AT the conclusion of this speech they stood up and went away to set fire to their waggons and their tents. If anyone wanted any of the extra equipment, they shared it out among themselves and threw all the rest into the fire. When this was done, they had breakfast, and, while they were in the middle of it, Mithridates arrived with about thirty horsemen. He asked the generals to come within hearing and then spoke as follows: ‘I, my Greek friends, was, as you know, faithful to Cyrus, and I am still a friend of yours. Also I find my present position here very alarming. If, then, I found that you were thinking of any safe way out, I should like to join you and bring all my followers with me. Tell me, then, what you propose to do, and consider me as a friend who is on your side and who would like to join you in your march.’
After a discussion the generals decided to give him the following reply. Chirisophus was the spokesman. ‘What we have decided,’ he said, ‘is this: if we are allowed to make our way home, we shall go through the country doing as little damage as possible; but if anyone tries to stop us on our way, we shall fight our way out as hard as we can.’
Mithridates then made an attempt at proving that it was impossible to get to safety against the King’s will, and at this point he was recognized as having been sent with a hidden object in view. Indeed there was actually one of Tissaphernes’ men in his company to ensure his reliability.
After this incident the generals decided that it would be better to make a resolution that, so long as they were in enemy country, the war should be conducted without any negotiations with the enemy, since ambassadors from the other side tended to seduce the soldiers’ allegiance. They actually did seduce one of the captains, Nicarchus the Arcadian, who deserted in the night with about twenty men.
Next, after having had a meal, they crossed the river Zapatas and marched in battle order, with the baggage animals and the camp followers inside the square. Before they had gone far Mithridates again put in an appearance with about two hundred cavalry and about four hundred archers and slingers. These were lightly armed and very quick on their feet.
Mithridates approached the Greeks as though he was on friendly terms with them, but, as soon as they got close together, his men, both cavalry and foot, suddenly shot their arrows, while the others slung stones and caused some casualtics. The Greek rearguard suffered badly, but were unable to retaliate, since their Cretan archers could not shoot so far as the Persians and also, being light troops, had taken refuge in the centre of the square; as for the javelin-throwers, their range was not great enough to reach the Persian slingers.
Xenophon then came to the conclusion that they should drive the enemy back, and this was done by the hoplites and peltasts who were with him in the rearguard. In the pursuit, however, they failed to catch a single one of the enemy. This was because the Greeks had no cavalry, and their infantry could not, over a short distance, catch up with the enemy infantry, who ran away when they were still some way off. It was naturally impossible to press the pursuit over a long distance from the rest of the army. The native cavalry, however, by shooting backwards from on horseback, managed to inflict wounds even when they were in flight; and when the Greeks had pursued them for a certain distance, they had to fall back again over the same distance, fighting all the way. The result was that in the whole day they covered no more than two and a half miles. However, they reached the villages in the afternoon.
Here again there was much despondency. Chirisophus and the oldest of the generals blamed Xenophon for carrying on a pursuit away from the main body, and, in spite of the risks he ran, not being able to do any damage to the enemy. Xenophon listened to their criticism and admitted that they were right in blaming him, and had the facts on their side to prove their case. ‘Nevertheless,’ he said, ‘I had to drive them back, when I saw that we were suffering badly by staying where we were and that we could do nothing in retaliation. Once we started driving them back, what you say is true. We were no better able to do them any damage, and we had the greatest difficulty in getting back ourselves. We should be grateful to the gods, then, that they did not come with a large force, but only in small numbers, with the result that, without doing us very great harm, they have shown us where we are deficient. At present the enemy archers can shoot further than our Cretans can shoot in reply, and their slingers can operate out of range of our javelin-throwers. When we drive them back, it is not possible for us to pursue them over much of a distance from the main army, and in a short distance no infantryman, however fast he runs, can catch up with another infantryman who has a bow-shot’s start of him. Therefore, if we are going to prevent them from having the power to harm us on the march, we must get hold of slingers and cavalry as soon as we can. There are some Rhodians, I hear, in our army, and they say that most of them know how to use a sling. Their weapon, too, has actually twice the range of the Persian sling. Persian slings do not carry far because they use stones as big as one’s fist for throwing; but the Rhodians know how to use leaden bullets as Well. If, then, we find out who has a sling in his possession, and pay for any there are, and pay more money to anyone who volunteers to make more slings, and think of some extra privilege we can give to anyone who volunteers to serve as a slinger in the ranks, then perhaps enough will come forward to be of use to us. I have noticed, too, that we have horses in the army: some are mine, others are parr of Clearchus’s property which he has left, and there are many more which we have captured and now use for carrying baggage. If, then, we sort them out, putting baggage animals in the place of some, and equipping horses for the use of cavalrymen, they too, perhaps, will give the enemy trouble when he runs away.’
This was agreed upon, and about two hundred slingers came forward that night. On the next day about fifty horses and cavalrymen were passed fit for service. They were provided with leather jerkins and breastplates, and Lycius the son of Folystratus, an Athenian, was given the command of the cavalry.