MAP 3. The Eastern Frontier under Nero
PARTHIA
INTRODUCTION
Any attempt to reach a proper understanding of Rome’s relations with Parthia during Nero’s reign will be fraught with difficulties. Most of what we learn about the Parthians comes from Greek and Roman sources, which are invariably hostile. In the case of our main source, Tacitus, we have the additional problem that although he may on occasion treat events outside of Italy in considerable detail, his grasp of geography and topography, as well as his understanding of the strategic issues, are seriously limited. In both of his accounts of the two major theaters of operation of the Neronian period, Britain and Parthia, both treated in considerable detail, there are fundamental problems of chronology and geography that have evaded satisfactory explanation.
The Roman writer Justin refers to the view that the world was divided between two powers, the Romans and Parthians (Epit. 41.1.1), and while this claim is much exaggerated, it is certainly the case that the great empire of Parthia occupied the attention of Rome for much of its history from the late republican period onward. Parthia was formed from what was originally a province (satrapy) of the Persian Achaemenid empire, the dynastic period of the empire named after King Achaemenes, of the early seventh century BC. Nothing is known of its history in this Achaemenid period. Assyrian sources of the seventh century mention a region called Partakka or Partukka; whether this is identical with later Parthia is disputed. The earliest certain occurrence of the name is as “Parthava,” in the famous Bisitun inscription of the Persian king Darius I, dated to about 520 BC. The region was joined to Hyrcania (now Gorgan in Iran) under Alexander the Great and ruled as a satrapy by the Seleucid rulers (named after Seleucus, one of Alexander’s generals). According to a (disputed) tradition, the founder of the independent Parthian empire was Arsaces I, who rebelled and instituted his own rule in the latter half of the third century BC, establishing the Arsacid dynasty as traditional rulers of Parthia. The Persian plateau was not, however, totally conquered until the time of Mithridates I (171–138 BC). At its height, the Parthian empire extended its sway from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, and was bounded in the west by the Euphrates and in the East by the Indus.
The earliest formal contact between the kingdom and a Roman official was friendly. In the second half of the 90s, Sulla, in Asia Minor to deal with the threat of King Mithridates of Pontus, traveled to Cappadocia and on to the Euphrates, where he accepted an offer of friendship from an envoy of the Parthian king (Livy Per. 70.7; Velleius 2.24.3). This happy situation would not endure. In the last generation of the republic, the Roman generals Lucullus and Pompey saw themselves as heirs to Alexander the Great and undertook the conquest of the Hellenistic kingdoms of the East, establishing the Euphrates as the demarcation between the two empires of Rome and Parthia. This left a Rome-dominated Asia Minor, where the regions adjoining the sea became generally Roman provinces and the interior was ruled by pro-Roman client rulers. Marcus Crassus took the situation one stage further when he chose Parthia as the arena in which to win military glory that would place him on a par with his two colleagues Pompey and Caesar. Crassus enjoyed some initial successes, but he was finally crushed in 53 BC at the major Battle of Carrhae. The defeat did little to curb Roman imperial appetites in the area, and Julius Caesar was planning to lead an army of sixteen legions into the kingdom when he was assassinated in 44 BC. Caesar’s project was revived by Mark Antony, who invaded Parthia in 36 BC with an enormous army of 100,000 troops. He was forced to retire in ignominy.
Augustus handled the Parthian issue with considerable skill. He was faced with an imperialist urge at home, which he managed to satisfy with the vague expectation that Parthia would one day be crushed, a notion much reflected in the literature of the time. But he was above all a pragmatist. He demanded from the Parthians the return of prisoners and standards taken in previous campaigns, and these were recovered in 20 BC in a huge diplomatic coup. Augustus appreciated that for all its size and wealth Parthia was internally weak. Ethnically and culturally diverse, with mixtures of Greek and Iranian elements, it was essentially a feudal society with a king who was suzerain over a number of vassals in the form of powerful noble families. Their loyalty to the central ruler was often suspect, and at various periods they enjoyed considerable local autonomy. As a result, the Parthian army lacked the Roman army’s discipline and staying power, and was almost totally deficient in siege craft. Added to these problems were the constant incursions from the seminomadic people to the East. This feudal and balkanized structure of Parthia meant that, in fact, after the death of the expansionist King Mithridates II (88 BC), the policy of Parthia was essentially defensive. It lacked the internal order and coherence required for it to behave otherwise. The conflicts between the Romans and Parthians, despite the efforts of the Romans to depict them otherwise, were generally instigated not by the Parthians but rather by the Romans, who had ambitions to extend their conquests beyond the Euphrates.
Augustus recognized that the key to Roman–Parthian relations was Armenia, the mountainous state south and southwest of the Caucasus and east of the Euphrates, bordering on Parthia (the area west of the Euphrates was defined by the Romans as Armenia Minor). The Parthians had a long-standing claim on Armenia, which ran counter to Rome’s desire to maintain the area as a protectorate. Caught between two great empires, it played a role similar to that of Poland between Germany and Russia in more modern times. With an Iranian aristocracy, it had a certain affinity with Parthia, but it also had a powerful sense of independence and identity, which the Romans were able to exploit. Augustus’s reduction of the total number of legions to twenty-eight and the preoccupation with military crises in Germany and Pannonia precluded any adventures in Armenia. He instead followed a double-headed strategy of military pressure and diplomacy, and was able on a number of occasions to install his nominee on the Armenian throne, and once even on the Parthian. But he did little to back them with serious support, and for all intents and puposes acquiesced on those occasions when the Armenians rejected his candidates.
This policy was essentially continued by his successor, Tiberius. When, early in his reign, Armenia was threatened, Tiberius sent out Germanicus, the grandfather of Nero, who installed Zeno/Artaxias on the throne, bringing stability until Zeno’s death in AD 32. In early 37, the aggressive Parthian king Artabanus was reputedly planning an invasion of Syria. The legate of Syria, Lucius Vitellius, moved his army up to the Euphrates and overawed the Parthians, who decided to yield in the face of superior force and decisive action. During Claudius’s reign, the region once again became a scene of conflict. In AD 47, a Parthian embassy came to Rome and, invoking their long-established alliance, asked Claudius to send them a king. This he did, in the person of Meherdates, although he gave his appointee little help, and Meherdates soon fell, to be replaced by the Arsacid Vologaeses, who proceeded to appoint one brother as king of Media and sought to establish another, Tiridates, as king of Armenia.
Pharasmanes, king of the Caucasian kingdom of Iberia (corresponding roughly to the eastern and southern parts of modern Georgia), had from AD 35 supported the claim of his brother, Mithridates, to the throne of Armenia. Pharasmanes’ son Radamistus, with the acquiescence of the Romans, usurped the throne from this same Mithridates, his uncle. The Romans had troops in Armenia, but when Mithridates sought their protection, the commander surrendered him to Radamistus for a bribe. Radamistus subsequently murdered him, along with his sons. Radamistus’s hold on Armenia was tenuous. This situation was exploited by the Parthians, who invaded in AD 52 or 53, driving out Radamistus and taking the fortress cities of Artaxata and Tigranocerta. The Parthians in turn were forced to retire because of the severe winter conditions, and Radamistus reentered the country, only to be forced out again, this time by an internal rebellion in support of Tiridates (Tac. Ann. 12.44–51).
This was the complex situation that confronted Nero at the time of his accession. The military strength of Rome was located in Syria, which housed four legions, and its legate could call on the assistance of the client monarchs in the neighboring regions. This was the first time since Mark Antony that Rome had committed major resources and efforts to dealing with Parthia. Despite the detailed information that we are given on Rome’s relations with Parthia during Nero’s reign, it is difficult to define a coherent Roman policy in the region. At its core, there seems to be a conviction that an invasion of Parthia was not to be countenanced, nor was annexation of Armenia, and that Tiridates, the brother of Vologaeses, should be allowed to rule Armenia if he was willing to receive the throne from Nero. It would take twelve years for the issue to be resolved, with the grand celebration held in Rome in AD 66 to mark Tiridates’ arrival there. There is no doubt that Armenia was the great “foreign policy” success of Nero’s reign. But if this was indeed Rome’s policy, it does not seem to have been a policy pursued consistently, as will become clear in Tacitus’s narrative, especially at Annals 15.6, when the Roman general Caesennius Paetus seems to speak of outright annexation by Rome, declaring that, “It would be he, Paetus, who would impose on the conquered peoples tribute and laws and, instead of a phantom king, Roman jurisdiction.”
In the end, Roman will prevailed, and the king established in Armenia was there essentially as a vassal of Rome. But for all that, he was a Parthian, and an Arsacid. And it is to be noted that according to John of Antioch (Fr. 104), the false Nero who came on the scene during the reign of Titus expected support from the Parthians on the grounds that they were indebted to him (i.e., supposedly Nero) for his having returned Armenia to them (cf. Dio 66.19.3).
SOURCES
The Parthians carry out raids in Armenia, and the Romans wonder how Nero will cope with the crisis. Client kings are instructed to muster in the frontier area. Internal domestic disputes oblige the Parthians to abandon their designs in Armenia. The development is treated as a great success in Rome, and a victory is celebrated.
Tac. Ann. 13.6.1. At the year’s end, disturbing rumors arrived of another incursion of the Parthians and of their raids on Armenia after the expulsion of Radamistus (who, after often taking control of the realm and then becoming a fugitive, had now also abandoned the war).1 2. As a result, in a city avid for gossip, questions were being asked.2 How could an emperor scarcely past seventeen shoulder this burden or stave off the crisis? What support was to be expected from a man ruled by a woman?3 Could battles, the blockading of cities, and all the other military operations also be conducted by teachers? 3. Others felt differently; what had transpired, they said, was better than calling on Claudius, enfeebled with age and indolence, to undertake the hardships of a campaign, a man who would be taking orders from slaves!4 In fact, Burrus and Seneca were known for their broad experience, and, people asked, how far could their emperor be lacking in strength when Gnaeus Pompey took on the burden of the civil wars in his eighteenth year5 and Caesar Octavianus in his nineteenth?6 4. At the highest level of government, more was achieved by authority and policy than by weapons and physical strength. Nero would give proof positive that he was relying on friends who were honorable (or otherwise) if, setting jealousy aside, he were to select an outstanding commander rather than a rich man relying on favor gained through influence-peddling.
AD 55
Tac. Ann. 13.7.1. As people passed these and other such observations around, Nero ordered the young men recruited in the neighboring provinces to be brought up to supplement the legions of the East and for the legions themselves to be deployed closer to Armenia.7 He further ordered the two veteran kings Agrippa and Antiochus to make ready forces for an offensive into Parthian territory,8 and bridges were also to be built over the Euphrates. Nero assigned Lesser Armenia to Aristobulus9 and the area of Sophene to Sohaemus, both of them also receiving royal diadems.10 2. And then, opportunely, a rival to Vologaeses emerged in the person of his son Vardanes,11 and the Parthians left Armenia, apparently postponing hostilities.
Responsibility for Armenia is assigned to Domitius Corbulo, with command over the provinces of Cappadocia and Galatia. There are no legionary troops there, and the Third Legion (Gallica) and the Sixth (Ferrata) are transferred from Syria. The legatus of Syria, Ummidius Quadratus, is concerned about his own status and meets Corbulo at Aegeae. His concerns are justified. Representatives of the two legati are sent to Parthia to receive hostages, and the Parthians opt to entrust them to Corbulo’s representative.
ILS 9018 (Smallwood 51a). [The Sixth Legion F]errata, which [spent the winter] in [Greater] Armenia [under] Gnaeus Domitius [Corbulo], legate [of Nero Caesar] Augustus with propraetorian power, [dedicated this monument] in honor of … Asper primipilus, son of Publius, of the tribe Scaptia.12
The transfer of the sixth legion from Syria to Armenia has left a physical memento in the form of this fragmentary inscription on a marble plaque that would have stood in Armenia, presumably near the base of the Sixth Legion, but through time found its way to Metropolis near the city of Cyzicus, where it resides. It was accompanied by a Greek version, now very fragmentary. The identity of the person honored is not known, but, as is standard in inscriptions, the names of his father and his tribe are recorded. Corbulo, as was normal for governors of imperial provinces, administered with the authority of a praetor, not consul, since as the subordinate of the princeps he had to occupy a lower rank.
The Sixth Legion Ferrata (“the ironclads”) was first raised in Gaul by Caesar in 52 BC. It served under Antony and after Actium came under the command of Octavian, who transferred it to Syria in 30 BC. It was still part of the regular garrison of Syria when Corbulo received his command. It would later move to Italy, where it supported Vespasian, but was shortly afterward sent back to the East. It received the title of Fidelis Constans (“Loyal and Steadfast”) from Septimius Severus.
Tac. Ann. 13.8.1. In the Senate, however, all was celebrated with hyperbolic proposals. Members voted public thanksgiving to the gods and triumphal dress for the emperor on the thanksgiving days,13 that he enter the city in ovation, and that he be granted a statue on the same scale as that of Mars the Avenger, and in the same temple.14 But the routine sycophancy apart, they were happy that Nero had given Domitius Corbulo responsibility for securing Armenia and that an avenue was apparently being opened up for merit.15
2. The troops in the East were divided in the following manner. Some of the auxiliaries, along with two legions, were to remain in the province of Syria under its governor, Quadratus Ummidius.16 Corbulo would have an equal number of citizen and allied forces, plus the infantry and mounted troops wintering in Cappadocia.17 The allied kings had instructions to take orders from either commander, depending on the requirements of the war, but their support leaned more toward Corbulo. 3. To capitalize on his reputation (which is of utmost importance in new ventures), Corbulo marched swiftly, but was met at the city of Aegeae in Cilicia by Quadratus.18 He had come there fearing that, if Corbulo entered Syria to take over his troops, he would have all eyes turned on him,19 for Corbulo was a man of large physique and flamboyant speech, and, beyond his experience and intelligence, he made an impression even with his unimportant attributes.
9.1. In fact, both men sent messengers to King Vologaeses, advising him to choose peace over war and supply hostages, thereby maintaining the deference to the Roman people customarily shown by earlier kings.20 To allow himself to prepare for war on his own terms or else to remove suspected rivals by calling them hostages, Vologaeses put in their hands the leading members of the Arsacid house. 2. They were accepted by the centurion Insteius, who had been sent by Ummidius and happened to be there first, visiting the king on that business.21 When this came to Corbulo’s notice, he ordered Arrius Varus, prefect of a cohort, to go and take possession of the hostages.22
This led to a quarrel between the prefect and the centurion, and, not to prolong this spectacle before foreigners, the hostages and Roman officers who were escorting them were left to decide the matter. They preferred Corbulo, whose renown was fresh and who enjoyed some sort of popularity even with the enemy. 3. The result was friction between the generals. Ummidius protested that the gains made by his plans were taken from him; Corbulo for his part claimed that the king had been brought to offer hostages only when he himself had been chosen as commander for the war and thereby transformed Vologaeses’ hopes into fear. To settle their quarrel, Nero had a proclamation made that laurel was being added to the imperial fasces because of the successes of Quadratus and Corbulo.23 These events I have put together, though they actually extended into the next consulship.
Tacitus now returns to Rome, picking up events from the beginning of AD 58. The Parthian narrative is resumed at 13.34. The sequence of events is far from clear, but it seems that Corbulo spent the period between 55 and 58 getting his troops into condition, raising levies in his province and strengthening his army with the addition of another legion. While the Parthian King Vologaeses is caught up in a revolt in Hyrcania, Corbulo urges Tiridates to seek his throne from Nero. Tiridates in turn tries unsuccessfully to lure Corbulo into a trap, then rejects his proposal, and hostilities break out. Corbulo captures the old Armenian capital Artaxata.
AD 58 Nero’s Third Consulship
Tac. Ann. 13.34.2. The war between Parthia and Rome over the possession of Armenia had been dragging on after a feeble start,24 but at the beginning of that year it was prosecuted with vigor.25 Vologaeses would not permit his brother Tiridates to be deprived of a kingdom that he had given him or to possess it as a gift of a foreign power, and Corbulo thought it in keeping with the greatness of the Roman people to recover territory earlier won by Lucullus and Pompey.26 Furthermore, the Armenians, whose loyalty was dubious, were inviting in the armies of both sides, although they were geographically and culturally closer to the Parthians, with whom they were also connected by intermarriage and to whom, in addition, they inclined through their ignorance of liberty.
Corbulo spends the winter of 57–58 getting his troops into shape.
Tac. Ann. 13.35.1. Corbulo, however, had more trouble coping with the lethargy of his troops than with enemy treachery. The legions transferred from Syria, listless after a long peace, had little tolerance for camp fatigues.27 It was clear that there were veterans in that army who had not done sentry duty or the night watch, and who looked on the rampart and ditch as something unfamiliar and strange. Without helmets and without breastplates, they were sleek and prosperous, having spent their service only in towns.28
2. Corbulo therefore discharged those disadvantaged by age or ill health, and requested reinforcements. Troop levies were then held throughout Galatia and Cappadocia,29 and a legion was added from Germany,30 together with auxiliary cavalry and cohorts of infantry. 3. The entire army was kept under canvas, despite a winter so severe that the ground, covered with ice, would not afford a place for tents without digging.31 Many had limbs frostbitten from the intense cold, and some died on watch. The case was noted of a soldier who, carrying a load of firewood, had his hands frozen to the point where they stuck to his load and fell off, leaving his arms as stumps. 4. Corbulo himself, lightly dressed and bareheaded, was regularly in the marching line and among the working parties, giving praise to the stouthearted and consolation to the sick, and setting an example for all. Then, because many could not bear the harshness of the climate and campaign and were beginning to desert, Corbulo looked to severity as a remedy. He did not treat the first or second offenses with leniency, as happened in other armies: anyone leaving the standards was summarily executed. That this was beneficial, and more effective than clemency, became clear from the results: there were fewer desertions from that camp than from those where leniency was shown.
Summary of Tac. Ann. 13.36–38. Tiridates carries out a number of swift raids, avoiding a major engagement. In response, Corbulo plans an attack on several fronts. Antiochus is ordered to invade the area bordering his kingdom. Pharasmanes executes his son Radamistus to show his support of Rome. Negotiations between Corbulo and Tiridates are fruitless [not translated].
Corbulo brings about the surrender of a number of important Armenian strongholds, including Artaxata.
Tac. Ann. 13.39.1. Corbulo, meanwhile, to prevent the war dragging on to no purpose and to force the Armenians to defend their own possessions, prepared to destroy their fortresses. The strongest in that prefecture, which was called Volandum,32 he kept for himself; the minor ones he assigned to his legate Cornelius Flaccus and to the camp prefect Insteius Capito.33 2. Then, after examining the fortifications and making appropriate arrangements for the assault, he encouraged his troops to chase from his home this vagrant enemy, prepared neither for peace nor for war, and who, by his flight, admitted his perfidy as well as his cowardice. They should think about the spoils as well as the glory, he said.
3. Corbulo next divided his army into four parts. One he grouped in tortoise formation and brought forward to undermine the rampart; a second he ordered to move ladders up to the walls; and a large contingent he ordered to launch firebrands and spears from the engines. The slingers and throwers were allocated a position from which to shoot their projectiles over a considerable distance, so that fear would be equally spread among the enemy and no unit would be able to bring assistance to those in difficulties. 4. Such was the fervor and drive of the army that, by the third part of the day, the walls had been stripped of defenders, the barriers of the gates demolished, the fortifications taken by scaling, and all adults slaughtered—with not a soldier lost and a mere handful wounded. The horde of noncombatants was auctioned off, and the rest of the plunder went to the victors. 5. The legate and the prefect were just as fortunate. Three fortresses were stormed in one day, and of the others some capitulated in terror and others surrendered through the decision of the inhabitants.
6. This inspired them with confidence for an attack on the tribal capital, Artaxata.34 The legions were not led there by the shortest route, however: crossing the river Araxes (which laps the city walls) by the bridge would put them in range of projectiles. They went over it at a distance, using a ford of some width.
Summary of Tac. Ann. 13.40. Tiridates makes an unsuccessful attack on the Roman forces [not translated].
Tac. Ann. 13.41.1. Corbulo established his camp on the spot and considered whether to march on Artaxata by night, with his legions unencumbered by baggage, and lay siege to the city, for he assumed Tiridates had withdrawn there. Scouts then brought word that the king was on a lengthy journey and that it was unclear whether he was heading for the Medes or the Albani.35 Corbulo therefore waited for dawn, sending ahead his light infantry in the meantime to invest the walls and commence the blockade at a distance. 2. In fact, the townspeople of their own accord threw open the gates and put themselves and their possessions at the mercy of the Romans. That move saved their lives. Artaxata was put to the torch, destroyed and leveled to the ground since, because of the size of its walls, it could not be held without a strong garrison, and we did not have forces enough to split between strengthening the garrison and prosecuting the war. On the other hand, if the town remained untouched and unguarded, there was no advantage or glory forthcoming from its capture. 3. There was, in addition, a seemingly god-sent prodigy. Up to this point, everything had been brightly illuminated by the sun. Suddenly, however, the area enclosed by the walls was covered with a black cloud and cut off by flashes of lightning, so that it was believed that the gods were attacking and the town was being consigned to destruction by them.36
4. Nero was hailed as Imperator because of this success, and following a senatorial decree prayers of thanksgiving were held. There were statues voted to the emperor, and arches and repeated consulships; and the day on which the victory was won, on which it was announced, and on which it had been discussed in the Senate were all to be set among the festal days.37 Other measures of this sort were also put to the vote, so outrageous that Gaius Cassius, who had supported the other honors, declared that, if thanks given to the gods were to be commensurate with the blessings of fortune, a whole year would be insufficient for their prayers. Accordingly, he said, there should be a distinction made between holy days and business days; that is, days on which they could hold religious observances without suspending human activity.38
Dio’s Account
Dio, unlike Tacitus, places all his Parthian narrative together, just after the account of the Fire of Rome in AD 64, and presents it in retrospect. Dio is even more enthusiastic about Corbulo than Tacitus is. The otherwise close resemblance between Dio and Tacitus in the narrative of events in Armenia suggests that both made use of Corbulo’s memoirs but that Dio did not make use of the hostile account from which Tacitus clearly drew at times. Where he provides more detail than Tacitus, that detail may well be taken from the memoirs.
Dio 62.19.1. While he was doing this, a report reached him from Armenia together with a laurel crown to mark another victory,39 for Corbulo had brought together the scattered military units and given them the training that had been neglected.40 Then even the report concerning Corbulo was sufficient to alarm King Vologaeses of Parthia and the Armenian leader Tiridates.
19.2. Corbulo, like the first Romans, not only had an illustrious pedigree and great physical strength but was also intellectually gifted, and he showed great courage, fairness, and integrity in his dealings with everybody, friends and foes alike. 3. This was why Nero sent him off to the war in place of himself and put in his charge a force greater than he would anyone else—he was as confident that Corbulo would crush the barbarians as he was that he would not revolt against him. Corbulo disappointed him in neither respect, 4. but he upset everyone else in one sole regard, namely that he maintained his loyalty to Nero: people so wanted to have him as emperor instead of Nero that they reckoned this to be his only bad quality.41 Corbulo, then, effortlessly took Artaxata, and he razed the city to the ground.42
Tigranocerta now falls to Corbulo, as well as the Fortress of Legerda. The Parthians are much preoccupied by a revolt of the Hyrcanians, who send envoys to the Romans.
AD 59–60
Tac. Ann. 14.23.1. After the destruction of Artaxata, Corbulo felt that he should capitalize on the fresh panic to seize Tigranocerta: by destroying it, he could heighten the enemy’s fears, or by sparing it he could gain a reputation for clemency. He therefore set off for the town.43 The army was not on an offensive footing—he did not want to quash hopes of pardon—but he did not relax his guard either, knowing as he did the volatility of the race, which, reluctant in the face of danger, was treacherous when offered opportunities.
2. The barbarians’ reaction differed with their temperament: some came to him with entreaties, and others deserted their villages and dispersed into the wilderness, while there were also those who hid themselves and their dearest possessions in caves. The Roman commander accordingly varied his approach, showing compassion toward suppliants, swiftly pursuing fugitives, and dealing ruthlessly with those who had occupied hiding places—he filled the mouths and exits of the chambers with brushwood and twigs and burned them out. 3. And then Corbulo himself came under attack from the Mardi (practiced marauders who had mountains to defend them against an invader) as he was skirting their territory.44 He sent in his Iberians and plundered their country, spilling foreign blood to punish the enemy’s effrontery.45
24.1. Though Corbulo and his army sustained no losses in the battle, they were beginning to experience exhaustion from food shortages and their labors, being reduced to staving off hunger with animal flesh. In addition, there was a lack of water, an intense summer heat, and long marches, lightened only by the endurance of the commander, who bore as much as—and more than—the rank and file. 2. They then reached a cultivated region, where they harvested the crops and took by assault one of two strongholds in which the Armenians had sought refuge (the other, which repulsed the first attack, was reduced by siege). 3. Passing from there into the lands of the Tauronites, Corbulo managed to avoid an unexpected danger. Not far from his tent, a barbarian of some distinction was discovered with a weapon, and under torture the man gave a detailed account of a plot against the commander, identifying himself as its instigator and naming his accomplices. There followed the conviction and execution of those who, under a pretense of friendship, had been plotting treachery.
4. Not much later, representatives sent from Tigranocerta brought news that the city’s defenses were open to Corbulo and that their fellow citizens were ready to follow his orders, and at the same time they handed over to him a golden crown as a gift of welcome.46 The Roman accepted it respectfully, and the city suffered no loss. Unharmed, they would adopt a compliant attitude all the more readily, he thought.
25.1. The fort of Legerda, however, which a group of defiant young warriors had closed against him, was not taken without a fight. The enemy ventured to do battle before the walls; furthermore, when they were driven back within their fortifications, they could be forced to yield only when faced with a siege mound and an armed assault.47 2. These ends were achieved the more easily because the Parthians were distracted by the Hyrcanian War. The Hyrcanians had sent representatives to the Roman emperor with a petition for an alliance, calling attention to the fact that, as a pledge of their friendship, they were obstructing Vologaeses. As the representatives were returning, Corbulo, fearing they might be surrounded by enemy patrols after crossing the Euphrates, gave them an armed guard and escorted them to the shores of the Red Sea.48 From there, they returned home, steering clear of Parthian territory.
Dio 62.20.1. After doing this, he marched on Tigranocerta,49 sparing all the lands of peoples who submitted to him but devastating those of peoples who offered resistance; and he took possession of the city, which voluntarily surrendered. He was also responsible for other magnificent and glorious accomplishments, which included bringing Vologaeses, formidable though he was, to accept peace terms appropriate to the great prestige of Rome.
In AD 60, Tiridates tries to recover Armenia from the East but is repulsed. Nero, meanwhile, sends out Tigranes, a descendant of Archelaus of Cappadocia, to take the throne. Corbulo leaves a small garrison with Tigranes and goes to Syria. Client rulers are given military authority over Armenia’s border areas.
Tac. Ann. 14.26.1. Furthermore, Tiridates was now advancing into the fringes of Armenia by way of Media. In response, Corbulo sent his legate Verulanus ahead with the auxiliaries,50 and then he followed with the legions by forced marches, thus obliging the Parthian to withdraw a long way and abandon his hopes for war. Those he found opposed to us he subjected to wholesale slaughter and burning, and he was proceeding to take control of Armenia when Tigranes, chosen by Nero to assume the throne, arrived on the scene.51 Tigranes was a member of the Cappadocian nobility, and a grandson of King Archelaus, but a long period as a hostage in Rome had brought him into a state of abject submissiveness. 2. And his welcome there was not unequivocal either, since there still remained some support for the Arsacids, though most people, from a loathing for the high-handedness of the Parthians, preferred a king given them by Rome. Tigranes was also provided with military assistance—a thousand legionaries, three cohorts of allies, and two squadrons of cavalry. In addition, to facilitate his defense of his new kingdom, various portions of Armenia were instructed to accept submission to whichever king they were contiguous to—Pharasmanes, Polemo, Aristobulus, or Antiochus.52
Corbulo withdrew into Syria, which, left vacant by the death of the legate Ummidius, had now been assigned to him.53
In AD 61, irresponsible raids by Tigranes provoke a Parthian response. The Parthians put the Hyrcanian problem to one side and prepare to take Armenia for Tiridates. Corbulo sends two legions to support Tigranes and proceeds to strengthen the frontier defenses along the Euphrates. Tigranocerta holds out against the Parthians, who, under the threat of invasion by Corbulo, agree to send an embassy to Nero. Corbulo informs Rome that Armenia needs to be the responsibility of a separate military commander, and Caesennius Paetus is appointed to that position.
AD 61–62
Vologaeses resolves to assist Tiridates and settles his differences with the Hyrcanians.
Tac. Ann. 15.1.1. Meanwhile, Vologaeses, king of Parthia, had learned of Corbulo’s exploits and discovered that Tigranes, a foreigner, had been placed on the throne of Armenia; and at the same time he wanted to avenge the expulsion of his brother Tiridates, which was an insult to the dignity of the Arsacids.54 However, when he considered Roman greatness and his past respect for the treaty, which had remained unbroken, he was drawn in two different directions at once.55 He was hesitant by nature and was also encumbered by the defection of a mighty people, the Hyrcanians, and the numerous campaigns arising from it.56
2. In fact, he was still wavering when news of a further insult galvanized him into action. Upon emerging from Armenia, Tigranes had inflicted damage on the bordering tribe of the Adiabeni too extensively,57 and for too long, for his action to be simply predatory raiding, and the chiefs of the Parthian races were infuriated. They had now become so despised, they said, that it was not even from a Roman general that they were under attack but from an overambitious hostage treated for years by the Romans as one of their slaves.58
Tac. Ann. 15.3.1. When Corbulo heard this from reliable reports, he sent two legions under Verulanus Severus and Vettius Bolanus to assist Tigranes,59 but secretly instructed them to act at all times with deliberation rather than speed. This was because he wanted to be in a state of war rather than fighting one,60 and he had also informed Nero by dispatch that Armenia needed its own commander for its defense, and that Syria would be in more serious danger if Vologaeses attacked. 2. In the meantime, he deployed his remaining legions along the bank of the Euphrates, put a makeshift company of provincials under arms, and with armed detachments closed the points of entry open to the enemy.61 And because the region lacked water, he established forts at the springs, and some of the streams he hid from view under piles of sand.
Awaiting Nero’s decision on the special appointment to Armenia, Corbulo reaches a truce with the Parthians, and both sides withdraw their forces from Armenia. Tigranes departs.
Summary of Tac. Ann. 15.4. Tigranocerta holds out against attacks by the Adiabeni [not translated].
Tac. Ann. 15.5.1. Despite his success, Corbulo felt he should not press his luck, and he sent off a deputation to Vologaeses to deplore the violence brought against the province and the fact that a king who was his ally and friend was under siege, along with Roman cohorts.62 He would do better to raise the siege, said Corbulo, or he, too, would pitch his camp in enemy territory!
2. The centurion Casperius,63 who had been chosen for this deputation, came to the king at the town of Nisibis, thirty-seven miles from Tigranocerta, and there delivered his instructions in strongly worded terms.64 3. Vologaeses had a long-standing and firmly held principle of avoiding armed confrontation with the Romans and, in addition, things were not running well for him. The siege was a failure; Tigranes was secure, thanks to his manpower and supplies; those who had undertaken the assault on the town had been routed; legions had been sent into Armenia; and others were on the Syrian border ready to launch an offensive. As for his own situation, his cavalry was weakened from lack of forage, for the sudden appearance of a swarm of locusts had left nothing in the way of grass or foliage. 4. Vologaeses therefore concealed his unease and, assuming a more conciliatory approach, replied that he would send spokesmen to the Roman emperor about his petition for Armenia and strengthening the peace.65 He ordered Monaeses to quit Tigranocerta, and proceeded to pull back himself.
6.1. Most praised this as a magnificent achievement brought off by the king’s fear and the threats of Corbulo. Others explained it as a secret agreement whereby Tigranes would also leave Armenia after both sides abandoned hostilities and Vologaeses departed.66 2. Why else, they asked, had the Roman army been withdrawn from Tigranocerta? Why had they abandoned in peacetime what they had defended in war? Was it better to have wintered on the fringes of Cappadocia in hurriedly erected huts rather than in the capital of a kingdom they had just succeeded in holding? Armed conflict had been deliberately postponed, they said, so Vologaeses could clash with someone other than Corbulo, and so Corbulo would not further jeopardize the glory he had earned over the years. 3. For, as I have observed, Corbulo had requested that Armenia have its own commander for its protection, and the news was that Caesennius Paetus was close at hand.
Dio 62.20.2. When he heard that Nero had distributed Armenia to others and that Adiabene was being laid waste by Tigranes,67 Vologaeses prepared to campaign in person against Corbulo in Syria, and into Armenia he sent Monobazus, king of Adiabene, and the Parthian Monaeses.68
3. These pinned down Tigranes in Tigranocerta. They were doing him no harm by their blockade, however, and, indeed, whenever they engaged him, they were beaten back both by Tigranes’ men and the Romans present with him; and, in addition, Corbulo was keeping a strict watch on Syria. Vologaeses therefore relented and abandoned the expedition.69
4. He sent a message to Corbulo and succeeded in gaining an armistice on the condition that he again send an embassy to Nero and that he raise the siege and withdraw his troops from Armenia. Even then, Nero did not furnish a reply that was either swift or clear, but he sent Lucius Daesennius Paetus to Cappadocia to obviate any revolutionary activity around Armenia.70
Paetus arrives on the scene. He is determined to pursue an aggressive policy and starts his raid into Armenia as winter approaches. Despite bombastic reports to Rome, he has to be rescued by Corbulo. The Parthians withdraw from Armenia, and Corbulo in turn abandons positions established across the Euphrates. there are premature celebrations in Rome.
AD 62
Tac. Ann. 15.6.3. Soon Paetus was there.71 The troops were then divided, with the Fourth and Twelfth legions, plus the Fifth (recently summoned from Moesia),72 put under Paetus’s command, along with the auxiliaries from Pontus, Galatia, and Cappadocia.73 The Third, Sixth, and Tenth legions, and the troops earlier serving in Syria, would remain with Corbulo. All else they would share, or divide up, according to the exigencies of the moment. 4. But Corbulo could not stand a rival, and Paetus, for whom being second to him should have been glory enough, kept disparaging Corbulo’s achievements. There had been “no bloodshed or spoils,” he would say, and the “storming of cities” that Corbulo often referred to applied in name only.74 It would be he, Paetus, who would impose on the conquered peoples tribute and laws, and, instead of a phantom king, Roman jurisdiction.75
7.1. Vologaeses’ representatives, whom I mentioned earlier as having been sent to the emperor, returned at about this same time, emptyhanded, and so the Parthians turned to open warfare.76 Paetus did not demur. He took two legions—the Fourth, which Funisulanus Vettonianus commanded at that time, and the Twelfth, which was under Calavius Sabinus77—and entered Armenia accompanied by a grim omen. 2. For on their way over the Euphrates, which they crossed by a bridge, the horse carrying the consular insignia took fright for no apparent reason and escaped to the rear of the troops.78 Furthermore, a sacrificial animal that was standing beside the winter quarters, which were under construction, burst through the half-finished works in flight and ran out from the rampart. Soldiers’ javelins also burst into flames, a prodigy of significance because, in combat, the enemy (i.e., the Parthians) fights with projectiles.
8.1. Paetus, however, disregarded the omens and, although he had not yet adequately fortified his winter quarters or made any provision for his grain supply, he hurriedly marched his army over the Taurus range.79 His aim, he kept saying, was to retake Tigranocerta and lay waste the areas that Corbulo had left untouched.80 2. He did take a number of strongholds and acquire a measure of glory and plunder81—but failed to exercise moderation in the pursuit of glory, or circumspection in the pursuit of the plunder. With forced marches, he overran areas that could not be held, only to lead back his army when the provisions that had been captured had rotted and winter was coming on. Then, as though the war were over, he wrote a letter to Nero framed in grandiose terms but devoid of substance.
9.1. Meanwhile, Corbulo secured the bank of the Euphrates—which he had never neglected—with more closely spaced guard posts. In addition, to ensure that enemy cavalry squadrons would not obstruct his establishing a bridge on the river—for they were already racing about on the nearby plains, an impressive sight—he drew a line of sizable ships, connected with planking and built up with turrets, across the river. From these, using catapults and ballistas, he drove back the barbarians, whom rocks and missiles could reach at a range that arrows shot back in response could not match. 2. Then the bridge was completed, and the hills on the far side were taken over by the allied cohorts and subsequently by the legionary camp.82 Such was the speed of the Romans, and such their show of strength, that the Parthians abandoned their preparations for invading Syria and directed all their hopes toward Armenia. This was where Paetus was, ignorant of the looming threat and with the Fifth Legion stationed far off in Pontus,83 and the remaining legions he had weakened by indiscriminately granting leave to his men. Then word came that Vologaeses was approaching with a large army, ready to attack.84
Summary of Tac. Ann. 15.10.1. Paetus disperses his forces and faces pressure from the Parthians. He has to protect his wife and son with a cohort of troops [not translated].
Tac. Ann. 15.10.4. They say that Paetus was only with difficulty made to acknowledge the enemy pressure to Corbulo. And there was no haste on Corbulo’s part—as the dangers mounted, credit for relieving Paetus would also grow.85 He did, however, give orders for a thousand men from each of the three legions, along with eight hundred auxiliary cavalry and a similar number from the cohorts, to prepare for the march.
Summary of Tac. Ann. 15.11. Vologaeses inflicts a defeat on the Romans, and Paetus again requests help from Corbulo [not translated].
Tac. Ann. 15.12.1. Corbulo was undaunted. He left some of his troops in Syria to hold the structures erected on the Euphrates, and, taking the shortest route that would not be devoid of provisions, he headed for the region of Commagene, then Cappadocia, and from there Armenia. Accompanying the army—apart from the usual war apparatus—was a large number of camels laden with grain, so Corbulo could ward off both hunger and the enemy.86
Summary of Tac. Ann. 15.12.2–14. Vologaeses blockades the forces of Paetus, who agrees to withdraw from Armenia and surrender his supplies to the Parthians [not translated].
Tac. Ann. 15.15.1. Meanwhile, Paetus set a bridge on the river Arsanias, which flowed past the camp.87 He pretended to be making a path for himself, but in fact the Parthians had ordered it built as evidence of their victory—it was to them that it was useful, as our men set off in the opposite direction. 2. Rumor added that the legions had been sent under the yoke and had suffered other indignities appropriate to a defeat, which had been imitated by the Armenians,88 for they entered the fortifications before the Roman column left, and they stood at the roadside identifying and removing slaves or beasts of burden that had been captured earlier. Even clothing was seized and weapons withheld, the frightened soldiers yielding them so there would be no grounds for a fight.
3. Vologaeses piled up the arms and corpses of the slain as a testimonial to our defeat but stopped short of watching the legions in flight; after indulging his pride to the fullest, he was seeking a reputation for moderation. He forded the river Arsanias on an elephant, and all members of his entourage charged over on their powerful horses, for the rumor had arisen that—because of the treachery of its builders—the bridge would give way under their weight.89 In truth, those who had the temerity to set foot on it found it strong and reliable.
16. It is well established, however, that those under siege had such quantities of grain at their disposal that they set fire to their granaries. On the other hand, according to Corbulo’s account, the Parthians, short of provisions and their forage exhausted, were on the point of raising the siege (and Corbulo himself was no more than three days’ march away, he says).90 2. He adds that a sworn undertaking was given by Paetus before the standards, and in the presence of men whom the king had sent to witness it, that no Roman would enter Armenia until the arrival of Nero’s letter stating whether he agreed with the peace treaty.91 3. While this account was intended to increase Paetus’s disrepute,92 the other details are not unclear: Paetus covered a distance of forty miles in one day,93 leaving wounded men all along the route, and the panic-stricken retreat was no less unsightly than if the men had turned tail in battle.
4. Corbulo met them with his own forces on the bank of the Euphrates, but he avoided such a display of insignia and weapons as would make a humiliating contrast between them.94 The units were downcast and deploring the lot of their comrades, and they could not even hold back their tears; greetings could barely be exchanged because of the weeping. Gone was the will to compete in valor, gone the striving for glory, which are the inclinations of successful men; pity reigned alone, and it was stronger in the lower ranks.
17.1. Next came a brief conversation between the commanders. Corbulo complained that his efforts had been wasted, that the war could have been ended if the Parthians had been routed. Paetus responded that everything remained unchanged for the two of them—they should turn the eagles around and together invade Armenia, now weakened by the departure of Vologaeses.95 2. Such were not the orders he had from the emperor, said Corbulo. He had left his province from concern over the danger facing the legions and, as the Parthians’ intentions were unclear, he would head back to Syria. Even so, he would still have to pray for the best of luck in order for his infantrymen, exhausted from the long distances covered, to overtake spirited cavalrymen, who would outpace them over the easy terrain of the plains.96
Paetus then wintered in Cappadocia.97 3. Messengers from Vologaeses were meanwhile dispatched to Corbulo to tell him to dismantle his forts across the Euphrates and make the river the boundary between them as before. Corbulo had a demand, too, that Armenia be cleared of its various garrisons. In the end, the king acquiesced; the fortifications that Corbulo had established beyond the Euphrates were demolished, and the Armenians were left without a ruler.98
18.1. At Rome, meanwhile, trophies and arches were being erected in the middle of the Capitoline Hill for victory over the Parthians.99 Decreed by the Senate when the war was still undecided, they were not even now discontinued, attention being paid to appearances, despite knowledge of the facts.100
In spring 63, quite different reports reach Rome from Paetus and Vologaeses. Rome sees through the pretenses of Paetus but refuses the approaches of Vologaeses, who is now willing to accept that Tiridates should accept the crown from Rome but without having to travel to the city. Conduct of the war is handed over to Corbulo, who is given a general military command, while the civil administration of Syria is handed over to Gaius Cestius.
AD 63
Tac. Ann. 15.24.1. Meanwhile, at the start of spring, representatives of the Parthians arrived with King Vologaeses’ instructions and a letter that ran along the same lines. The claims to sovereignty over Armenia that he had so often insisted on earlier he was now dropping, Vologaeses said. The gods, arbiters of all peoples, no matter how powerful, had delivered possession of it to the Parthians, not without some humiliation for the Romans. 2. Recently, he had blockaded Tigranes, and then released Paetus and his legions unharmed when he could have crushed them.101 He had given sufficient proof of his power and also demonstrated his clemency. Tiridates would not have refused to come to Rome to accept his diadem either, he said, had he not been held back by the religious taboos of his priesthood. He would, however, come before the standards and statues of the emperor, there to inaugurate his reign in the presence of the legions.102
25.1. Such was the letter of Vologaeses, and Paetus’s account, suggesting that matters were still undecided, contradicted it.103 A centurion who had arrived with the representatives was therefore questioned on the Armenian situation, and he replied that all the Romans had quit the country. 2. Aware now of the mockery implicit in the barbarians asking for what they had already seized, Nero consulted the leading men of Rome on whether they preferred a dangerous war or a dishonorable peace.104 It was war, without question. With his many years’ experience of the Roman troops and the enemy, Corbulo was put in charge of the campaign, so there would be no further bungling through another’s inexperience—they had had enough of Paetus.105
3. The representatives were therefore sent back with their mission not accomplished but bearing gifts to raise hopes that Tiridates would not fail with the same request if he petitioned in person.106
Gaius Cestius was entrusted with the civil administration of Syria,107 and Corbulo with the military forces, which were reinforced by the addition of the Fifteenth Legion, under Marius Celsus, brought in from Pannonia.108 Tetrarchs, kings, prefects, procurators, and praetors in charge of neighboring provinces were sent written instructions to take orders from Corbulo,109 whose powers were increased roughly to the level of those the Roman people had granted Gnaeus Pompey for the war on the pirates.110 4. Although Paetus feared worse upon his return, Nero was satisfied merely with a facetious rebuke, the gist of which was that he was pardoning Paetus immediately in order that a man so prone to panic might not fall ill from chronic worry.111
Dio 62.21.1. Vologaeses marched on Tigranocerta and repelled Paetus, who had come to its aid. When Paetus fled, he gave chase, cut down the garrison that had been left by him on the banks of the Taurus, and then blockaded him in Rhandea, close to the river Arsanias.112 2. But he could not get near the defensive wall because he lacked heavy-armed soldiers and was not well stocked with food, especially since he had arrived with large numbers and without preparations made for provisioning, and would actually have left with nothing accomplished but for Paetus’s fear of his archers, whose arrows actually reached his camp, and his horsemen, who appeared on the scene everywhere. Paetus therefore sent him communications about a truce and came to an understanding with him, swearing that he would leave all Armenia and that Nero would give it to Tiridates.113 3. The Parthian was well satisfied with these terms inasmuch as he would take possession of the country without a fight and also put the Romans under obligation for a great service done for them. 4. In addition, he had found out that Corbulo, whom Paetus had kept sending for before he was surrounded, was now approaching. He released the blockaded Romans, first securing an agreement that they would bridge the river Arsanias for him, not because he actually needed any bridges—he had crossed the river on foot—but to show them that he had power over them. Not even then did he withdraw by the pontoon: he crossed on an elephant, and the others crossed by the same means as they had before.
22.1. The agreement had just been made when Corbulo came to the Euphrates with extraordinary speed and waited there. When the two armies came together, one could have observed the enormous difference between them and between their commanders: on one side, there was rejoicing and pride over their speed; on the other, grief and shame over the agreement that had been reached. 2. Sending Monaeses to him, Vologaeses demanded that Corbulo abandon the fortress in Mesopotamia. The two men had many discussions together on that very bridge over the Euphrates, after they had removed its middle section.114 3. Corbulo undertook to leave the country if the Parthian also left Armenia. Both items remained provisional until Nero learned what had transpired, dealt with the second set of ambassadors that Vologaeses sent, and told them in his reply that he would give Armenia to Tiridates if he came to Rome. 4. He also relieved Paetus of his command, sent the soldiers who were with him elsewhere, and again put Corbulo in charge of the war against the same enemy. Nero intended to go with him on the campaign, but when he fell ill while offering a sacrifice, he did not dare set out on it but remained in the country.115
Corbulo reorganizes the army and launches an invasion of Armenia. Tiridates and Vologaeses are willing to come to terms, and Corbulo meets them at the site of the earlier Roman disaster under Paetus.
Tac. Ann. 15.26.1. In Corbulo’s view, the Fourth and Twelfth legions, with their best fighters lost and the rest demoralized, were not battle-ready. He transferred them to Syria, and from there took into Armenia the Sixth and Thirteenth.116 2. This was a force with a full complement of soldiers that had been hardened by regularly and successfully facing difficult tasks. He added to it the Fifth Legion (which had been spared the disaster because it was on service in Pontus),117 the soldiers of the Fifteenth, recently brought into the theater, and companies of elite troops from Illyricum and Egypt.118 He also added all the auxiliary cavalry and infantry that he had, and the auxiliary troops of the kings that had been concentrated at Melitene (which was where he was preparing to cross the Euphrates).119 3. Corbulo then undertook the ritual purification of the troops and summoned them to a meeting. There he proceeded to talk in grandiose terms about his campaigns under the emperor’s auspices, and his own achievements, attributing the reverses to Paetus’s incompetence. And this he did with great authority, which counted as eloquence in the military man.120
27.1. Presently, Corbulo took the road once opened up by Lucius Lucullus,121 clearing such obstacles as the years had thrown up. And when spokesmen came from Tiridates and Vologaeses to discuss peace, he did not rebuff them, sending back with them some centurions bearing a communiqué that was not intransigent in tone.122 Matters had not yet reached the point where out-and-out war was necessary, it said. 2. Much had gone well for the Romans, and some things for the Parthians—and this served as a warning against pride. Accordingly, not only was it to Tiridates’ advantage to receive as a gift a kingdom spared the ravages of war, but Vologaeses would also serve the interests of the Parthian race more by an alliance with Rome than by resorting to mutual damage. Corbulo was aware of the amount of internal conflict in Vologaeses’ realm, the message concluded, and of the unruliness and ferocity of the tribes he ruled over, whereas Corbulo’s own ruler had undisturbed peace everywhere else, and this was his only war.
3. At the same time, Corbulo pressed home his advice with some intimidation. He drove from their homes the Armenian grandees who had been the first to defect from us, demolished their strongholds, and filled the plains and highlands, and the strong and the weak, with the same terror.
28.1. Even among the barbarians, Corbulo’s name did not excite animosity or the hatred felt for an enemy, and so they thought his advice reliable. Consequently, Vologaeses was not inflexible on the main issue, and even requested a truce in certain prefectures.123 Tiridates demanded a place and day to parley. 2. The date chosen was close, and the place was where the legions and Paetus had recently been under siege—selected by the barbarians in remembrance of a rather successful operation there. Corbulo did not shy away from it, hoping that the contrast between the two situations would only increase his prestige. Nor did Paetus’s disgrace distress him, a fact made abundantly clear by the order he gave to Paetus’s son, a tribune, to take some units and cover over the vestiges of that unfortunate encounter.
3. On the appointed day, Tiberius Alexander and Vinicianus Annius came into Tiridates’ camp as a mark of respect for the king and also to allay any fears of a trap.124 (Alexander was a distinguished Roman knight who had been brought in as a military administrator, and Annius was Corbulo’s son-in-law, not yet of senatorial age but set in command of the Fifth Legion as a legate.) Then each leader took an escort of twenty cavalrymen. Catching sight of Corbulo, the king was the first to dismount. There was no hesitation on Corbulo’s part either, and, on foot, the two clasped each other’s right hand.
29.1. The Roman then praised the young man for rejecting impetuous policies in favor of a safe and secure course. After a lengthy prelude on the nobility of his family, Tiridates proceeded modestly. He would go to Rome, he said, and bring Nero a novel honor—an Arsacid as suppliant, although Parthia had suffered no reverse. It was agreed that Tiridates would set his royal diadem before the emperor’s statue and take it back only from Nero’s hand. And the meeting ended with a kiss.
2. Then, after a few days’ interval, there was a magnificent display on both sides. On the one, cavalry was deployed by squadrons and with tribal insignia; on the other, legions were standing in columns, with gleaming eagles, standards, and representations of the gods, as in a temple. In their midst was a tribunal, which held a curule chair, and the chair held an effigy of Nero. 3. Tiridates went forward to it. After the customary slaughter of sacrificial animals, he took the diadem from his head and set it at the feet of the image, which stirred deep emotions in all present, emotions magnified by the vision of the slaughter and the blockade of Roman armies that still lingered before their eyes. Now, they reflected, the situation was reversed: Tiridates would go ahead to be on view for the world—and how little short of a captive was he!
30.1. Corbulo enhanced his glorious reputation by affability and by hosting a banquet. Moreover, the king would ask for explanations whenever he noticed something unfamiliar—the centurion’s announcement of the start of each watch, for instance, the dinner party’s end signaled by a bugle call, and the fire on the altar before the general’s tent being lit from beneath with a torch.125 Corbulo embellished everything and filled him with admiration for the old Roman traditions. 2. The next day, Tiridates requested time to visit his brothers and his mother, since he had such a long journey before him. Meanwhile, he handed over his daughter as a hostage, together with a letter of entreaty to Nero.126
31.1. Setting off, Tiridates found Pacorus in Media and Vologaeses in Ecbatana.127 Vologaeses was not unconcerned about his brother, for he had requested of Corbulo, through his personal messengers, that Tiridates not be subjected to any outward appearance of servitude. Vologaeses asked that Tiridates not surrender his sword, that he not be barred from embracing provincial governors or be made to stand at their doors, and that, in Rome, he be shown as much respect as the consuls.128 Vologaeses, of course, was used to the pomp of the foreigner and had no knowledge of us, people for whom the reality of power is important but its trappings irrelevant.
Tacitus ends his account of events on the Parthian border at this point.
FIGURE 8. RIC2 Nero 283, Brass Dupondius. Obverse: NERO CLAVD(ius) CAESAR AVG(ustus) GER(manicus) P(ontifex) M(aximus) T(ribunicia) P(otestate) IMP(erator), P(ater) P(atriae), “Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus, Chief Priest, with Tribunician Power, Imperator, Father of the Country.” Reverse: PACE P(opuli) R(omani) TERRA MARIQ(ue) PARTA IANVM CLVSIT, “After achieving the peace of the Roman People on land and sea he closed (the temple of) Janus.” From the collection of Andreas Pangerl ∕ romancoins.info.
The Temple of Janus was a small building in the northeast corner of the Forum, rectangular in shape and with a double door at each end. It appears frequently on coinage of Nero down to AD 67. The reverse of the coin in Figure 8 depicts the temple, with a latticed window and a celebratory garland hung above the closed double door. The legend records that Nero closed the Temple of Janus after bringing about peace. The closing of the temple was a symbolic act to mark the cessation of war. It was a rare event. Augustus recorded that he closed it three times and that it had previously been closed only twice (RG 13).
The status of the Temple of Janus during Nero’s reign is a major problem. The late source Orosius (7.3.7) claims that according to Tacitus’s Histories (presumably in a part now lost) the temple was open continuously from late in Augustus’s reign to Vespasian’s. This is flatly contradicted by Suetonius’s statement (Ner. 13.2, see section on Nero as Performer in Chapter IX) that Nero closed it during the celebrations to mark the arrival of Tiridates in Rome in 66. The closure on this occasion is not mentioned by Dio (63.1.2); the Annals are of course missing for that period. But some issues of the type bear the legend Tr(ibunicia) Pot(estate) XI, hence the eleventh year of Nero’s reign (end of 64 to end of 65). This could mean that the temple was closed to mark the symbolic surrender of Tiridates to Corbulo in AD 63 (Tac. Ann. 15.29), and that out of a desire to keep the achievement before the public eye, Nero continued to issue the same type in later years.
ILS 232 (Smallwood 51b). Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus, Imperator, pontifex maximus, holding tribunician power for the eleventh time, consul for the fourth time, Imperator for the ninth time, father of the country, with Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo as his legate with propraetorian authority, and Titus Aurelius Fulvus as his legate of the third Gallic Legion.
This inscription occurs on a stone base, one of a matching pair, the other very fragmentary (CIL 6742), found in Charput in Armenia Minor. The reference to Nero’s eleventh tenure of tribunician power, which, unlike the consulship, occurred every year successively from succession, indicates that the inscription belongs to the period late 64 to late 65, thus after the formal submission of Tiridates to Corbulo but before Tiridates’ arrival in Rome. It may have accompanied some victory monument, perhaps connected with the Third Legion.
Nero and Corbulo are mentioned (on Corbulo’s propraetorian powers, see the earlier discussion on ILS 9108). The third individual has a link with later Roman history. Titus Aurelius Fulvus was the grandfather of the emperor Antoninus Pius. He was at this time commander of the Third Legion, Gallica (“Gallic”). It was probably raised by Caesar in 48 BC and taken over by Antony, but commanded by Octavian after Actium and transferred to Syria. After the Parthian settlement, Nero moved it to Moesia in 67 or 68, and it was still commanded by Titus Aurelius in AD 69, when he led a successful campaign against the Rhoxolani, who invaded Moesia in that year. In recognition of his achievement, Titus received the ornamenta consularia from Otho (Tac. Hist. 1.79.3). He went on to a second consulship, perhaps in AD 85, as well as the prefecture of the city (SHA Ant. Pius 1.2).
Dio 62.23.1. Corbulo, then, openly prepared for war against Vologaeses. Sending a centurion, he commanded Vologaeses to leave the country but confidentially advised him to send his brother to Rome, and he did manage to persuade him because he apparently was superior to the king in military strength. 2. Thus, Corbulo and Tiridates met right in Rhandea, as this location was agreeable to both—to Vologaeses because his men had shut up the Romans there but had released them under a truce, which clearly demonstrated they had been done a favor, and to Corbulo because his men would surely erase the infamy that had earlier befallen them in the place. 3. Nor was it just a matter of their making speeches there. A high stand was erected and images of Nero set on it, and Tiridates came forward and did obeisance to them under the eyes of many Armenians and many Parthians and Romans. Then, after sacrificing and uttering words of praise over them, he took the diadem from his head and set it before them.129 4. Monobazus and Vologaeses both came to Corbulo and gave him hostages.130 And in commemoration of this, Nero was many times hailed as supreme commander, and he broke precedent by celebrating a triumph. 5. So Corbulo possessed a strong force and no slight reputation. He could easily have been declared emperor since people were sick to death of Nero but had unqualified admiration for Corbulo in every respect, but he made no attempt at revolution and faced no denunciation for it either. 6. In actual fact, he became even more self-restrained in every way, and in particular he willingly sent to Rome his son-in-law Annius, who was serving as his legate; and while this was ostensibly so that Annius could escort Tiridates, it was really so that Nero should have a hostage.131 Such was Nero’s confidence that Corbulo would make no revolutionary move that the general received his son-in-law as his legate even before the man had held the praetorship.
1 Tacitus resumes his account of eastern affairs from the end of Annals 12.51, beginning his narrative at the very end of AD 54 (Nero was almost certainly seventeen on December 16, 54). As is often the case when dealing with events outside Rome, and especially when dealing with Parthia, Tacitus abandons the strictly annalistic format and allows his narrative to continue beyond the year’s end, indicating at the close of Annals 13.9 that he has done just that.
2 This next passage is presented by Tacitus almost in the form of a controversia, an artificial legal disputation used in the rhetorical schools.
3 Tacitus here suggests that by the end of 54, despite the contretemps involving the Armenian ambassadors (see Chapter II, n.73), there was a public perception that Agrippina still exercised enormous influence.
4 Claudius had in fact launched and participated in the highly successful invasion of Britain in AD 43, and the suggestion here is that by the end of his reign some ten years later he was a spent force.
5 Pompey the Great was born in 106 BC; he received his first command in 84 BC, when he was actually 23: Velleius Paterculus (2.53.4) observes that some authorities negligently made an error of five years in calculating Pompey’s career. He had already served under his father in 87 BC and had possibly taken part in the capture of Asculum two years earlier. But these last two hardly constitute commands.
6 Augustus was born in 63 BC. In the Res Gestae (1.1), he refers to assuming military command at the age of nineteen; he did not in fact conduct regular operations until 43 BC.
7 The “young men” would be Roman citizens residing in the provinces. Legions were manned by citizens, the auxiliaries by allied noncitizens.
8 Nero’s strategy is in some ways a vindication of the Roman policy of maintaining a number of “client” rulers in the frontier area; that said, in the end, the rulers enumerated here saw no direct service. Marcus Julius Agrippa (II) was the son of Julius “Herod” Agrippa, the close friend and adviser of Caligula and of Claudius, who died in AD 44. Originally granted Chalcis by Claudius, the younger Agrippa’s territories had subsequently been enlarged by both Claudius and Nero.
Antiochus IV was made king of Commagene by Caligula and then possibly dismissed by him. He was apparently restored by Claudius, and his territory was enlarged by the addition of part of Cilicia. He was removed by Vespasian in AD 72 on suspicion of collaboration with the Parthians.
9 Aristobulus was the son of Herod of Chalcis, whose kingdom he subsequently acquired. After his reign, Armenia Minor, which lay west across the Euphrates from Armenia and had a coastline on the southeast of the Black Sea, seems to have been incorporated into the empire by Vespasian.
10 Sohaemus was granted Sophene in the southwest of Armenia, separated by the Euphrates from Cappadocia. Josephus (AJ 20.158) states that Sohaemus was made king of Emesa in Syria in this year (AD 54), and he says nothing of Sophene. Sohaemus was later a supporter of Vespasian.
11 The bane of the Parthians was internal dissent, often involving rival members of the ruling family. Nothing further is known about Vardanes.
12 Primipilus, the senior rank of centurion, is a restoration for a word almost completely missing from the inscription.
13 The news of the success in Parthia would have arrived in Rome in a period when there was already general euphoria following the highly positive initial impression created by Nero. The vesta triumphalis was worn not only by those awarded a triumph but also by senior magistrates on important occasions and then by the emperor. Caesar was entitled to use it at public events, and it was worn by Caligula at the dedication of a temple and later by Nero when receiving Tiridates (Dio 44.4.2, 6.1; 59.7.1; 63.3.3).
14 The temple of Mars Ultor was the traditional venue for the celebration of victories and therefore highly appropriate in this case.
15 Tacitus postpones until this point reference to what was a key factor in the success achieved by the Romans, the command given to [Gnaeus] Domitius Corbulo. He greatly admires this individual, even down to his imposing physique and his eloquent tongue. Corbulo’s mother, Vistilia, had married six times (Plin. HN 7.39), and, as a consequence, Corbulo had a number of important family connections (he was the half-brother of Caesonia, Caligula’s wife).
Corbulo’s initial career is not easy to determine, since it is difficult to distinguish between his activities and those of his father in that early phase, but we know that he served in Germany under Claudius in AD 47, when he held his first command (Tac. Ann. 11.18.2; see Chapter V) and achieved major successes. His generalship there, which would set the tone for the rest of his career, was marked by the restoration of legionary discipline, previously allowed to slacken, and by the severity of his punishments. He was suspected, however, of stirring up trouble among the Chauci and was called back across the Rhine, although he was all the same awarded the ornamenta triumphalia. Tacitus’s caustic comments on his treatment are reminiscent of Tiberius’s recall of Germanicus from Germany and the bestowal of supposedly empty honors (Tac. Ann. 2.42.1). Corbulo later held the governorship of Asia, perhaps in AD 52/53. In the current crisis, he was appointed to a special legateship of Cappadocia, the rugged area in eastern Anatolia annexed by Rome in AD 17 and in this period normally falling under the authority of the legate of Syria. It may well be that he was also on this occasion given command over Galatia, the region bordering Cappadocia to the west, since he is later recorded as raising troops there (Tac. Ann. 13.35.2). His mandate was limited to ensuring the stability of Armenia and its status as an independent kingdom.
After his sterling work in dealing with the Parthians, Corbulo was, in 67, summoned by Nero to Greece, where he committed suicide to avoid execution. One of his daughters, Domitia Longa, later married the emperor Domitian.
One anecdote attached to Corbulo (although the reference may be to his father) is that he reduced Cornelius Fidus, the son-in-law of Ovid, to tears by calling him a plucked ostrich (struthocamelum depilatum: Sen. Dial. 2.17.1).
16 Gaius Ummidius Quadratus was praetor in AD 18, but for reasons unknown his career then slowed down, and he did not reach the consulship until about AD 40. Under Claudius, he became governor of Illyricum, and by 51 was governor of Syria. He had to intervene in Judaea several times to deal with local unrest, and he was drawn into the strife over Armenia. He died while still in office, probably sometime shortly before AD 60. His career is attested in an inscription from Mt. Cassino (ILS 972).
17 Syria normally housed four legions—the Third (Gallica), Sixth (Ferrata), Tenth (Fretensis), and Twelfth (Fulminata)—with close to five thousand men each. These were divided equally between Ummidius and Corbulo.
18 Aegeae, founded originally by the Macedonians and later a naval base, was located near the mouth of the river Pyramus on the Gulf of Issus in Cilicia in southern Asia Minor (Barr. 67 B3).
19 It was perhaps inevitable that the divided command in the campaign against the Parthians would create rivalries and confusion over zones of responsibility.
20 Tacitus (Ann. 12.10.2) states that the Parthian deputation to Claudius speaks of the great respect that the Parthians felt for Rome.
21 Insteius may possibly be the Insteius Capito who is mentioned later by Tacitus as Corbulo’s camp prefect in AD 58 (Ann. 13.39.1). If so, it almost certainly means that at this time he was a senior centurion (primipilus), reasonably so, in view of the importance of his mission. He would presumably have been later assigned to Corbulo and promoted to the senior post of camp prefect.
22 Arrius Varus would later make secret reports on Corbulo and be rewarded by Nero with a promotion to senior centurion (Tac. Hist. 3.6.1). He later became a supporter of Vespasian.
23 The imperial fasces were the symbolic axes bundled in rods borne by the twelve attendants (lictors) assigned to Augustus in 19 BC and retained by his successors. They were wreathed with laurels for victories won under the emperor’s auspices.
24 It is not clear what Tacitus’s precise meaning is here. There had been no actual war with Armenia since the accession of Nero. Perhaps he is going back earlier, to AD 52 or 53, when the Parthians drove Radamistus out of Armenia.
25 Tacitus resumes the account of the Parthian campaign, which he left in AD 55. We now find ourselves at the beginning of 58. We have to assume by inference from what Tacitus says here that in the intervening period King Vologaeses had been offered the throne of Armenia for his brother Tiridates, provided the latter would accept it as bestowed by Rome. The Parthians seem to have been obdurate on the principle that Tiridates would not recognize the right of the emperor to bestow the kingdom from Rome.
26 During the republic, the Romans had achieved a major success in Armenia. Tigranes (II) the Great had built his kingdom into a major power, but he became drawn into the war between Rome and his father-in-law, Mithridates. Lucullus inflicted the first of a series of defeats on him in 69 BC, but it was Pompey who finally subdued him and obliged him to become a Roman ally. Pompey, in fact, owed much of his success to the kind of internal dispute that would frequently come to the aid of the Romans, in that Tigranes’s son had rebelled against his father.
27 The legions of Syria had been divided equally between Corbulo and Ummidius (Tac. Ann. 13.8.2), with Corbulo receiving the Third and Sixth, and Ummidius retaining the Tenth and Twelfth. But a vexillation of the Tenth is also recorded as serving with Corbulo (Tac. Ann. 15.40.2).
28 It was clearly the practice in Syria for legions to wear civilian clothing when they were not on campaign.
29 Roman citizens in these two provinces would be recruited for the legions, and noncitizens would serve in the auxiliaries. Galatia had been incorporated into the empire, with its territory enlarged, upon the death of its last king, Amyntas, in 25 BC (Dio 53.26.3).
30 The reference to a legion sent from Germany is very puzzling, since no German legion is attested as taking part in the eastern campaign. The Fourth Legion, Scythica, is mentioned as being present in Cappadocia in AD 62 (Tac. Ann. 15.7.1), and it is possible that Tacitus or his source has confused that legion with the Fourth Legion, Macedonica, which was stationed at Mainz in Germany at that time. But Tacitus makes no reference to it or indeed to any non-Syrian legion in the current campaign.
31 Tacitus presumably refers here to the winter of 57–58. Roman legions would sleep under canvas while on campaign; in winter, they would remain in their legionary fortresses. The tactics described here show Corbulo to have been a ruthless disciplinarian. Conditions would be particularly harsh because the winter camps seem to have been in Armenia, not in Cappadocia (as implied in Tac. Ann. 13.36.1).
32 The fort of Volandum is unknown, although from Tacitus’s account we can place it south of the Araxes River and west of Artaxata (Barr. 89 G1).
33 Cornelius must have been a legionary legate, but is otherwise unknown. Insteius may be the centurion mentioned in 13.9.1.
34 Artaxata had been founded by the Armenian king Artaxias, supposedly on the advice of Hannibal, on the left bank of the Araxes River in 186 BC. It was the capital of Armenia.
35 The Medes were a people akin to the Persians; they inhabited the mountainous area southwest of the Caspian. By “Media” Tacitus is referring strictly to Media Atropatene (Barr. 69 H2), in the northwest, distinguished from Greater Media.
The Albani were a group of tribes in modern Dagestan/Georgia. Tacitus (Ann. 14.26.1) suggests that Corbulo in fact went to Media.
36 A solar eclipse of April 30, 59, is mentioned by Pliny (HN 2.180) as having been seen by Corbulo in Armenia. The Tacitean description here does not properly suit an eclipse, but the account may have been much distorted in the sources. It is therefore possible that Corbulo spent the winter in Artaxata and did not destroy the town until the following spring. Syme (1958), I.391.2, argues that, because the narrative breaks off after the destruction of Artaxata, that event marks the end of the campaigning year and occurred in 58.
37 The fall of Artaxata was the first great military success of Nero’s reign. The acclamation of Imperator, traditionally made to a successful commander in the field, was now enjoyed exclusively by the emperor, for victories won by his legates. Nero accepted that particular honor, but the record shows clearly that he did not accept the continuous consulships.
38 Gaius Cassius had been consul in 30 and was later appointed as legate of Syria in 44. He was an eminent legal scholar and author of several books on civil law. Banished by Nero in 65 (Tac. Ann. 16.9.1), he was recalled by Vespasian. He was the brother of Lucius Cassius Longinus (see Ann. 6.15.1). Cassius was sarcastically suggesting that care should be taken lest the festive days become so numerous that there would not be any days left for the conduct of business.
39 Dio takes as his starting point the fall of Artaxata, probably late in 58 (Tac. Ann. 13.41), and then summarizes events down to the ending of military action.
40 Dio here echoes Tac. Ann. 13.35.2, where Tacitus notes that Corbulo added a new legion, Scythica IV, and in Cappadocia brought the Syrian legions up to fighting capability.
41 There is some irony in this account, in that Corbulo would be forced to commit suicide after the failed Pisonian conspiracy in 65.
42 Almost certainly in 58. Dio, with Tacitus (Ann. 13.41.2), probably reflects Corbulo’s commentaries in observing that Artaxata was burned to the ground.
43 Tacitus resumes his narrative from 13.41. This section covers the campaigns of AD 59–60.
Tigranocerta had been founded sometime after 80 BC by Tigranes I to replace Artaxata as the capital of Armenia. Its initial population consisted mainly of Greeks forced to resettle there after an invasion of Cappadocia. The partially completed city was almost totally destroyed by Lucullus in 69 BC. Its location is unknown; a strong candidate is Arzan in the eastern Tigris basin (Barr. 89 D3).
44 The Mardi were a nomadic people found in Armenia and Media. They were partially conquered by Alexander the Great and appear as enemies of the Romans at the time of Lucullus. They have been seen by some as ancestors of the modern Kurds, but the identification is far from confirmed.
45 The Iberians would be the troops of King Pharasmanes, who had given up his own dynastic ambitions in Armenia.
46 Frontinus (Strat. 2.9.5) reports a different account, that Tigranocerta was besieged and held out stubbornly until Corbulo executed one of the enemy nobles, Vadandus, and hurled his head into the city by siege machine. It fell by chance in the middle of a council that the residents were holding and terrified them into submission.
47 Legerda is mentioned by Ptolemy (Geog. 5.13.19), although his text here is far from certain; it was a fortress near the north Tigris, possibly Lidjia on the upper slopes of the Taurus, west-northwest of Tigranocerta (Barr. 89 C2). It should be noted, however, that the name is an emendation of the word legerat in Tacitus’s manuscript.
48 The reference to the Red Sea can generally mean the modern Red Sea or the shore of the Persian Gulf. The former can be ruled out here. Furthermore, it is hard to see how there could be a route between the shore of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea that did not cross through Parthian territory, and it has been argued that there has been confusion here between the Red Sea and the Caspian Sea. Corbulo, in control of Armenia, could easily have sent the Hyrcanians by the southern end of the Caspian.
49 Dio’s “marched in the direction of Tigranocerta” and Tacitus’s “He therefore set off for the town [Tigranocerta]” (Ann. 14.23.1) clearly reflect a single source.
50 Verulanus is otherwise unknown, unless he is the Severus Verulanus mentioned in Tac. Ann. 15.3.1, who would later hold a consulship, probably in AD 66.
51 The uncle of this man, Tigranes V, had been appointed king of Armenia by Augustus (RG 27.2) and was later executed under Tiberius for maiestas (Tac. Ann. 6.40.2). The nephew, Tigranes VI, was the great-grandson of Herod the Great (Joseph. AJ 18.5.4) and great-grandson (Tacitus is casual in referring to him as grandson) of Archelaus, last king of Cappadocia. He had spent much of his life in Rome, where he was held as a hostage. His link with the ruling family of Armenia was a tenuous one. The family of his grandfather, Alexander, son of Herod, had renounced Judaism and settled in Armenia. Tigranes must have been highly regarded by Nero, but Tacitus has little respect for him, and his tenure proved to be a short one. The appointment of Tigranes seems to suggest a move away from the policy of accepting a Parthian candidate to rule Armenia provided that he do so under the nominal blessing of Rome. This may reflect a confused policy in Rome at a time when Nero was breaking out of the orbit of Seneca and Burrus. The arrival of Tigranes seems more or less to have coincided with Corbulo’s appointment to Syria (discussed later) and departure from Armenia for that province.
52 Corbulo made extensive use of client kings for the defense of Armenia’s borders. Tacitus’s language (“accept submission”) suggests that the general reference here is probably to military authority in the border areas of Armenia rather than to the assignment of territory. Note that in giving Aristobulus and Sohaemus territories to actually rule over, he specifies “both of them also receiving royal diadems.” Of the kings who had been asked to provide help at the outset of the crisis in AD 54 (Tac. Ann. 13.7.1), the services of Antiochus of Commagene and of Aristobulus are called on once again. Agrippa II and Sohaemus ruled kingdoms some distance from the theater of operations, in Chalcis and Emesa, respectively, and had presumably returned there once the crisis passed.
Two other kings appear to be used at this stage. Pharasmanes of Iberia had initially supported the claim to Armenia made by his son, Radamistus. Later, to ingratiate himself with the Romans, he had put Radamistus to death and taken some sort of military action against Armenia on his own initiative, not on the instructions of Corbulo. Tacitus (Ann. 14.23.3) suggests that he sent troops to aid the Romans against the Mardi. He would have been an ally to be handled with caution, and it is surprising that he was given military authority in part of Armenia. Polemo (II) was the grandson of Polemo I, who had received his kingdom of Pontus and Armenia Minor from Antony, and Augustus had added the kingdom of Bosporus. Armenia Minor, however, was transferred initially to Antiochus of Commagene by Augustus (Dio 54.9.2), subsequently by Caligula to King Cotys of Thrace (Dio 59.12.2), and finally, as Tacitus (Ann. 13.7.1) shows, to Aristobulus by Nero. Polemo II received Pontus and the Bosporan kingdom from his childhood friend Caligula (Dio 59.12.2). Although he lost his Bosporan realm, he did receive part of Cilicia (Dio 60.8.2). At some point after 63 and the end of the Armenian crisis, Nero incorporated Pontus within the empire (Suet. Ner. 18). Polemo is one of the more important client kings, and yet there is no other mention of his supposed role in the campaign. Moreover, the area of Armenia contiguous to his kingdom was not under threat. It is important to note that the presence of both Pharasmanes and Polemo is based on an emendation made in 1672 by J. F. Gronovius of pars nipuli in Tacitus’s manuscript to Pharasmani Polemonique.
53 Corbulo had been operating as special legate in Cappadocia (and Galatia). In AD 60, he was appointed to the regular and prestigious governorship of Syria. It had been intended that Ummidius Quadratus, who had clashed with Corbulo, would be replaced by Publius Anteius in AD 55 (Tac. Ann. 13.22.1), but Anteius was detained in Rome, possibly because he was an ally of Agrippina. He seems to have been involved in some sort of shady trafficking in property that had legally been confiscated by the state but not collected. He committed suicide in AD 61 (Tac. Ann. 16.14.3). We do not know when Ummidius died, and some plausibly read the sibi of Tacitus’s phrase sibi permissam (“assigned to him”) as a reference not to Corbulo but to Syria, to mean that the province “had been left to its own devices.”
54 The account of events on the eastern frontier is resumed from the end of Ann. 14.26, where Tacitus had carried them down to the end of AD 60. We now resume in the spring of AD 61, and this section must cover two years, 61–62, since Paetus did not arrive until 62 (Syme [1958], 392). Tacitus describes the final settlement with Parthia in some detail because of its historical significance. The military and diplomatic events are very complex.
55 The treaty of friendship that Augustus had reached in 20 BC, and that had resulted in the recovery of Roman standards taken in battle by the Parthians, had been renewed by Artabanus (Tac. Ann. 2.58.1). It was also renewed when Germanicus was in Syria and again at the end of Tiberius’s reign and the beginning of Caligula’s. It had never been formally broken. Respect was symbolically important. When in AD 49 Parthian ambassadors went to Rome to seek the return of Meherdates, Claudius noted the deferential attitude shown by the Parthians toward Rome (Tac. Ann. 12.11.1).
56 Hyrcania was a fertile area south of the Caspian, bounded on the east by the Oxus. It was annexed to the Persian empire, probably by Cyrus the Great, but preserved its national consciousness and involved itself in the factional disputes in Parthia (Tac. Ann. 6.36.4, 43.2). Some of the Parthian kings were of Hyrcanian origin.
57 Adiabene was a Parthian vassal state in the Tigris region (Barr. 91 E2), the northern part of Assyria between the Tigris and the mountains of Kurdistan, although confusingly the elder Pliny sometimes uses it to refer to the whole of Assyria (HN 5.66). Its ruler Izates (AD 36–50s) was much involved in Parthian dynastic politics (Tac. Ann. 12.13.1) and converted to Judaism, partly from political motives (Joseph. AJ 20 passim).
58 Tigranes did have a connection with the royal house of Parthia, but it was tenuous. He was not popular with the Armenians; he had spent too long at Rome and was considered a foreigner (Tac. Ann. 14.26.1). He also seems to have proved himself incompetent, since his deliberately provocative raids outside Armenia on Parthia went counter to the Roman policy at this time of seeking some degree of accommodation with their rivals.
59 Verulanus Severus is presumably the Verulanus mentioned in an early part of the campaign (Tac. Ann. 14.26.1); he would later be consul, probably in AD 66. Little is known of the earlier career of Vettius Bolanus; he possibly did not come from a consular family, but his later career was distinguished. He would go on to be consul in AD 66, governor of Britain in 69–71, and proconsul of Asia in about AD 78–80. He is praised by Statius in a poem dedicated to Bolanus’s son, Crispinus (Silv. 5.2.30–67).
60 It might of course have been suspected that Corbulo wished to protract his command by avoiding a decisive outcome. But he seems to have been constrained from the outset by instructions from Rome to show strength but keep open the chance of accommodation with Parthia.
61 The province of Syria regularly housed four legions. With the removal of two of them, three would have remained available to Corbulo, since Tacitus notes that one more legion was added, from Germany, in 58, although no legion from Germany is known to have taken part in Corbulo’s campaign. The Fourth Legion (Scythica) was sent from Moesia, not Germany. The fortification of the Euphrates would be seen as a provocative act by the Parthians.
62 The violence presumably refers to desultory raids that Tacitus has not deemed important enough to record.
63 Under Claudius, Casperius tried to mediate between Pharasmanes and Mithridates (see the Introduction to this chapter) in the castle of Gorneae in Armenia (Tac. Ann. 12.45.2; Barr. 88 C4).
64 Nisibis was a major city in northeast Mesopotamia, on the river Mygdonius (Barr. 89 D3). It was strategically important, being in the frontier area between Parthia and Armenia. It featured widely in the campaigns of Lucullus. The precise figure of thirty-seven miles does not in fact help in locating Tigranocerta and may well be an error. The Barrington Atlas (Barr. 89 D3) locates Tigranocerta about sixty miles north of Nisibis.
65 Tacitus is rather cryptic here, but the implication is that Vologaeses will now agree to what he had earlier rejected (13.34.2): to contemplate Tiridates’ going to Rome to seek recognition of his position in person. It is not clear why the negotiations broke down, but we have to assume that the Parthian envoys discovered that the Roman attitude had hardened.
66 There were suspicions that Corbulo had secretly agreed to remove Tigranes, who now drops completely out of the narrative. This could suggest that Corbulo was not comfortable with the new aggressive policy now being promoted by Rome and that the abandonment of Tigranes would be a way of resisting that policy without overt disobedience. This would create a complex scenario. It is of course possible that Tigranes simply left of his own accord.
67 Dio is in agreement with Tacitus (Ann. 15.1.1–2, not included in the translated passages) in saying that Vologaeses had a reaction to two developments, the appointment of Tigranes to Armenia and his raids against the Adiabeni.
68 Tacitus (Ann. 15.1.1–2) notes that Monobazus of Adiabene rebuked the Parthians for leaving his kingdom exposed by the surrender of Armenia but says nothing about his personal participation in the incursion into Armenia. He does mention the Parthian general Monaeses as commanding in that incursion and the presence of some units from Adiabene (Ann.15.2.4).
69 Tacitus (Ann. 15.5.3–4) also sees the failure of the siege of Tigranocerta as the primary reason for Vologaeses’ willingness to come to terms.
70 Like Tacitus (Ann. 15.4–6), Dio provides no explanation for why the parleys broke down, and the obscurity of both accounts suggests that the issue was not properly laid out in the common source.
71 Caesennius Paetus served as consul ordinarius for AD 61 and in that same year was given Corbulo’s old special command in Cappadocia, where he served until 63. As described by Tacitus, his term was a disastrous one and led to a humiliating defeat. Despite the setback, Paetus was appointed governor of Syria by Vespasian in AD 70, and probably died in 73. He was instrumental in organizing Commagene into a province (Joseph. AJ 7.219).
Paetus’s arrival is best placed in AD 62. Tacitus refers to Corbulo wintering in Cappadocia (Ann. 15.6.2), presumably with reference to the winter just past. But the chronology of this period is very confused. It is possible that Paetus arrived in Cappadocia in summer 61, was defeated a year later, and then wintered in 62–63. But it also may be that he did not arrive there until 62.
72 The Fifth Legion (Macedonica) was stationed in Macedonia until AD 6 and then transferred to Moesia. In 61/62, it was transferred to Armenia, but was still in Pontus when Paetus assumed his command. It later took part in the Jewish War, and in 71 it was returned to Moesia.
73 Corbulo had already been engaged in the levying of auxiliaries in Galatia and Cappadocia (Tac. Ann. 13.35.2). Presumably, King Polemo would have raised auxiliaries in Pontus.
74 The unusual circumstances of the operations, as well as Corbulo’s dread of being eclipsed, meant that there was almost bound to be a repetition of clashes of the kind that had occurred between Ummidius and Corbulo. Later, Corbulo will be given an overall command in order to avoid such problems. Paetus is technically correct in that military outposts had been taken but Artaxata and Tigranocerta had surrendered voluntarily.
75 Paetus here speaks of what seems to be an intention to incorporate Armenia into the empire, a plan that appears to run counter to what Corbulo had been striving to achieve. This could suggest an appointment by an independent-thinking Nero that would lead to a more aggressive policy in Armenia than the one being promoted by Seneca and Burrus, who by now had begun to fall from grace. This new policy might have been marked by the rejection of the terms offered by the envoys sent to Rome by Vologaeses, mentioned by Tacitus (Ann. 15.5.4).
76 Tacitus suggests that the Parthians began an aggressive campaign in AD 62, but the possibility that Paetus had already taken preemptory military action cannot be discounted. It is interesting to note that the diplomatic efforts of the Parthians were unsuccessful. We are not told what terms they had tried to obtain, but clearly they did not find Nero amenable.
77 Funisulanus is recorded in inscriptions (ILS 1005, 1997) as pursuing a highly successful civil and military career under Domitian. Calavius is unknown. These two were Paetus’s appointees. Corbulo had sent Verulanus Severus and Vettius Bolanus as commanders of the legions (Tac. Ann. 15.3.1).
78 Plutarch notes that a horse of Crassus similarly fell in the Euphrates (Crass. 19.5), and Julius Obsequens (69) records the collapse of a caparisoned horse in the presence of Pansa during his consulship (43 BC) as a bad omen (he died in battle). Strictly speaking, this was the only omen that occurred when Paetus led his forces into Armenia. The others happened when they were already established there. It is likely that they entered Armenia from Cappadocia near Melitene to travel south to Tigranocerta.
79 The quarters would have been for the winter of AD 62–63. This would seem to place Paetus’s march in autumn 61, since he had spent the first part of the year in Rome, as consul. It is assumed that here Tacitus is following the hostile commentaries of Corbulo.
80 Tigranocerta had been abandoned by Roman troops, and Tacitus’s text makes it quite clear here that Tigranes made no effort to maintain it.
81 Tacitus is not an impartial observer, but Paetus clearly could not have engaged the Parthians in a major campaign, since the next chapter indicates that they were focusing their attention on the frontier with Syria, not on Armenia. They did not turn to Armenia until later.
82 Corbulo clearly established a Roman bridgehead on the Parthian side of the Euphrates, a major bone of contention. Vologaeses made the removal of the fortifications his key demand for coming to terms with the Romans.
83 The Fifth Legion (Macedonica) had been transferred from Moesia. It seems that Paetus felt it was not needed immediately and was keeping it in Pontus, where it could more easily be provisioned.
84 It is remarkable that Paetus knew nothing of the threat posed by the Parthians. The removal of their forces from the Syrian border would have signaled the near certainty that they would now turn their attention to Armenia. It is possible that Corbulo made no effort to alert Paetus to the change in circumstances, as hinted in the next section.
85 Tacitus speaks of two appeals from Paetus to Corbulo, (a) the earlier passage, which he attributes to reports on the situation (“they say”), presumably in sources that were hostile to Corbulo and to which Tacitus had access, and (b) a follow-up appeal, related in the next chapter, which finally galvanized Corbulo to action. Dio (62.21.4) claims that Paetus “kept sending” requests for help. Corbulo’s hesitation may have nothing to do with his hostility toward Paetus but may rather reflect the danger, of which he remained conscious, that the Parthians could turn their attention back again to Syria.
86 Corbulo’s qualities as a commander are illustrated here. He does not leave the Euphrates unguarded since a surprise Parthian attack was always a risk. He does not march directly north through Parthian territory, where securing supplies would be difficult and he would be exposed to attack, but takes the longer route through the Roman-held territory of Commagene and Cappadocia. He also appreciates the necessity of taking supplies with him. It must have been late in 62 when his mission was launched.
87 The Arsanias is mentioned by the elder Pliny (HN 5.84, 6.128) as one of the main tributaries of the Euphrates, and indeed it may well be its main eastern branch (cf. Barr. 89 B2). Dio (62.21.1) gives the name of the camp as Rhandea, which would presumably be on the northern bank, since the Parthians had to cross the river to reach it. Plutarch (Luc. 31.4–5) records that Lucullus crossed it on his northward march from Tigranocerta to Artaxata.
88 Romans were obsessed by the recollection that in 321 BC Roman soldiers were trapped by the Samnites in the pass of the Caudine Forks and forced to go “beneath the yoke.” Spears were held in an archway, and defeated troops were forced to march under it in a humiliating display of submission (Livy 9.6.1–4). Dio says nothing of this recent supposed disgrace, but Suetonius (Ner. 39.1) reports it as a fact, citing it as one of the two great external disasters of Nero’s reign, the other being the Boudican rebellion. This is the sole reference to the events of the Parthian campaign in Suetonius’s Nero. It seems curious that Vologaeses, who, Tacitus goes on to say, was seeking a reputation for moderation, would have inflicted this pointless humiliation on the Romans or that Paetus’s subsequent career could have survived it.
89 Dio (62.21.4) says that Vologaeses, and the elephant, actually crossed the river by the bridge.
90 Tacitus is explicit that he is here using Corbulo’s own account, which clearly tries to paint Paetus in the darkest possible terms. The earlier expression “it is well-established” he seems to identify as coming from another source, equally hostile to Paetus. Tacitus (Ann. 15.14.3) says that the supplies were to be surrendered to the Parthians. Corbulo’s claim that the Parthians were considering lifting the siege is plausible, since winter would be approaching and the opportunities for supplies would be limited.
91 Dio (62.21.2) states that Paetus swore he would abandon Armenia to Tiridates; Tacitus’s claim that he agreed that no Romans would enter Armenia would have meant that Paetus had gone well beyond his competence and had imposed an unauthorized restriction on Corbulo. On the other hand, Dio’s assertion that Paetus agreed that Nero would give Armenia to Tiridates seems like a misleading summation of what might have been a nuanced suggestion. Tacitus’s reference to an expected communication from Nero suggests that some offer of compromise, along the lines of what was finally agreed, was expected.
92 It is noticeable here that while Tacitus is a great admirer of Corbulo, he is aware that his memoirs are not going to be without bias.
93 A daily march of forty miles would be remarkable, in fact double the normal rate.
94 Corbulo would presumably have been at Melitene.
95 Paetus’s suggestion seems on the surface highly implausible and may represent the version that he sought to propagate in Rome after his return.
96 Corbulo uses the argument that his provincia was limited to Syria, and he technically could not move his troops into another zone without the permission of the emperor. This does not seem very persuasive. His other arguments, that the intentions of the Parthians were not clear (implying that they might well have intended to move against Syria) and that his troops would be too exhausted to attempt such a mission, are more plausible.
97 This would have been the winter of AD 62–63.
98 After a fairly detailed exposition of the preceding military events, Tacitus describes the final negotiations in very cursory terms, perhaps because, for reasons that are not clear, the truce broke down. Dio (62.22.2–3) adds that the negotiator for Vologaeses was Monaeses and that the terms were to be validated by Nero upon receipt of an embassy (covered by Tacitus in the next section).
99 Tacitus here refers to the custom of setting up a pile of captured arms as a victory memorial, a practice adopted by the Romans from the Greeks and first recorded toward the end of the second century BC.
100 The Senate would have been obliged to depend on the dispatches of Paetus, with their tone of exaggerated confidence. In fact, the news of his humiliation did not reach them until the next year (see Tac. Ann. 15.24.1), so the criticism here is somewhat misplaced. Also, the “arches” may be a confusion with the victory arches decreed to mark the fall of Artaxata in AD 59.
101 Vologaeses gives an inflated account of his achievements. As part of the agreement with Corbulo, he had evacuated Armenia.
102 The elder Pliny (HN 30.16–17) claims that Tiridates was a Magian, who refused to travel by water. He was willing to go to a neighboring military camp in Syria or Cappadocia, where legionary standards and the image of the emperor would be stored. This refusal to come to Rome was a major stumbling block in the negotiations, and Nero was clearly unwilling to give up his opportunity for a coup de théâtre. Tiridates later did overcome his scruples about coming to the city.
103 Tacitus has of course summarized and simplified the Parthian offer of terms and has perhaps presented the interpretation he has placed on it rather than the actual terms. Paetus’s letter must presumably be different from the one reported in Tac. Ann. 15.8.2, and we must assume that he sent a second report giving a different version of events from the one provided by Vologaeses. The implication is that he claimed that the Romans were still in control of Armenia.
104 These “leading men” would have been a body of leading citizens with no formal constitutional position, made up from among the friends of the emperor. The Parthian view was somewhat misrepresented. They did not regard Armenia as won and did not ask for it back, and in fact were making a point of not asking for it (Tac. Ann. 15.24.1).
105 Tacitus places the military preparations, the campaign, and the negotiations in AD 63. That would pack a lot of activity into a single year, and it may be that events should be extended over two years, AD 63 and 64, with military operations beginning in that second year (see Vervaet [2000], 264–67).
106 Tacitus here suggests a nuanced and subtle element in the negotiations; the Roman gesture as he reports it does not make great sense. Dio (62.22.3) seems to offer a more satisfactory narrative, that Nero explicitly made an offer to Tiridates if he would come to Rome in person.
107 Gaius Cestius was consul in AD 42; in 63, he became legate of Syria, where he died (Tac. Hist. 5.10.1). Tacitus does not make clear whether Cestius went to Syria as Corbulo’s assistant or as legatus Augusti, with the limitation that command of the legions was assigned to Corbulo. Certainly by AD 66 we find Cestius acting as a regular legatus, with command of troops restored to him, since he is then engaged in a major military intervention with considerable forces in Judaea (Joseph. BJ 2.499–500).
108 Marius Celsus would later go on to hold a consulship in AD 69. The Fifteenth Legion was probably raised by Octavian in 41–40 BC and stationed in Pannonia from AD 9. It is mentioned as being in Pannonia during the mutinies that broke out following the death of Augustus (Tac. Ann. 1.23.5). Transferred to Syria, it was later used in the Jewish Wars.
109 Tetrarchs had in principle been originally the rulers of roughly one-quarter of a country, but at this period the term is used generally for the ruler of a small state in the East. Prefects are presumably the officers in charge of cohorts of troops established within some provinces. Procurator was the term now used for the administrators of the small administrative areas, such as Judaea, not strictly provinces in themselves but under the aegis of the legates of large contiguous provinces. The use of “praetor” is interesting here; it may be applied as a general term covering the governors of imperial and public provinces in the area, or perhaps it is being used pointedly. All imperial provinces were governed by legates pro praetore, as only the emperor had proconsular power in the imperial provinces. Bithynia and Asia, however, were public provinces governed by proconsuls. It may be that they did not come under Corbulo’s jurisdiction.
110 The Lex Gabinia of 67 BC conferred on Pompey an extraordinary command over the whole of the Mediterranean to enable him to deal with the problem of pirates. He had twenty legions and 500 ships, although unlike Corbulo he had an imperium that was equal to that of the proconsuls. He took three months to complete the task. The special command given to Corbulo, with its maius imperium (“greater imperium”), had during the principate previously been enjoyed only by members of the imperial family, such as Germanicus.
111 The fate of Paetus is one of the most baffling aspects of the whole Parthian campaign. As Tacitus presents the situation, which is not contradicted seriously by Dio, Paetus had led the Romans to a disaster, yet he suffered no consequences when he returned to Rome, and in AD 70, he was appointed legatus of Syria by Vespasian.
112 Dio summarizes very briefly the mistakes of Paetus. He alludes to the troops stationed in the Taurus Mountains, also mentioned by Tacitus (Ann. 15.10.3), and provides the name of the location of the camp at Rhandea, where Paetus was cut off by the Parthians.
113 Tacitus (Ann. 15.16.1) cites Corbulo for the claim that the Parthians were on the verge of giving up the siege when Paetus surrendered.
114 Dio adds the information, not in Tacitus, that Monaeses was sent to discuss the terms with Paetus and that the discussions took place on the bridge. Both of these details presumably came from Corbulo’s account.
115 Dio’s claim that the troops were sent “elsewhere” and that Nero had planned to lead the new expedition himself is baffling. There is no other evidence for such a scheme.
116 No mention is made of the Tenth Legion (Fretensis), one of the regular legions stationed in Syria. Presumably, it was left in that province to shore up the weakened Fourth (Scythica) and Twelth (Fulminata).
117 It is puzzling that the Fifth Legion (see Tac. Ann. 15.9.2) had not been brought from Pontus earlier to help deal with the crisis.
118 Confusingly, Illyricum is sometimes used for the province that initially bore that name (which later became Dalmatia) and sometimes, as here, more loosely of the Danube area, including Pannonia, which became a separate province in about AD 9.
119 Melitene was a town (Barr. 64 G4) and region (E4) near the Euphrates River; it controlled the crossing there at Tomisa. It was technically in Armenia Minor (Ptolemy 5.7.5) but became part of Cappadocia. After 70–71, it became the legionary base of the Twelfth Legion (Fulminata) (Joseph. BJ 7.18).
120 Tacitus earlier referred to Corbulo’s eloquence (Ann. 13.8.3: “flamboyant speech”).
121 The reference is to Lucullus’s advance on Tigranocerta in 69 BC; his journey is vaguely described by Plutarch (Luc. 24.2–4).
122 Dio (62.23.1) does not mention this deputation from the Parthians but has Corbulo send a centurion to Vologaeses with a strict order to leave Armenia but also privately suggesting that he might send Tiridates to Rome.
123 The elder Pliny (HN 6.27) indicates that Armenia was divided into 120 praefecturae.
124 These two men were individuals of considerable prominence. Tiberius Alexander pursued an active and important career in the politics of the empire. Born into a prominent Jewish family in Alexandria (he was the nephew of Philo), he turned his back on his faith and rose to become procurator of Judaea (46–48). After his service under Corbulo (of which this is the sole mention), he went on to become the prefect of Egypt sometime before 68 and brutally crushed a Jewish uprising in Alexandria. He declared his support for Vespasian’s candidacy in 69 and offered his troops to him. He participated with Titus in the siege of Jerusalem, when he unsuccessfully tried to save the temple.
Annius Vinicianus was the son-in-law of Corbulo. He was appointed legate of the Fifth Legion even though he was not yet of senatorial age (Tac. Ann. 15.28.3). He in fact was the leading figure in a conspiracy against Nero in Beneventum in 66 (Suet. Ner. 36.1) (See Chapter VIII.)
125 The night was divided into four watches, and each watch was introduced by the sound of a bugle (bucina). The leading centurion (primipilus) supervised the routine (Polybius 6.35.12), and this passage suggests that he reported the passing of each phase to the commander. The reference to the altar is obscure; a fire on the top of an altar would not merit surprise. Tacitus’s language suggests a temporary altar set alight for some unknown ritual purpose.
126 Dio (62.23.4) suggests that Vologaeses and Monobazus, king of Adiabene, came to Corbulo and gave hostages. This seems to be contradicted by Tacitus’s version.
127 Pacorus had been appointed ruler of Media Atropatene (he was the last king of the area) by his half-brother Vologaeses in AD 51. He supported Tiridates’ effort to assume the throne of Armenia. Pacorus would later (about 72) suffer the humiliation of fleeing and having to ransom his harem when the Alani invaded his kingdom.
128 It was the custom of Parthians to wear the broadsword, which conflicted with the principle that no one could appear armed in the presence of the emperor. Tigranes, for example, had been required to surrender his to the lictors of Pompey (Plut. Pomp. 33.3). As it happened, Tiridates refused to surrender his sword but fixed it to his scabbard with nails (Dio 63.2.4).
129 Tacitus (Ann. 15.28–30) reports the negotiations between Corbulo and Tiridates and the latter’s submission to the image of Nero in the camp.
130 Tacitus says nothing of the direct meeting between Corbulo and Monobazus (king of the Adiabeni) and Vologaeses. According to Tacitus (Ann. 15.30.2), it is Tiridates who leaves a hostage, his daughter.
131 On Annius, see Tacitus (Ann. 15.28.3) and Chapter VIII.
