Anti-reductionist: A position in philosophy of mind that the mind and mental states are complex phenomena and cannot be wholly reduced to and wholly explained by more basic entities such as the brain and brain states or even more basic material states.
Artificial Intelligence: The scientific research project of designing computer programs and machines that model or simulate human intelligence.
Asymmetry: A lack of a relationship of correspondence, equivalence, or identity between something’s parts or between different things.
Begging the question (Question-begging): A fallacy or logical mistake in reasoning in which an argument assumes as a true premise the conclusion that is supposed to be proven.
Category mistake: A mistake regarding the kind or type of entity under discussion in which this entity is described in terms that do not apply to it but to entities of a different kind.
Causally quiescent: “Quiescence” is a state of rest or stillness. When something is causally quiescent it is not causally interacting with any other things such that they would be affected by it and, in turn, cause other effects.
Central State Identity/Type Identity: The view that types of mental states are identical to types of brain states.
Cogito, ergo sum: Latin phrase meaning, “I think, therefore I am.”
Contingent: A condition that is likely or possible but is not necessarily determined. A state of affairs that could be otherwise.
Disposition: A tendency toward a state that results from the constitution of an entity. Dispositions, such as the solubility of sugar in liquids, are qualities that are activated or realized only under certain conditions (e.g., the sugar is placed in water), although the physical constitution determines these tendencies.
Dualism: The metaphysical view that there are two different fundamental or basic substances, mental substance and physical substance.
Eliminative Materialism/eliminativism: The view that our everyday, commonsense terms that regard mental states can be eliminated by more precise and accurate neuro-scientific terminology.
Epiphenomenal: A secondary phenomenon accompanying a primary phenomenon. In philosophy of mind, epiphenomenalism holds that mental states are the products accompanying the activity of the brain, but these secondary products do not have further causal powers.
Evil Genius: In the first of Descartes’ Meditations, he describes an all-powerful “Evil Genius” whose sole intent is to deceive a thinker into believing that the world and the body are real when they are illusions.
Extended Thing (Latin: Res Extensa): Physical entities that take up space (are extended in space) and can be measured and quantified.
Folk-psychology: The psychological explanation of people’s behavior implied in ordinary language through ascribing beliefs, desires, and other mental states to persons. It is a “folk theory” in that it is not a theory that has been subject to rigorous scientific testing but is an explanatory tool in place in everyday circumstances.
Functional description: A description of a system’s inputs, outputs, and internal state changes.
Functionalist/Functionalism: In philosophy of mind, functionalism is the view that mental states are defined by their causes, effects, and relations to other mental states. A functionalist (in philosophy of mind) is someone who holds this viewpoint.
Homunculi (plural): A homunculus (singular) is a miniature human being.
Hyperbolic doubt: Descartes’ method of destroying his earlier beliefs found in the first of his Mediations. Hyperbolic doubt is exaggerated doubt in which Descartes treats any belief that can possibly be doubted as if it was a false belief.
Intentional: In philosophy of mind, an intentional state regards the manner in which a mental state relates to some kind of entity or is “about” something. Beliefs and desires are considered good examples of intentional states. Intentional states are sometimes referred to as propositional attitudes.
Intentional stance: An attitude of attributing beliefs and desires to people and even to other kinds of entities.
Introspection: Looking in upon or reflecting upon one’s own mental states. Observing how things seem to oneself.
Intuition: Insight or understanding that is pretheoretical; coming prior to scientific or other kinds of explanations.
Knowing how: Skills or abilities that, once acquired, do not require one to think through each step of a process. Riding a bicycle is an example of such a skill.
Knowing that: Propositional knowledge; knowledge of rules and/or facts.
Leibniz’ Law: Entities A and B are identical if and only if A and B possess all of the same qualities.
Logical Behaviorism (also known as Analytical Behaviorism): The view in philosophy of mind that mental states are behavioral dispositions or tendencies to act in certain ways under certain conditions.
Machine Functionalism: The type of functionalism attributed frequently to Alan Turing in which mental processes are defined as analogues to computer programs.
Materialist/materialism: Materialism is the view that all that exists is made of matter (is material). A materialist is someone who holds this viewpoint.
Mental causation: Our commonsense explanations of people’s behavior indicate that mental states cause physical states (and vice-versa). Mental causation is often considered a sharp criticism of the dualist position on the nature of the mind.
Mentalist: The view that some mental phenomena cannot be explained through scientific investigation.
Multiple realization: The idea that mental states or mental properties can be realized in different kinds of physical systems.
Naturalistic/naturalism: Naturalism in philosophy is the view that all phenomena can be explained and accounted for through scientific investigation and the laws of nature. A naturalistic perspective holds that science will eventually explain all phenomena.
Objective: The quality of being observable and having a factual basis.
Ockham’s Razor: The principle that “Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity.” It is desirable in forming theories that we choose the simplest theories in which the unknown entities we seek to explain are explained by way of entities we do know.
Phenomenon: An event or occurrence.
Phenomenological: The way in which things seem or appear to be from the perspective of one’s own experience.
Physicalist/Physicalism: A view that, like materialism, holds that what is factually real is physical stuff. A physicalist holds that our knowledge of the world can only regard physical, observable entities and causes.
Primitive term: A simple or basic term that is undefined and from which other terms are derived.
Property dualism: The view that at least some mental qualities are not reducible to physical qualities. The physical entity—the brain—has both qualities and physical qualities; but unlike the dualist, the property dualist does not need to hold that the mind as a whole is a completely different substance than that of the body.
Psychofunctionalism: The view that the mind is explained scientifically by way of its organizational structure (as in a computer program) and not through its biological structure.
Psycho-physical/Psychophysical: Regarding the interrelations of the mental (psychological) and the physical.
Qualia: The feeling or sensation of “what it is like” to experience something.
Reductionism: The explanation of a complex set of facts by way of a simpler set of facts.
Representational Theory of the Mind: A view of the mind that holds that our intentional states such as beliefs and desires involve a relation between the believer or desirer and a symbolic mental representation of the belief or desire. The meaning of a symbolic representation in the mind may remain the same, while there can be a change in one’s intentional state (propositional attitude) toward this representation.
Scientific hypothesis: A conditional of the form If H (hypothesis) then O (observational consequence). The observational consequence of the hypothesis confirms the hypothesis, if it occurs. If the observational consequence fails to occur, the hypothesis is falsified.
Semantics: The study of the meanings in language.
Skeptic/Skepticism: Skepticism is the view that knowledge is not possible either as a whole or in a specific area. A skeptic is someone who doubts that knowledge exists as a whole or within an area.
Stance: An attitude toward someone or something; a point of view.
Strict identity: See Leibniz’ Law
Syntactical operations: Manipulation of a syntactic or grammatical structure; following the rules of syntax or the formation of proper sentences.
Subjective: Something particular to an individual’s perspective or point of view.
Substance Dualism: See Dualism
Thinking thing (Latin: Res Cogitans): Mental substance, which for Descartes is not extended in space and cannot be observed, but is the substance that engages in mental activity (thinking, doubting, perceiving, willing . . . ).
Thought experiment: An experiment carried out only in thought. Thought experiments are used in philosophy to test ideas and theories.
Token identity (also known as Functionalism): The view that an individual mental state is a token (particular instance) of a general type of mental state. There are many different tokens of any one mental state type. For instance, different people and animals, when they each experience a pain, experience a token of a general type of mental state—pain. Each individual pain token is said to be identical to the material that realizes that token (a human brain, a dog brain) but, importantly, this identity between a token and the material is contingent. Different materials can realize token instances of pain.
Turing Test: A phrase that refers to Alan Turing’s “Imitation Game” in which a human interrogator must ask questions of a computer (hidden from view) and then must try to gauge from its replies whether the computer is human or not. Turing believed that a computer could eventually pass this test and be found intelligent.
Type Identity/Central State Identity: The view that types of mental states are identical to types of brain states.