APPENDIX I

THE CLOSURE OF CLUB ROUTE / HELL’S HIGHWAY BY ENEMY ACTION

‘The line of communication must be certain and well established, for every army that acts from a distant base and is not careful to keep this line perfectly open marches upon a precipice. It moves to certain ruin if the road by which provisions, ammunition, and reinforcements are to be brought up is not entirely secured.’

Raimundo Montecuccoli

(1609 - 80)

Memoroe della guerra ed instruzione d’un general

(Venice 1703)

Much of the criticism of XXX Corps during MARKET GARDEN is based on a lack of understanding of the impact of a cut in an armoured or mechanised formation’s lines of communication. Also, airborne forces are, expected to conduct most of their operations behind enemy lines and are therefore familiar with the idea of being ‘cut off’ and sustained for short periods by air. Many of XXX Corps’ critics have failed to appreciate the quantity of combat supplies required by a corps conducting offensive operations. By the time the spearhead of XXX Corps had reached Nijmegen, its logistic vehicles were operating at distances of seventy miles from their combat supplies Distribution Points, located between the Albert and Escaut Canals. The round trip of one hundred and forty miles was complicated not only by the cuts but also by the need to close the route to returning traffic, in favour of urgently needed formations moving forward. XXX Corps was operating on a single ‘Centre Line’ or axis and was, therefore, extremely vulnerable to enemy action. Traffic prioritization was not good but the problem was exacerbated by the need to get the ‘Sea Tail’ (the supply vehicles) of the three airborne divisions forward as a priority.