While the first winter in Russia exposed huge shortcomings, there was at least one area of German tactics that gave grounds for optimism. Steps to provide the vast numbers of skis required commenced in 1941 with the requisition of all new factory-produced skis in Norway, and fresh orders for more than 400,000 pairs. During 1942 donation drives and purchases netted approximately 900,000 pairs in Germany. The key German military ski tactics manual from the middle war period was Vorläufige Richtlinien für Ausbildung und Kampf von Skitruppen (‘Provisional Instructions for Training and Tactics of Ski Troops’), published in August 1942 to supersede a less complete document issued during the disastrous winter of 1941. The new instructions were not specifically for specialized mountain units, but built upon the experience of raiding detachments, ski battalions, and ‘improvised ski companies’ on the Eastern Front, plus ‘knowledge gained from the Finnish Army’, to create a generally applicable rubric. It was assumed only that trainee combat skiers would gain the rudiments of skiing in its ‘Nordic’ or cross-country form, and be tolerably familiar with tactics as given in the various editions of the Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie; ski and combat training were now to be ‘synchronized’.
The basic style of movement on skis was ‘long sliding steps’, for which equipment had to be arranged for free movement of the arms, preferably with the rucksack packed as flat as possible and contents arranged to create a low centre of gravity. The bread bag, bayonet, and any other impedimenta were carried towards the back of the belt with only ammunition pouches to the front. How weapons were carried depended on the degree of readiness required: when out of contact rifles were slung on the back, a second sling sometimes being added to ensure that the weapon remained firmly anchored in place down one side of the rucksack. In the case of ‘urgent battle alert’ the rifle was held in the right hand, ski sticks in the left.
German MG42 mounted on a pulk or Lapland wooden sled for snow transport, as illustrated in the US Intelligence Bulletin (October 1943). Apart from ammunition and spares the sled might also carry mats for keeping the feed belts out of the snow. If optical sights were carried these were not left on the gun for protracted periods, but carried in pouches close to the gun-team’s bodies. Compare this image with Plate H5.
On the command ‘Hinlegen!’ the soldier was to throw himself flat into a basic prone battle position, either with the skis pointed outwards, or onto one side with skis parallel. In standing or kneeling positions ski sticks could be used as improvised rifle rests. Wherever possible, however, skis were shed before coming into combat; fighting on skis was regarded as an emergency measure for encounters only. From the prone position, the soldier could move in a number of different ways according to circumstance. With the skis off, he could revert to movement on foot, dragging the skis, or, if the enemy were near, advance in a crouching position, or push forward using the skis as a sliding platform to prevent sinking into the snow. If a sudden rush was needed the skier could brace himself against the left knee, pushing himself up with the poles in one hand and rifle in the other. While low combat positions were best, ideally pressed down into the snow, deep drifts or undulations might require kneeling or even standing fire. In extremis skiers could throw grenades, stick grenades being preferable as they were less likely than ‘egg’ types to roll away out of control. When throwing grenades in snow troops were to consider that range might be hampered by heavy clothing and difficulty of obtaining a solid footing, and that fragmentation effects were lessened by deep snow. Throwing from the prone position required practice, the best method being to heave oneself momentarily upward, throwing overarm while resting the left arm on the ski sticks; this gave momentum while keeping exposure to fire to a minimum.
Other weapons and ammunition were carried by the ski team in a Finnish or Lap-style ahkio, ackja or akja:
It is used in two forms: the boat akja and the weapons akja. The boat akja is used to carry ammunition and equipment. When lined with blankets, it may also be used for the transportation of casualties. In the weapons akja, the weapon is mounted and fired from the sled. The light and heavy machine gun, the light mortar and the anti-tank rifle are the weapons most suitable for mounting on sleds. The weapons akja is open at the back to facilitate the handling of the weapon from the prone position. In place of the boat and weapons akja, other types of hand sleds improvised by the troops may be used.
In snow, when no contact was expected, weapons and ammunition were to be wrapped in shelter-halves against the elements, and loads distributed so that the heaviest part was at the rear. Loads were not usually to exceed 60kg (132lb); thus packed, the akja hull presented a good ‘angle of attack’ to the snow and could be towed by two or three skiers. When negotiating difficult going another skier controlled the akja from the rear by means of a brake rope or pushes with a ski stick. Where dog teams were available a rough rule of thumb was that the weight of the burden should not exceed the weight of the dogs. Where action was likely, sled weapons were to be kept ready and loaded for immediate dismounting or firing from the sled. The firer could lie down in the akja, bracing his feet against the snow; during relocations other members of the team could haul the sled in brief bounds before throwing themselves down into cover.
In ski warfare it was recommended that Gruppe (squad) be increased to 11 men plus the squad leader, to allow extra hands for the sleds. An ideal allotment of weapons was a light machine gun, two sub-machine guns, two semi-automatic rifles, a sniper rifle with telescopic sight, and six ordinary rifles. While automatic weapons were increased, platoon light mortars were regarded as expendable owing to their reduced effectiveness in snow. Likewise, given stronger squads, the platoon was reduced to three squads. A common deployment for action would be without skis, in a rough skirmish line, with the LMG towards one end of the line. When advancing in skirmish formation the squad leader took point position with the gunners towing the LMG in their sled nearby, and riflemen spread out to either flank. If there was a second sled attached this followed another 20m or so to the rear, attended from behind by the assistant squad leader. Given the exertion required for skiers to break separate tracks, ‘this [extended line] formation should only be employed when the intention is to open fire’.
Ordinary point-to-point movement was carried out in various forms of column or file, but longer marches over deep snow by units larger than platoons required the use of ‘trail-breaking detachments’. These were often broken down into smaller six- to ten-man details, with individuals assigned specific tasks. Point was commonly allotted to an alert scout with wire-cutters, followed at an interval of about 30m by a ‘direction observer’, whose equipment included a compass, binoculars and a hatchet. The observer would be followed by the first of the ‘trail improvers’, then the squad leader (also equipped with compass, binoculars and map). Behind him came the remainder of the team, whose task was to identify and improve the path for following troops, using spades, brush knives and marking equipment. Trail markers might include arrows, numbers, broken twigs, papers, or distinctive impressions made with ski sticks; in some circumstances subtle marks were preferred, but usually bold signs with some element of colour were best. As far as possible the trail-breakers chose paths suitable for even weak skiers, avoiding obstacles and sharp turns particularly on uphill segments, and making allowance for sledges. To maintain speed, details were rotated at frequent intervals.
As ski troops often acted independently of large bodies patrol skills were vital, as were alert sentries. Fixed posts had to be well camouflaged, while mobile pickets made use of ‘security tracks’, circulating at a radius of a kilometre or more around a position. Protection was further increased by mining the approaches, issuing flare pistols to sentries for emergencies, and establishing an inner security track. In extreme cold thought had to be given to allowing sentries ‘an opportunity to warm up by vigorous movements’, and to more frequent reliefs.
In combat on skis the swift execution of all movements… and the ability to deceive and outwit the enemy in every situation… greatly increase the striking power of even small units. Squads and platoons are frequently specially organized and reinforced with heavy weapons and signal and engineer equipment to enable them to accomplish missions independently. Care must be taken that the mobility of the unit is not thereby impaired. Pieces of equipment that might reduce speed must be left behind, or deposited during the approach march at selected points in the terrain. When approaching the enemy, advantage should be taken of poor visibility, such as fog, snow squalls, twilight and darkness. Creeping skilfully and soundlessly toward the enemy is of decisive importance…
A British NCO of No.1 Commando, with a slung Thompson SMG, demonstrates free climbing at Glencoe, Scotland, in November 1941. Commando training for ‘cliff assaults’ was also carried out on the Cornish coasts. Sometimes a strong climber was used as a lead, paying out behind him ropes carried in a wicker basket.
Close contact must be maintained within the squad and platoon. It is the responsibility of every unit to keep contact not only with the units to the right and to the front, but also with those to the left and rear. During the attack and pursuit, envelopment should always be sought by utilizing mobility. Only weak forces should be left in front, to deceive and pin down the enemy. It may be practical temporarily to detach the light machine gun of one squad operating on the flanks and employ it frontally. If an attack bogs down in snowy terrain shortly before the objective is reached, heavy casualties result. Therefore a decision must be sought as soon as possible and with the greatest tenacity. In choosing the direction of an attack, consideration must be given to the fact that difficult skiing terrain frequently offers better possibilities for a surprise breakthrough than favourable skiing terrain. Close combat is usually decided by the use of small arms and grenades. If possible, close combat should be started with a surprise attack – if on skis, by a rapid downhill run. It may be more practical in certain instances to avoid meeting the enemy in hand-to-hand combat and seek a decision through a fire-fight within the most effective range.
In ski combat the infantry fire-fight took on even greater significance than in ordinary warfare. Visibility tended to be better, while supporting arms – such as the artillery – tended to be weaker. Increased use of rifles with telescopic sights improved the possibilities not only for sniping at distance, but for concentrating accurate fire on important targets. Conversely, the problems of resupply made conservation of ammunition crucial. In extreme cold small arms could not be touched with bare hands and gloves or mittens had to be worn, which sometimes reduced the speed and accuracy of firing. In extreme cold, first shots tended to fall shorter than from a weapon that had warmed up. Muzzle blast could displace and blacken snow, creating a shadow that gave away a firer’s position.
According to the US appreciation Tactical and Technical Trends (November 1942), German organization included one trained ski company per battalion, and one additional platoon in every other battalion. However, this seems to have been something of a pious hope; at that date this system was ‘not put into practice, for German skiers were few and poorly trained’. It was not that the Wehrmacht lacked knowledge: it was training and numbers that so often remained deficient.
