As in the first Persian Gulf War in 1991, Washington’s main partner in Operation Iraqi Freedom was the United Kingdom. By every measure that matters, especially given its small size and limited resources, the United Kingdom was a coequal player with the United States when it came to the quality of its equipment, military leadership, concepts of operations, and combat prowess. Such close involvement was hardly surprising; the United States and Great Britain have had a long-standing special relationship dating back to the early twentieth century. The United Kingdom was a similarly pivotal participant in Operation Desert Storm, as well as a close partner of the United States in a succession of subsequent UN-approved military contingency responses, including Operation Deliberate Force and Operation Allied Force over the Balkans during the 1990s, and the decade-long enforcement of the UN-mandated no-fly zones over post–Desert Storm Iraq through Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch (the British portions of which were code-named Operation Resinate).1
In addition, the RAF had routinely trained with the U.S. Air Force in realistic large-force exercises such as Red Flag at Nellis AFB, Nevada, and similar training evolutions elsewhere around the world. Perhaps most important of all, ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) had maintained an embedded senior leadership and staff presence at CENTCOM’s headquarters at MacDill AFB, Florida, in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom, to which the RAF contributed notably in the support role by providing VC-10 and Tristar tankers, E-3D Sentry AWACS and Canberra PR9 reconnaissance aircraft, and intratheater airlifters, as well as basing provisions at the British island base of Diego Garcia that were crucial for supporting U.S. bomber operations.2
Yet the United Kingdom’s participation in the second Gulf War was by no means a foregone conclusion. On the contrary, Britain’s close involvement in the planning for the campaign from its earliest months continued, almost up to the beginning of combat operations, against a backdrop of persistent uncertainty as to whether British forces would actually take part in those operations.3 Prime Minister Tony Blair faced substantial opposition in that regard both within the Labour Party and among the British public. Barely a day before the first bombs fell, he was subjected by his own party to what was, in effect, a vote of confidence in Parliament. The vote passed by a comfortable margin of 396 to 217, largely on the strength of Blair’s compelling performance in laying out the case for war.4 After that, the British government secured parliamentary approval to use “all means necessary” in the conduct of the impending campaign, albeit with the backing of only about a third of British public opinion.5
In the end, however, all of the required pieces fell into place in time for the United Kingdom’s combat involvement, code-named Operation Telic, to commence at the war’s opening moments. There was, moreover, a closer alignment of American and British campaign objectives for Iraqi Freedom than had been the case for enforcing the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. That allowed the campaign to be conducted at the optimum tempo and with minimum political friction. On March 20, just as the campaign was getting under way, Britain’s secretary of state for defence declared the campaign’s objectives in Parliament as being to disarm Iraq of WMD and to secure key elements of Iraq’s economic infrastructure from sabotage and willful destruction by the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein. After the campaign ended, the initial after-action report by the MoD affirmed that the nation’s “overriding political objective [had been] to disarm Saddam of his weapons of mass destruction.”6 A subsequent report by Britain’s comptroller and auditor general further affirmed that a second key task had been the elimination of Hussein’s regime.7
Toward both ends the United Kingdom contributed, among other assets, some 46,000 military personnel, 19 warships, 115 fixed-wing aircraft, and nearly 100 helicopters.8 That contribution made Operation Telic Great Britain’s largest force deployment for combat since Operation Granby, its contribution to the first Gulf War, in late 1990 and early 1991. The deployment entailed moving a highly capable force some 3,400 miles in just 10 weeks, less than half the time that had been required to deploy a roughly similar-sized force to take part in the 1991 war. It occurred against a backdrop of concurrent British operations in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Northern Ireland and at a time when the RAF was already overflying northern and southern Iraq as a part of the twelve-year UN effort to enforce the no-fly zones.9
Australia likewise offered a spirited and substantial military contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom that reflected a deep and politically courageous national commitment. Under the successive code names Operation Bastille and Operation Falconer, the Australian government provided twenty-two aircraft—nineteen from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and three from the Australian Army—and upward of two thousand military personnel to the coalition effort. That contribution included a national headquarters similar to but smaller than that of the British contingent that was collocated with CENTCOM’s forward headquarters at Camp As Saliyah in Qatar.10 In addition to the RAAF contingent, the Australians committed HMAS (Her Majesty’s Australian Ship) Kanimbla, an amphibious landing ship with three Sea King helicopters; HMAS Darwin, an Oliver Hazard Perry–class guided missile frigate (FFG) with two S-70B-2 Sea Hawk helicopters; HMAS ANZAC, a light frigate (FFH) with one S-70B-2 Sea Hawk helicopter; a clearance diving team from the Royal Navy; thirty Australians on exchange assignment with deployed U.S. and UK units; and an Army Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) built around a Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) squadron supported by a reinforced commando platoon as a quick-reaction force. The Australian Army also provided three CH-47D Chinook helicopters to support the SOTG. 11
Australia’s contribution to Iraqi Freedom likewise stemmed from a long history of close bilateral ties with the United States, in this case going back to the Australian government’s decision in 1941 to align itself formally with Washington in the security arena, an agreement that was subsequently ratified in the ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand–United States) Treaty of 1951 and that has been sustained ever since by an extensive and continuing series of bilateral service-to-service relationships in such areas as joint training (the RAAF, like the RAF, had participated for years in the USAF’s recurrent Red Flag exercises), contingency planning, intelligence sharing, and, in the cases of Korea and Vietnam, actual combat as partners in arms.
Australia’s input consisted first of Operation Bastille, the forward deployment of Australian forces to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility and initial area orientation and in-theater training, followed thereafter by Operation Falconer, the actual participation of Australian forces in combined coalition combat to help disarm Hussein’s regime. This contribution, moreover, came at a time when the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) were heavily engaged in other forward-deployed military commitments, including Operation Citadel, Australia’s involvement in UN peacekeeping operations in East Timor; Operation Relex, the protection of Australia’s northern borders against illegal immigration; and Operation Slipper, the ADF’s involvement in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan that commenced immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.12
As in Great Britain, popular opinion in Australia ran against involvement in Iraqi Freedom. The leader of the opposition Australian Labor Party, Simon Crean, vocally declined to support Prime Minister John Howard’s effort to make Australia part of the coalition. The minister for defence and the government’s leader in the Australian Senate, Robert Hill, responded to Crean in a press interview as Operation Bastille’s initial force deployment was getting under way: “I’d like to think that the Australian Labor Party . . . are nevertheless totally behind the forces as they are deployed. And I think that’s the case. Again, the Australian way is that once forces are deployed, the community does come together and back them 100 percent.” Senator Hill added: “The alliance is a strong and important alliance. It’s not the primary reason why we are predeploying these forces. We’re predeploying these forces in our own national interest. But the alliance is very important as our ultimate form of national security.”13
Although the RAAF’s initial involvement in CENTAF’s early planning workups began in late summer 2002, it was not until January 10, 2003, that the Australian government formally announced that it would deploy ADF units to the Middle East in case such a commitment should become necessary to help implement UN Security Council resolutions calling for a disarmament of Iraq—by means of force should matters come to that.14 Three weeks later, on February 1, the government declared that the ADF would commit a squadron of fourteen F/A-18 Hornet strike fighters, as well as three C-130s (two C-130Hs and a C-130J), two AP-3C maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft, and three Australian Army CH-47D Chinook helicopters, along with a forward air command element that, according to an ADF spokesman, would reside in the CAOC and be “responsible for coordinating air operations with coalition partners and providing national control of Royal Australian Air Force assets.”15
Also in February 2003, in clear acknowledgment of its support in principle for the Bush administration’s determination to deal definitively with Iraq, the Australian government released its latest strategic review declaring that “the prospect that Saddam Hussein might threaten to use WMD against his enemies in the region or supply WMD to terrorists reinforces the international community’s efforts to ensure Iraq is disarmed.”16 At roughly the same time, the Australian government assigned responsibility for Iraqi matters to a new Iraq Coordinating Group chaired by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and consisting of key government representatives, notably including from the Department of Defence, as ADF planners continued to refine possible Australian force contribution options. On March 18, the day President Bush delivered his ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his two sons to leave Iraq within forty-eight hours or face the full force of coalition operations to drive them out of power, Prime Minister Howard advised the Australian parliament that his government had authorized the ADF to join in force employment by the coalition once the campaign was under way. The ADF commenced Operation Falconer immediately afterward, with Australian air, naval, and special forces initiating combat operations with the CENTCOM force components with which they had planned and trained over the preceding months.17
Command Arrangements
The British military contingent that had been embedded at CENTCOM headquarters since Operation Enduring Freedom began getting indications as early as May 2002 that the command was increasingly engaged in NOFORN (no foreign nationals) planning, with a likely Iraq contingency in mind. The British representatives interpreted those indications as clear evidence that something unusual was gearing up, because normally, in the words of Lt. Gen. John Reith of the British Army, the eventual chief of joint operations for Iraqi Freedom, they had “very, very good access on everything.”18 The RAF in particular had embedded staff officers at all echelons both at CENTCOM’s headquarters in Florida and at CENTAF’s headquarters at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, as well as in the latter’s forward-deployed CAOC at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. That early embedding of key personnel at all levels ensured visibility, credibility, and the development of a deep trust relationship between the British team and its American counterparts.
Once it became clear that British involvement in such a contingency might eventually take place, the MoD established a contingency operations group comprising representatives from the MoD’s Defence Crisis Management Organization and its Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood on the outskirts of London. It further established a current commitments team to manage all preparations that would require ministerial direction. For its part, Permanent Joint Headquarters formed a contingency planning team to plan the eventual British military contribution, should the British government approve it. The chief of the defence staff then issued a planning directive to Permanent Joint Headquarters that the contingency planning team used to formulate the plan. As for the RAF’s prospective involvement, headquarters Strike Command convened a contingency action group to plan the air portion of the chosen course of action, employing cell members who were overseen by the contingency plans division at Strike Command.
Roughly concurrently, the chief of the defence staff in autumn 2002 appointed the Northwood-based commander of Permanent Joint Headquarters, General Reith, as joint commander for all British military involvement in the impending campaign. Within the United Kingdom, the MoD and Permanent Joint Headquarters collectively constituted the Defence Crisis Management Organization for the impending British participation in Iraqi Freedom. As the designated chief of joint operations, Reith exercised operational command over all participating British forces through Permanent Joint Headquarters and would be responsible to the chief of the defence staff for the conduct of operations. He delegated operational control of British forces committed to Operation Telic to the three-star national contingent commander, Air Marshal Brian Burridge, who was to be forward-deployed in the theater and would report daily to the chief of joint operations.19
In this chain-of-command arrangement, Air Marshal Burridge was the senior MoD representative to CENTCOM’s commander, General Franks, with whom he would have close daily contact throughout the campaign. He later acknowledged that Franks’ forward deployment to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility constituted a major improvement in command efficiency over the Operation Enduring Freedom experience.20 Burridge reported through the chief of joint operations to the defense staff in the MoD, with General Reith serving as a welcome buffer between Burridge and London. This arrangement closely followed the pattern first established by the British in Operation Desert Storm. During that earlier combined campaign, however, Permanent Joint Headquarters had not yet been formed, so the chief of the defence staff instead chose an existing four-star headquarters—RAF Strike Command—and designated its commander in chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, as the overall UK-based joint commander, with Lieutenant General Sir Peter de la Billiere of the British Army as the national contingent commander deployed forward in the theater.
Reith further delegated tactical command of all RAF forces through Air Marshal Burridge to the two-star British air contingent commander, then Air Vice-Marshal Glenn Torpy.21 Torpy’s initial responsibility was to establish the force in-theater; then, during the execution phase, to ensure that British forces were used as effectively and efficiently as possible, and that operations were conducted as safely as possible in light of combat conditions within the constraints of British policy; and finally, after the period of major combat was over, to bring the forces home. Like his counterpart British land and maritime contingent commanders who worked alongside their respective CENTCOM three-star component commanders, Torpy delegated operational and tactical control of all British air assets to the air component commander, General Moseley. This was consistent with years of British-American military interaction within NATO and in connection with Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch. With respect to the differences between operational command, operational control, tactical command, and tactical control, Burridge noted that “it actually takes longer to describe than it does to use in practice.”22
Air Vice-Marshal Torpy’s air contingent headquarters staff at Prince Sultan Air Base numbered about two hundred personnel, some of whom were embedded in various CAOC staff positions. Air Commodore Chris Nickols headed the contingent’s staff and also was one of three rotating one-star CAOC directors each day who oversaw the day-to-day execution of the ATO for General Moseley. That arrangement gave the RAF both visibility and influence within the CAOC organization. It also preserved British direction of British forces and ensured that those forces would only undertake specific operations that had been approved by British commanders. In this post–Desert Storm arrangement, the United Kingdom built on the structure that it had developed a decade before in connection with its involvement with CENTCOM in enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq.
In subsequent testimony before the Defence Committee of the House of Commons, Burridge noted that as the British national contingent commander, his role had focused specifically on three areas: first, supporting the three British military contingents (air, land, and maritime); second, informing the senior government leadership in London of details they needed to know for conducting responsible political and military decision making; and third, influencing CENTCOM’s planning and execution of the campaign to the extent possible and appropriate. General Reith explained in similar testimony that Burridge “was controlling the operation as the man in theater dealing with the detail.”23 The chief of joint operations assigned different British forces to different CENTCOM missions. Burridge, as the designated wielder of operational control, was assigned forces and tasks by the chief of joint operations and, in his words, “just had to match them up with the American plan.”24 Reith, he said, “was looking at the London end and some of the international aspects away from the theater,” whereas he, as the national contingent commander deployed forward, “was looking horizontally at the region of the theater and downwards.”25 Burridge attributed the resultant smoothness of fit and flow among the various players to the key personalities involved, a fact on which the American system heavily depended.
The American arrangement was less structured and more personalized than was the more formal British approach, with General Franks and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in daily direct contact and with the American service chiefs often making direct calls to CENTCOM’s component commanders. Moreover, the interface between the senior U.S. military leadership and the political authorities in Washington was far more direct, from the president through the secretary of defense to General Franks. In contrast, Burridge made a point of noting that he was “happy” with the United Kingdom’s command arrangement because it shielded him from direct dealings with London and further allowed him to be “very much left to get on with things.”26
Air Chief Marshal Burridge also pointed out that many on General Franks’ CENTCOM staff “would regard us as their conscience because we see things through different eyes.”27 He attributed this good relationship to the many years of close RAF involvement with CENTCOM going back to Desert Storm and the subsequent enforcement of the no-fly zones, as well as to the fact that Franks and his principal deputies recognized the quality of the thinking that the embedded British staff brought to CENTCOM’s policy and strategy deliberations. That broad-based acceptance enabled the British contingent, as appropriate, to influence CENTCOM’s decision making from the bottom up.
With respect to Australia’s involvement in CENTCOM’s command and control arrangements, Prime Minister Howard announced on March 18 that the Australian government had authorized the chief of the defence force, General Peter Cosgrove, to offer already deployed ADF forces as a contribution to any U.S.-led coalition that might commit to combat operations in accordance with existing UN resolutions authorizing the use of force against Iraq.28 Throughout Operations Bastille and Falconer, General Cosgrove retained full command of all Australian forces. Operational and tactical control, as in the case of British forces committed to the campaign, was seconded to CENTCOM’s component commanders as appropriate, but national command of those forces remained with the commander of the Australian national headquarters for Middle East operations, Brigadier Maurie McNarn. The Australian Department of Defence’s after-action report explained that “this arrangement let coalition commanders assign specific tasks to ADF forces while they remained under their Australian commanding officers at the unit level.” In addition, “although ADF force elements worked toward the overall coalition combat plan, there were processes in place to ensure that Australian forces were always employed in accordance with Australian government policies.”29
The British were the first allies to be brought into CENTCOM’s planning for Iraqi Freedom. They were invited by the U.S. government to join in the process in June–July 2002, well in advance of Australia and at a time when U.S. forces were still reconstituting after having just completed the major combat portion of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. After Britain’s secretary of state for defence announced in September 2002 that the United Kingdom was involved in contingency planning for a possible Iraq scenario, key RAF station and squadron commanders were drawn into the planning process. Even at that early stage of preparations, a significant portion of the RAF’s high-readiness forces were already deployed and flying operational missions in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility as part of Northern Watch and Southern Watch. Regarding this early involvement, Air Chief Marshal Burridge later recalled that although no timetable had been announced or even determined at that point, “it was put to me that if the [United Kingdom] was at any stage likely to participate, then best we at least understand the planning and influence the planning for the better.”30 Air Marshal Torpy similarly recalled that the United States was “absolutely clear that there was no commitment on Britain’s behalf at that stage to commit forces to any sort of operation.”31
Most of the equipment that was procured expressly for Operation Telic was obtained through the MoD’s well-established urgent operational requirements (UOR) process. The MoD’s after-action report explained that the UOR process, announced in Parliament on November 25, 2002, was created to “provide a cost-effective solution to specific capability shortfalls related to a particular operation.”32 The associated establishment of the Defence Logistics Organization’s logistics operations center ensured that needed equipment was delivered to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility in accordance with the priorities of Permanent Joint Headquarters. UORs also helped to increase the number of RAF aircraft configured to deliver precision-guided munitions and to provide for additional stocks of precision munitions and other weapons. Thirty-three percent of the UORs that were issued in support of the war effort accelerated existing programs, with another 20 percent introducing new and previously unprogrammed capabilities, 30 percent topping off holdings already in the inventory, and 17 percent modifying existing equipment or infrastructure.33
The MoD moved in mid-December to encourage the shipping market to tender for the timely provision of possible needed surface transportation vessels, as well as to begin specific unit training and to reduce the notice time to move for some units.34 The British contingent was a fully invested participant in CENTCOM’s Internal Look planning exercise in December 2002, during which CENTAF’s force requirements and the RAF’s contribution to the impending campaign, were it to participate, were finally nailed down.35 The RAF also participated in multiple CENTAF “chair-fly” exercises, as well as in actual large-force strike and other mission rehearsals at Nellis AFB and elsewhere. The RAF’s E-3D Sentry AWACS community conducted tactical employment seminars, did spin-up training to include getting needed U.S. combat information release and access, and conducted briefings and simulations prior to final mission certification.36
Shortly before the 2002 holiday season, the British contingent conducted an exercise that determined that the command structure in place was, in Air Chief Marshal Burridge’s words, “pretty much 95 percent right.”37 In the course of that exercise the contingent identified potential friction points, and liaison officers were installed at those points. That timely evolution bore out the value of mission rehearsals. The British government did not, however, make its final decisions regarding the composition and deployment of British assets until early 2003.
Australia joined in CENTCOM’s planning for possible contingency operations against Iraq not long afterward. On June 18, 2002, the minister for defence had declared that the government of Australia was ready to consider supporting additional U.S.-led coalitions beyond Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In addition, in response to the obvious resolve of the Bush administration to address the challenge posed by Iraq, the government further directed Australian defense planners to initiate contingency planning for an Australian contribution to any U.S.-led coalition in case diplomacy should fail. In return, in August 2002, the U.S. government invited initial Australian participation in CENTCOM’s planning workups in Tampa, Florida, albeit with no firm military commitment sought by either side. The well-developed personal ties and trust relationships established within CENTCOM throughout the course of Australia’s earlier contributions via Operation Slipper made it clear to all that the initial groundwork was now in place should Australia be included in a U.S.-led combat coalition against Iraq.38
By August 2002 the ADF’s joint planning staff had gained a fairly thorough understanding of CENTCOM’s evolving contingency plans for Iraq and began developing appropriate options for the Australian government to consider should the latter ultimately decide that Australia would participate in coalition operations against Iraq. Later in November, Prime Minister Howard declared that the ADF had “made appropriate contingency arrangements,” including moving the Australian national headquarters for Middle East operations forward to be collocated with CENTCOM’s deployed headquarters in Qatar.39 The following month the government directed the ADF to begin training for combat operations in case Iraq failed to comply with the weapons inspection regime stipulated in UN Resolution 1441. Finally, on January 10, 2003, as the start of its initial deployment of forces to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility neared under the aegis of Operation Bastille, the government formally declared that it would commit ADF forces to the allied coalition and would begin preparing them for possible combat operations soon to come. The ADF’s deployment itself finally began on January 23, 2003, with the departure of the amphibious transport ship Kanimbla from Sydney to the North Arabian Gulf and other Australian force elements concurrently moving forward by air.40
The Allied Force Component
In a force buildup code-named Operation Warrior, the United Kingdom committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom the largest composite military force that it had deployed since its contribution to Operation Desert Storm twelve years before. RAF Strike Command was the designated force provider for all British air assets presented for the impending campaign. In response to requests submitted by CENTCOM and CENTAF, and working closely with Permanent Joint Headquarters, Strike Command identified RAF force requirements and volunteered options, including the new Storm Shadow standoff hard-target munition and Tornado F3 interceptors, to help with the anticipated defensive counterair effort.41
Even before the start of focused planning for the impending campaign, the RAF already had in place a well-functioning presence of some 25 aircraft and associated personnel in the Gulf region. On February 6, 2003, Britain’s secretary of state for defence disclosed that the RAF’s contribution to Iraqi contingency response needs would be increased to 100 fixed-wing aircraft manned and supported by an additional 7,000 uniformed British personnel. This increased force contingent included E-3D Sentry AWACS and Nimrod and Canberra PR9 reconnaissance aircraft, VC-10 and Tristar tankers, Tornado F3 counterair fighters, Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 strike aircraft (with Storm Shadow missiles fitted to the GR4), and C-130 Hercules intratheater transports. The United Kingdom fielded 46,150 service personnel, 8,100 of whom were to support the impending RAF air operations. The deployment reinforcement provided 115 fixed-wing RAF aircraft and about 100 helicopters, including 27 RAF Pumas and Chinooks that were fielded by Joint Helicopter Command. Among the numerous RAF ground support assets were Rapier SAMs, force protection units, and explosive ordnance disposal and expeditionary airfield units.42
The roster of committed British equipment included a third of all of the tanks that were available to CENTCOM’s land component. It featured a force of Challenger 2 tanks, Warrior infantry fighting vehicles, AS90 self-propelled guns, and some 28,000 personnel drawn from British Army units in the United Kingdom and Germany. For maritime operations, Naval Task Group 2003 was led by the aircraft carrier HMS (Her Majesty’s Ship) Ark Royal and accompanied by the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean, which operated Royal Navy Sea King and Royal Marine Gazelle and Lynx helicopters.43 It further included two nuclear fast-attack submarines (HMS Splendid and HMS Turbulent) armed with TLAMs. In all, the United Kingdom’s contribution of military personnel came to about 10 percent of the coalition total of roughly 467,000. This deployment into CENTCOM’s area of responsibility began in January 2003 and was accomplished with 670 airlifter sorties and 62 ship moves. During the course of the deployment, the RAF’s four C-17s and other mobility aircraft transported roughly half of the personnel and equipment that needed to be moved by air.44
A potential spanner in the works that complicated this deployment evolution for planners at Strike Command entailed keeping the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD, pronounced “tip-fid”) on track in the presence of continued uncertainty, right up to the very eve of combat operations, as to whether Turkey would support the coalition’s impending campaign. Some senior RAF officers felt that CENTCOM’s leaders had taken Turkey’s prospective support more for granted than they should have, possibly in part because Turkey was in EUCOM’s area of responsibility rather than CENTCOM’s, and accordingly was not an object of daily attention and concern on CENTCOM’s part. After the Turkish government declined at the last minute to support the coalition, the United Kingdom’s TPFDD essentially went out the window as ships that had been dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean in anticipation of offloading their troops and equipment in Turkey were rerouted instead to the North Arabian Gulf and Kuwait via the Suez Canal.45 (The initial planning for Operation Telic had envisaged significant British air and land forces operating out of Kuwait in the south and from the north through Turkey. As a hedge against the possibility of Turkish noncooperation, however, alternate plans were developed for a British air contribution solely from the south. That hedge turned out well in the end, because the ability of Hussein’s Ba’athist regime to resist in the north proved to be extremely limited.)
RAF Strike Command also looked at first for additional bed-down space to the south of Iraq for its Jaguar GR3A attack aircraft that were flying reconnaissance missions out of Turkey in support of Operation Northern Watch. In the end, Air Marshal Burridge concluded that such a move would have been both impossible and unnecessary given the existing tactical reconnaissance capability already present in the RAPTOR (for “reconnaissance airborne pod for Tornado”) kits that had been fielded for the Tornado just the year before, to say nothing of additional U.S. Air Force and Navy reconnaissance assets. Ultimately, as the three-week phase of major combat began winding down in early April 2003, the joint reconnaissance pods that had been attached to the Jaguars were removed and refitted to the RAF’s Harriers that were operating out of Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait.
Australia committed more than two thousand ADF servicemen and -women to the impending campaign against Iraq. The principal equipment contribution consisted of fourteen F/A-18 Hornet multirole fighters from 75 Squadron of the RAAF’s 81 Wing that deployed to Al Udeid Air Base via Diego Garcia from RAAF Base Tindal in Australia’s Northern Territory. The Hornet’s multirole capability made it a clearly preferred choice over the RAAF’s only other combat aircraft alternative, namely, its single-mission F-111C long-range maritime strike aircraft. In addition, the profusion of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18s that were also committed to the campaign offered the added advantage of commonality with respect to munitions, spare parts, and overall mission capability.46
The F/A-18s that the RAAF contributed to the campaign were all Hornet Upgrade (HUG) 2.1 jets that had recently been provided with improved APG-73 radars, APX-11 combined interrogator transponders, and an ASN-172 GPS provision embedded within the aircraft’s inertial navigation system. Because the upgrade program was still in an early phase at that time and only HUG variants were to be sent forward to Al Udeid, HUG aircraft had to be marshaled from all three of the RAAF’s combat-coded F/A-18 squadrons.47 Six aircraft came from 75 Squadron at Tindal, and four each were drawn from 3 and 77 Squadrons based at Williamtown. A select group of twenty-two experienced pilots was also gathered from the RAAF’s three operational Hornet squadrons.48
Group Captain Bill Henman, the commander of the RAAF’s air combat wing deployed for Operation Falconer, later explained that the twenty-two pilots
were selected from across the wing so that we could have a suitable residual capability, continued training, and preparation for rotation back in Australia. This was part of my challenge as the commander of 81 Wing at the time, because there were obviously going to be some fairly disappointed people not going in the first tranche, [so we accordingly] avoided any reference to an A-Team or a B-Team. . . . We wanted a balanced force in Australia preparing and ready to deploy on rotation, and therefore the first group that went over was not in any way seen or judged to be better than those people who remained behind. . . . If Iraq had put up stiffer resistance [and] we got into a prolonged campaign, it was hard for us to see, as planners, that we should plan only for three months and then not consider a rotation. So our eye was always on a sustainable rotation through to at least six months, rotating at the three-month period, and that’s what we considered.49
En route to Diego Garcia from Tindal, the F/A-18s conducted seven in-flight refuelings from a U.S. Air Force KC-10, which itself had been topped off by a U.S. Air Force KC-135 tanker. After spending two nights on Diego Garcia, the pilots pressed ahead to their final destination at Al Udeid, again accompanied by a KC-10 tanker escort and a support element of some 250 RAAF personnel. This detachment represented the largest deployment of RAAF fighters for combat since the Korean War. On arrival, 75 Squadron was embedded in the U.S. Air Force’s 379th Expeditionary Air Wing, which had also deployed to Al Udeid. In addition, the RAAF contributed two C-130Hs from 36 Squadron and one C-130J from 37 Squadron of the RAAF’s 86 Wing headquartered at RAAF Base Richmond, New South Wales; and two AP-3Cs from 92 Wing headquartered at RAAF Base Edinburgh, South Australia, each with appropriate combat support personnel. (The AP-3C, which had just entered line service in the RAAF the year before, is a much-upgraded Orion configured with a variety of sensors that include a digital multimode radar; electronic support measures; and electro-optical, acoustic, and magnetic detection equipment.)
Finally, the RAAF provided an air forward command element consisting of 42 of its best air warfare experts to further augment CENTAF’s overall CAOC staff of around 1,700 U.S. and allied personnel at Prince Sultan Air Base. That liaison element was responsible for coordinating RAAF air operations with the other two coalition partners and providing national control of all RAAF assets that had been seconded to the coalition. Elements of an expeditionary combat support squadron were also deployed forward to fulfill security, logistics support, airfield engineering, administrative, medical, communications, and other essential support functions. Of this group, 79 servicemen and -women drawn from RAAF units around Australia supported the F/A-18s, 75 supported the AP-3Cs, and 66 supported the C-130s.
The British contingent was directly involved in CENTCOM’s early selection of more than nine hundred target areas of potential interest throughout Iraq. The target approval machinery for the British portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom was developed in close consultation between the MoD, Permanent Joint Headquarters, and the in-theater national contingent commander, who worked together to create the most expeditious approval arrangement possible. That machinery was developed and put into place to head off the sorts of target approval delays involving coalition partners that had afflicted NATO’s Operation Allied Force in 1999 and Operation Enduring Freedom two years later, when British government approval was required before CENTCOM could attack emerging targets with American aircraft that operated out of Diego Garcia or had just taken on fuel from RAF tankers. (The Australian target approval process was very similar to the United Kingdom’s process.)
Target approval in the southern no-fly zone had proceeded at a relatively slow pace, and decisions were routinely referred back to Permanent Joint Headquarters and the MoD.50 The anticipated rapid tempo of Operation Telic, however, would not allow that luxury. Target approval decision making would have to go from “sedate” to “fast and furious,” in Air Chief Marshal Burridge’s formulation.51 That requirement, in turn, dictated significant delegation of target approval authority to Burridge and his targeting board. As was the case for the U.S. side within CENTCOM’s chain of command, powers delegated to the in-theater British national contingent included the authority to attack emerging targets quickly as actionable intelligence on them became available. Air Chief Marshal Burridge later summed up his role in this respect succinctly: if a target was to be attacked with a British platform, either he or someone in the British contingent to whom he had delegated authority had to approve it. The same applied in the case of a U.S. heavy bomber operating out of a British facility such as Diego Garcia or RAF Fairford.52
Target nominations that required approval at the highest levels were submitted through Permanent Joint Headquarters to the MoD’s targeting organization, whose principals would present the target requests to the appropriate ministers for approval. Such ministerial involvement with target approval was kept to an absolute minimum in the campaign. The secretary of state for defence laid out the broad parameters of what was acceptable and what was not, and reserved beforehand certain target categories that only minister-level authority could approve; those categories, however, were very few. As one minister put it, “the military men were given maximum flexibility within those parameters to go about their task.”53 Air Marshal Torpy could not recall a single situation in which the British contingent’s need to seek political clearance conflicted with immediate campaign operational requirements, because so many contingencies had been anticipated and planned for in advance.54 The only targets within the United Kingdom’s cognizance that really needed London’s approval were command and control targets that could result in a significant amount of collateral damage.
Consistent with the laws of armed conflict, target nominations stipulated that no target attack would be carried out if any anticipated loss of noncombatant life, injury, or other harm were deemed excessive in relation to the direct and material military advantage anticipated from the attack. Air Vice-Marshal Torpy was the designated “red card” holder should any suggested target over which the United Kingdom had veto power prove unacceptable for any reason. Furthermore, with strong British concurrence, CENTCOM planned effects-based operations and selected all targets with a view toward achieving a particular military effect. Air Chief Marshal Burridge observed in that vein that “there are other ways of doing shock and awe than by breaking things.”55
British command elements did sometimes influence the selection of targets over which the United Kingdom did not wield veto power, as well as some targets that lay outside its formal purview altogether. In such cases the American side freely accepted proffered British advice, even when not required to do so. Air Chief Marshal Burridge later explained that the British contingent felt that it provided valuable input “in saying yes, okay, this is an American target, American platform, no British involvement, but actually let me just say how this might be viewed in Paris, Berlin, or wherever.”56 In its after-action report, the MoD noted that there had been no instances in which such proffered British advice had not been accepted. It further noted that the targeting authority that was delegated to British commanders was “significant” and allowed for flexible and responsive operations.57
As in the case of the United Kingdom’s involvement in coalition planning and decision making, RAAF and Australian SOF legal officers were also assigned to the CAOC to ensure that targets assigned to 75 Squadron were “appropriate and lawful.”58 The combined targeting coordination board (CTCB) was chaired by Major General Renuart, CENTCOM’s director of operations, with the United Kingdom and Australia represented, respectively, by Burridge and McNairn. As did Burridge, Brigadier McNairn provided senior military campaign advice to the CTCB as he deemed useful and appropriate. ADF commanders also had service lawyers at their side who vetted targets on CENTCOM-developed strike lists that were assigned to 75 Squadron and assessed them in accordance with Australian legal obligations. Several target categories were subject to ministerial approval, and, as was the case with all other coalition aircrews, Australian pilots could, and did, abort attacks when there was concern for collateral damage or if the assigned target could not be identified and validated from the air.59 In a belated but ultimately helpful additional contribution to this effort, the Australian Department of Defence announced on March 31 that it was sending six RAAF imagery analyst officers and airmen to support U.S. Air Force U-2 operations to help assess wet-film target images taken over Iraq, select targets, and assess strike results. In addition, a four-person RAAF battle damage assessment team was embedded within CENTCOM’s headquarters at MacDill AFB, Florida.
Reflecting on the instant trust relationship that he established with General Moseley on arriving in the CAOC, the Australian air contingent commander, then Group Captain Geoff Brown, commented:
I think we lucked in with the fact that he was in charge of CENTAF at the time, because my first day there, he sort of grabbed me, there was an RAF air commodore and I’m [just] a group captain and he’s the three-star general, and he took me under his wing and bang, sat me down at the table with him at the first [video teleconference] he was having. . . . It was interesting the way he treated me . . . he let the rest of his colonels know that I had direct access to him. At the time, I didn’t realize the value of that. . . . But the reality was that they were incredibly inclusive of us in the planning side. . . . [We weren’t even sure yet that we would get the F/A-18s there at all], but they allowed us to have a look at the plan, where we wanted to go, how we wanted to operate, they pretty much allowed us to do what we wanted to do. . . . [General Moseley] was just happy to have us there.60
Punctuating this point, the commander of the RAAF’s 75 Squadron later remarked in his own postcampaign reflections: “If you ever have to go to war, go to war with the Americans. They set things up very well.”61
Overall Combat Performance
The second Persian Gulf War was a genuinely combined operation when it came to British and Australian involvement, with RAF and RAAF sorties wholly integrated into the CAOC’s daily air tasking flow. For the RAF these included offensive strike, defensive counterair, surveillance and reconnaissance, tanking, intratheater lift, and aeromedical sorties. Offensive strike missions included firing a number of air-launched antiradiation missiles (ALARMs) at Iraqi SAM radars.62 In all, the RAF flew 2,519 sorties, approximately 6 percent of the coalition total of 41,000.63 RAF tankers dispensed some 19 million pounds of fuel, more than 40 percent of which was transferred to U.S. Navy and Marine Corps strike fighters.64 (RAF tankers, with their drogue refueling system, are compatible with probe-equipped U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, whereas many U.S. Air Force tankers, which mainly employ the boom refueling system, are not.)
One clear lesson the RAF had learned from its experience in Operation Allied Force was the need to improve its all-weather strike capability. After the Kosovo campaign the RAF stepped out smartly to acquire antiarmor Maverick missiles and enhanced Paveway LGBs equipped with additional GPS guidance, thus building on its existing Paveway LGB capability. (The enhanced Paveway II and Paveway III have a dual-mode laser seeker and GPS guidance kit and can be delivered both by laser spot tracking, if accurate target coordinates are not available, and by GPS guidance should weather or other factors prevent target designation.) The RAF also increased the number of Tornado GR4s and Harrier GR7s that were capable of delivering such munitions.
The RAF in Operation Iraqi Freedom operated out of eight forward locations in various countries throughout the region.65 It employed fewer aircraft than it had in Desert Storm, but its greatly expanded use of precision munitions allowed those aircraft to produce substantially greater combat effects than before. RAF aircraft released 919 of the 29,200 munitions expended by the coalition, with roughly 85 percent of the 919 being precision-guided. Weapons released on RAF sorties included Storm Shadow, Paveway II, enhanced Paveway II, enhanced Paveway III, Maverick, ALARM, and unguided general-purpose bombs. The 138 unguided bombs included 70 cluster bombs that were used against enemy troops and armor in the open, primarily in the vicinity of Baghdad. The RAF also delivered a number of precision-guided inert 1,000-pound bombs in an effort to minimize collateral damage, but these concrete-filled shapes, which relied on kinetic energy, often did not produce the desired effect when they hit their designated aim point.
Operation Iraqi Freedom saw the first combat use of the RAF’s Storm Shadow precision standoff ground-attack cruise missile. This weapon, designed to penetrate and disable hardened structures, is powered by a turbojet engine, cruises at Mach 0.8, and has a range of more than 130 miles.66 It is guided by GPS and digital terrain profile matching, with a terminal seeker for maximum accuracy and collateral damage avoidance, and was delivered by Tornado GR4s against such exceptionally fortified enemy installations as communications bunkers. It was used both day and night and in all weather conditions to attack a variety of high-value targets. The missile was almost invariably accurate, offering what the MoD’s initial after-action look called the promise of a “step change” in the RAF’s precision standoff attack capability.67 On March 21, 2003, for example, four GR4s each armed with two Storm Shadow missiles launched from their base in Kuwait against Iraqi IADS command and control centers housed within bunkers at Taji and Tikrit. Battle damage assessment the following day showed that all four targets had been successfully struck.
Storm Shadow was one of a number of weapons and other systems that were made available for Operation Telic under the UOR arrangement. The missile had only just begun coming off the production line, so the RAF had a limited supply. It proved adequate, however, for the targets that General Moseley designated. Indeed, apart from the B-2 stealth bomber armed with GBU-37 hard-structure munitions, Storm Shadow provided General Moseley with the only significant deep-penetration target attack capability available to CENTAF. Twenty-seven Storm Shadow missiles were fired during the course of the campaign, mostly during the first few days against especially hardened enemy command and control facilities. Storm Shadow was able to disable four such key targets in the opening seconds of the air war. Its hard-target penetration features made it uniquely qualified to fill a critical niche.68 The MoD’s after-action synopsis reported that Storm Shadow had been the most effective weapon in the coalition’s inventory to penetrate these hardened targets. Storm Shadow was attractive to CENTCOM’s weaponeers because it offered a better hard-target penetration capability than anything in the American standoff munitions inventory.
The tactical reconnaissance capability offered by the RAF’s Tornados, Harriers, and Jaguars was likewise in short supply among U.S. forces; only the Navy’s F-14s configured with TARPS offered a similar capability. Tornado GR4s equipped with RAPTOR imaging pods and Canberra PR9s provided high-quality, near-real-time imagery in the tactical reconnaissance role. The Nimrod MR2, normally employed as a maritime surveillance platform, supported coalition operations in the Iraqi western desert, providing both surveillance and reconnaissance support and also serving as an airborne radio relay platform. RAF Harriers and Tornados had thirty thermal imaging airborne laser designator (TIALD) pods on hand and used some of them in a nontraditional way as a surveillance and reconnaissance asset for monitoring enemy tank positions and potential Scud launching sites. That novel use prompted subsequent efforts to determine the utility and practicality of data-linking TIALD imagery to ground stations and other airborne aircraft.
The RAF had just completed a major midlife upgrade of its Tornados to GR4 standard, adding a wide-field-of-view head-up display, new avionics and forward-looking infrared systems, GPS navigation, cockpit lighting modifications to allow the use of NVGs, and additional modifications that enabled the aircraft to carry the new Storm Shadow missile and the RAPTOR reconnaissance pod, first employed in Operation Resinate. Operating the RAPTOR system required the Tornado pilot to fly straight and level for a significant period of time to record target images, which made for a predictable flight path. Accordingly, Tornado GR4s conducting reconnaissance missions were typically escorted by U.S. Air Force Block 50 F-16CJs armed with HARMs.69 Although successfully used in the CAS role, the Tornado GR4 was not the best-suited aircraft for that mission because of its limited maneuvering performance at high altitude. Target-area searches often require a bank angle of 30 degrees or more at 20,000 feet, while the GR4 was designed for high-speed, low-level operations. Offsetting this liability in some mission profiles, however, was the GR4’s range capability, which exceeded even that of the USAF’s F-15E. A CAOC planner recalled that the GR4 “was the only aircraft that could make it up to Kirkuk on Night One.”70
In another important contribution, the RAF deployed four E-3D Sentries to provide continuous coverage of one of the four AWACS tracks that were constantly manned adjacent to and, eventually, over Iraq. In Operation Veritas in the Afghan air war, RAF E-3Ds had flown 473 missions between October 9, 2001, and January 29, 2002, with 97 percent mission accomplishment. In Operation Telic they flew 127 missions from March 12 through May 27, 2003, with a 100 percent mission success rate.71 Initially, nine crews were made available for the four aircraft, but available billeting at Prince Sultan Air Base, from which the aircraft operated, could accommodate only six AWACS crews. Each crew flew a twelve-hour mission every other day to maintain three daily eight-hour on-station periods with only a fraction of the equipment and spare parts that would normally be available at the aircraft’s home station of RAF Waddington.72 Because the E-3D can refuel with both probe-and-drogue and boom systems, it was refueled by U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard KC-135s and U.S. Air Force KC-10s in addition to RAF Tristar and VC-10 tankers. (By the end of major combat, the 6 VC-10s deployed from RAF Brize Norton to Prince Sultan Air Base had flown 223 missions, with an average sortie length of 4.5 hours, no mission aborts, and a consequent operational success rate of 100 percent. A quarter of the 3,700 tons of fuel they offloaded were transferred to U.S. combat aircraft.)73
Although the United Kingdom’s Phoenix UAV offered less capability than the U.S. Air Force’s RQ-1 Predator, it nonetheless played a key role in supporting coalition land forces, primarily by geolocating ground targets. Initially, it was used around the clock. As the campaign progressed, however, it flew mostly at night to extract the greatest resolution from its thermal-imaging sensor. In all, Phoenix UAVs flew 138 sorties; 23 ended with the platform being lost or damaged beyond repair, and another 13 sustained repairable damage. Most of the losses were due to technical difficulties associated with operating in Iraq’s unforgiving spring weather.
Helicopters from the United Kingdom’s Joint Helicopter Command provided combat support to ground forces from land and sea bases. At the time, the British armed forces did not possess a full-fledged attack helicopter, although the AH-64 Apache was on order. Royal Navy Lynx and Gazelle helicopters, however, fired forty-nine TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) missiles in successful attacks against enemy tanks, APCs, and bunkers.
The RAF Tornado and Harrier squadrons that were a part of General Moseley’s air order of battle maintained a crew ratio of two to one throughout the three-week campaign. The only notable limiting factor associated with personnel tempo that caused even momentary concern had to do with the E-3D, since the four deployed AWACS aircraft were constantly operated at an exceptionally high utilization rate. At one point the British contingent’s leadership considered bringing more AWACS aircrew members into the theater to relieve the heavy workload.
Allied air involvement over the Iraqi western desert in support of Scud missile hunting and related SOF activities on the ground were later portrayed by an RAF Harrier GR7 squadron commander who took part in them as having been “possibly the best-integrated air-land operation since World War II” and “a good role model for future operations involving SOF and air.” He further noted that the associated tactics, techniques, and procedures had all been carefully rehearsed by all participants; that they were aided by ample support assets and suffered no shortage of needed communications; that the troops on the ground were some of the best soldiers in the world and they fully understood how to make the most of modern air power; and that the operations resulted in a persistent air presence that effectively countered outdated criticisms alleging the impermanence of air power.74
The United Kingdom’s contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom bore out the vision of the nation’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review that the British armed forces should develop an expeditionary-based strategy aimed at maximizing maneuver warfare and seeking decisive effects. The RAF’s accomplishments showed the extent to which it had embraced and captured the new expeditionary culture. Much of that success was the result of more than a decade of close operational proximity to U.S. forces. As a measure of the effectiveness of the overall British contribution to the campaign, as of April 19, 2003, of some 46,000 British military participants, only 27 were killed in action and 55 were wounded, with the majority of the fatalities having resulted from noncombat-related accidents.75
In reflecting on the many reasons that accounted for the RAF’s strong showing in the three-week campaign, Air Chief Marshal Burridge noted that the technology gap between American and British air power had for years been quite small, and was narrowed further by the RAF’s experience at working almost in lockstep with U.S. forces in enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq and in training together with American combat air forces in joint and combined exercises such as Red Flag.76 An informed and thoughtful RAF observer remarked that the various challenges the British encountered during the lead-up to and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom were overcome by a combination of mutual dependence, good fortune (in everyone’s having had the comparative luxury of a fairly unrushed planning period); ready willingness by both sides to engage in burden sharing; deep mutual trust at all levels, especially deep and strong interpersonal relations at the most senior levels; and “a motivation to find common ground and to engineer solutions to any problems that threatened the coalition’s integrity.”77
From the very start of CENTCOM’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the British contingent was brought into the division of labor between the two main coalition partners in a way aimed at leveraging British assets that might best complement and enhance American forces. “We very definitely were not there for the ride,” Air Chief Marshal Burridge recalled. “On the air side, we flew [only] seven percent of the sorties, but we provided a larger proportion of precision-guided munitions than did the Americans,” as well as “niche capabilities . . . that the U.S. was lacking in, particularly tactical reconnaissance.”78 After the period of major combat ended, both Burridge and Torpy confirmed that in contrast to the experience of Operation Allied Force in 1999, final target approval delegations in Iraqi Freedom had been far more flexible. An informed account noted that use of Britain’s red card “was avoided, on more than one occasion, because the trust that existed at all levels of command allowed informal dialogue to preempt any potential formal action. This approach was absolutely pivotal in minimizing friction.”79 In a related vein, Air Marshal Torpy later indicated that the British national contingent never felt that only RAF assets should support British land forces, because “that would be an inefficient use of air power. Inevitably, we would not have sufficient [British] assets to provide cover, for instance, to a [British] land component 24 hours a day.”80 The use of air power, Torpy added, has to be planned and prioritized centrally, with execution decentralized, for efficient employment of air resources.81 At bottom, the British contingent benefited from close commonality with its American counterparts in equipment, communications, and operational mindset, as well as from close personal relationships from the four-star level all the way down to aircrews working conjointly and harmoniously at the tactical level.
Australia’s contribution to the three-week air war began almost as soon as the RAAF’s 75 Squadron arrived in-theater and was declared operationally ready. The squadron sought to gain an early combat edge by joining the RAF in Operation Southern Watch so that Australian pilots could be exposed to the CAOC’s mode of operations in managing the airspace over southern Iraq, but the Australian high command refused to grant permission. A U.S. Marine Corps exchange pilot with the squadron later reported, “Although the coalition wanted Australians to fly [Southern Watch] missions, the federal government in Canberra had sent us . . . [only] to support ‘offensive operations’ against Iraq. In the government’s eyes, [Southern Watch] didn’t warrant our participation. As termed by the commander of Australian forces, that would have been ‘mission creep.’”82 In fairness to the Australian government’s position in this regard, enforcement of the no-fly zone under the UN mandate was never one of the reasons for which the ADF had been deployed to the Persian Gulf region.83
The RAAF’s Hornets were initially assigned to provide defensive counterair protection for such high-value coalition aircraft as the E-3 AWACS, E-8 JSTARS, RC-135 Rivet Joint, and allied tankers operating near and over southern Iraq, with 75 Squadron typically generating twelve sorties a day toward that end. These defensive counterair missions typically lasted between five and six hours, with the F/A-18s conducting three or four in-flight refueling evolutions from allied tankers in the process. Because of the considerable distance between Al Udeid and their assigned area of operations in southern Iraq, the Hornets were always configured with three 330-gallon external fuel tanks in addition to their normal air-to-air and ground attack weapons loadouts. A 75 Squadron pilot later described these initial sorties: “We’d fly out of our host nation and then we’d refuel up in the Gulf region around Kuwait. You would pretty much cross over into Iraq with full tanks. Although most sorties lasted six hours, some of those I was involved with turned out to be nine-hour marathons. That meant you were strapped into the jet for up to ten and a half hours from the time you started up until finally shutting down at mission end. . . . It was like being strapped to a kitchen chair and put into a phone booth for ten and a half hours.”84
With respect to the Australian contingent’s confidence level going into the RAAF’s first shooting war since Vietnam, the commanding officer of 75 Squadron, Wing Commander Mel Hupfeld, later reflected on the question candidly and at considerable length.
The Americans had been fighting there for 12 years, so they knew what Iraq had. That was shared well with us as Australians, so we had a good idea of the threats, and we pretty much trained to what we thought the worst case would be. . . . Our basic level of training was right where we needed it, so it was quite a simple process to actually then focus it more on the threats that we expected in the Iraqi theater. . . . I was very comfortable that our aircrews knew what was required, and there was a broad range of skills that we needed. . . . [Yet] I was very comfortable with our level of skill at that stage and comfortable with the capabilities of the aircraft. There were some limitations with the aircraft, but we knew what they were, and we could mitigate against those and operate in an appropriate manner not to have those affect us. . . . Before the major conflict started, [there were naturally] a few nerves, but once we actually got across the border and started doing what we were doing, it was business as usual. And with the training that we’d been doing, it was all second nature.85
At the outset, when 75 Squadron’s fighters were principally assigned to defensive counterair CAPs (with the option to be re-roled as necessary for strikes against emerging ground targets), the typical weapons loadout for each aircraft consisted of two wingtip-mounted AIM-9M Sidewinder infrared air-to-air missiles, three AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs), and a single 500-pound GBU-12 LGB. Just a day into the campaign, however, the CAOC asked a 75 Squadron Hornet escorting a high-value coalition aircraft to strike a designated ground target that had just emerged and been validated. After confirming that the requested attack was consistent with the laws of armed conflict and standing rules of engagement, the Australian air contingent commander, Group Captain Brown, approved the attack. One of his F/A-18s promptly dropped the first Australian bomb released in anger since a 2 Squadron Canberra light bomber last did so during the Vietnam War. The entire request and approval sequence took less than thirty minutes, with an initial bomb damage assessment provided to the ADF’s forward headquarters ten minutes thereafter.86 Within forty-eight hours of the campaign’s commencement, the CAOC switched 75 Squadron to a “swing mission” configuration, swapping out one of the three AMRAAMs for an additional GBU-12 or 2,000-pound GBU-10.
On March 24 the RAAF’s chief, Air Marshal Angus Houston, reported that 75 Squadron’s Hornets were being assigned strike missions against selected fixed targets in Iraq, even as they continued to fly defensive counterair sorties as required by the CAOC. In the strike role, RAAF fighters flew as autonomous formations within a larger coordinated package of coalition aircraft, with one such early strike featuring an RAAF Hornet pilot serving in the role of mission commander.87 As the campaign moved closer to its endgame and the squadron found itself performing almost exclusively CAS missions, smaller 500-pound GBU-12s replaced the GBU-10s.
The RAAF’s air contingent commander, by then Air Commodore Brown, recalled that “in the initial planning, the USAF wanted to have about four CAPs [provided by 75 Squadron’s fighters], but we were tanker-limited, so we ended up just having the three CAPs. . . . We normally had a counter-rotating CAP of two aircraft and [another] two aircraft would be on the tanker at any one particular time. Just to maintain that over an eight-hour period—which we did—took 12 of our 14 aircraft. So over [the first] nine days, we had to keep 12 of the 14 F/A-18s serviceable. That was a challenge, as the logistic system did not work quite as well as I would have liked.”88 Nevertheless, the RAAF’s F/A-18s managed to maintain a better than 90 percent FMC rate throughout the campaign. It was fortunate, Air Commodore Brown added, that the Australian government had deployed the Hornet detachment more than a month before the campaign got started, because “it took us probably about two weeks to make sure we had communications links and everything working properly.”89
Once it became apparent to CAOC planners after about nine days of combat that the Iraqi air force was likely to remain out of the fight, the RAAF’s Hornets were swung almost exclusively to ground attack operations. The first preplanned strike mission took place even before that determination when a four-ship flight of 75 Squadron F/A-18s was integrated into a strike package that also included American and British strike and electronic warfare aircraft in an attack against Republican Guard units near Al Kut. In addition, as the allied land offensive reached full swing, RAAF Hornets contributed to KI/CAS operations in support of both V Corps and I MEF. Because the RAAF’s F/A-18s were not configured to carry JDAMs, they dropped either the GBU-10 2,000-pound LGB or the GBU-12 500-pound LGB, depending on target weapon requirements; these two precision munitions types accounted for all of the bombs delivered by RAAF fighters during the campaign.90
By March 29, 75 Squadron’s Hornets had flown defensive counterair, strike, and CAS missions, with CAS sorties typically being diverted from initially assigned defensive counterair missions. At that point in the campaign, the fourteen aircraft were totaling about ninety flight hours a day, five times their normal peacetime operating rate. The ADF’s air contingent commander credited his support staff: “The maintenance guys did an outstanding job. We had to have 12 of those 14 aircraft serviceable. Most of the time they had 13, often 14, serviceable and we never missed a mission.”91 During the campaign’s final days, when kinetic attacks became increasingly infrequent, the RAAF’s Hornets would join other coalition strike fighters on request from ground commanders to provide so-called shows of force by making low-altitude, high-speed passes over concentrations of Iraqi civilians to break up gathering crowds that were causing problems for allied occupation forces. By the deployment’s end, the 14 RAAF Hornets had flown 1,800 hours and more than 670 sorties, with more than 350 of those having been combat sorties, and had dropped 122 LGBs on assigned enemy targets, all to useful combat effect.92
RAAF C-130s also supported allied operations in southern Iraq, their first mission having been to airlift ground refueling trucks into the recently captured Tallil Air Base near An Nasiriyah on March 30 so that coalition aircraft could use the base as a forward operating facility. On April 13, after the major combat phase had ended, RAAF C-130s flew their first mission into the newly named Baghdad International Airport as part of the coalition’s Operation Baghdad Assist. Although the three C-130s provided by the RAAF represented only 3 percent of the total coalition Hercules force, they lifted 16 percent of the coalition’s total cargo delivered by C-130s into CENTCOM’s area of operations.
Finally, the RAAF also operated one of its two deployed AP-3C Orions in various time windows over the North Arabian Gulf, using the aircraft’s onboard sensors to detect and identify vessels in or near Iraqi waters, with special interest in any such vessels that might threaten coalition and civilian maritime operations by means of mine-laying or suicide attacks. By April 11, two days after the Ba’athist regime collapsed, the RAAF’s Orions had maintained a near-perfect FMC rate of 98 percent.93
ADF Special Air Service (SAS) troopers joined with other coalition SOF teams in scouring the Iraqi western desert for concealed ballistic missiles that might be fired against Israel or other countries. During these ground sweeps, allied combat aircraft performed armed overwatch missions in constant readiness to provide any immediate on-call CAS that might be required. The previous February and early March, before the campaign’s start, these forces had conducted full mission profile exercises day and night with other coalition SOF teams, including the involvement of on-call CAS by U.S. and RAF combat aircraft. Beginning on the night of March 19, the Australian SAS teams were flown deep into Iraq by low-flying American SOF helicopters, often through heavy enemy air defenses.
On April 11, two days after allied forces took Baghdad and the Ba’athist regime collapsed, an entire Australian SAS squadron, at CENTCOM’s request, captured Al Asad Air Base some 120 miles west of Baghdad, with RAAF F/A-18s providing top cover. In the course of securing the base, the squadron discovered more than fifty concealed MiG-21 and MiG-25 fighters. The task force then cleared and repaired Al Asad’s runways using captured Iraqi equipment so that allied fixed-wing aircraft could operate out of the base, with the first arriving aircraft being an RAAF C-130 from 36 Squadron.
Not only was 75 Squadron’s involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom the first time an Australian aircraft of any type had seen combat since Vietnam, it also represented the RAAF’s first fighter combat operation since 77 Squadron’s P-51 Mustangs and, later, Meteor jets joined U.S. forces in Korea a half-century before. By the time the Ba’ath regime fell, 36 Squadron’s C-130Hs and 37 Squadron’s C-130J had exceeded 2 million pounds of cargo and more than 700 passengers delivered since the start of the deployment. In a message issued five days before the fall of Baghdad, Air Marshal Houston quoted the chairman of the American JCS, General Myers, who had declared that “the contributions from the Australian force have been tremendous. . . . They have been absolutely superb, and we appreciate it.”94 For their exceptional performance throughout the campaign, 75 Squadron earned a meritorious unit citation from the Australian government. The squadron’s commanding officer, Wing Commander Hupfeld, was one of only three participating ADF officers (and the only RAAF officer) in Operation Falconer to be awarded Australia’s Distinguished Service Cross.95 The RAAF’s air contingent commander, Group Captain Brown, was also awarded the U.S. Legion of Merit by General Moseley, as was the RAF’s air contingent commander, Air Marshal Torpy.
Afterward, Group Captain Brown reported that there had been no major interoperability issues with the F/A-18s, C-130s, or P-3s. He added:
If you ask any of the guys who flew in the missions over Iraq, they were pretty happy with the [rules of engagement] that they had, and they were pretty happy with the targeting directives. I believe that that was a very mature approach by everybody who was involved in the chain. In the CAOC, I also had exactly the same sort of collateral damage criteria as [General Moseley did] and, again, that made it easier to operate [in a coalition context]. . . . The fact that we fitted into the operation seamlessly, I think, had a lot to do with the training regimes that we have had over the last 50 years.96
Among the operating issues that 75 Squadron encountered, Brown singled out the Nighthawk targeting pod (the same as the one carried by U.S. Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18s before the advent of ATFLIR) as “the one that gave me the most heartache over the five weeks” because it “was unreliable and . . . did not have enough magnification capability.” He also mentioned the RAAF’s lack of NVGs, an inadequate electronic warfare suite, and a lack of all-weather standoff precision munitions such as the satellite-aided JDAM series. (The RAAF has since acquired both JDAMs and the Litening II pod for its strike fighters, as well as NVGs and a new electronic warfare capability for their F/A-18s.)97 As for the many positives, he concluded:
The coalition with whom we worked, and the USAF in particular, were incredibly accommodating. The USAF allowed us to do pretty much what we asked them. I do not think I was ever knocked back on any particular request. . . . If you are going to work with anybody, you cannot pick a better partner. We also had the RAF there and, again, they were incredibly generous to us. I did not have a communications aircraft to get from where I was to the other bases, but the two-star there [then Air Vice-Marshal Torpy] gave me a pretty free rein in his HS 125. So great cooperation . . . really made the difference.98
One minor problem experienced by the RAAF’s Hornet pilots, and often, no doubt, by U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and RAF pilots, whose aircraft were similarly configured with the probe-and-drogue in-flight refueling system, had to do with refueling from the U.S. Air Force’s KC-135 tanker, which normally uses the boom refueling system but also is equipped to provide probe-and-drogue refueling for non-USAF aircraft. One RAAF F/A-18 pilot frankly recalled:
Tanking was comfortable from the KC-10, as it had a large and forgiving basket. The KC-135, on the other hand, was a nightmare to refuel from. Although it was easy actually to plug in, staying in the basket and getting gas was challenging, to say the least. You had about four feet in which to move around before you got sprayed with fuel or fell out of the basket, with no formation cues to use. The basket was made of hard metal and was attached to the solid boom by about six feet of hose—crazy design. We nicknamed it “the wrecking ball,” and one of our pilots trashed a probe soon after we arrived in theater.99
Another reported source of frustration for 75 Squadron’s pilots, and one that was encountered at times by all coalition combat aircrews, entailed the inefficient apportionment of KI/CAS targets by the U.S. Air Force ASOC that supported V Corps due to the V Corps commander’s insistence on close control of kill-box operations on his side of the FSCL (see Chapter 5). Like the other allied strike pilots, those in 75 Squadron soon eagerly sought assignment to the far more efficient Marine Corps direct air support center (DASC) that supported I MEF so that they might have greater opportunities to employ their GBU-12s to useful effect rather than returning to Al Udeid with unexpended munitions. At first, the ADF’s air contingent commander and the commander of Australian forces denied the request because it smacked of “mission creep.” Eventually, however, as the U.S. Marine Corps’ exchange pilot with 75 Squadron recalled, “after figuring out that Warhawk [the ASOC’s call sign] was not a good organization to work for, the Aussies asked to get into I MEF’s [area of responsibility] and were accepted—as any jet carrying bombs was.”100
Looking ahead, the MoD’s after-action report on Operation Telic recognized that “the implications of maintaining congruence with an accelerating U.S. technological and doctrinal dominance [will] need to be assessed and taken into account in future policy and planning assumptions.”101 The most senior British military leaders also recognized the importance of planning for future combined contingency responses with the United States, especially those that might entail policy dimensions and implications less than fully congruent with British national interests. On this point, Air Chief Marshal Burridge underscored the fact that the current American style of military decision making, going at least as far back as Operation Desert Storm, depends largely on the personalities of the most senior principals involved. He added that were UK participation in future combat with the United States to become “more the norm than the exception,” Britain should approach with care the question of whether “we need a different sort of command and control structure which fits a bit more easily with that direct line that the Americans are currently using.” Noting the personality-driven aspects of the U.S. approach, he suggested that “you cannot always say that their doctrine looks like this and that is what they will do. If we modify, we may find that the next time it does not work quite so well.”102 In a similar vein, the Defence Committee of the House of Commons acknowledged that the British officers embedded at all levels of CENTCOM’s command hierarchy gave the United Kingdom welcome influence over CENTCOM planning. However, it went on to raise a cautionary note about the “parallel dangers of being locked into American policy where that planning leads to military action.”103
Perhaps most important from an operational perspective was the serious and legitimate concern within the British defense establishment, and particularly within the RAF, that the close commonality of operational styles and the trust relationships established between British and American airmen through their combined involvement in enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq would disappear once Northern Watch and Southern Watch were no longer needed. In this regard, RAF officers from the chief of the air staff on down acknowledged a pressing need to replace that former real-world marriage of forces with surrogate peacetime mutual training opportunities that are regularly exercised either in the United States or wherever else the airspace and required training infrastructure might allow. Addressing an important facet of this concern, an RAF group captain noted that since “it is most unlikely that the [United Kingdom] will ever fight another major campaign of the nature of Operation Iraqi Freedom except as a coalition partner of the United States, . . . we need to develop an understanding, particularly in our middle-ranking officers, of our shared concepts for the employment of air power to enable them to understand the context of any combined operations and headquarters in which they may find themselves involved.”104
RAF operators further identified an ever-growing need for joint and combined air-ground training for close air support that regularly exercises the entire command and control system from the CAOC through the ASOC to JTACS and FAC-As.105 General Moseley emphasized the same point in his postcampaign reflections, insisting that all services, both U.S. and allied, must devise ways of jointly exercising such crucial command and control assets as the theater battle management core system (TBMCS) and area deep-operations coordination system in a dynamic peacetime training setting.106 On this important point, some CENTAF planners declared that “counterland is, arguably, the most difficult mission that the air component performs. The size, diversity, and mobile nature of the counterland target set, in combination with the extensive real-time coordination that is required, challenges both aircrews and command and control unlike any other air-component mission.” In the face of this challenge, these planners added, both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army still lack any realistic means for rehearsing the joint counterland mission in peacetime training. Lacking in particular are significant opportunities to exercise and refine critical force employment processes through extended, large-scale, live-fly execution of the KI/CAS functions that proved so critical time and again throughout Iraqi Freedom.107
To head off or ameliorate this mounting concern, the U.S. Air Force and the RAF in 2005 implemented a new engagement initiative aimed at sustaining close ties between the two services to help ensure that their long-standing interoperability efforts and joint training and dialogue would continue to flourish. An early testament to this continued commitment was the successful conduct of the first Coalition Flag exercise involving U.S., RAF, and RAAF aircrews held at Nellis AFB in January 2006. More important yet, ever since the period of major combat in Iraqi Freedom ended, RAF and RAAF officers have continued to serve in key positions in CENTCOM’s CAOC at Al Udeid Air Base, with air commodores performing rotational duties both as British and Australian air contingent commanders and as CAOC director. RAF aircrews have continued to contribute to the counterinsurgency air operations over Iraq and Afghanistan that have ensued at varying levels of intensity in each country since 2003, although that commitment ended in Iraq in May 2009 at the behest of the elected Iraqi government in compliance with the agreed timetable for the gradual withdrawal of coalition forces from that country.108