the blame at poor planning and coordination with the air component of Anaconda. Certainly the aircraft were in place at the right time – one B-1 bomber, one B-2 bomber, and a pair of F-15Es circled overhead, but only seven bombs were released.
Lodin’s column eventually began to move forward again only to be struck by a heavy 82mm mortar barrage by the by-now fully awake and aware enemy. The Afghans moved forward once more until they finally halted before “The Whale.” Lodin’s own mortar crews were deployed and managed to fire several counterbattery fire missions against the emplaced enemy mortars.
The AMF were briefly supported by a pair of AH-64As who engaged enemy mortar crews on the western ridges of “The Whale.” The attack helicopters were soon recalled to support Task Force Rakkasan as they prepared to air assault into the valley. This would be the only close air support (CAS) the AMF received that day. The attached ODAs attempted to rally the AMF but to no avail, and Task Force Hammer, frustrated by the lack of air support and with growing casualties from enemy mortars, finally withdrew to Gardez.
With the main effort halted and in disarray, the six CH-47D Chinook heavy-lift helicopters of Task Force Rakkasan thundered into the Shahikot Valley exactly on H-Hour at 06:30. The Rakkasans landed two rifle companies from each of the 2-187th and the 1-87th onto the valley floor. The 1-187th was also assigned to Task Force Rakkasan but was being held as a strategic reserve and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and as such was not inserted with the initial Chinook lift. Overhead, five AH-64As (a sixth had been grounded with mechanical problems) from the 101st’s Killer Spades flew air cover, watching for mujahideen weapons positions that could threaten the Chinooks.
Incredibly, the enemy defenders appeared to be surprised by the air assault and did not take the Chinooks under fire. This may perhaps be explained by the distraction of Task Force Hammer’s advance and the fact that the various groups of enemies did not effectively communicate, negating a hasty response to the air assault operation into the valley. Such a response, resulting in even one downed helicopter, would have certainly been a disaster and changed the course of the battle.
As the soldiers raced down the helicopter ramps and quickly established perimeter security, the first shots rang out. Initially, the enemy small-arms fire was scattered and intermittent and the troops, many coming under fire for the first time, had difficulty locating the source of the incoming fire. Soon, the rate of fire increased as enemy gunners manned their heavy weapons and turned them toward the valley floor and the Rakkasans.
The two companies of the 2-187th landed in the northern end of the valley and began receiving effective enemy fire as they advanced but they managed to seize most of their closest BPs. The two companies of the 10th Mountain’s 1-87th were landed at the southern end and experienced immediate and protracted resistance from the valley’s defenders. The volume of fire pinned them down in a small depression that offered their only cover and which would become known as “Hell’s Halfpipe.”
As the men of Task Force Rakkasan attempted to suppress the enemy fire and secure their objectives, the AH-64As began engaging mujahideen positions on the ridges above. The Killer Spades encountered heavy resistance, with the enemy determined to bring down an Apache. The mujahideen used their DShKs and ZPU-1s along with bracketed small-arms fire against the attack helicopters. The enemy also began firing their RPG rockets into the air, intending for the self-destruct mechanism that automatically detonates the warheads at 920m to catch the helicopters in lethal “flak bursts” of shrapnel. The Afghan mujahideen had long experience in using the RPG as a field-expedient antiaircraft weapon and these skills had been shared with their allies. The mujahideen in the Shahikot began to use another of these Soviet–Afghan War-era tactics – launching barrages of RPGs just ahead of the helicopters as the Apaches navigated through the valley.
A US military briefing map showing the projected locations of all elements before Task Force Hammer was left in disarray after the AC-130 friendly-fire incident and the lack of preparatory air strikes. Note the SOF teams deployed to assist in cutting off any withdrawing mujahideen. (US Army)
Two Apaches were taken out of the fight early on the first day as they were peppered with RPG and machine-gun fire and forced to return to base. One AH-64A was hit by an RPG, which destroyed its left-side Hellfire mount, sending shrapnel through the airframe. The same Apache was also simultaneously engaged by a DShK, rounds from which actually penetrated the cockpit, narrowly missing the pilots. When the damaged helicopter was eventually landed, the crew counted more than 30 bullet holes in the fuselage in addition to the RPG damage.
On the ground, the infantrymen of Task Force Rakkasan were initially outgunned by the mujahideen. Their 5.56mm M4s and M249s did not have the range to effectively engage the valley’s defenders. Nor did they have the penetrative power to punch through the enemy’s prepared positions. Their few 7.62mm M240B general-purpose machine guns and the 40mm M203 launchers carried by every fire team were the only squad weapons systems that were proving effective in the difficult long-range environment they found themselves in.
The 2-187th brought with them no mortars in their initial Chinook lift. The 1-87th had brought in their organic 60mm infantry mortars and a single 120mm mortar that had only recently been added to the unit’s Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). The mortars became the most effective infantry weapons of the battle with their ability to lob bombs into mujahideen fighting positions and suppress the enemy’s heavy weapons. The enemy also quickly realized that the US mortars were the greatest threat and poured small-arms and mortar counterbattery fire against them. The sole 120mm mortar was soon fired dry after having expended the 35 bombs its crew brought in on the insertion.
No sooner would an enemy firing position be suppressed than another would pop up. The mujahideen used the network of caves and prepared positions to their advantage, moving between sites and hiding their mortars, machine guns, and recoilless rifles when air support was overhead. Major General Hagenbeck later explained in Field Artillery magazine:
The al Qaeda soldiers would hear fixed wing aircraft overhead and quickly duck into the caves, protected from most air dropped munitions. So to get them, we had to put a JDAM inside the cave. But you only have so many of those precision munitions.
To keep the enemy from ducking back into their caves, we used mortars and machine guns to kill them outright, when we could, or suppress them. We got a number of kills with close air support but they were primarily because our mortars and machine guns kept the al Qaeda from getting up and running back into the caves. (Quoted in McElroy 2002: 6)
Colonel Frank Wiercinski, commander of Task Force Rakkasan, was later quoted on the quality of the mujahideen in the Shahikot in a 2002 interview with noted columnist Austin Bay:
They are tenacious. They wanted to go toe to toe with the US Army. They formed up there. They knew we could see them and come after them. They wanted to go face to face and say something. They were prepared. They had weapons systems they had been trained on: 82s, RPGs, small arms – AKs predominantly.
And they are very good with 82 mm mortars. They’re good with RPG tactics. I watched an Apache get hit with an RPG. I saw Apaches get hit with a lot of stuff and take it. I did not find them to be very good as marksmen, and they were not good at night. We owned the night. (Bay 2002)
Despite the heavy opposition, Task Force Rakkasan managed to secure their BPs to the north by the middle of the morning. After initially seizing a compound that had been very recently vacated by foreign mujahideen (leaving behind several SPG-9 recoilless rifles, RPG launchers, 82mm mortar bombs, and IED-making components), the men of the 2-187th began to take the fight to the enemy with units advancing up the difficult slopes to engage mujahideen positions.
The scheduled second lift of troops into the valley was postponed and eventually aborted due to increasingly poor weather and the tenacity of the enemy defenders – Task Force Rakkasan leadership were understandably concerned about a Chinook being lost to the significant air defenses in the valley. The men of the 10th Mountain at the southern HLZs were still pinned down, however. The 1st Platoon of Charlie Company of the 1-87th briefly secured one of their BPs before 82mm mortar fire wounded ten members of the platoon, forcing them to withdraw back into “Hell’s Halfpipe.”
Much of the fire directed at 1-87th was coming from the village of Marzak to the northwest of the depression they sheltered in. Hagenbeck explained: “Later on the first day and into the second day, when I declared two of the villages in the Shah-e-Kot Valley as targets, the aircraft leveled them – we had taken hostile fire from the villages and flown Predators over them to confirm their activities. The aircraft’s precision munitions were most effective against those fixed targets” (quoted in McElroy 2002: 8).
Even with the fire from the village eliminated, mujahideen attempted to flank the 1-87th throughout the day. The battalion commander’s tactical HQ landed by UH-60 Blackhawk on a ridge below “The Finger” where MAKO 31 had earlier eliminated the mujahideen DShK position. The Blackhawk was fired upon both by RPGs and small-arms fire that narrowly missed the aircraft – if MAKO 31 had not destroyed the concealed DShK, doubtless the Blackhawk would have been shot down. The HQ element linked up with the AFO team before also being mortared. MAKO 31’s attached Combat Controller joined forces with the battalion commander’s air liaison officer to direct fast air onto the enemy mortar positions.
A two-man sniper “pair” from the 101st Airborne search for targets in the Shahikot Valley on March 4, 2002. The spotter in the foreground is identifying insurgent positions with an M114 spotting ’scope for the sniper who is “on the gun” in the background, manning his 7.62×51mm M24 sniper rifle with mounted AN/PVS-10 Day/Night sight. The M24, with an effective range of 800m, was one of the few weapons initially deployed during Anaconda which could decisively engage the enemy at the extended ranges encountered in the valley. (Getty Images)
The Brigade Air Liaison Officer coordinates with MAKO 31’s Combat Controller to guide in air strikes against targets in the Shahikot. This image was taken on “The Finger.” (US Army)
The other AFO teams continued to provide the best overview of enemy strengths and intentions from their mountaintop vantage points. Their only frustration was that Task Force Rakkasan had “priority of fires” over AFO and the other SOF SR teams surrounding the valley. This meant that if a Rakkasan Enlisted Terminal Attack Controller (ETAC) requested an air strike, his request would take precedence as they were classed as “troops in contact” whilst the special operators for the most part were not in direct contact with the enemy and thus their requests naturally took second place. The frustration was compounded as the AFO teams often had a far better read on the exact locations of enemy fire than the Rakkasans purely because of their location, and understanding and experience of the valley.
The Grey Fox operators of Task Force Orange attached to the OP teams also proved their worth, intercepting enemy communications and translating the intelligence to pass up the line. The signals-intelligence specialists managed to warn when the enemy was sending reinforcements or attempting to flank friendly forces on the valley floor. They even managed to triangulate the location of enemy spotters from their radio transmissions.
The Task Force Rakkasan leadership eventually decided that the second Chinook lift of troops would be inserted into the northern end of the valley to advance toward the southern end, clearing the eastern ridges as they went. The soldiers of the 1-87th, and their 26 wounded, would be extracted after dark. Task Force Hammer, and their SF advisors, had attempted another advance but again came under heavy and effective 82mm mortar fire. Receiving no air support as Rakkasan’s plight, particularly in the southern end of the Shahikot, monopolized all available air assets, the Afghan fighters eventually withdrew once again back to Gardez, playing no further part in the fight.
As darkness finally fell on a long day of combat, the mighty AC-130s returned over the Shahikot and began to pummel enemy firing points. The men of the 1-87th marked targets by goading the enemy into firing. The return fire registered on the AC-130’s sensors and was rapidly followed up with 105mm howitzer rounds. A HH-60G Pave Hawk was brought in to evacuate the most seriously wounded. The helicopter narrowly avoided an RPG fired at it and as it lifted off, a DShK opened fire on the departing HH-60G. The DShK position was noted by the orbiting AC-130 and as soon as the helicopter was clear of the airspace, the position was destroyed by a 105mm round.
Several hours later, the extraction Chinooks arrived and touched down near “Hell’s Halfpipe,” the AC-130s keeping a close eye on any enemy activity. The exhausted men piled aboard the pair of Chinooks and they lifted off without incident. The AC-130s had apparently cowed the enemy into submission and not a single round was fired at the helicopters as they flew up and away from the valley. The TAC HQ element near “The Finger,” and overwatched by MAKO 31 who had returned to their OP, was also extracted by a Chinook in the same lift.
The next day, the strategic reserve component of Task Force Rakkasan, the 1-187th, was inserted into the northern end of the valley by Chinook supported by the Mortar Platoon of the 1-87th – this time with two 120mm and two 81mm mortar tubes. Linking up with the 2-187th, Task Force Rakkasan secured several BPs midway down the valley and took up static positions to allow close air support to pummel the enemy.
This image, taken from “The Finger” looking east, shows a string of Mark 82 500lb bombs being dropped from a B-52 upon targets near BP “Ginger.” Takur Ghar can be seen to the far left of the bomb strikes. (US Army)
The air component had been significantly enhanced since the chaos of the first day. A flight of USAF A-10A Thunderbolt II ground-attack aircraft were deployed to Bagram and began near-constant sorties in support of the Rakkasans. Sixteen more Apaches from the 101st Aviation were deployed in support (replacing the one operational Apache left flying after the first day of the battle) as were five AH-1W Cobra gunships from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Major General Hagenbeck later commented on the close air support his men received during Anaconda:
The most effective close air support asset we had was the Apache, hands down. The Apaches were extraordinary – they were lethal and survivable … The detainees later said the Apaches were the most feared weapons on the battlefield – the helicopters were on top of them before they knew what was happening. The Apaches came as close to “one shot, one kill” as you can get.
Our next most effective CAS assets were the A-10s in the daytime and AC-130s at night. They were great. We also had F-16s and F/A-18s and B-52s providing CAS. For the most part, they carried JDAMs and some dumb bombs. (Quoted in McElroy 2002: 7)
With the greatly expanded air support and reinforcements from the 1-187th, Task Force Rakkasan advanced down the Shahikot, clearing the ridges as well as the floor of the valley. The SOF OPs manned by the special operators of the SFO and Task Force K-Bar continued to severely hamper the ability of the enemy to reorganize or reinforce against the Rakkasans. However an urgent request by Task Force 11 leadership to insert further, probably unneeded, SOF teams into the fight, would soon end in disaster.