Long-simmering territorial disputes, control of potential oil deposits, and concerns about American-supported insurgents had pushed the new communist government in Phnom Penh to defend its oceanic sovereignty around Cambodia. Nations in the region had a history of geographical disputes that made relations contentious for decades. Some of these issues arose after France withdrew from her colonies in Indochina, resulting in the independence of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. For several years, Phnom Penh sparred over borders shared with South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. In the Gulf of Thailand, ongoing questions regarding undefined maritime boundaries and ownership of several islands led to problems, including armed confrontations between South Vietnam and Thailand.
Pol Pot’s rise to power did not alter Cambodia’s border problems. Khmer Rouge forces, despite recently taking control of Cambodia, were still trying to assert sovereignty over several islands, including Poulo Wai, Hon Panjang, and Dao Phu Quoc. Cambodian soldiers had raided Dao Phu Quoc, for example, on May 1, 1975, to demonstrate the government’s seriousness over this issue. The boundary problems were not only about national honor, but also control over a more substantive resource – petroleum. These islands contained potential oil reserves that might bring wealth to a war-ravaged nation. Whatever country controlled this area would have a great advantage to get access to oil and natural gas reserves.
Revolution in Cambodia cemented apparent communist control over the country. Although the Khmer Rouge had secured the nation, the fight had been long and bloody. The former Lon Nol government had received vast quantities of arms and funds from the United States, while the vehement xenophobia of Pol Pot’s government contributed to a heightened fear of potential foreign activities to overthrow the new communist regime. Khmer Rouge military units were on alert to intercept Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funded insurgents crossing the border with Thailand, or landing from ships transiting the Gulf of Thailand. Pol Pot was still fearful that merchant ships, in the guise of commercial trade, were secretly funneling CIA weapons to insurgents trying to ignite a counter-revolution. Additionally, the Cambodian government was also concerned about potential American espionage efforts to aid its enemies. The new government had started to expel all foreigners from Cambodian soil, and foreign governments could not contact the Pol Pot government directly. Compounding this problem was the new regime’s struggles to organize the government and get control over its military forces and foreign relations, activities that needed time to consolidate.
This Mayaguez photograph shows the container ship after its recovery. The ship was en route from Hong Kong to Singapore with a stop in Thailand when it was captured. After the incident, it continued to serve as a freighter until its owners scrapped it in 1979. (US Navy)
Boundary squabbles and perceived security questions were immediate problems that required solutions. One method to illustrate Cambodian resolve was to maintain a naval presence and demonstrate aggressively its ability to enforce its maritime boundaries. Khmer Rouge Swift boats, former US Navy patrol craft captured from the Lon Nol government, provided the capability to enforce Cambodian boundary claims. In early May 1975, Khmer Rouge naval units started to seize vessels in the Gulf of Thailand. On May 2, Cambodian military forces took control of seven Thai fishing boats. Two days later, the South Korean freighter Masan Ho avoided seizure, but Khmer Rouge gunboats chased and fired upon the ship. Khmer Rouge naval units also took refugee boats fleeing South Vietnam. The most serious maritime incident occurred on May 7, when Cambodians held a Panamanian freighter for 35 hours. Phnom Penh officials had ordered the detention and interrogation of the ship and crew. The communist government’s actions were not new; under Lon Nol, Cambodian naval forces had also taken Thai fishing boats caught in its waters.
Cambodians were not the only military forces in the region. Khmer Rouge naval forces had witnessed American military and commercial shipping throughout the Gulf of Thailand area. Washington maintained several USAF tactical and strategic wings on bases in Thailand, remnants of the massive American Southeast Asian military presence to fight the Vietnam War. USAF aircraft flew training missions throughout the region, and the US Navy had evacuated American citizens and others when Phnom Penh fell to the communists. US Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) ships patrolled the Gulf of Thailand to aid refugees fleeing both Cambodia and Vietnam. Additionally P-3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft conducted surveillance missions that included flying near Cambodia.
The end of the Vietnam War did not stop the Cold War. Washington still had to contend with Soviet Pacific naval activities along with securing trade routes for American and allied nations. PACFLT assets also conducted training exercises and transited international waters. However, disagreements arose about what constituted international waters. Washington insisted on recognizing only a 3 nautical mile territorial boundary while Phnom Penh, among other Southeast Asian states, claimed a 12 nautical mile limit. Cambodia had argued for such a boundary since 1969. Despite these incidents, commercial shipping continued to travel to routine destinations through the region.
One of the hundreds of commercial vessels plying the Pacific trading routes was the SS Mayaguez. The Mayaguez was a 10,485-ton containerized American-flagged cargo ship. Built in 1944 as the SS White Falcon, the ship had a crew of 40 and carried 107 commercial, 77 military, and 90 empty containers on May 12. Charles T. Miller was Mayaguez’s captain and the voyage initially seemed uneventful. He was guiding the ship from Hong Kong via Sattahip, Thailand, to its final destination of Singapore. Miller would drop off the military cargo at Sattahip. This cargo did not include weapons; instead, it contained machine parts, supplies, mail, replacement equipment, commissary goods, and food. The remaining military containers, about half of the cargo, was destined for base exchanges at the USAF’s Thai installations. The Mayaguez’s path would pass close to Poulo Wai. Khmer Rouge units had already taken the island from the Vietnamese. Despite the recent ship seizures, Miller had not received any warnings about problems with Khmer Rouge gunboats. The vessel steamed at 12.5 knots on a heading towards Thailand.
At 1418hrs on May 12, two Cambodian Swift boats approached the Mayaguez and fired across the bow and down her sides with rockets and .50-caliber rounds. Fortunately, the Mayaguez’s radio operator transmitted a Mayday message that reported they were under attack. Miller was about 7 nautical miles southwest of Poulo Wai when seven Khmer Rouge naval personnel boarded his ship. Poluo Wai is located approximately 60 nautical miles south of the Cambodian mainland. Armed with a combination of AK-47 and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) weapons, the Khmer Rouge boarding party indicated, on navigational maps, for Miller to proceed to Kompong Som. Kompong Som, is a port complex on the Cambodian coast. However, the Mayaguez had a damaged radar system that could endanger the vessel, since there were many shallow reefs in the region, which would be especially difficult to negotiate if Miller proceeded to Kompong Som at night.
The National Security Council met several times during the Mayaguez incident. Ford’s administration had several Nixon appointees who gave him an experienced national security team. Here acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, briefs Ford as William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, looks on. (Ford Presidential Library)
John Neal of the Delta Exploration Company, in Jakarta, Indonesia, received the following emergency message: “Have been fired upon and boarded by Cambodian armed forces at 9 degrees 48 minutes North/102 degrees 53 minutes East. Ship being towed to unknown Cambodian port.” Neal tried to raise the Mayaguez, but failed to do so. He then contacted the American embassy in Jakarta to report the incident. Another shipping agency in Singapore also transmitted the message to the local American embassy. Washington would soon hear about the boarding. The US defense attaché in Singapore notified PACFLT’s Commander, Seventh Fleet. The American ambassador in Jakarta sent immediate messages to the White House, NSA, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), and other appropriate commands. CINCPAC was the regional combatant command responsible for military actions in the Pacific area, including the Gulf of Thailand. Located in Honolulu, Hawaii, CINCPAC only had command of assigned air, naval, ground, and marine forces. Other forces in-theater, such as strategic reconnaissance aircraft, belonged to other commands. NMCC officials started to discuss the Mayaguez situation with the CINCPAC staff and suggested that they prepare to send Navy and USAF reconnaissance aircraft to search for and locate the Mayaguez.
Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General David C. Jones, received the news about the Mayaguez at 0646hrs. In Cambodia the local time was 1746hrs, and time zone differences would affect some coordination and decision-making. About 45 minutes later, Jones ordered CINCPAC to launch reconnaissance aircraft to locate the Mayaguez. Fortunately, search aircraft would have to go no further than Poulo Wai; due to approaching darkness and the broken radar, Miller convinced his Cambodian captors to anchor off the island.
President Gerald R. Ford had been in office less than a year. Ford had replaced Richard M. Nixon, who had resigned in lieu of facing impeachment due to the Watergate scandal. At his 0740hrs daily intelligence briefing, CIA briefers told Ford about the Mayaguez. Washington would soon react.